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DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NAVAL BASE SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 8, Aug 79 pp 412-417

[Article by Commander Ludwig Stoll: "Soviet Sea Power and Naval Base Policy"]

> [Text] For years we have been observing the consistent expansion of the Soviet Navy and have regularly presented to our readers all the technical information accessible to us regarding the Soviet Navy. The Baltic Sea area, the Mediterranean, the near Atlantic and the North Sea are the areas in which NATO is being directly affected by Soviet naval activities. In the same way as the Army and Air Force armament of the Kremlin, those activities go far beyond the normal security requirements of the Soviet Union. Since Western Europe must not fall into the effor of estimating the Soviet threats exclusively from the land aspects, one must keep calling to mind that NATO is an alliance of sea powers whose existence depends on the possibilities of free movement on the world oceans. Any efforts toward an objective evaluation of the overall military and political situation makes a summary of the present situation created by the Soviet impetus toward expansion necessary. An awareness of it is the basis for understanding the regular technical reports and accounts of our periodical on modern Soviet warship construction. With the following article by an author known to our readers through a number of publications in SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, we are at the same time satisfying the desire of a number of our friends for a precise presentation of Soviet fleet activities from their beginnings to the very recent present.
>
> We also refer to this present article on pages 426-429 of this issue.

"The Soviet Union has no overseas naval bases at all and she is not striving to acquire any, since plans of conquest of any kind are alien to her."

This sentence was spoken not by just any Soviet or pro-Soviet propagandist but by no one less than Fleet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, the commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, in an article appearing in the military journal TYL I SNABZHENIYE (Rear Service and Supply). Doubtlessly the admiral against his better judgment had to make a concession to propaganda, an obligation which in the USSR is apparently imposed on writers of even quite unpolitical publications. For the reader in the Western world familiar with maritime development the Agit-prop statement acts like a spur and stimulates him to a comparison with reality.[1] The question arises as to how it applies to the Soviet Union actually in the non-intervention into the affairs of foreign countries and in the use of overseas military bases. In connection with the growth of the USSR into a super seapower an investigation must be made of how the Soviet Union has developed her coastal base and her fleet bases as important cornerstones of maritime power. Of interest here is not only the acquiring of bases overseas, but the overall development since the founding of the Soviet Union. Much has been said and written just recently about Soviet efforts to acquire fleet bases throughout the world. For a better understanding of this policy however it is necessary to consider this problem not only historically but in its technical aspects. Finally, the methods must be analyzed which lead to the gaining of bases. This study is to be limited to Soviet naval bases, despite the fact that naval air forces and therefore air bases are necessary for maintaining the operational freedom of a fleet. First, however, the term "fleet base" calls for clarification and/or an attempt at an explanation.

Definition of the Term "Fleet Base"

In the Soviet version the fact of using foreign bases is interpreted in such a way that the Soviet warships are calling at ports in friendly countries from time to time on friendly visits and to replenish supplies and at the same time crews also have an opportunity to go ashore. According to this theory, the Gorshkov statement cited at the beginning rings true. But actually the term "fleet base" cannot be defined one hundred percent. In the reference works and yearbooks of the prewar period and from the time of the Second World War (e.g., "Nauticus") a distinction was still being made between first-class and second-class bases, wherein the criterion for assignment as a first-class base was the presence of high-capacity repair capabilities for even large ships. Taking into account all the technical demands, the ideal fleet base--a giant naval base like Norfolk or San Diego perhaps comes to mind--satisfies the following requirements:

--Sheltered wharves and anchorages (independent of tide as much as possible) with connections for electricity, fresh water, steam, condensate, and, as far as possible, a fuel replenishment capability at the wharf;

--Handling capability for supplies of all kinds, including ammunition;

--Repair capabilities for all shipboard installations, also possibility of drydocking;

--Telecommunications connections;

--Installations for housing/quarters, and for medical care of crews.

The course of the Second World War, however, brought the knowledge of the mobility of modern fleets and their extensive dependence on bases. The Americans, for example, in their wide-ranging operations in the Pacific were not able to rely only on distant Pearl Harbor and other well-developed bases, but frequently had to operate from makeshift advanced naval bases in their island hopping. Repair, hospital, and other supply ships were stationed in sheltered bays, and combatants were provided with the most urgent rear services here.

Even the most urgent repairs, e.g., of minor combat damage, were able to be performed here. In that way the fleet remained operational, although many a combatant was unable to return to home port or enter a shipyard for years. After the Second World War finally mobile replenishment of sea became a matter of course for many navies and their dependence on bases therefore became greater. Since also the technology of the supply services has progressed, it can be said that a temporary naval base can be set up today with a substantially smaller expenditure for the infrastructure than perhaps a military airfield for modern jet aircraft. First of all a protected anchorage is necessary which can also be easily protected militarily. Then only the needed supply and replenishment ships need to be transferred and anchored. Floating electric power plants and floating cranes can complete this service and supply echelon of auxiliaries.

In consideration of these technical capabilities given today, the term "fleet base" must therefore be understood considerably more broadly than it has usually been heretofore and is apparently being represented outwardly by the Soviets. Even with a broad interpretation of the term it is still difficult to distinguish between ports which can be entered only occasionally for replenishment purposes and those which must be regarded as falling under the category--even if only temporarily--of developed naval bases.

The Historical Development of the Soviet Base System

In the historical consideration of the development which the Soviet Union has undergone in her sixty-year history, first a widely held error must be dispelled. It says that the Soviet Union did not recognize the significance of sea power until Gorshkov assumed command in 1956 and that only from that point on did she decide to build up an oceanic navy. In a good number of publications one gets the idea that until about 1956 the Soviet command visualized the development of a fleet suited for coastal defense. Actually, Soviet naval forces can be designated as purely defensive only in their early beginnings. As early as 1935 there came into being with the express approval of Stalin an ambitious plan for building up a high seas fleet which eclipsed the German Z-plan and included 16 battleships among others. The biggest handicap to building sea power was the then extremely unfavorable naval strategic position of Russia. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov therefore in a talk with Hitler in Berlin in November 1940 demanded that the German Government recognize the Turkish Straits as an area of Soviet interest. That demand represents an especially aggressive act of typical sea power and naval base policy and is to be understood from the aspiration already existing toward better access into the world's oceans. The Soviet Government had in all frankness returned to the goals of the old Czarist power politics. Hand in hand with the planned expansion of the fleet--which the Second World War abruptly interrupted--went the effort to broaden the base system and to create a broader fleet base. That policy can be divided into the following phases:

--Phase 1: The period of restoration and at the same time of expansion in Europe (1940-45), that is, the regaining and the territories and bases lost in 1905 and 1918 and the Soviet expansion as a result of the Second World War.

--Phase 2: The period of gaining a foothold and of penetration into the Mediterranean and exercise of influence in the Near East (since 1958).

--Phase 3: The period of strengthening of Soviet sea power and of maritime imperialism, that is world-wide expansion by acquisition of bases in Third World countries (since about 1970).

Phase I: Restoration and Expansion Until 1945

After revolution and civil war Soviet Russia around 1922 was in a catastrophic situation. Just as her industry and economy were stagnating, so, too, were the remnants of the formerly Czarist fleet in a desolate situation. This was true not only for the personnel and material, but also for the remaining coastal base. After heavy territorial losses Russia was at a low point in this regard also (Fig.1): in the Far East the southern part of Sakhalin Island and Port Arthur were lost in 1905 as a result of the war with Japan. On the Baltic Sea coast the Soviet base was compressed into a narrow coastal strip around Leningrad after 1918. Just 25 km off this city began the international boundary with independent Finland. Also the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had won independence at Russia's expense. Thus in the early building phase the Soviet Baltic fleet was able to be based only in Leningrad-Kronstadt. In the other fleet areas there remained as main bases Murmansk in the North Sea, Sevastopol in the Black Sea, and Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk in the Pacific.

Only the German-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1939--which has gone down in history as the Hitler-Stalin Pact--and the successful outcome of the Second World War for the Soviet Union created possibilities for expansion and most importantly opened the door to the West (Fig. 2). The Winter War against Finland (1939-40) brought the Soviet Union territorial gains on Fischer (Rybachiy) Island in the north, in central Finland and in Karelia. After the conclusion of a peace in 1944, still harder conditions were imposed on the Finns. Now the naval base of Petsamo (Pechenga) and the important industrial and port city of Viipuri (Vyborg) were annexed to the Soviet territory, and the naval base of Porkkala had to be made available temporarily to the Soviet fleet.

The Hitler-Stalin Pact also gave the Russians a free hand to annex the Baltic states in the summer of 1940. Thus the port cities of Riga, Reval, and Libau were again in Russian hands, as were the less important naval bases of Baltischport, Werder, Loksa, Windau, and Duenamuende. The Allied victory in 1945 bestowed upon the USSR an expanse on the Baltic Sea coast of never before suspected scope: Memel, Pillau and Koenigsberg fell to the Soviets, Gdingen again became a Polish naval base , and Swinemuende came under Polish administration. Those bases of the newly emerging Polish Navy were just as open to the Soviet fleet as the seaports in the part of Germany declared to be the Soviet Zone of Occupation. Thus the sea power of the Soviet Union which was formerly limited to the innermost corner of the Gulf of Finland had become the most important one adjacent to the Baltic Sea and had extended its orbit up to shortly off Luebeck.

In the Far East also the naval strategic situation changed considerably in the Soviet Union's favor (Fig. 3) in 1945. Japan was eliminated as a sea power and had to return the Japanese southern half of Sakhalin Island which she had held since 1905. Otomari (Korsakov) and Shikoda (Poronaisk) became Soviet fleet bases.[2] The Kuriles were ceded as a strategically especially important group of islands to the USSR. The Japanese have never recovered from that loss and even now are demanding the return of those islands by the Soviets as a sign of good will.

All in all therefore the year 1945 moved the Soviet Union a long way forward also in her aspirations for sea power. Not only were territorial losses from earlier wars of the Czarist Empire restored, but an additional broad coastal base was won. There was little change in the situation of the original naval strategic predicament of Russia--control of the Danish and the Turkish Straits in foreign hands and no direct access to the Atlantic except from the North Sea.

Phase 2: Penetration Into the Mediterranean and Exercise of Influence in the Near East Since 1958

Relatively early in the years of the Cold War the Soviets were gradually penetrating into the Mediterranean (Fig.4). The regular presence of the 6th U.S. Fleet provided the excuse for them to dispatch naval forces into the Mediterranean. The history of Soviet base policy in the Mediterranean area is especially interesting, since it exhibits regular ups and downs, a succession of alternating successes and failures. The Soviet presence consisted at first of submarines, for which friendly and Communist-controlled Albania opened the port of Valona as a base. This episode lasted from 1958 to 1961 and came to an end when Soviet-Chinese relations were broken off and Albania sided with China. Afterward the Albanian-Chinese friendship was also renounced, and it remains to be seen whether or not there will be a rapprochement between Tirana and Moscow.

The Near East was also very soon included in the base policy of the USSR. Her clear support of the cause of the Arabs and against Israel made the Arab states susceptible to Soviet propaganda and compliant with respect to Soviet desires for bases. Especially valuable to the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (eskadra) which had grown to over 50 ship units in the meantime, were the Egyptian ports of Marsa Matruhm, Port Said, and Alexandria, the last especially on account of its well developed El-Gabbari Shipyard with docking also for large ships. The rapprochement of Egypt and the West brought with it the final renunciation of Soviet use rights. This "booting out" was certainly the hardest setback which Soviet base policy has had to sustain until then. The squadron must now restrict itself to using the less valuable bases of Latakia and Tartus in Syria; Tobruk in Libya is supposed to be developed as a base. Anchorages are frequently sought out in the Gulf of Mammamet and in the Aegean in international waters. According to what has been said so far about the mobility and the base-dependence of modern fleets, this would have to be enough just for the logistics of the squadron. Steps taken by the Soviets in the past however lead to the conclusion that they are not satisfied with this situation and will initiate further base-associated activities.

One of their targets, now as before, is probably Malta (see also No. 2/79, p. 96), the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of Great Britain in the Mediterranean in the Second World War, constantly attacked by the German and Italian air forces but never subdued. Malta's Prime Minister Dom Mintoff has followed a remarkable seesaw policy since the island state gained its independence, first giving the cold shoulder to Soviet offers, having the port facilities restored with the help of German experts, and then permitting Great Britain to continue stationing troops for a large payemnt. After the withdrawal of the British garrison in the spring of 1979 Mintoff declared NATO an enemy of Malta and befriended Libya's head of state Qadhdhafi. Malta since then has been receiving financial aid from oil-producing Libya and has practically become her outpost in the Mediterranean. NATO can regard this development with only the greatest concern. The danger that the Russians will finally emerge from behind the unfathomable and unpredictable Qadhdhafi and assume rights in La Valetta cannot be denied.

Yugloslavia, too, is a special problem. She broke officially with the Soviet Union in 1949 and since then has been exposed to constant pressure from Moscow and has stubbornly refused to grant the squadron rights to Kotor (Cattaro) Bay. Still, Yugoslavia in 1974 permitted the USSR use of certain shipyards by warships (see also No. 2/77, pp. 84-85). How the relations between the two states will develop in the post-Tito era is a completely open matter.

Phase 3: Strengthening of Soviet Sea Power and Maritime Imperialism Since About 1970

Parallel to the enormous growth in Soviet naval hardware in recent years was an ever increasingly perceptible effort to expand her sea power into the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans, jointly with the effort to acquire base rights in Third World countries. If the regaining of lost territories and the expansion on the Baltic Sea served Soviet interests directly right at their front door, so to speak, then her entry into the Mediterranean could certainly not be justified any longer by the defense of her own coast. The irony of history is that this phase of development coincides in time with that sector of postwar policy which is described as "detente".

When the Americans reported the development of Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean as a fleet base, it was met with indignation in an orchestrated reaction in Soviet Bloc countries. But not a word was uttered about the fact that the Soviets had long established a foothold in that ocean. Figs. 5 and 6 show that situation and possible future developments in the Atlantic also. By way of explanation let us add that only those countries were displaced as "pro-Soviet" which consistently followed the policy line of Moscow and provide bases to the Soviets. Actually the line between "pro-Soviet" and "non-pro-Soviet" is hard to draw sharply in Africa, since a number of states receive economic and/or military aid from the USSR and have become dependent on her in varying degrees.

In the Red Sea the Soviets can use the Port of Massaua, in South Yemen the bases of Muskalla and Aden. East German combat engineers of the National People's Army were detailed to develop the port in Massaua. A drydock for cruisers and destroyers is supposed to come into being there. On the Persian Gulf the Port of Um Qasr in Iraq is a Soviet base, although in no strategically favorable position. A new question has been raised by the Iranian revolution in this critical area and has been raised by the Iranian revolution in this critical area and an especially threatening situation has quite possibly emerged for the West. The development in Iran since the transition to a republic cannot be foreseen. If the Soviets should prove to be the beneficiaries of the revolution, the oil port of Abadan and the naval base of Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz would fall into their hands. After the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf as the direction of thrust of Soviet policy is clearly evident anyway.

The Soviet Union had to take setbacks in Somalia. With this country's turn toward the West, use of the port in Berbera and Mogadishu came to nought. Instead the Russians gained a foothold in Mozambique. There Bazaruto and Beira were developed as Soviet bases. The Soviets also established themselves on the Island of Sokotra as well as in the Port of Victoria in the Seychelles. The situation is promising for them on Mauritius and the Maldives (see also No. 2/77, p. 681). They can use the facilities in the Indian port of Vishakhapatnam on a commercial basis.

An ominous situation is clearly discernible possibly in South Africa. Rumors will not die away to the effect that secret negotiations have been held between the South African Government and high KGB officials. According to them the Russians are said to have agreed to tolerate a white Boer republic if air bases and the military port of Simonstown were to be made available to them. If South Africa, abandoned by the West, should have to agree to those offers out of self-preservation, a catastrophic situation would result for Western shipping at the Cape.

The USSR had successes also in the Far East. In Singapore the highly-developed repair yards there are probably in demand at least by merchant ships, which in turn means relief for the domestic shipbuilding industry. In Vietnam well developed U.S. bases fell into communist hands after the American withdrawal, including Cam Ranh Bay. Thus there came into existence a new Soviet fleet base which complements those already existing in the Pacific. In the Pacific the Soviets attempted in 1976 to gain a foothold on Tonga Island. However, the king of that island kingdom balked openly at ties with the USSR.

Reports on Soviet activities in the Kuriles are cause for concern. It has become known that major troop movements have taken place on the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiro. According to Japanese sources, these islands are said to be serving as a submarine base.

A no less ominous development is looming in the Atlantic, since the Soviets began in 1974 to set up housekeeping in the Cuban port of Cienguegos and set up a submarine base there. On African soil they succeeded in establishing a fleet base in Conakry. The Congolese port of Pointe Noire has become known as a transhipment port for Soviet supplies; it may possibly be upgraded into a fleet base in the meantime. This holds true in even greater measure for Luanda, the main port of Angola. Soviet activities are to be expected also on the Island of Sao Tome and on the Cape Verde Islands. Since their release from the Portuguese Union they have been a "people's democracy." Presumably their defense minister requested NVA assistance in developing military and naval installations, while on a visit to East Berlin. Of very great interest to Soviet fleet units is likely the naval base established on Fernando Poo Island (now Macias Nguema) which belongs to Equatorial Guinea. The Soviets have anchored their only floating dock stationed in West Africa in the natural harbor of San Carlos (now Luba).

When the Soviet Government tried some years ago to acquire port rights for her fishing vessels in the Portuguese port of Figueira da Foz, Western naval experts sat up and took notice. It is easy to imagine what would have happened if the Portuguese revolution of 1974 had led to a communist victory. Portugal would have left NATO and its Atlantic ports fallen prize to the Soviets.

Methods of Soviet Naval Base Policy

Just as the goals of Soviet base policy were being set on an ever broader scale, so, too, have the methods been refined and differentiated. For the first phase of this policy conquest by war and/or annexation of foreign territory sufficed. With the postwar development, however, refined methods became necessary. The following measures and steps have been discerned up to now:

--The simplest possibility is the exploitation of a revolution or a civil war in the targeted country. Whether plotted by the Soviets or not, whether stemming from political or religious motives, revolutionary development in the final analysis brings the communists to the helm and opens the door to the Soviet Union. Vietnam and Angola are disturbing examples of that possibility.

--Economically weak countries of the Third World receive economic and military assistance and are, thereby, made dependent, at least where training, logistics, and material maintenance for the weapon systems supplied are concerned. The slowness of Western industrial nations to recognize such a danger works to the advantage of the Soviet"developers." A glance at the table of existing weapons assistance agreements in "The Military Balance" of the International Institute for Strategic Studies reveals that for example Libya and India are receiving warships from the USSR, in addition to the supplies of Western arms. To break this dependence, as for example Egypt dared to do, is very difficult and requires considerable technical adjustments, which in turn are possible only with Western help.

--They acquire port rights (e.g., Yugoslavia) and therefore already have a foot in the door.

--The victory of a communist or a Marxist party in democratic elections establishes favorable conditions. During the election in Mauritius in 1976 two Soviet cruisers were standing in the waters off that island in order to set ashore the necessary experts right after an election with an outcome favorable to them.

--Frequently the first step in establishing base rights is the acquisition of port rights for fishing vessels. The first "friendship visit" of a Soviet warship is then not long in coming.

--Often the base policy is introduced by the conclusion of commercial treaties as well as by establishing consulates and commercial representations. In La Valetta on Malta there is already a Soviet trade office and an Aeroflot travel agency, as SOLDAT UND TECHNIK has reported.

In summary it can be said that the expansion of the navy and the merchant fleet and also that of the Soviet base system is being accomplished consistently and that no opportunity is being missed to establish a foothold abroad. Reality therefore appears to be quite different from what is described by Admiral Gorshkov. The fact that in the age of long-range weapons of annihilation fleet bases are just as threatened as other fixed targets underscores the thesis that it is not the well-developed base which is the best foundation in the usual sense, but the temporary and movable ones equipped with mobile means. The Soviet Union has taken that development into account by building up her replenishment fleet. In peacetime however every naval base has the function of a lever and--in a favorable strategic position--of a thorn in the side of a potential enemy. We must give credit to the Soviets for conducting an extremely skillful and far-sighted policy in that respect. They must expect setbacks to the degree that their treaty partners are "unreliable customers." The concerted actions of the Russians is characterized no more appropriately than by the statement of Winston Churchill about his former allies:

"They will bang and rattle at every door and window until they find one which they can open. And then they will invite themselves to dinner."

FOOTNOTES

1. On this subject see the article Flottenadmiral Gorshkov [Fleet Admiral Gorshkov] in No 8/76 and Die Sowjetflotte heute [The Soviet Fleet Today] in No 7/77.

2. Port Arthur was temporarily made available to the Russians again.

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CSO: 1826

WARTIME ROLE OF SUBMARINES DISCUSSED

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to press 5 Sep 79 pp 81-87

[Article by Vice Adm K. Stalbo, Doctor of Naval Sciences, Professor, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR and USSR State Prize Laureate: "Development of Views on Submarine Forces"]

[Text] The role and place of submarines in the fleets of all naval powers, and chiefly the great naval powers, were determined precisely and completely in the postwar period and particularly with the development of the scientific-technological revolution. It is now impossible to find doubts in a single military doctrine concerning the high combat capabilities of submarine forces in accomplishing many missions not only in contemporary armed warfare at sea, but even in the war as a whole.

Submarines have become a very important part of strategic nuclear arms. They have not lost their importance as the primary arm in the struggle against surface warships and transports and they make up a mandatory and very effective part of ASW forces. Thanks to their specific nature and primarily their concealment and great striking force, submarines are an important means of winning and maintaining sea supremacy.

There is a very obvious opportunity for using sumbarines for transport purposes and for helping to perform work involving reasearch of the World Ocean and exploitation of its resources.

The rapid growth in submarines' tactical and technical characteristics and their general recognition as the most universal and primary attack forces of fleets of the great powers are connected with the introduction of atomic propulsion aboard these ships and their outfitting with various missiles, and strategic ballistic missiles above all. There is no question that scientific research contributed to a revelation of the capabilities contained in submarines. The importance of its role is obvious in development of systems of armaments and rational methods of their employment.

It should be noted that when debates were held in a number of countries after the war under the influence of the appearance of nuclear weapons with regard to the advisability of constructing particular ships (this concerned aircraft carriers in particular) or developing naval aviation, submarines remained outside the subjects of discussion and firmly held a place as an inalienable part of the naval forces.

Submarines now represent a very important component of the naval power of states. The concept of employment of submarine forces is now completely free of any layers of doubts or vagueness. It bears traits of a scientifically substantiated and rational system of views. At the same time, there is probably no one element of the doctrine which experienced so many difficulties and contradictory interpretations along its development path as the theory of construction and employment of submarines in the overall system of naval armaments of states. An examination of the development of views on submarine forces is of considerable interest in this regard.

It is advisable to begin a study of this process with the period of preparation of naval armament systems in the period between the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. We will note that the first mention of submarines in history is encountered in 1620 in England and in 1724 in Russia, but such ships were not viewed as a real force for a long period of time. Their creation and development was no more than the concern of isolated enthusiasts.[1]

The creation of submarines which more or less met the requirements of modern times falls in the first decade of the 20th century.

There was a total of 17 submarines in commission in the fleets of Russia, Japan, the United States, and Germnay by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.[2] At that time there naturally was no theory of their employment in armed warfare at sea. The experience of employing Russian submarines in the war was limited to patrolling in friendly coastal areas and performing reconnaissance. No scientific development involving the use of submarines was carried on.

There were around 210 submarines[3] in the navies of England, Russia, France, Japan, Germany, and the United States by the beginning of World War I, while there were 390 surface warships of the first rank (less Japan).[4] Around 100 submarines were being built.

The low rates of submarine construction in Russia, Japan, and the United States remained the same throughout all of World War I. Only in Germany did a significant increase in the number of submarines built begin in the latter half of the war: 1915--52 units; 1916--108; 1917--87; 1918--86. A total of 344 submarines were commissioned here from 1915 up until November 1918 and 226 were in various stages of construction. Losses comprised 178 units.

England was in second place in the intensity of submarine construction in the war years (137 units), and Russia was in third place (43 submarines). A total of 30 submarines was built in France in the war years.

Russia was in last place among all countries participating in World War I.[5] By the beginning of the war the fleet had only 15 submarines. But if we take the sum and the number of submarines built during combat operations, it will be seen that four European powers had a grand total of around 730 submarines in their fleets--unquestionably a large figure for that time. The allies (Russia, England, and France) "passed through their fleets" a lesser number of submarines (356) with common efforts than Germany alone (372). It was for this reason that the German Navy received the primary experience in employing submarine forces in World War I. It is generally known that this involved the struggle on ocean lines of communication, during which submarines destroyed over 11 million gross register tonnage, or aound 85 percent of all tonnage sunk.

Submarines of the warring sides also operated successfully against warships (192 units were sunk, including 12 battleships, 23 cruisers, 39 destroyers, and 30 submarines).

/The experience of World War I showed that submarine forces were a powerful and universal ocean-going means of armed warfare at sea./ [Passage in slantlines in italics]

Another important result of submarine combat activities was the appearance of antisubmarine ships and, on the whole, a system of combating submarines which comprised one of the chief directions in fleet construction and in the development of naval art.

Under conditions of a general stagnation in military operations on the land and at sea in World War I, which led to no very decisive results, only operations of the sumbarines were able to create a number of crisis situations of great importance.[6] This allows a consideration of the experience of submarine employment in World War I as practically exhaustive for their entire subsequent development as a system of armaments intended for the destruction of surface targets.

This experience was not used, however, nor did it serve as a stimulus for development of submarine forces in the interwar period. Construction of a surface fleet with a leading role played by large, primarily gun-firing ships, remained the chief trend in the development of fleets of capitalist countries. Antisubmarine forces also did not receive proper development.

Here I would like to direct attention to the fact that the experience of employing large gun-firing ships in the Russo-Japanese War unquestionably contributed to the fact that just 9 years later, by the beginning of World War I, large squadrons of battleships and cruisers armed with guns were operating as part of the fleets. At the same time, the more impressive results of submarine combat actions in World War I did not have the necessary effect, or an effect adequate to their significance, on the development of important provisions of naval doctrines in all capitalist countries.

In this regard the balance of navies of capitalist countries remained tilted toward surface forces by 1939--the beginning of World War II. The experience of World War I, which showed the impossibility of accomplishing missions at sea with forces of large surface ships alone, proved insufficient for bourgeois military science. Still another world war was required, and it demonstrated the total unsuitability of battleships and reaffirmed the special capabilities of submarines and aircraft in attaining the objectives of armed warfare at sea.

With regard to submarines, there was a total of 437 of them in the navies of the United States, England, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany in 1939[7], i.e., not many more than before World War I.

It is typical that Germany, which had the most extensive and significant experience in employing submarines during World War I, had only 57 submarines. It is true that their construction was limited by provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, but they were quite freely violated by fascist Germany, which created powerful ground forces and aviation despite the limitations. An underestimation or lack of understanding of the importance of submarines obviously stopped the German command from creating submarine forces appropriate to the situation. It was only during the war that fascist Germany again turned to submarines and to the idea itself of submarine warfare against ocean shipping by building over 1,100 submarines. These were the chief means for cutting Anglo-American lines of communication in the Atlantic and they shared the palm with aviation in the Mediterranean.

While England, the United States, and France followed in the rut of their traditions by relying on powerful surface fleets, Germany did this despite its own experience of employing submarines, which was practically the extent of its experience.

It should thus be noted that the fleets of capitalist countries entered World War II without having the necessary physical base or theoretical principles recognized by military doctrines for employing submarine forces in armed warfare at sea which corresponded to their objective operational and strategic capabilities revealed during the last world war.[8]

Just what are the reasons for bourgeois military doctrines to ignore the experience of employing submarines? There are several.

The basic reason obviously was the difficulty of perceiving something new under conditions of a dominance of views on use of something old. What told here to the full extent was both a struggle of the new against the old and the difficulty of developing something new generated in the depths of traditional concepts and ideas. The dialectics of this process are not new and this example serves as one further illustration of the development of phenomena and theories.

For centures capitalist countries saw in surface ships the alpha and omega of those forces needed to conquer colonies, augment them, and defend them. For example, Holland, England, Spain, and Portugal in their time attained grandeur thanks to fleets represented by surface forces. These fleets embodied the height of capabilities of the struggle for sea supremacy. It was of course difficult for them to stand aside and give up the positions won over the course of history.

For a long while surface forces also had the priority in resolving problems of foreign policy and in implementing the concept of naval presence, which continues to be an important tool of pressure on a weak partner even in our days.

The weakness of bourgeois military science obviously was an important reason. Prior to World War II it was not capable of properly evaluating capabilities of the arms or of analyzing the past war's experience and elaborating scientific principles of balancing their fleets as applied to new missions and a new situation. We know that where science proves to be groundless, preeminence automatically is given to bias and subjectivism. Therefore, the subjective factor was one of the factors which did not allow a proper understanding or use of the abundant experience of employing submarines in World War I by the beginning of World War II. It was to a significant extent because of this that the concept of submarine forces did not have such a carefully developed and generally recognized theory of their employment on the path of its development as was the case with respect to surface ships.

There were many enemies of submarines, blind emulators of previously formulated postulates about their limited combat capabilities, and adherents of Mahan methods of winning sea supremacy among the leaders of the British, French, Japanese, and American fleets, which had no experience of employing submarines in major operations or campaigns of a war. They could not and did not wish to consider the experience of submarine employment in World War I.

The subjective factor showed up in the worst form in this process of an evaluation of the arms of bourgeois navies. It always is inevitable in making decisions in the field of military organizational development without a proper reliance on science, without an understanding of the perspective, and without a consideration of the experience of history, which was especially typical of the British Admiralty.

By ignoring the importance of submarine forces, British naval doctrine proved to be in a very serious situation not only because it determined large surface ships to be the chief force of the fleet, but also because it did not substantiate at all the need for development of antisubmarine forces. The conservatism of British naval thinking showed up especially vividly in this matter. Having already been placed on the verge of catastrophe once, when the Kaiser's submarines interrupted the nation's sea routes, England again did not have the antisubmarine forces it required on entering World War II. The fact is that they were even more necessary than during the last world war. Great Britain again turned for assistance to the United States, which cost no small territorial losses.[9]

An underestimation of the experience in employing submarines in World War I was to a certain extent also a result of the fact that in the entire brief history of the development of views on the conduct of submarine warfare and official recognition of the capabilities of submarines, the decisions in these matters were prepared and made by people who made the idea of sea supremacy achieved through the battle of line forces into a fetish. Especially favorable conditions were created here for the development of departmental conservatism and the dominance of an ideology built on the eternal nature and unchangeability of the laws of armed warfare at sea formulated at one time with regard to ships.

The fate of submarine forces essentially was in the hands of followers of traditional paths of development of naval force such as Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Raeder, and practically all Japanese naval leaders. And science also was "moved" by the enemies of submarines--Groos, Corbett, Wegener, and others.

The subjectivism in this matter led to a significant extent to the fact that the capabilities of the new forces were measured using old criteria. No consideration was given to the fact that recognition of submarines as a real and promising force involved a need to comprehend and understand not only weapons systems fundamentally different from the previous systems, but also the very content of naval warfare under new conditions. The process of recognizing submarines has much in common here with the difficult process of recognizing aviation as a naval arm.

There a large number of problems also were resolved in no simple manner and not without a struggle. Let's take just the following fact: The positive feature of aviation, which was capable of achieving the objective of a battle in a short period of time with one blow, was classified as a deficiency allegedly consisting of its incapability for exerting lengthy pressure against the enemy.

Another reason which prevented naval powers of the West to evaluate the importance of submarines opportunely was a unique inertia in evaluating the importance of naval arms.

It is generally known that the development of armament systems has two basic forms: evolutionary and revolutionary--qualitatively abrupt leaps accomplished in relatively short historical time periods.

Bourgois military theorists and practitioners always gave preference to the evolutionary path in the period before the scientific-technical revolution. It could be supported by the existing scientific-production shipbuilding base and by traditional forms of industrial cooperation. It required no detailed scientific substantiation under fundamentally new criteria, and it fit within the channel of customary decisions and the assimilated methods for implementing them. And finally, it was devoid of risk, including financial risk, which was especially important for the private companies and concerns in charge of shipyards and which consequently influenced technical policy and the building of fleets. This began to be felt most noticeably during the period of the appearance of military-industrial complexes capable even of influencing state policy.

The building of surface ships, which remained the only direction in the building of fleets right up until the 20th century, was such an evolutionary form in the development of fleets, with a thousand years of history and traditions just as old. It therefore acquired special inertia and as history shows, a minimum number and sometimes only isolated successes of surface ships were sufficient to maintain that inertia, while to overcome it required extraordinary efforts and a lengthy time period.

Returning to the experience of employing surface gunfiring ships in the Russo-Japanese War, it can be seen that all naval theorists hastened to use just one aspect--the Japanese experience. Once again they unconditionally declared battleships to be the backbone of fleets and the personification of their might. No one sought possible new paths of development of fleets prior to World War I, although they already existed objectively and soon appeared.

The one-sided analysis of the Russo-Japanese War's experience and its being made into a fetish was the most convenient and customary tool for naval theorists and practitioners of that time in resolving key issues of trends in fleet development. None of the naval specialists were able to rise to the level of understanding that it was not Japanese surface ships which won victory over the Russian Japanese surface ships which won victory over the Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War. The reasons for the defeat of the Czarist regime in Russia had to be seen primarily in the sphere of politics.

An examination of the process of recognizing submarine forces as a certain dominant idea in the system of naval armaments in Germany merits special attention.[10] This issue is of interest because it was Germany which was the country where the largest submarine fleet was created and where the experience of its combat operations demonstrated its great capabilities with sufficient persuasiveness.

In speaking of the experience of employing German submarines in World War I, we must note above all the fact that they proved the only possible means for achieving abrupt turning points throughout the war. At a certain stage in the war the Germans saw no other weapon for victory over the British.

Military leaders at all echelons gradually became adherents of these views. Hindenburg wrote: "...and thus, the submarine war should have decided the course of the war. And even more so--at the beginning of 1917 this was the only means which we could employ to end the war victoriously."[11]

Germany took the path of submarine warfare, but steps taken to support it were extremely insufficient. The shipbuilding industry just was not able to receive only the 69,000 persons necessary for work at the yards from an army numbering 14 million. In addition to purely objective reasons involving the course of war in land theaters, the German "infantryism" was felt here especially. It was the constant companion of the development of this country's armed forces under the pressure of infantry generals.

An analysis of decisions by the German leadership for building a fleet prior to World War II shows that they were aimed at creating a surface fleet. It is generally known that the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, which limited Germany's right to have a strong navy, were violated unilaterally after Hitler's arrival in power. By agreement with England on 18 June 1935 envisaged the creation primarily of a surface fleet by the beginning of a possible war (1944, according to German plans). It was planned to build 26 large surface ships and only 126 submarines.[12] Submarines thus were given a secondary place. When world war began in 1939, only 15 German submarines could operate at sea. Here is where the numerous theoretical elaborations of the interwar period told. The apologists of line fleets intentionally distorted historical experience and they drew conclusions both in the face of facts and of common sense. Matters even went to the absurd. For example, on the basis of experience of warfare on ocean lines of communication in World War I, the well-known German naval theorist Groos drew a conclusion as to the advantages of surface ships in this form of operations while, as is generally known, they actually were unsuitable for this. With regard to the long term, Groos gave a larger place to the surface cruiser than to a submarine in a future war.

Wegener, another German theorist, relegated "submarine weapons" to a secondary role, admitting the possibility of their use where powerful surface forces were lacking. Admiral Raeder, who was preparing the fleet for war, underestimated the role of submarines and bowed to battleships.

Even submariner Doenitz, later the commander in chief of the German Navy, admitting that "the world war showed the importance of the submarine in the war against commerce," regarded submarines as a weapon of second-class powers which "have no other means for attacking sea lines of communication of a stronger naval power."[13]

His demand that 300 submarines be built for the war against England was a forced step in connection with the impossibility of the rapid creation of armadas of battleships and cruisers and did not stem from an estimate of the objectively existing high combat qualities of this naval arm.[14]

It is completely clear that "under the pressure" of such "authorities" in German Navy doctrines, the concept of employment of submarine forces just did not find proper expression in the prewar period despite the most extensive experience in this matter.

Germany turned to submarines twice. In World War I this occurred accidentally to a significant extent in a search for a step capable of countering the British surface blockade.

The matter was resolved differently in World War II. They recalled the experience of World War I, when the exceptional capabilities of submarines were revealed in combat operations against England. Adherents of the development of submarine forces, which were gathering strength, also exerted a certain influence.

After the seizure of Norway, Germany's surface fleet actually was idle. The British Navy continued its domination. Under these conditions even Raeder shifted over to the camp of the submariners. Germany began feverishly to create a powerful submarine fleet. Each month, 20, 30, and even 35 submarines were being built here.

The considerable expansion of the material base of armed warfare in the underwater environment made it necessary to develop a theory on the methods of submarine operations, and such a theory was developed in Germany. It was based primarily on the struggle against enemy shipping and unrestricted submarine warfare. It must be noted that its creation was accompanied by a lengthy struggle. Raeder, commander in chief of the German Navy, was retired in 1943 despite his apparent reorientation. Doenitz took his place.

The theories of Groos and Wegener, apologists of a surface fleet, gradually were replaced in the Berman press by ideas of submarine adherents Spindler and Assman, who attempted to define their role and place in the war against England in the system of submarine blockade of this state.

Spindler was a convinced adherent of the view that victory in the war against England would come from strikes against British SLOC by submarine forces after sufficient areas had been won in the East capable of providing Hitler's war machine with the necessary resources. Assman considered submarines to be the chief weapon in Germany's economic war against England.

The principles in the concept of employing submarine forces in war formulated by these scholars far from corresponded to the situation. For example, problems of supporting submarines during their operations in oceans were not examined at all. After departure from bases, submarines were left to their own resources. They therefore gradually began to give way to the overall capabilities of rapidly developing antisubmarine defense of the Allies and suffered heavy losses.

The strategy of employing submarines for "total" destruction of enemy tonnage regardless of the transports' load or direction of movement was erroneous.

Despite this, World War II provided new, enormous opportunities for assessing the role and importance of submarine forces and for developing the concept of their employment in warfare. Submarines of Germany and the United States sank 320 warships and over 4,000 transports with a total displacement of over 20 million tons.

A total of 1,669 submarines were built in the war years, and 1,123 were lost.

In the postwar period, however, only the Soviet Union was able to evaluate submarine forces thoroughly and correctly. With regard to capitalist powers, and the traditional naval powers above all, they only turned specifically to submarines after the development of atomic power engineering, and primarily to platforms for strategic ballistic missiles, without letting up in the arms race for a single day. The navies of the United States, England, and France have 49 such submarines. More attention now has begun to be given to the creation of multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines. But nuclear-powered submarines are very complex and costly weapons. Therefore only major powers such as the United States can have them in the optimum numbers. The other western countries are not building nuclear-powered submarines, and only England and France have a limited number of such ships.

Contemporary naval rivalry is concentrated to a significant extent in the sphere of building nuclear-powered submarines. The number of strategic submarines is regulated by international agreements.

The very rapid development of submarines made the creation of large, all-arms ASW forces into the most important direction in the building of modern fleets.

We analyzed the paths of development of views on the employment of submarines as applied to events which occurred in the Atlantic. It was here that the primary operations of submarine forces unfolded. Over 80 percent of all submarines lost (941 out of 1,123) were sunk in waters of the Atlantic and adjoining seas. Over 70 percent of the submarines (1,337 out of 1,669) were built for operations in the Atlantic. It was the system of naval opposition of Germany and England which was the environment in which views on the employment of submarine forces were formed in the two world wars.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" (Soviet Military Encyclopedia). Vol. 6. Voyenizdat, 1978, p. 376.

2. Moiseyev, S.P. "Spisok korabley russkogo parovogo i bronenosnogo flota" (List of Ships of the Russian Steam-Powered and Armorclad Fleet). Voyenizdat, 1948.

3. "Floty velikikh derzhav"(Fleets of the Great Powers). Sankt Peterburg 1914, p.38.

4. Gorshkov, S.G."Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva"(Sea Power of the State) Voyenizdat, 1976, pp. 118, 119.

5. Ibid, p. 158.

6. Ibid, p. 165-166.

7. Ibid, pp. 175, 185.

8. The Soviet Union was an exception. Our prewar theory and doctrine regarded submarines as the most important fleet arm. In this connection the primary direction of its development was accelerated construction of submarines as an important means for defending the maritime boundaries of our state. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Union had 218 submarines. This was more than in the fleet of any other country participating in World War II or in the fleets of England, France, and the United States together (202).

9. In 1941 England was forced to transfer its military and air bases on Newfoundland, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, the islands of Antigua and Saint Lucia, British Guiana, and the islands of Jamaica and Trinidad to the United States for 99 years in exchange for 50 old American destroyers.

10. It was only in 1908 that the first submarine was commissioned in the German Navy.

11. "Vospominaniya gindenburga" (The Hindenburg Memoirs). Petrograd, "Mysl'", 1922, p. 40.

12. Alafuzov, V. "Doktriny germanskogo flota" (German Navy Doctrines). Voyenizdat, 1958, p. 154.

13. Ibid, p. 160.

14. After the war Doenitz stated that Germany should have had at least 1,000 submarines by the time it began.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION RED TAPE CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Correspondent A. Korolev: "To Moscow For Information"]

[Text] According to the statistics 2 million persons come to Moscow every day. On business trips, to visit friends, for training, and as participants of tourist groups. There are many reasons. Engineer-Major V. Bykovets, one of the many visitors to the reception room of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, also came to the capital midweek not without cause and not just on pleasure.

"I won't take up much time," he said. "I would just like to know whether or not I am entitled to travel pay in connection with my transfer to a new place of service."

In 5 minutes the officer was given a reply based on the provisions of the documents presently in effect. The satisfied visitor left the reception room for his unit, which incidentally was located a few dozen kilometers from Moscow.

It would seem that this incident has nothing remarkable about it: A person travels to the capital, asks a question, receives an answer, and goes away.... But let us not come to hasty conclusions and consider another case.

While Engineer-Major Bykovets had to sacrifice 1 day to get his information, the time and resources expended by Warrant Officer N. Rylov were by far greater--after all, he works more than a thousand kilometers from the capital! Even so, the warrant officer did embark on the long trip. His objective was to find out in Moscow whether or not there is a document that governs the order of providing housing to military servicemen who had previously occupied reserved housing space. Naturally this visitor also received an exhaustive reply from the editorial board in just a few minutes, and he traveled back pleased as well.

Unfortunately many such alarming cases have been occurring. They are alarming because they show that people in some places continue to collide with the bureaucratic behavior and indifference of officials.

What is happening in fact is that for one reason or another, officers must abandon their daily duties (or sacrifice a day off) to make a special trip to Moscow for information. They must travel to Moscow to find out what should have been explained to them in their unit. The warrant officer's question should have been answered locally, but....

Engineer-Major V. Bykovets encountered spiritual callousness, an open reluctance of workers of the financial service to delve into the essence of the problem; nor was Warrant Officer Rylov met with tactfulness and attention. This is why both of them, who had initially no intention of traveling to Moscow, nevertheless decided to make their "journey for information," troubled by problems that were important to them personally.

The continuing Moscow trips for information attest to the fact that far from all units, military commissariats, military enterprises and institutions have organized visitor reception well, and that visitors do not always encounter a benevolent attitude toward themselves everywhere. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's mail says the same thing rather eloquently.

For example Seaman R. Agaverdiyev wrote to the newspaper that he wished to enroll in a military school, but that none of the officers he turned to were able to inform him of the admission requirements of the educational institution he was interested in. Another letter came from Chistopol', from Great Patriotic War veteran A. Anisimov, who complained that he could not get any information on the privileges enacted for war veterans: "...the city military commissariat sent me to the city social security department, and the latter sent me right back to the military commissariat..."

Of course, workers in every institution perform a certain range of responsibilities requiring both exertion of effort and attention. But no excuses of "being busy," or other "objective" causes could serve as a justification for red tape and indifference in relation to people, their complaints, and their requests.

A worker who by the nature of his activities is constantly in contact with people turning to him with complaints, declarations, urgent problems, or simply questions of interest to them, must always be tactful, attentive, and efficient. Whatever the circumstances, he must always find the time to calmly hear out the individual and give him a grounded response, one which would make it unnecessary for him to turn to other sources of information. In this case it is very important for the official to store, close by and not in some long-forgotten corner, all of the necessary orders, instructions, and other references that could be used to give swift and competent explanations on all problems.

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COMBAT INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Major General F. Gredasov: "The Art of Reconnaissance"]

[Text] It would be impossible to make a suitable decision in combat without knowing the enemy, his intentions, his combat capabilities, his strong and weak sides, and the terrain on which the mission is to be executed.

Tactical reconnaissance has the purpose of revealing the combat composition of the enemy, his fire plan, and the locations of his control posts, antitank resources, and reserves. Its most important objective is to uncover the enemy's preparations for a nuclear strike in time.

Tactical reconnaissance is represented today by troop reconnaisance subunits as well as by reconnaissance subunits of the different arms and services--artillery, engineering, and radiation and chemical. While in the past tactical reconnaissance was concerned with the relatively small area in which the combat was proceeding, its present capabilities and resources make it possible to acquire data on enemy objectives dozens of kilometers away. But in view of its nature, tactical reconnaissance is concerned in the bulk of its missions with specifically the tactical zone.

Information is acquired on the enemy through the combat activities of units and subunits, by observation, listening, photography, interception and rangefinding of electronic resources, strikes, raids, ambushes, and other means.

Many of these are traditional, time-tested methods. As an example a significant share of valuable intelligence was acquired during the Great Patriotic War by observation, raids, and ambush.

At the end of 1942 at the Voronezh front, for example, a reconnaissance group consisting of enlisted men and sergeants of the 1st Rifle Battalion, 931st Rifle Regiment captured a valuable "canary"--the commander of a German infantry division's signal company--as a result of a successfully conducted raid. He provided rather thorough information on the enemy's men and equipment in the vicinity of Kastornoye.

In 1943 at Belgorod, a well organized system of observation in the regiments (consisting of 18-22 troup, artillery, and engineering observation posts per unit) revealed the moment the enemy occupied his forming-up place for the offensive.

We can cite many such examples. Our tactical reconnaissance units performed their missions masterfully during the war. The war experience continues to be instructive today as well.

What do we mean today by the words "competently organized reconnaissance"? It means a complex of mutually related measures. First of all we must clearly define the objective of reconnaissance: precisely what information on the combat composition and nature of enemy actions it must acquire. Next the company or battalion commander must determine what sort of men and equipment it would be suitable to assign for reconnaissance, and how to prepare these resources for the mission. It is important for the commander to personally explain the mission to the reconnaissance subunits and spell out the time the mission is to begin and the means of attaining the goal (observation, ambush, raid, and so on). And, finally, stable communication must be maintained with the reconnaissance subunits; the intelligence must be collected, generalized, and reported efficiently to the senior chief, and subordinates and neighbors must be supplied with information on the enemy quickly.

The reconnaissance effort must be subordinated to the intent of the battle and to the missions assigned to the subunit and unit, and it must correspond to the nature of the concrete situation. Reconnaissance provides an especially broad avenue for the display of a commander's creativity, initiative, and inventiveness.

Reconnaissance can be effective only if it is maintained in all forms of troop combat activities, day and night, in all terrain, and in all weather conditions. Observation of all of the most important objectives must also be continuous.

The following serves as the raw data used by the company or battalion commander to organize reconnaissance: the mission assigned to the subunit, available data on the enemy, and the possibilities of the men and equipment allocated for the reconnaissance missions. Moreover he may also receive reconnaissance instructions from his senior chief.

Combat reconnaissance patrols and trained observers are usually allocated for reconnaissance missions in every platoon and company, and at the battalion observation post. On instructions from the senior chief, subunits may organize raids. Motorized infantry and tank battalions can also be included in the intelligence gathering effort.

The subunit commander bears full responsibility for organizing reconnaissance; he personally determines its most important objectives, indicating the objectives or sectors upon which the main efforts must be concentrated.

During combat he personally (through the chief of staff at battalion level) exercises control over the reconnaissance effort.

I have seen competently organized reconnaissance many times in exercises. As an example Captain N. Prudnikov, the commander of a motorized rifle battalion, displayed his best side in a training battle. Competently utilizing his observers and his combat reconnaissance patrols, he managed to reveal the simulated enemy's fire plan in that subunit's zone of advance. When approaching "enemy" artillery batteries occupied their fire positions and when the opposing side laid minefields at the forward edge and within the near defense zone, the battalion commander promptly reported these actions to the regiment commander.

As with many others, this case once again persuades us that if a commander is to organize reconnaissance competently, he must have a deep knowledge of the nature of modern combat, of the possibilities of organic and non-organic reconnaissance forces and resources, and of the principles of their application in combat.

A commander cannot count on success in combat if he has been unable to organize effective reconnaissance. Indicative in this aspect is an episode from another training battle. Major I. Karpenko, the commander of a motorized rifle battalion that was in direct contact with the "enemy," assumed that the defenders had occupied the forward position only with covering and security subunits. In the course of the attack, however, it was revealed to him that during the night the "enemy" had managed to draw his main forces to this center of resistance. His error cost the subunit dearly.

A commander must not only assign concrete missions to his reconnaissance subunits, but he must also pose such missions as early as possible. After all, detachments, squads, and platoons assigned to reconnaissance missions must make preparations. They must be provided full support for their missions.

Experienced commanders find the time before a battle to subject reconnaissance personnel to practical drills on the actual terrain, or to brief the personnel with the help of terrain models and maps; if the nature of the mission requires, they acquaint the personnel with the intelligence characteristics of the particular "enemy" objectives.

Precise determination of the time to begin reconnaissance and terminate it has great significance. Serious mistakes could result from failing to establish when and where reconnaissance subunits are to set out on their mission. This brings to mind a certain exercise in the Carpathian Military District, in which the scouts lost themselves in the combat formation of the motorized rifle and tank subunits and advanced together with them in the attack. The commander had lost communication with his reconnaissance subunits.

Maintenance of stable communication with reconnaissance subunits is of priority importance. Radio training sessions conducted by many commanders during preparations for training exercises have justified themselves completely. Scouts must be proficient with various sorts of procedure tables and specially prepared maps, and they must be able to transmit a maximum of information per unit time.

The habits of organizing reconnaissance are acquired by commanders in troop exercises, command-and-staff exercises, and training sessions. Experience has shown that reconnaissance receives priority attention in exercises in which a complex situation close to that of real combat is created, and in which the participants receive only a minimum of information on the simulated enemy.

Exercises involving live ammunition impart many valuable reconnaissance skills to officers and all personnel. All that is important is for the target situation to correspond to the organizational structure, armament, combat equipment, and tactics of the enemy.

Reconnaissance competitions held in both reconnaissance and motorized rifle and tank subunits, and the training of all categories of personnel on specially equipped ranges have a positive effect, raising the level of reconnaissance preparedness.

Many units have taken an integrated approach to solving the problems of reconnaissance training. As an example a broad practice is made of fire and special training exercises and of combat vehicle driving in concrete tactical situations in the Belorussian, Carpathian, and Far East military districts. Under these conditions the personnel are able to work on their reconnaissance training standards and develop their powers of observation, their powers of visual estimation, and their ability to report what they see clearly.

The platoons, companies, and batteries of the arms and services and of special troops are asked to participate with combined arms subunits in tactical drills held in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and in the Transbaykal and other military districts. This permits the commander to acquire the habits of utilizing information obtained by the reconnaissance subunits of the arms and services, which is extremely important in modern combat.

Group exercises, training exercises on reconnaissance topics, and tests and seminars on reconnaissance fundamentals and on the probable enemy have proven themselves to be effective resources by which to raise the level of reconnaissance preparedness of subunit, unit, and staff officers. The methods of reconnaissance training are undergoing continual improvement. We must creatively utilize all of its forms, introduce the best experience efficiently, and do everything to support all new and promising efforts.

We are now in the middle of the summer combat training season. Assimilating the means of combat application of equipment and armament, the unit and subunit personnel must persistently master the art of reconnaissance. The ability to conduct effective reconnaissance in modern combat is an important prerequisite of high troop proficiency in the field.

11004
CSO: 1801

PERSONNEL: FRUSTRATED OFFICER CANDIDATE'S COMPLAINT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Aug 79 p 2

[Letter by Junior Sergeant M. Tyulenev and Article by Major V. Zhitarenko: "And the Dream Remained a Dream...."]

[Text] "Dear Editor! I would like to share what are, speaking frankly, not very happy thoughts. The essence of the problem is as follows.

"I was drafted into the Soviet Army in April 1977. I was sent to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. For the first while I was in a training subunit preparing radio communication specialists. I completed my studies successfully. On arriving at my unit I was appointed to the post of mechanic-radio telegrapher.

"The longer I served, the more I came to like strict military order. And by the end of the first year of service I was fully resolved to become an officer, to enter the Ryazan' Higher Military Command Signal School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union M. V. Zakharov.

"I found out what was needed for this. I submitted my application up the chain of command. Not long after, our company had to participate in some important exercises. Immediately after they ended, I learned that I had supposedly been late in submitting my documents. This is what I was told by Senior Lieutenant V. Baranov, the subunit commander. He advised me to enter the school in the following year.

"What else could I do? I patiently waited, and I studied hard for the examinations during my free time. Once again I submitted my application together with a request to be sent to the military school, and I appeared before the medical commission. The time for my retirement into the reserves was coming near. Some of my comrades advised me to go home, but I did not want to part with my dream.

"On learning that a traveling admissions commission was to be holding interviews in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, I asked for permission to take my entrance exams. No one stated any arguments against this, but

I was told that even if I were to pass my exams, the question as to my enrollment in the school would not be resolved before 1 September. But by this time my term of service would have ended. I was advised to sign up for extended service, and to take my examinations after that.

"This is what I did. I became an extended service serviceman. I was transferred for the preparatory courses. I spent an entire month in school. But when the time for the traveling admissions commission to meet came around, I found out that I had to serve a certain amount of time in extended service before becoming entitled to enter the military school. Why did no one explain this to me before?

"When I returned to my unit, they told me: 'Sorry, we didn't know. Go back and talk with the commission chairman, and maybe he'll meet you half way.' Naturally, nothing came of this. Quite understandably the commission must strictly follow the rules of admission to military training institutions.

"Why doesn't anyone know anything about these rules in our unit? This is terribly disheartening. I am still serving in the subunit, and my dream remains just a dream."

Junior Sergeant (Extended Service)
M. Tyulenev

> From the Editor: Our correspondent, Major V. Zhitarenko, visited the unit in which the author of this letter serves. Here is what he reported:

The reason the junior sergeant's dream remained a dream is that officials responsible for selection of candidates for military schools do not know the guidelines well. This is despite the fact that the senior chief had ordered all officers and warrant officers to study them. A mention of this order's execution did exist: "Brought to the awareness of the personnel."

But judging from everything, it was submitted to the awareness of the personnel only formally. Even Captain A. Solonitsyn, who is responsible for document handling at staff level, had not a single doubt as to the correctness of his actions, concurrently preparing both certificates and performance reports for military school admission and for extended service for Tyulenev. We can truly say that the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing!

The obvious contradiction and the gross errors were not discovered by the chief of staff or unit commander either. They as well obviously have an unclear impression of the procedures for applying to military training institutions.

This story, it was revealed, did have another side to it as well. Tyulenev is a good specialist. For this reason Senior Lieutenant Baranov "was late" in drawing up the documents for him last year (or perhaps he did not want to?). The new company commander Senior Lieutenant V. Rychkov honestly admitted: "We need people like Tyulenev." One gets the feeling that he is even pleased by the fact that Tyulenev must remain with the subunit. Incidentally the company commander persistenly advised him to go to warrant officer school rather than to the signal school. As a rule warrant officer school students return to the unit and the subunit in which they had started.

But no one thought about the fact that this good soldier might transform into a good officer in 4 years. Moreover it is no loss if he is transferred to another unit. After all, the main thing is that he should serve, on becoming an officer, with complete devotion of his efforts to our common goal--protecting the socialist motherland.

11004
CSO: 1801

TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS IN FIRING BATTALION NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Correspondent, Senior Lieutenant A. Oleynik, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "The Pledges Are Locked Up in the Safe"]

[Text] Officers of the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Sal'nikov received a low grade in a qualification shoot during the winter training period.

Inspectors from the district's combat training directorate revealed the reasons for the failure: lack of exactingness on the part of drill instructors, and poor planning of officer occupational training. The district representatives made special mention of the absence of specificity and efficiency in the organization of socialist competition among the officers.

These conclusions alarmed the regiment commander and the party organization. The inspection results were discussed at party meetings in the subunits, and at a meeting of the unit party bureau. The resolution emphasized the need for raising the responsibility of communist officers for their own training and for satisfaction of their pledges in the competition.

That was several months ago. What has changed in the battalion? The regiment deputy commander for political affairs was extremely cautious in his reply: "There is no cause for praise yet."

Acting battalion commander Major G. Zagoruyko (the former commander was dismissed from his post) gave a more optimistic evaluation to the state of affairs in the subunit:

"All officers are now caught up in the competition. The results are regularly summarized and the names of the best and worst competitors are being announced."

I asked to see the pledges adopted by the officers (they are not displayed for everyone to see at battalion headquarters). Major Zagoruyko pulled a rolled sheet of paper--a summary of the personal pledges--out of the safe. On copying a few of them down, I decided to interview those who had adopted them, and find out what has been done to achieve the planned goals.

My first interview was with platoon commander Lieutenant N. Ignat'yev. It turned out that the officer had forgotten what his pledges were. Other officers were extremely vague about their pledges as well. Why was this so? I found out that the summary of the pledges stored in the headquarters safe had been written personally by Major Zagoruyko. Writing the summary, he made no reference at all to any pledges that were actually adopted. He simply looked at the grades of the officer received in the winter training period and added a point or two to each of them as the goal. But few were aware of the existence of such "pledges."

After this, I was no longer surprised by facts I uncovered indicating that competition had been organized in the subunit in name only. As an example Lieutenant Ignat'yev had the notion that he was competing against Senior Lieutenant S. Olzoyev.

"That's news to me," Olzoyev shrugged his shoulders. "As far as I can remember, my rival in the competition is Senior Lieutenant Avdeyev."

When I discussed the competition among the officers once again with Major Zagoruyko, he explained the confusion as follows:

"The officers do not have time to devote to the competition. They have enough problems meeting the plan for combat and political training...."

I think that it is precisely in these words, in this position that we can find the true causes of formalism in the organization of the competition. The competition in the subunit is artificially separated from the training process, from the day-to-day struggle for high-quality fulfillment of the plans and programs; the competition is viewed as an "additional load." The summary of the so-called "personal" pledges of the officers had been written at headquarters, obviously just for the benefit of the inspectors. When we look at what is actually happening, meanwhile, we find that no one is seriously concerned with the competition among the officers, who are called upon to serve as an example for all of the personnel.

The battalion recently underwent a qualification shoot and driving tests. The officers took the tests as well. A certain change for the better could be seen in comparison with the winter training period. The officers displayed greater confidence in their actions. But it would be too soon to hope for proficiency or stable grades. The grades written down in the log are modest, far from those abundantly promised in the pledge summary.

Would this not be grounds for a stern lecture on the unity of word and deed, on the personal example given by officers in a competition? We find, however, that mention was never made of pledge fulfillment neither in the training field nor on returning to the unit.

Met by an atmosphere of indifference, some officers have weakened their exactingness toward themselves, and they have stopped studying regularly to raise their occupational skills. As an example Senior Lieutenant A. Isakov has now been a 3d class specialist for 5 years. Had the subunit officers been in an environment of lively, objective competition, the young, and in my opinion, capable platoon commander would have long ago upgraded himself. Visuality and continuous comparison of results would have forced him, and all of the other officers, to work more purposefully and persistently. All the more so because there are individuals in the subunit that could serve as the ideal. Senior Lieutenant S. Olzoyev joined the battalion a year ago. He had the top class qualification--master. Specialist 1st Class Senior Lieutenant V. Avdeyev can fire successfully and drive his vehicle confidently in all conditions. But the commander, staff, and party organization of the battalion show no concern for generalizing and disseminating the experience of the best specialists, and they understate the mobilizing and educational role of competition among the officers. Everything in the competition is reduced to its external attributes, to a list of pledges stored in a safe and dragged out on demand of inspection commissions.

Incidentally the battalion had been inspected several times this summer. The higher staffs and the formation's political section are aware of the disquieting results of the winter period. Surveillance has been intensified. But has it become more effective? Unfortunately, no. Qualitative changes never have come about in organization of the training process and in socialist competition among the battalion officers. The subunit is as bad as it was before.

11004
CSO: 1801

COMPLAINT ABOUT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES REPORTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 79 p 2

[Letter by Colonel (Reserve) S. Skryabin, Senior Inspector, USSR Ministry of Defense Main Trade Directorate: "And the Deficiencies Still Remain"]

[Text] A collective of military builders managed by Engineer-Colonel A. Litvinenko spent 9 years erecting a motor vehicle repair and maintenance complex for the Moscow Military District Trade Directorate. During the time of construction, responsibilities stated in the contract were violated several times, and for this reason the facility never was completed. In July 1978 the builders surrendered the structures to the clients with numerous deficiencies, though they did assure the clients that they would correct them within 2 months. A year has passed, and the deficiencies still remain.

Dozens of conferences concerning completion of the motor vehicle complex were held, and dozens of conference records were signed by the various authoritative commissions headed by the first deputy chief of the supervising construction organization. All of the papers said the same thing: Eliminate the deficiencies in the shortest time possible. But all of this remained just on paper.

I will not list the jobs still to be completed; they are major ones. Let met cite the conclusion arrived at by N. Repin, the chief of the motor vehicle complex:

"All of the remaining deficiencies make it impossible to organize, completely and well, technical maintenance and current repair of the motor vehicle fleet, they dramatically reduce the fleet's technical preparedness, and they create great difficulties in fulfillment of the tasks posed to the motor vehicle complex by the district command."

Is it not time to make the poor workmen pay for their mistakes?

11004
CSO: 1801

PERSONNEL: YOUNG OFFICER'S DIFFICULTIES DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 79 p 2

[Letter by Lieutenant V. Kulik and Article by Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel G. Molchan: "Counting on Stiff Measures"]

[Text] "Dear Editor! I graduated from the Khar'kov Higher Military Air Command Signal School imeni Leninskiy Komsomol Ukrainy last year. Even before my leave expired I traveled to my new place of service as commander of a radio platoon. I was met well. I was also pleased by the fact that I was ordered to participate in support of airman combat training from the very first day. I felt that I could handle the job, and that if something did not work out right, my senior comrades would help me.

"But I immediately encountered some difficulties. Some specialists are in the platoon only on paper. Materials and equipment listed in the subunit's books are not all there. How was I to accept the platoon?

"My desire to analyze the entire situation and my persistent appeals to furnish the radio stations with the lacking instruments were perceived as an attempt on my part to absolve myself of my responsibilities. It is obviously because of this that the company commander, Captain Ya. Grushchak, reprimanded me. This happened on the third day after my arrival in the unit. This was followed by another reprimand, and in around half a year of service I have been subjected to nine disciplinary sanctions. I also had to defend myself before the Komsomol organization and an officer comrades court of honor.

"My purpose in writing is not to exaggerate; it is to air the offense I feel. I decided to become an officer while still in grade school. I fell to love

> this profession. I knew that it was not the easiest I could choose. But what need I do to correct this situation now? What should I do to make my service honorable in the future?"
>
> Lieutenant V. Kulik

On arriving at the signal subunit's permanent location I learned that the platoon commanded by Lieutenant Kulik had successfully completed a march of several dozen kilometers and was now at an airfield in support of flying by the air regiment. I talked with the unit's chief of staff Major N. Palenyy. He readily explained to me the plans for breaking in and working with young officers. But Officer Kulik's service card was not at headquarters. The chief of staff told me that it was in the possession of political worker Major Rybchenko, who had recently spoke with the lieutenant and had also traveled to the standby airfield. In the opinion of Comrade Palenyy Officer Kulik was a difficult person. Difficult in what way? It turned out that the platoon commander demanded that he be furnished with everything stated in the regulations, but that life dictates its own laws. Moreover, Palenyy continued, he lacked internal discipline and was afraid of hard work. This, he said, was the root of the problems in his work. And thus it was necessary to resort to strict measures of influence.

Captain Ya. Grushchak, the company commander, called his subordinate an energetic and competent officer, one possessing organizational capabilities. When the discussion turned to political indoctrination of young officers, the company commander followed the chief of staff's lead, referring me to the same plans. But he was unable to explain, in terms that I could comprehend, the way these plans were being implemented in practice. He also completely forgot when it was that he issued his first reprimand to the lieutenant. My interview with the unit commander, Lieutenant Colonel V. Tashchuk, shed a little more light. Discussing the development of young soldiers, he limited himself to a list of nonspecific measures.

But what sort of individual indoctrination was being afforded to young officers, particularly Lieutenant Kulik? Speaking frankly, all indoctrination was reduced to stiff measures of influence. This, incidentally, was not denied by political worker Major S. Rybchenko when I visited with him later. No one could find Lieutenant Kulik's service card. What good is it to him anyway, if the political worker was already aware of every reprimand issued to the lieutenant? He did not conceal the fact that, in his words, they might have gone too far.

No, Lieutenant Viktor Kulik was not overly defensive in my discussion with him. He was able to see the blame he carried for what had happened. I talked with him in detail about his life, service, and his attitude toward his work. He grew and was raised in a working family. He studied diligently in the military school, earning nine commendations. He spoke respectfully of his commanders and teachers. I could feel that this was a man who treasured his service and the work to which he dedicated his life. But things were not going smoothly for him in all ways. On occasion he was obstinant and excessively self-centered, getting into arguments with his seniors.

I listened to Kulik, and I became more amd more convinced that the officer was self-critical of his service, which he did in fact love. Why did things evolve the way they did? I think that the young officer's chiefs must assume a large part of the blame. Naturally, work violations must not be left without influence. But measures of persuasion and measures of compulsion must be combined competently and utilized correctly; the personal merit of the subordinate must be respected, and concern toward him must be displayed constantly. I think that issuing a reprimand on the third day of service is an indication that these attributes were lacking. Was it really necessary to be so harsh, especially when the lieutenant was fully justified in making his requests!

It is also very important to take notice of a person's first success, and to offer him support. There were reasons for such support in this case. In the first half of the year the platoon commanded by Kulik raised itself out of its slump of several years. Then the lieutenant was sent on a long business trip. He completed his assignment. He brought some repaired apparatus back with him, and while on his trip he had acquainted himself with the new equipment. A petition to reward the lieutenant was submitted to unit headquarters. But it was left unattended, as incidentally was true of many of the young officer's other commendable actions.

We must consider, however, that no one is indifferent to praise or reproach. We know that kind words remain in the officer's memory throughout his entire life. We must not forget this. Unfortunately, some of the chiefs of this unit did not know how to use kind words.

11004
CSO: 1801

PRE-DRAFT TRAINING RESULTS REVIEWED

In the Secondary Schools

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 12 Aug 79 p 3

/Article by A. Averin, chief of the Basic Military Education Department, USSR Ministry of Education, in the column "Basic Military Training of Youth": "Field Examinations"/

/Text/ In the Gorkovskaya Oblast secondary schools for general education, five-day field exercises with ninth grade students are conducted, as a rule, by the method of assemblies of all the rayon or city schools at the training base of the patronal plants, institutions, military subunits, defense-sports health and pioneer camps, and camps for labor and rest. Military warriors help a great deal in preparing and conducting them.

Field activitiss in all of the Arzamas secondary schools have been of great benefit to basic military training. The schools' patronal plant provided the plant's pioneer camp for this purpose.

There were well equipped training sites here for activities in all aspects of the basic military training program, including the taking of the GTO tests.

The daily routine, mode of life, activity and training of the youths largely resembled the tenor of life in a military unit. The training day began with physical exercises, formations and posting for activities, and ended with evening formations and walks.

A standard uniform was set for everyone. The youths stood guard at the camp banner, patrolled the camp and performed daily details.

Concern for the camp's appearance was evidenced by vivid, graphic propaganda, easy to understand. Battle leaflets were issued regularly and discussions were held on political and patriotic military themes and political information. Each military instructor was thoroughly prepared for the activities and conducted them on a high ideological-educational and organizational-methodological level.

Activity results were totaled daily and displayed by companies, platoons and squads. Outstanding achievers were recognized individually.

An order evaluating each school's results is issued for the results of the field activities in the camp jointly by the city department of public education and the city voyenkomat /military registration and enlistment office/. Gratitude was expressed to the military instructors who handled their tasks most successfully. Individual pupils were awarded mementos. This order was announced at a ceremony after the end of the field assemblies.

The field activities were prepared thoroughly and conducted in an organized fashion in the oblast's other rayons too. Thus, prior to the start of the field assemblies, the ninth graders of all the schools in Vyksa and Vyksunskiy Rayon attended a rally at the city stadium. They were addressed by the leaders of the CPSU city committee, the city executive committee and the voyenkomat. War veterans, parents and representatives from social organizations also attended.

On the way to camp, the pupils completed a 15-km march completely fitted out, and with gas masks and training weapons. Training problems stipulated by the activity program were worked out during the march.

The Vyksa city public education department and the city voyenkomat thoroughly prepared the physical training plant at the camp and rationally planned and organized the training process. The city voyenkomat assigned the most well trained reserve sergeants to aid the schools' military instructors. Methodological training assemblies and instructional activities on the basic military training program were conducted in advance with both the sergeants and the military instructors.

During the field activities, the pupils reinforced in practice and expanded their theoretical knowledge and skills learned in school. These activities also contributed to psychological moral and physical preparation of youths for military service.

Graduates once filled out questionnaires in the Arzamas schools. To the question: "What were the most interesting measures that made a lasting impression on you during the years of your schooling?", the majority of youths answered: "Field activities for basic military training and standing guard at the Memorial to Combat Glory."

In Gorkovskaya Oblast schools, a great deal of experience has been gained in preparing, providing for and conducting field activities with ninth graders.

It is difficult to overestimate the value of these field assemblies to basic military training and patriotic military education and to strengthening the discipline and organization of future warriors.

In the Armenian SSR

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 15 Aug 79 p 2

/Article by I. Bagramyan, chairman of the DOSAAF central committee of the Armenian SSR: "New Equipment for New Schools"/

/Text/ Thanks to the continual attention and concern of the CPSU, the Soviet government and the entire Soviet nation, our Armed Forces are being furnished with powerful combat equipment and the most modern arms. Profoundly aware of their sacred duty to the homeland and following Lenin's behests, the warriors of our Army and Navy are persistently studying the military profession. Systematically raising the level of combat and political training and strengthening military discipline, they are always ready to defend the gains of socialism.

The DOSAAF of our republic is carrying out great work on basic military training of youth. Guided by party and soviet agencies, we have succeeded in recent years in developing a network of DOSAAF organizations, setting up a modern physical plant in the training and sports organizations, ensuring the fulfillment of annual plan tasks, and in raising the quality of training specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces.

DOSAAF committees in the republic are continually concerned about ensuring that the training and sports organizations meet the modern requirements imposed by both the physical plant and the level of the educational and training process. All DOSAAF training and sports organizations in the Armenian SSR are currently housed in new buildings. Conditions for conducting practical activities in a qualitative manner have noticeably improved. For example, in the Yerevan automobile, technical and joint technical schools, there are excellent shops and laboratories and the required number of automobile ranges where complex driving exercises can be practiced. The schools have a full set of new equipment and conditions have been established for storing it.

The physical plant is being improved in DOSAAF sports organizations too. The republic's naval STK /technical sports club/, for example, where water-motor types of sports are cultivated, has a lake with boats and scooters, well equipped classrooms for conducting activities, lounges and workshops. And it has the necessary diving equipment.

The republic's rifle club has a fine base for the activity of various circles and sections and for holding competitions. There are two shooting galleries here and a well equipped shooting range.

A great deal of effort has been put into establishing and improving the physical plant of the republic's aeroclub. It is housed in a well equipped three story building. The club has two airfields: one primary, and one reserve.

Fine conditions have been established for the young sportsmen in the DYuSTSh [children's and juvenile technical sports school] which trains riflemen. All its facilities and classrooms have been provided with modern equipment and the children shoot in two galleries. Last year, on the basis of this school alone, 220 sportsmen were trained, including 3 masters, 8 candidates for master and 10 holders of a first category rating.

The material and technical base of DOSAAF rayon and local organizations has been noticeably improved. For example, in the Shaumyanskiy committee of DOSAAF there are available automobiles, motorcycles, go-carts and a 50-meter shooting gallery. This rayon has a joint training center with the required training plant for conducting activities on basic military and technical training of youth.

The experience of activity of the training and sports organizations confirms that high results in preparing youths for the Army, Air Force and Navy are achieved when a modern physical plant is set up and when the committees exercise daily specific guidance of this important matter.

The defense collectives cited serve as an example in this matter. They hold the top places in the republic among the other DOSAAF organizations. Thanks to the initiative and persistence of the leaders of these defense collectives, favorable conditions have been established here for fruitful training, training quality is monitored properly, methodological and educational work has been well organized, and almost all cadets have been enlisted to engage in technical military types of sports. Political educational work with youths is being continually improved. The forms of socialist competition for achieving high indicators in training specialists for the USSR Armed Forces are being improved. And continual concern is shown for the organization of the mode of life and cultural services for the draftees.

As a result, the youths are becoming skillful warriors within a short period after call up into the Army and Navy. This is confirmed by the numerous letters arriving from commanders and political workers of military units and from the former cadets of DOSAAF training and sports organizations themselves.

Thus, the material and technical base is being improved, and the leaders of the committees, training and sports organizations of our republic, under the direction of the local party and soviet agencies in close coordination with military units and voyenkomats, have significantly improved the training of technical specialists. For these successes, the republic's DOSAAF organization has often been awarded the travelling Red Banner of the USSR DOSAAF CC.

While noting the achievements in training specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces, we must not silently pass over the shortcomings which are primarily associated with neglecting to improve the material and technical base. In some training and sports organizations, there are still no classrooms for practical laboratory activities, vehicle ranges and radio training grounds are poorly equipped, and independent training of the cadets has not been established. For this reason, the practical training of some draftees leaves much to be desired.

The republic's DOSAAF committee is taking the necessary measures to improve the physical plant of the training and sports organizations, and is going deeper into the content and techniques of basic military training, striving to see that the quality of training fully meets the requirements imposed.

In the Latvian SSR

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 30 Sep 79 p 2

/Article by M. Karklin', Minister of Education, Latvian SSR: "School Rears Patriots"/

/Excerpts/ These were not your ordinary lessons. They were being awaited with special excitement at the 62d Riga School. After the bell, gray-haired veterans of the party and participants in the Great October Socialist Revolution sat down together with the children behind the desks.

And then the talk about love for the homeland, great civic responsibility, and sense of duty began. And this was no abstract talk--the children could see before them those who had won Soviet power and had defended it in the hard battles of the Civil War and the engagements of the Great Patriotic War, and who by their bravery and courage had warranted the lofty title of citizens of the land of the soviets.

Such meetings of the generations and such lessons of courage are not isolated occurrences in Soviet Latvian schools. Propaganda of the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of our nation and its Armed Forces has become an integral part of the training and educational work done by all the republic's school collectives.

As is known, the school has a special role in the patriotic military education of the rising generation. The foundations of a communist world outlook by the pupils are laid during the training process. Broad possibilities for education of the children by patriots of the homeland are offered by many disciplines in the school program, but in particular--by the lessons on literature, history, geography, basic military training and a number of others.

The popularity of the military sports games "Zarnitsa" /summer lightning/ and "Orlenok" /eaglet/ is growing from year to year in the schools. We now have over 1000 battalions of young servicemen. The commander of the games, Hero of the Soviet Union, reserve Major General N. Groshev, deserves great credit for this. Brother-officer of the immortal Nikolay Gastello, he is always with the teachers and children and helps them organize and conduct the games.

Participation in "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" cultivates in the young servicemen strength of will, resolution, endurance, courage, fortitude and a sense of collectivism and mutual assistance. They accustom the children to activities in technical and sports groups, and in the end, they help train them for service in the army. The final of the pioneer "Zarnitsa" held in the summer in Dobele was clear evidence of this. Struggling for the right to be in the final were 780 battalions--124,000 young servicemen. The final competitions brought 30 of the strongest teams together. I recall that in 1968, at the first final, there were only three.

Republic schools are making skillful use of state museums for patriotic military education of children. Rigans, in particular, maintain close ties with the Museum of Red Lettish Riflemen.

Representatives of the military units and ships of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, the Red Banner, awarded twice, Baltic Fleet, and the Border Guards are giving us much help in forming patriots of the homeland. They guide the numerous technical military groups and clubs of the young friends of sailors, airmen, tankers and border guards. The youths in uniform conduct lessons of courage in the schools and help organize military sports games. The pupils are very interested in their stories about the peaceful days of guarding the sacred borders of the homeland.

The matters of patriotic military, ideological, labor and moral upbringing of youth are at the center of attention of Latvian party and soviet organs. Thanks to this, the efforts of the school workers in rearing pupils in the glorious traditions of the Soviet people are acquiring special single-mindedness. Much attention is paid in the republic to generalizing and propagating know-how of military patriotic work in the schools. Scientific and practical conferences and meetings of military instructors are held and methodological developments are issued regularly.

Nevertheless, one cannot say that the summit in military patriotic education of pupils and training them for defense of the homeland has been reached. There are still quite a few shortcomings, difficulties and unresolved problems.

For all the scope of military patriotic work, a considerable portion of children is still not covered by it. It happens that this work is conducted episodically in the schools, from one "red" date to another. A large number of steps taken does not always evidence their high effectiveness and efficacy. It happens that the initiative of the children in military sports games and in research is wholly assumed by adults.

Therefore, a thorough and profound analysis of the activity of each pedagogical collective and a critical interpretation of their experience is so necessary in the light of the CC CPSU decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Educational Work." Primary attention must be paid to deepening the content of military patriotic work and to improving the guidance of it both within the school and on the part of the agencies of public education. It is necessary to skillfully rear young patriots and bring them up to be determined, staunch defenders of their homeland. A great deal of help in this matter can and should be given to the school by the commanders, political organs, military commissariats and committees of DOSAAF.

Common efforts must be made by everyone so that the young generation of our citizens piously realizes the ideals of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin and becomes ready to rise to the defense of the homeland at any moment.

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DOSAAF TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Report, Election Meetings Preparations

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 2 Sep 79 p 1

[Article: "Unremitting Attention to Reports and Elections"]

[Text] The Bureau of the Central Committee Presidium of DOSAAF USSR considered the question, "On the status of work by DOSAAF committees in preparing for reports and elections in the society's organizations in light of the decisions of the 4th (1979) plenum of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee." It was noted that in implementing the decree of the plenum, the society's committees under the direction of the party organs and in cooperation with trade union, Komsomol, and other public organizations are conducting important work in the preparation of reports and elections in the DOSAAF organizations, directing it toward an increase in the quality and effectiveness of military-patriotic, mass defense, training, and sports work and the organizational strengthening of all defense collectives.

Here, the committees concentrated basic attention on accomplishing the requirements of the 25th Party Congress, the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work," and the decisions of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress; on the timely and complete realization of planned tasks and socialist obligations; and on a worthy greeting for the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

In the majority of the defense society's organizations the course of accomplishment of the decisions made at the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress, the results of past elections and reports, and the realization of critical remarks and suggestions expressed by DOSAAF members have been analyzed. Measures for the preparation and conduct of this year's report and election campaign have been coordinated with party organs. Instructive seminars and lessons have taken place with chairmen of committees, auditing commissions, and public activists, and measures are being adopted to improve the qualitative composition of committees and auditing commissions. This work is being conducted most purposefully in the DOSAAF organizations of the Belorussian SSR and the Voronezhskaya, Murmanskaya, and several other oblasts.

It was stressed that the work which has been performed contributes to the further improvement of committees' organizational activity, the rise of military-patriotic and mass defense work, raising the quality of specialist training for the Soviet Armed Forces and the national economy, and tne development of the mass nature of technical and applied military types of sport, and it raises the authority of the defense society among the broad masses of workers and students.

At the same time, serious shortcomings and omissions are noted in the work of DOSAAF committees of the Komi ASSR and the Arkhangel'skaya, Chitinskaya, and several other oblasts. In individual organizations, questions on the preparation and conduct of reporting and election meetings and conferences are not discussed at committee plenums up to the present, plans and measures for the preparation for reports and elections are drawn up formally and are not coordinated with local party organizations, and public-spirited activists are not properly involved in practical work.

A number of DOSAAF obkoms and kraykoms are not sufficiently strict in monitoring the course of preparations for reports and elections in primary, rayon, and city organizations, do not offer them specific assistance, and make little use of the forces and capabilities of DOSAAF Houses and training and sports organizations for these purposes.

Up to now, some raykoms (gorkoms) have not conducted seminars with representatives of committees and auditing commissions of DOSAAF primary organizations and are not properly engaged in improving the qualitative composition of the society's leading organs during forthcomings elections. Questions are resolved slowly in drawing up and coordinating schedules for the conduct of meetings and conferences and assigning committee members and activists from among the permanent commissions, ad hoc sections, and lecture groups to render practical assistance to primary organizations.

Many kray, oblast, rayon, and city auditing commissions have not planned their work in such a way as to conduct checks of the corresponding committees and organizations within their jurisdiction prior to the start of reports and elections.

Some of the committees do not attach proper significance to popularizing DOSAAF's patriotic activity in the period of preparation for the reporting and election campaign and do not display activity in using the capabilities of local mass media means for this purpose.

The presidium bureau of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee required the DOSAAF Central Committees of union republics and the DOSAAF kraykoms and obkoms to make a comprehensive analysis of the status of work in implementing the decree of the 4th plenum of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, "On the conduct of reports and elections in the society's organizations," eliminate the shortcomings which are present, and work out and implement additional measures to ensure a high ideological-political and organizational level in the reporting and election campaign. They are also required to ensure the strict monitoring and checking of the execution of decisions connected with the conduct of reports and elections in DOSAAF organizations, to consider the course of their preparation and conduct systematically at sessions of bureaus and committee presidiums, and to increase the personal responsibility of each committee member for the assigned sector.

Special attention was devoted to the rendering of assistance to chairmen of auditing commissions (auditors) of DOSAAF organizations in the preparation for reports and elections. The bureau of the Central Committee presidium, DOSAAF USSR, required the DOSAAF auditing commissions to adopt concrete measures to check the state of financial-administrative activity of the committees and the organizations within their jurisdiction while still in the period of preparations for reports and elections and to prepare their suggestions to improve this work sector of the society's organizations.

It was recommended to the committees that, being guided by the decisions of the 3d Plenum of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee, they improve work on the selection and assignment of cadres for the corresponding leading organs of the society. It was also recommended that, in the course of reports and elections, they envisage the creation of permanent commissions, ad hoc setions, and lecture groups in the committees.

Work on popularizing the society's patriotic activity should be conducted more persistently and the capabilities of local press, radio, and television organs should be used for these purposes.

In the Ukrainian SSR

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Avn A. Korotchenko, Chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR: "A Creative Process"]

[Text] Work on instilling the readiness of the young Soviet man for the defense of the fatherland is honorable and responsible. An important role is played here by the DOSAAF training organizations. Specialists capable of operating the most improved equipment are successfully trained in them. Among them are drivers of transport and special vehicles, diesel operators, electricians, parachutists, ships master radio operators, aqualung divers....

A network of DOSAAF training organizations is functioning on the republic's territory. One out of every two of them is now located in a new, improved building. This year, for example, the training complex of the Buchach automobile school of the Ternopol'skaya oblast joined the ranks of those operating while the vehicle operators in the city of Kalush, Ivano-Frankovskaya oblast, received excellent quarters and the Rovenskiy aviation-sport club had a house-warming.

Many vehicle driving grounds, radio ranges, trainer complexes, and so forth have been constructed. The available training-material base is being continuously improved. But, however improved the base may be, it still cannot ensure high quality in training personnel by itself. To a very great extent, this depends on those who teach the draftees today.

The pedagogical collectives of the training organizations are facing a difficult and important task in the consistent realization of the integrated nature of communist indoctrination and the active use of all forms and methods for the ideological-political, labor, and moral tempering of tomorrow's servicemen. Today, in the republic's leading schools there is a striving to combine the experience which has already been amassed with the simultaneous search for new work forms and new solutions.

For example, it is difficult to overestimate the role of political lessons as the basic form in the indoctrination of trainees. It is they which, on the basis of the Lenin teaching concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland, mold a scientific world outlook in their students, confirm in their consciousness the ideas of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, and instill in the future servicemen the readiness to stand and defend the motherland's interests.

The ideological-political and organizational level of political lessons in the Nezhin automobile, L'vov radio engineering, Kiev naval, and other DOSAAF schools is high. Here, the conduct of political lessons is practiced more and more often in branches of the Vladimir Il'ich Lenin Central Museum and directly in plant shops and museums of combat glory. It is believed that this is fully justified. On such lessons, the trainees receive a high emotional charge and come in contact with the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the Soviet people.

When the political lessons are conducted by the former party organizer of a naval infantry battalion, N. Markelov, the trainees listen to him with special interest: for to them this person is the living embodiment of our glorious combat conditions. When he became a Hero of the Soviet Union, he was 18 years of age--as old as his today's students. V. Teterevlev, former chief of a "Katyusha" rocket launcher section, also celebrated the attainment of his majority during the assault crossing of the Dnepr. These are people for whom the indoctrination of the youth is not simply an obligation, but the highest moral duty.

Delegates to party congresses, deputies of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR [UkSSR], distinguished production workers, Heroes of the Soviet Union, and Heroes of Socialist Labor are involved in the conduct of political lessons in training organizations more and more often.

As a rule, political lessons are conducted by the best trained reserve officers. Each of them has behind him a significant life's school and solid theoretical training. However, knowledge should always be supplemented. To stop means to fall behind. This is why the Donetskiy, Dnepropetrovskiy, L'vovskiy and other obkoms of the defense society regularly conduct training-methods assemblies with them. Important party and soviet personnel, scientists, and activists of the Znaniye Society step forth as lecturers.

Scientific-practical conferences devoted to urgent problems in the ideological-political indoctrination of the youth have firmly become part of our system. Not only the leaders of training organizations, but also regular propagandists who conduct political lessons participate in them.

Many other favorable examples could be presented, but today we are guided in evaluating the quality of political lessons and their effectiveness by those high requirements which are imposed by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work." And, it should be said, here we still have much to do.

In recent years, the general educational and cultural level of the trainees has grown immeasurably. However, some teachers interpret the material in a simplified manner, sketchily, and replace a living, creative word with wordy, twaddle and all types of truisms and cliches. Naturally, such lessons do not provide the desired effect.

An important condition for the observance of a composite nature in indoctrination is development of the personality's activity, the conscious state of discipline of a person, and his responsibility. Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev noted: "Nothing so raises the personality as does an active life's position and a conscientious attitude toward public duty where unity of word and deed becomes the daily standard of behavior."

Our attraction of the trainees to active work in the course of which knowledge and ideas are transformed into conviction for them and into conscious motives for behavior and labor is also attained by those forms which are used, for example, in the Sevastopol' model naval school. Sloop trips are frequent here. But these are not simply drills or the improvement of technical knowledge. For the trip routes pass among places of past battles. Such trips are also practiced in the Zhdanov naval school. And then, the trainees of the Shorsu automobile school are accomplishing auto runs over routes of partisan glory (Chernigov-Brest).

The indoctrinational significance of such measures is indisputable. It is one thing to know by hearsay, and another to see with one's own eyes. To remember and preserve in one's heart. The sons are graphically convinced again and again that they are inheriting not only their fathers' names, but also their deeds.

The quality material-technical base, the experience of our teachers, and that active life's position which they generate in the trainees permit the attainment of high indices in labor indoctrination, too. Here, we have in mind not only the purely production successes of the youth at their enterprises, but also how they master the new technical specialty which is so necessary for successful service in the Armed Forces. For you see, training is also labor. And difficult. Literally in months, the trainee must not simply master a certain sum of knowledge and skills but must also prepare himself for independent combat work.

Our training organizations always oriented and will orient on the personal initiative of the teachers, masters of production training, instructors, and technicians and on their experience and knowledge. All this is a necessary addition to scientifically substantiated pedagogical recommendations.

The method, "Do as I do," received permission in the republic's schools. For example, who of the future aqualung divers does not want to accomplish a most difficult operation under water as freely and easily as is done by the honored coach of the UkSSR, diving instructor of the Kiev naval school, Viktor Ivanovich Ukrainets. And really, doesn't the high professional training of the teacher of the L'vov radio engineering school, Stepan Vasil'yevich Marinovich, who literally blindfolded can assemble and disassemble any unit or assembly serve as an effective, stimulating factor? But the possession of professional skill is inseparable from another principle of indoctrination: "Here is the problem, here is your teacher's opinion. And what is your opinion?" It is namely the application of this principle which permits the instilling of creative activity in the trainees and future servicemen. This scientific recommendation was checked in the Kiev radio school. Here, the trainees are not simply taught a subject but, figuratively speaking, they are taught to study....

It is also important that simultaneously with the working out of individual procedures the trainees are taught group actions and a situation is created in the lessons which requires mutual assistance. It must be confessed that trainees are still often encountered who at first underestimate physical training. They reason approximately as follows: "Why overload myself for no reason if machines do everything for us?" But you see, contemporary battle requires of each one not only valor but also previously unprecedented speed and clarity and, the main thing, the ability to withstand prolonged psychological and physical loads.

Many interesting lectures are usually given on this subject. But really, it makes much more sense if the lessons are as close as possible to the conditions of an actual combat situation. In this regard, the experience of many automobile schools of the Chernigov area and the Belotserkovskiy technical school (Kiyevskaya oblast) deserves imitation. Here, lessons in the practical driving of wheeled and tracked vehicles are conducted simultaneously with the accomplishment of tactical missions on the ground. The very conditions require the maximum straining of the trainees' strength. Several such lessons and talk about the needlessness of physical training stops. Conversely, more and more youths are coming in contact with regular sports lessons.

Last year, the Kiev model naval school was awarded the challenge Red Banner of the Ministry of Defense for high training quality. The Zaporozhets aerial club was awarded the challenge Red Banner of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee and the Central Committee of the aviation workers' trade union. The Nezhin automobile school has emerged among the best.

Even now, the Ukrainian training organizations are not reducing the tempos which have been assumed. Evidence of this is the awarding of the Soviet Navy's challenge Red Banner to the Khmel'nitskiy naval school. Planned assignments and socialist obligations are being accomplished successfully by personnel of the Zaporozhets aerial club, one of the initiators of the all-union competition among DOSAAF organizations.

Unfortunately, along with the leaders we still have many training organization, the quality of whose pedagogical work leaves much to be desired. Of course, the mastery and confirmation of an integrated approach to indoctrination everywhere is a difficult matter. There must be persistent work for the integrated approach, as the scientifically substantiated expression of party policy in the field of indoctrination, to become the methodological basis in organizing the work of our training organizations in the molding of the motherland's reliable defender.

Book Review on Modern Warships

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 16 Sep 79 p 4

[Review by Rear Adm (Ret) A. Rodionov, candidate of naval science, of the book "Sovremennyye boyevyye korabli" by N. S. Suvorov, V. P. Ivanov, and V. P. Fedorov, Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF, Moscow, 1978]

[Text] The number of seamen who have received good initial naval knowledge in DOSAAF organizations is increasing in our navy with each passing year. The more complete this knowledge, the more rapidly they master complex combat equipment and become rated specialists. The book "Sovremennyye boyevyye korabli" [Modern Warships] which has been published by Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF will also render substantial assistance to the youth preparing for service in the fleet.

The book is organized according to the principle "from the general to the particular" and successively acquaints the readers with the missions assigned to the Navy and with its organization, basic qualities, and combat capabilities of warships. The presence of the section, "General Information on the Geometry and Main Dimensions of Ships" in the first chapter helps the readers to obtain the necessary information on the theory of ships as a complex engineering structure. Without the knowledge of these theoretical principles it is impossible to understand such important propositions as buoyancy, survivability, stability, and unsinkability of a ship.

The book's authors show the basic difference in the purpose of the Soviet fleet and the fleets of the capitalist countries. Our fleet has been created to defend the state interests of the socialist motherland and, together with the other services of the Armed Forces and the forces of the countries in the socialist commonwealth, is a factor in the active protection of peace and international security. The fleets of the capitalist countries are an instrument for unleashing aggressive wars and suppressing the national-liberation movement in all regions of our planet.

Nuclear weapons and missiles of various classes which have been received in the fleets have attached a new character to combat operations at sea. The book under review tells in detail about the warheads, engines, control systems, launchers, and instruments for the prelaunch preparation and check-out of ballistic, cruise, surface-to-air, and antisubmarine missiles and their basic characteristics are given.

The book shows the direction in which such traditional combat means of the fleet as torpedoes, mines, sweeps, and depth charges developed and their contemporary status. Great attention is devoted to a description of ships electronic equipment.

The authors tell in detail about the layout, power plants and tactical and technical characteristics of surface ships and submarines and about the significance of surface and submarine forces as part of the fleets. Surface ships and submarines are important components of the fleet and the book's authors proceeded correctly by devoting equal attention to submarines and to surface ships.

The variety of combat missions and the conditions for their accomplishment led to the division of surface ships and submarines into a large number of classes, subclasses, and types. At present, the narrow specialization of ships continues to remain one of the basic trends in the development of the fleets of all countries. With consideration of this division, the authors also illuminate the layout of surface ships and submarines, their power plants, armament, and technical equipment. Having become familiar with the sections of the book devoted devoted to surface ships, the readers have a clear picture of the fact that in recent years abroad their development was characterized by the introduction of antisubmarine warfare [ASW] and assault helicopters, vertical-takeoff airplanes, antiship cruise missiles, artillery and missiles to combat low-flying aerial targets, electronic countermeasures, and automated control systems. Gas turbines and, on U. S. aircraft carriers and frigates, nuclear power, began to be widely employed. An important trend in the development of surface ships which the reader cannot fail to notice is the 1- to 2-fold growth in the displacement of aircraft carriers and 1.5- to 2-fold in escort ships in comparison with ships of the World War II period and the first postwar years. In this regard, top speed and endurance have remained virtually unchanged. What is new is the construction of surface ships on hydrofoils, on air cushions,and ground-effects ships which are capable of having speeds commensurate with the speeds of airplanes. In the opinion of foreign naval specialists, such ships can be employed as assault, ASW, and assault-landing ships and even for troop shipments.

The authors devoted great attention to submarines: their purpose, classification, layout, power engineering, and armament. A genuine revolution in submerged sailing was accomplished by the introduction of nuclear reactors as the main power plant. They ensure the attainment of high submerged speeds for a long time which eliminatedthe need to surface to replenish reserves of electric power, that is, which transformed the submarines into genuine underwater ships, and the appearance of missiles within overall dimensions which permit their placement on submarines transformed them into the fleet's main strike force.

The authors show how the qualities of diesel submarines improved and their combat capabilities increased on the basis of new technology. In contrast to submarines of former construction, they possess rather high submerged speeds.

But the book "Sovremennyye boyevyye korabli" is not free of shortcomings, either: Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to surface ships, 6, 7, and 8--to submarines, and 9, 10, and subsequent chapters--again to surface ships. Such "overlapping" is in no way justified. It would have been expedient to state in the book which fleets and flotillas are found in the Soviet Navy, provide a concept of the fleet's fighting arms, and define more precisely the terms "armament," "weapons," and "equipment" employed in Chapter 1. It is difficult to understand the table on pages 202-203 in the part on artillery weapons due to close printing.

On the whole, the book's author and editing collectives succeeded in telling about contemporary warships laconically and, at the same time, intelligibly. It will render substantial assistance to predraftees, seamen, petty officers, and a broad range of readers in expanding and deepening naval knowledge and will become a good aid in military-patriotic work.

Training Facilities in Kuybyshevskaya Oblast

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 26 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by A. Barskiy, deputy chairman, Kuybyshevskaya DOSAAF Obkom: "What is Interfering with the Construction Work"]

[Text] In recent years the material-technical base of the DOSAAF organizations in Kuybyshevskaya oblast have strengthened noticeably. In the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plans alone, 1,530,000 rubles have beendirected for the construction of buildings for the society's training organizations. This permitted tripling the balance sheet value of the structures. Good conditions have now been created in the majority of DOSAAF motor vehicle and technical schools for the conduct of theoretical lessons and improving the quality of practical training of future specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the solution of construction problems, very much depends on the initiative and businesslike efficiency of the leaders of DOSAAF organizations who step forth in the role of customers. Here is only one example.

In 1978, a shooting gallery with an estimated value of 100,000 rubles was constructed in Syzran' by the use of the organizations own resources and put into operation. At one time, the chairman of the DOSAAF gorkom, N. Marchenko, introduced a proposal concerning the necessity for the erection of this installation, became one of the most active organizers of the construction work, attracted many interested organizations to it, and constantly relied on the assistance of local party and soviet organs. The concerns were repaid a hundred-fold. City and inter-rayon competitions are conducted regularly in the shooting gallery and a rifle club has been created.

Chiefs of training organizations V. Sternik, I. Torchin, and many other leaders are purposefully involved in the development of the training-material base.

Much has been done. But nevertheless, the rates of build-up of the material-technical base in the oblast's DOSAAF organizations lag noticeably behind the growing requirements for the training of specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces and the national economy, for the development of military-technical types of sport, and for the initiation of all mass defense work. Now, special significance is acquired by the efficient organization of capital construction and the effective and zealous use of material and financial resources. It is namely this at which we are aimed by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers USSR, "On improving planning and intensifying the effect of the mechanism for using the organization's own resources to improve the efficiency of production and the quality of work."

In this connection, I should like to touch on a number of problems.

In my opinion, the organization of planning requires serious improvement. As a rule, installations needed by the defense society, including buildings of training organizations, are planned by unspecialized organizations. Here, the stipulated periods for turning over documentation are often dragged out and errors are committed which must be corrected in the course of construction. This occurred when planning the House for Military-Technical Instruction in Zhigulevsk and the first section of the motor vehicle school in Tol'yatti.

At the same time, the selection of standard plans is extremely limited. For training organizations, for example, it has been worked out only for schools of the third group. The use of plans for general educational schools or vocational and technical schools inevitably entails numerous revisions and additional expenditures.

And take vehicle driving grounds. It is absolutely clear that they cannot be constructed and equipped without shop drawings and estimates, being guided only be general drawings and diagrams. Therefore, the customers must put up with estimates which are worked out by the contractors themselves. As a rule, this leads to an unjustified increase in the cost of construction.

Another aspect of the matter. Even in a standard plan for a motor vehicle school there is no technological study of the outfitting of classrooms with standard equipment. Not having qualified specialists, local planning organizations require that all data on the technology of the training building or, let us say, the vehicle driving grounds be worked out by the customers. Meanwhile, the oblast DOSAAF committee has neither the personnel nor the resources for that, either.

What is the result of the incomplete work in technological planning which can be seen in the example of the Syzran' motor vehicle school. It moved to a new building several years ago. But because of the small size and inconvenient arrangement of the premises the classrooms cannot be equipped here in complete conformity with the requirements of the training process.

The problem can be resolved as follows: create zonal (inter-oblast) specialized planning groups or bureaus. Working on the cost accounting principle, they would render substantial assistance to the oblast DOSAAF committees in preparation and appraisal of planning and estimate documentation for the construction of installations and in working out the equipping of classrooms and sports structures.

It is also possible to follow another path: to create such sections in planning organizations which are already in existence.

Considering the limited number of standard plans, it is obvious that plans of buildings which have already justified themselves in practice should be more widely distributed and utilized. The publication of albums with the appropriate information, which does not require large expenditures, would facilitate considerably the preparation of planning documentation locally.

And something else. In our oblast were were convinced that it is most efficient and economically substantiated to construct training or training-sports complexes rather than individual buildings having narrow purposes. The complex of the Kuybyshev motor vehicle school No 2, for example, includes a training building, parking area, and driving grounds. The Zhigulevsk school was constructed according to this same principle and the motor vehicle school in Tol'yatti is being constructed in accordance with it. Of course, the initial expenditures on the creation of such complexes increase somewhat; however, they are quickly repaid through a reduction in operating expenditures. Nor is it hardly necessary to speak of the great opportunities which the complexes provide to increase the effectiveness and quality of specialist training. Here, it appears expedient to include in the training complexes areas for technical types of sport.

The time has also come to solve some organizational questions which are connected with the further initiation of construction. Thus, during the last three years the total volume of capital investments in the DOSAAF installations of our oblast tripled while the staff of associates in the section and their official duties remained unchanged. With the start of work on big installations, the post of technical supervisory engineer is earmarked and charged against the estimate of the construction work. But virtually no one is engaged with questions of construction work during the period of preparation of the construction. Hence oversights in support with documentation and a lack of coordination in supply.

In the future, too, the DOSAAF organizations of Kuybyshevskaya oblast will increase their efforts in the construction of the installations necessary for the further initiation of mass defense and sports work. The solution of the problems which hinder construction work will certainly help to conduct this important matter even more efficiently and economically.

Military-Technical Sports Reviewed

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 3 Oct 79 p 1

[Article: "For a Further Growth in Sports Skill"]

[Text] The Bureau of the presidium of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee examined the results of the competition finals of the 7th Sports Festival of people of the RSFSR in military technical types of sports. It was noted that the majority of the defense society's committees of the Russian Federation have done considerable work in the preparation and conduct of mass zonal and final competitions. Tens of millions of people took part in all stages of the sports festival. The increased mass nature of the competitions and growth in the physical tempering and sports skill of the youth are indicated by the following indices: more than 4 million youths and girls accomplished the rating standards of the Single Sports Classification, 805 people became masters of sport of the USSR, and 20 million passed the standards for the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] complex in firing with bullets.

The geography of military-technical types of sport has expanded significantly. For example, all oblast DOSAAF committees participated in competitions in motocross, 68 in competitions in aircraft modeling sport and the reception and transmission of radio messages, 63 in the motor-vehicle all-around combined tournament and "fox hunt," and 55 committees in military-applied and radio operators' all-around combined tournaments.

The combined teams of Moskovskaya, Novosibirskaya, Rostovskaya, Omskaya, Kuybyshevskaya, Vladimirskaya, Sverdlovskaya, and Chelyabinskaya oblasts and Primorskiy and Krasnodarskiy krays participated most successfully in the zonal and final competitions.

The sports achievements of the Moskovskaya, Novosibirskaya, and Rostovskaya oblast organizations were noted by the Council of Ministers USSR.

Important organizational work in the preparation and conduct of zonal and final competitions and propagandizing military-technical types of sport was conducted by the Vologodskaya, Ivanovskaya, Tyl'skaya, Komi, and Checheno-Ingushskaya DOSAAF obkoms.

A special role in the conduct of the concluding stage of the sports festival was played by the Omskaya oblast DOSAAF organization. Under the immediate direction of the CPSU obkom and with the active participation of party, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organizations and construction collectives the oblast DOSAAF committee was able to create a good material-technical base, receive the participants in the sports festival, ensure the organized conduct of 11 final competitions, and prepare and conduct on a high level an aviation-sports celebration which was attended by more than 200,000 residents of Omsk and the oblast.

Evaluating highly the sports achievements as a whole, the bureau of the presidium of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee at the same time turned attention to unresolved problems and the substantial shortcomings in the activity of a number of DOSAAF committees and organizations in the development of military-technical types of sport.

It cannot be considered normal when 43 oblast DOSAAF committees do not enter the necessary number of teams in 15 or more types of sport envisaged by the sports festival program. The Tuvinskaya and Kamchatskaya DOSAAF obkoms took part in only two zonal competitions, Yakutskaya in five, and Kalmytskaya in eight zonal and one final competition.

There have been no major shifts in the mass development of such types of sport as glider, motor races over cinder tracks, and underwater orientation. Many committees, training organizations, and sports and technical clubs of DOSAAF do a poor job in attracting the youths and juveniles to participation in model automobile-and shipbuilding. As formerly, insufficient attention is devoted to the creation and improvement of the material-technical base for the applied military all-around combined tournament in the DOSAAF primary organizations.

In a number of DOSAAF committees, primarily of the Kuybyshevskaya and Tul'skaya oblasts and the Bashkirskaya ASSR, little concern is manifested for the development of radio and motor types of sport.

The Central Committee bureau of DOSAAF USSR noted that several DOSAAF oblast organizations have reduced sports results in comparison with the 6th Sports Festivals of the people of the RSFSR. Gor'kovskaya oblast, for example, moved from 6th to 11th place, Saratovskaya from 10th to 15th, Tul'skaya from 9th to 16th, Volgogradskaya from 12th to 19th, and the Udmurtskaya ASSR from 16th to 22d place.

The task to develop military-technical types of sport in the primary organizations is being accomplished slowly. Thus, in the Orlovskaya, Tambovskaya, Pskovskaya, Orenburgskaya, and Kurskaya oblasts and in the Checheno-Ingushskaya, Mordovskaya, Buryatskaya, and Dagestanskaya ASSR's an average of only one to three competitions have been conducted in each DOSAAF primary organization in two and a half years.

The Irkutskaya, Chelyabinskaya, Sverdlovskaya, and Kemerovskaya DOSAAF obkoms were seriously reproached because they did not display the proper attention to questions of the organization, preparation, and conduct of zonal and final sports festival competitions.

The bureau of the presidium of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee approved the general-team results of zonal and final competitions of the 7th Sports Festival of the people of the RSFSR for military-technical types of sports and its results as regards mass nature, training rated sportsmen, and passing the GTO norm for firing with bullets.

The decision was adopted to award challenge prizes and certificates of the Central Committee of DOSAAF USSR to the Novosibirskaya, Rostovskaya, Omskaya, and Kuybyshevskaya oblast and Primorskiy kray DOSAAF organizations for high results in the general-team tests at the zonal and final competitions.

The Moskovskaya oblast, Krasnodarskiy kray, and Chelyabinskaya and Omskaya oblast DOSAAF organizations were awarded challenge prizes of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee for high indices in the development of military-technical types of sports. The challenge prize of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA PATRIOT was awarded to the Kaluzhskaya oblast organization.

The DOSAAF organizations of the Moskovskaya and Rostovskaya oblasts, Krasnodarskiy kray, Omskaya, Bryanskaya, Novosibirskaya, and Kuybyshevskaya oblasts, Komi ASSR, and Permskaya and Tul'skaya oblasts were awarded memorial prizes and certificates of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee for the results of the mass competitions of the sports festival involving the sum of three indices (mass nature, training of rated and badge-winning participants in the GTO complex for firing with bullets).

The bureau of the presidium of the DOSAAF USSR Central Committee required the oblast and kray committees to analyze the results of their sports collectives' participation in the final competitions of the sports festival, the analysis to be made in November and December, and to outline and implement measures for the further development and improvement of military-technical types of sports and improving the skill of the sportsmen. It is necessary to introduce modeling types of sports more widely in the training and primary organizations and technical and sports clubs of DOSAAF and to attract youths and juveniles more actively to pursuits in these types of military-technical sports.

Special attention should be devoted to improving the political-indoctrinational work with sportsmen, increasing the quality of training of qualified coach personnel, and the creation of the necessary conditions for coaching work with youths and juveniles.

Uneconomical Facilities Criticized

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 10 Oct 79 p 2

[Article by S. Tiro: "Empty Mansions"]

[Text] The House for Military-Technological Training gave a housewarming recently in Chernigovskiy rayon, Primorskiy kray. It is a high-quality building. Three-story. Concrete, glass, and aluminum. Spacious, light training rooms. Broad corridors, steam heat. In short, everything is present, but the Chernigovites are not pleased with their expensive gift.

"Why do we need such a mansion!" the senior bookkeeper of the Chernigovskiy DOSAAF raykom, Z. Krasnyuk, is indignant. "The kraykom spent almost 200,000 rubles on the construction work. And now, we are incurring losses...."

It turns out that when the construction of this building was being planned, they evidently forgot in the DOSAAF kraykom that Chernigovka is a comparatively small taiga village and not a city with a population of half a million people. And, not worried with economic calculations, they erected this house in the middle of the village. Now it devours so much electric power, steam, and repair resources that the income of the DOSAAF raykom is insufficient for its upkeep.

But you see, everything could have been weighed ahead of time. Is it necessary to erect such a structure in the village? Would it be sufficient to construct a good STK [sports-technical club] with two or three training classrooms? It would have been just as good and the public's money would have been saved.

Now the house is a heavy burden for the DOSAAF raykom. The "extra" classrooms are rented to public organizations. But, alas, this measure is not saving the raykom from financial difficulties.

Exactly the same house is being erected in Chuguyevskiy rayon, Primorskiy kray. And the same problems are there as in Chernigovka.

For the present, in these two rayons they are racking their brains over how to proceed with the empty training classrooms while in the kray's big cities --Nakhodka, Spassk-Dal'nyy, Arsen'yev, and even in Vladivostok--the chairmen of the DOSAAF organizations are literally suffering from a shortage of premises. They only dream about such Chernigovka-Chuguyev mansions.

To put it mildly, such lack of coordination is peculiar not only to the Primorskiy DOSAAFites. A secondary school was built in the Yevreyskaya autonomous oblast in the village of Leninskiy. Through the fussing of the sports public and the raykom, DOSAAF achieved the decision to construct a heated shooting gallery in it. The only one in the rayon!

They built it for seven long years. And then, finally, to the music of a brass band the DOSAAFites were given the key to the shooting gallery. It is a pleasure just to stroll through the shooting palace. Cool in summer, warm in winter. A concrete shooting gallery. An excellent bullet trap. There is a weapons room. There is a training classroom. There is an entire complex of cultural and everyday-services premises. One should be happy with such a shooting gallery, but the members of the raykom are sad. Why?

"Well, the shooting gallery is only 23 meters...."

"What!?"

"We asked the builders to lengthen the shooting gallery. But it can't be done: there is a hothouse behind it. Now we have what could be called a shooting gallery, but what kind of drills or competitions can be conducted in it?

"Almost 100,000 thrown to the winds...."

The DOSAAFites of Sovetskaya Gavan' lagged a trifle behind (for sum) as regards extravagance. Here, the House for Military-Technical Training was built quickly and with quality. And just as in Chernogovka they did too much too fast.

When the house was erected, the DOSAAFites asked the builders to break through several partitions and enlarge the training classrooms. It cost a pretty penny.

"But can't planning be done normally at once?" I asked the chairman of the Sovetskaya Gavan' DOSAAF gorkom, Yu. Velichko.

"Who will venture to get in touch with the builders?!"

It cannot be denied, the argument to justify the extravagance is very sound. True, scope and depth are not felt in it. It is a different matter, for example, in Amurskaya oblast. Last year, the Blagoveshchensk combined DOSAAF technical school gave a house-warming with great trouble. An assembly hall was placed in one of its wings. Everything is done with taste in it. Thirteen thousand rubles were spent on acquiring seats alone. Much money was spent on blinds, a rostrum, and so forth....

"But is it expedient for the school to have an assembly hall when there is an urgent shortage of training classrooms? Really, a gymnasium would not interfere with the trainees."

The chairman of the Amurskaya DOSAAF oblast, Yu. Bakin, answered my question with the firm conviction of a person who knows what he wants:

"The hall is extremely necessary. We conduct the plenums of the DOSAAF obkom here."

It goes without saying, the plenum is an important measure. But Yuriy Ivanovich forgot to add that they are conducted twice a year. The rest of the time, the wind strolls through the hall....

To administer zealously is not an empty phrase. It is a requirement of the times, of our life itself. Unfortunately, far from everyone understands this.

New Training Method Evaluated

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 31 Oct 79 p 3

[Article by L. Tsukerman, chairman of Khabarovskiy DOSAAF kraykom: "Problem Instruction"]

> [Excerpts] Our newspaper reported on the so-called method of problem situations which was used in the Khabarovsk naval school for the first time in 1972. Since then, the method has been used in a number of other training organizations of the society. And in the Khabarovsk naval school it has already become an important component part of training and indoctrinational work of many teachers.
>
> At one time the author of this article, L. Tsukerman, contributed much to this matter. In it, he discloses the principle of the problem method of instruction, shares his experience in employing it, and cautions against possible mistakes.

As is known, instruction is inseparable from indoctrination. Therefore, in the course of instruction it is necessary to use those methods which do not permit the trainee to remain only and simply a listener but force him to interpret the subject being studied creatively and critically. One of the methods which ensure the active participation of the trainee in the training process is the method of problem situations or the method of problem instruction.

With this method, information is not imparted to the students in a form which is convenient for assimilation, but is fed in the form of a problem. It is here that different, at times contradictory views on the subject being studied are pointed out. In this case, the trainees encounter certain difficulties which they cannot overcome by means of creative thought. The instructor, giving all those who so desire the opportunity to express their their opinions, listens to the various opinions and helps the audience to come to the correct conclusion.

The experienced teachers of the Khabarovsk naval school have been using the method of problem situations since 1972. But then, they were the first timid steps which were based on the recommendations of the journal SOVETSKAYA PEDAGOGIKA [Soviet Pedagogy]. Now, it is seven years of experience which shows that employment of the method provides good results.

How are they good?

First of all, no other method provides the opportunity for a fast determination of the level of knowledge of the trainees attending the lesson. There is no need to prove how important this is with a short instruction period.

Second, the method does not leave the trainees passive on the lessons.

Third, the striving to express one's opinion on the subject under study causes a spirit of competition on the lesson.

Finally, fourth, there is nothing more joyful for a trainee than the right to realize that he came to a correct conclusion independently, as they say, with his own mind.

However, experience shows something else, too: the method of problem situations must be used skillfully. Some young instructors commit mistakes. Two of them are studied most clearly.

The first one. The instructor does not consider that he should prepare for the conduct of a lesson using the problem method especially thoroughly in order to be ready to answer any question which arises in the course of the collective search for the truth. Situations which he devises ahead of time and on the lesson appear to be artificial and far-fetched. Therefore, they do not cause activity among the audience. The instructor's attempt to rectify the situation by posing newer and newer questions only leads to the unproductive expenditures of time and the lesson's material proves to be unassimilated. Later, during the analysis of his failure the teacher begins to criticize the method and frequently stops using it.

The second error. Individual instructors try to conduct all lessons using the same method. In this case, the questions, "What is your opinion?" and "What do you think?" simply become irritating and the goal is not attained.

In the Khabarovsk naval school, it was learned long ago that the method of problem situations should not supplant other methods of instruction. It is a component part of the instructor's work with the trainees. And it should be employed when the subject contains many debatable questions and when the activity of the students is necessary in order to draw a conclusion concerning the quality of their assimilation of material on a given subject and even on several preceding subjects.

Let us sum up what has been said. We were convinced that the method of problem situations is good. By itself, it has no negative aspects or minuses. But they appear at once, as soon as it is undertaken by a poorly prepared teacher who has not sufficiently mastered this method. This means that such an instructor must learn from his experienced colleagues. From those who are able to select a problem situation, interest the audience in it, and direct the conversation in the required channel.

I especially want to stress that with the use of the problem instruction method the instructor must keep track of the time and should not relax the military regime and the monitoring of the observance of the rules for internal order even for a minute so that the lesson is not turned into a "bull session." It is necessary that he improve his methodological skill, keep track of the latest pedagogical literature, and accomplish creative, independent work.

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AVIATION UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Commander Flight Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Aug 79 p 1

[Article: "Commanders' Flights"]

[Text] During the days of the summer training period, flights for combat employment in the Air Force, the aviation of the Ground Forces, the National Air Defense Forces, and the Navy are distinguished by high intensity. The aviators are sharpening their flying and tactical skill and learning the ability to utilize the capabilities of the equipment and weapons entrusted to them with effectiveness in contemporary battles on the ranges, in the zones of aerial battles, and on distant routes.

Many factors influence the effective and quality accomplishment of combat-training missions and ensuring flight safety. And this is primarily the level of flying and methodological skill of aviation command personnel. On the ground and in the air, the commander trains the aerial fighters, transfers his experience to them, and instills a sense of self-discipline, industriousness, and an inflexible will for victory. In a group flight, he is the leader, in battle--its organizer and director. The quality of the aviators' aerial ability depends to a great extent on the methodological and flying qualifications of the commander and on his ability to employ equipment and weapons effectively. Therefore, in the level of his flight training he must always be higher than his subordinates and possess the experience of controlling the subunit or unit with consideration of the requirements imposed by the combat situation.

The aviation flights, detachments, and squadrons are presently headed by young officers, as a rule. They need purposeful command training. Commanders' flights are a generally recognized school for improving the methodological and instructional skill of command flight personnel. The clear planning and skillful organization of these flights permit the attainment of unity in the procedure for teaching the aviators the most difficult elements of piloting and combat employment. Participating in them, commanders receive the opportunity to exchange experiences in the accomplishment of the most difficult exercises and master and introduce into practice new tactical procedures for aerial combat, strikes against ground and sea targets, and methods for assault landings of troops and the shipment of cargoes. Here, the staff is granted the broad opportunity to work out questions of coordination of men and equipment for the control and support of flights.

In the course of preliminary and preflight training, on flights, and on the postflight critique the commanders learn to assign a mission to subordinates in accordance with the requirements of the documents which regulate flying service, analyze their errors, organize socialist competition by missions and norms, and make skillful use of recording monitoring equipment to analyze the quality of the exercises being accomplished and the work of the aircraft technicians. Finally, commanders' flights permit their participants to raise their personal level of flying and instructional ability. The skills and knowledge thus obtained then help them to attain high results in the combat and political training of the personnel of the units and subunits.

The air regiment commanded by 1st-class military pilot Lieutenant Colonel V. Boldyrev is accomplishing the plan for combat training and operating without accidents and coarse preconditions for flying incidents. Here, the majority of the pilots are masters of combat employment. The aviation equipment and training base are maintained in exemplary condition and the norms for the actions of the subunits on the signal "assembly" have been reduced significantly. The young pilots have taken an appreciable step in their training. Clearly organized flights of the unit's command personnel played a large role in the accomplishment of these and other tasks for raising the regiment's combat readiness.

It is important to see that an innovational, investigative, scientific approach and the most efficient procedure for organizing and accomplishing missions in the air are inherent to commanders' flights. Stereotype and simplification as occurred in the Nth air unit are impermissible here. In the Nth unit, commanders' flights were organized so that they differed little from regular flights in which all aviators participate regardless of the level of their flying and instructional training. They prepared for flights without the proper responsibility and conducted them hastily. As a result, Senior Lieutenant M. Yaroslavtsev, who did not have the right to participate in commanders' flights. committed a coarse precondition for a flying incident.

We cannot put up with a situation where individual officer-leaders who give priority to concern for the number of hours of flying time and the accomplishment of immediate missions violate the established rules for permission to participate in commanders' flights. At times, they do not devote proper attention to the training of instructor personnel ahead of time. This has an unfavorable effect on the realization of training plans and programs and the accomplishment of exercises in the air with the established weather minimum day and night. In this case, the young aviators must learn from several instructors, as a result of which unity in flight training procedures is not ensured. And this occurs to a great extent because commanders' flights are not always exemplary and instructive for the participants, especially for young flight, detachment, and squadron commanders and, therefore, they do not attain their goal.

In organizing such flights, the flying-methodological training of commanders who are mastering the difficult art of instructional work for the first time must be at the center of attention of senior commanders. The careful planning of their theoretical training is required for this purpose. It is best to conduct it using the method of assemblies to which candidates for assignment to their first command duties should also be attracted. And during the conduct of flights, it is necessary to implement the effective monitoring of improvement in instructional skills and thoughtfully to teach the young commander methodological skill, the ability to make a deep analysis of the most typical errors in piloting technique, and how to eliminate them competently.

In the struggle for high quality in flying-methodological work and the exemplary organization and conduct of commanders' flights, the role of political organs and party organizations of units and subunits is great. They are called upon constantly to be concerned that such flights are not only a school for increasing professional skill, but also that they actively contribute to the molding of lofty moral-political and psychological qualities in the aviators. Well-organized party-political work and the effective use of socialist competition's mobilizing force are the most important conditions for raising the flying-methodological and instructional skill of aviation commanders.

The high level of ability of the command personnel is the decisive factor in the outstanding combat training of units and subunits. It is the duty of senior air commanders to attain the further growth in the professional maturity of those to whom have been entrusted the training and indoctrination of skillful and brave defenders of the motherland's skies.

Fighter-Interceptor Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Capt V. Dmitriyev, 1st Class Military Pilot, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Battle on the Verticals"]

[Text] The cotton-like flakes of a distant cloud were swiftly cut by two dots. They are "enemy" airplanes. "Action!" I order the wingman, Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Bolychev. On this command, one should change the wing sweep and turn on the booster. The wingman accomplished all actions in time. The distance to those being attacked began to decrease rapidly. We were the first to detect the target, and this means that we thereby had already obtained a tactical advantage. However, it still must be realized. For it cannot be excluded that the "enemy" is also trying to seize the initiative. And that is what happened.

Noticing us, those being attacked energetically executed a turn in our direction. We had to adopt immediate measures in order to preserve our speed advantage and prevent the "enemy" from getting out from under the strike.

In aerial battle, literally seconds are allotted to the analysis of the situation and the generation of a decision. The thorough, comprehensive preparation for the flight on the ground helps in this. We expended considerable efforts with Senior Lieutenant A. Bolychev and the flight commander, Captain M. Shemetko, in developing models of battle--a primary and alternate. On the advice of the flight commander, we paid special attention to the initial stage. For it is important to seize the initiative immediately and impose our will on the "enemy." We worked out several versions of the battle. Here, we also tried to consider the frontline experience of our brother-officers and the advice of the masters of aerial engagements.

For example, in telling about the accomplishment of difficult flying missions, military sniper-pilot officer I. Kuz'menko stressed many times: "Our airplane is maneuverable, with a powerful engine. It permits us to fight in a vertical plane, on a high power level." The ace's advice stood us in good stead.

We direct the airplanes at the zenith in order to attack the "enemy" from above. We now have a reserve of speed and altitude. We dive. The camouflaged fuselages of the attacked airplanes are distinguished against the variegated background of the Earth's surface, although with difficulty. It remained to execute a small turn in order to "corral" the leader's silhouette in the sight. But we did not succeed in executing this maneuver: the target took off upward swiftly, in an oblique loop.

It was necessary to be convinced once more that the "enemy" would not yield the victory so easily. He is distinguished by a high level of flying ability, orients himself in a difficult situation quickly and clearly, and masters the arsenal of tactical procedures well. But then, in the dynamics of the battle the attacked pair dropped, so it seemed, to the very ground. They understand that this will create additional difficulties for us in controlling the airplane. Actually irreproachable clarity in piloting is required to come out of a dive at a safe altitude. And all attention--to the ground! This was also utilized by the "enemy": in a turn, turning on the booster, he increased speed which permitted him to employ a vertical maneuver again.

Now, in order to execute an attack we must operate at an even swifter rate. The distance to the attacked airplanes decreases. In the sight, the airplane of the "enemy" pair's leader is again seen to approach the crosshair. A little more, and a rocket can be fired. But here I suddenly note: the speed of my airplane is dropping rapidly. I was carried away and overpulled the control stick! Will the attack really be foiled this time, too?

I look back at the wingman. I have been flying in a pair with Senior Lieutenant Bolychev only for several months. But he is a first-class pilot, and this helped us to attain a high level of ability in flying together and teamwork in actions quickly. He is distinguished by discipline in flight and the ability to make a rapid estimate of the situation and display initiative and activity. Of course, this is also considered by the flight commander and often gives him preference in determining the victor in competition with Captain Aleksey Petrichenko.

Now, Aleksandr is strictly holding his place in the combat formation and, at the same time, is attentively following the actions of the "enemy's" wingman. In case the attacked pair spreads, he is ready to fight independently. And then, when I found myself in a difficult situation I gave the command to my wingman with full confidence:

"Attack, I will cover you."

Increasing speed, the wingman moved forward. He turned to the right energetically. His voice soon sounded on the air: "I fired!" This was against the airplane of the "enemy" pair's wingman.

At this moment, the leader of the opposing side threw his airplane into a dive. But now I had superiority in speed and the tactical advantage. And I also succeeded in executing an irresistible attack. We accomplished the mission successfully. This was confirmed by the materials from recording monitoring. The victory was twice as dear to us because it was difficult to attain.

Air Regiment Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Capt V. Abramov, air regimental chief of aerial gunnery and tactical training, 1st-class pilot: "Teach Tactics Specifically"]

[Text] This is how it used to be. When flying a route the crew employed antifighter and antimissile maneuvers and launched accurate strikes against targets on the range. And although the mission was accomplished, the aerial fighters often felt no complete satisfaction. And what was the reason? Well, the fact that the crew had no data on the actions of the opposing side. And because it could judge the effectiveness of the maneuvers executed in flight to overcome the "enemy" air defense [AD] system only approximately. As regards this the navigator, Senior Lieutenant A. Lozhkin, even expressed the opinion once that, he said, the conventionalities of combat training do not permit one to become convinced of the high tactical and technical capabilities of our airplane. A combat situation is another matter. There, we learn at once the degree of training of the crew and whether it is able to break through to the strike objective which is densely covered by AD weapons. By the way, these questions also disturbed other young aviators just as much. They needed a graphic lesson.

And then, by agreement with the commander of an air defense missile subunit the aviators visited a missile-guidance station. They observed the actions of the air defensemen for a while. Here, the flight of aerial targets was simulated by bombers piloted by 1st-class military pilots Major A. Zvyagintsev and Captain A. Trusov. They received similar missions: to break through to the strike objective. But the selection of variants for reaching the target was knowingly limited for Captain Trusov and, as they say, his flight was tactically unsophisticated. In return, it was recommended to Major Zvyagintsev that he select the most effective of the arsenal of tactical procedures which we had worked out and make complete use of the aircraft's combat capabilities and great power-to-weight ratio.

The demonstration lesson proved to be instructive. Several young pilots and navigators who lined up alongside the men of the guidance station section observed how the actions of their experienced brother-officers are reflected on the radar scopes. Furthermore, they could also see the combat procedures of the opposing side.

The airplanes moved toward the objective at different altitudes, from different directions, and with optimum time interval. The first target--the bomber piloted by Trusov--appeared in the station's scanning sector at the calculated distance. Therefore, without experiencing a rigid time limit the operators detected it quickly and led it steadily, without gaps. Had this been a combat situation, the bomber crew would hardly have accomplished the assigned mission successfully.

But then a blip from the second target appeared on the radar scope. And right here its direction of movement and flight parameters changed sharply--Major Zvyagintsev undertook an energetic combat maneuver. And right after it--a second. Then, the station's scope became spotted with interference. The operator immediately switched over to manual control of the antenna and displayed maximum skill. But the bomber had already dropped to a low altitude and the pilot made skillful use of folds in the terrain; therefore, the radar intersected the target only for short periods. One more energetic maneuver by the airplane--and the tension of the station section's work reached the limit. Major Zvyagintsev's crew managed to break through to the target and launch an accurate strike against it.

By now, the young aviators were also convinced with their own eyes that mobility of tactical thought, firm will, and combat ability guarantee victory in contemporary battle to a great extent. At the critique of this lesson they were graphically shown once again, using materials from recording monitoring equipment which had been decoded, how to operate with the greatest results in difficult situations of breaking through to the strike objective and in the course of the attack and specific examples were used to explain to them the consequences of stereotype in tactics. Officers of the air defense missile subunit who had been invited also spoke here. This contributed to mutual enrichment by experiences. We began to practice such meetings more often.

Contemporary battle is dynamic, and frequent and sudden changes in the situation are typical of it. We consider this in the course of all lessons, to include during preliminary preparations for flights. With consideration of the special features and nature of the forthcoming flight, the crews work out variations of combat maneuvers which ensure overcoming the resistance of the "enemy's" air defense system and breaking through to the strike objective. Of course, the specific situation in the air may later require a different decision than the one which was assumed and simulated in the course of preparations. But the arsenal of tactical procedures is truly inexhaustible. And as a result of, one can say, research work the aerial fighters develop their operational thinking and acquire the ability to operate actively and decisively in the accomplishment of difficult combat-training missions and in a situation as close as possible to actual combat reality.

Commanders and experienced methodologists skillfully develop a taste for creative searches in the flight personnel. For example, 1st-class military pilot Major N. Kuz'minskiy sees that during tactical quickie exercises which are conducted in the classroom using electrified diagram models, specially prepared maps, and other aids an instructive situation is created which corresponds to the flight dynamics of the situation. He announces special situations in such a way that the pilot or navigator must thoroughly "shake out" his knowledge of the combat and tactical capabilities of the opposing sides and learn to make an intelligent decision without delay under conditions where time is short. Here the lesson director gives the students the opportunity to dispute the validity of the tactical concept of one crew or another and propose a new solution for discussion. Such a method contributes to the maintenance of an atmosphere of competition on the lesson and stimulates the aviators toward creative activity.

Pilots Captains N. Chernobel' and V. Barsukov and navigator Major A. Ufimtsev demonstrated profound knowledge many times on quickie exercises and in the course of group exercises. Typically, they also operate in flight in a combat manner, boldly, and actively.

...In the course of exercises the "enemy" began to bring up the tank reserve from the tactical depth of his defense. The aviators were ordered to launch two successive strikes against the target with a minimum time interval. The time for preparations was extremely rigid. One group was led on the mission by the flight commander, Captain Chernobel'. Executing an active combat maneuver, the crews broke through to the target at low altitude, using mountain ravines. Despite the jamming in the control channels and other methods of counteraction, they overcame the AD screen. The group of bombers was already above the assigned area, but where is the target? The "enemy" camouflaged the tanks thoroughly. But nevertheless, the aerial fighters discovered them from indirect signs. Rockets bracketed the target accurately.

The bombers of the other group soon appeared over the objective at a different altitude and from another direction and took a combat course. The smoke and dust above the ground hindered aiming with the optical sight. It was necessary to use the radar sight. The bombing strike also proved to be successful. The crew of 2d-class military pilot Captain Barsulov especially distinguished itself.

Frontline experience and today's practice convinces us: the more purposefully the military aviators supplement their professional knowledge and the more boldly they search for the most effective tactical procedures, the more rapidly are their fighter qualities strengthened and the higher the combat readiness of the subunits and the unit as a whole.

Flight and Ground Crew Teamwork

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Maj G. Ivanov, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Teamwork"]

[Text] The changeable weather in the local krays introduces its corrections in the combat training of the aviators. This is how it is. Having begun flights in accordance with the basic version of the planning table, after a while it is already necessary to switch to its alternate version. And in order to accomplish training-combat missions successfully, the aviators require high professional ability and combat teamwork in actions in all flights.

There is a clear, measured rhythm at the airfield. The position on which the technicians and mechanics under the direction of the deputy squadron commander for the Air Force Engineer Service, Major of Technical Service A. Vostrikov, prepare the airplanes for repeated takeoff is easily visible from the engineer's control post.

The roar of the turbines thunders in the sky. The combat machines take off and make their landing approach exactly at the time indicated in the planning table. Here the technician, Senior Lieutenant of Technical Service Ye. Suponev, is preparing an airplane for takeoff. He has the highest rated qualification--master. And this is felt from his confident, dexterous actions. The technician showed the driver of the airfield starter unit where to stop and he helped the pilot to sit in the cockpit and fasten the straps. Then he stood near the airplane at the point designated exactly for him. The flight technician and mechanic were at the places allotted to them. Attentively inspecting the airplane after the starting of the engine, they are convinced that all is in order. The pilot is given the taxiing signal.

"Do you note the teamwork in the work of the aviators?" says the senior flight engineer turning to me. "This helps to prepare the equipment in an exemplary manner and conduct a thorough takeoff inspection."

The following case occurred earlier. In preparing an airplane for repeated takeoff one of the mechanics did not close the lid of the fuel tank tightly in haste. This was noticed only on taxiing up to the start line. Why not at the position? It was learned that after the starting of the engine the technician and the mechanic stood side by side on the other side of the airplane. In short, because of a lack of coordination in their actions. This case served as a lesson. It was the subject of a conversation based on principle at a party meeting. The communists expressed recommendations on specific measures to improve teamwork in the work of the aviation specialists which correspond to the scientific organization of labor. For example, officer A. Vostrikov worked out the most efficient procedure for placing the specialists at the airplane which permitted them to monitor the quality of preparations and the takeoff inspection of the machine effectively. This proposal was then discussed and concretely defined at a session of the technical-engineering section of the methodological council headed by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel G. Novikov.

The improvement in the clarity and teamwork in the actions of the aviation specialists, flights, and service groups is also furthered by the contemporary level of air traffic control. Therefore, in the unit they were concerned that the engineer's control post is well equipped with all necessary communication and signalling equipment. Engineer-Captain V. Zaika and Warrant Officer [praporshchik] N. Tomka made a large contribution to this matter. Considerable sharpness and skill were required to create a panel with 200 switches. It is an electrical memory device for incoming information concerning the technical condition and degree of readiness of each airplane for flight. A microphone is alongside. The senior flight engineer has reliable communication with the aircraft parking places, the group for recording monitoring equipment, and the flight operations officer. Using a light panel, he issues instructions to the specialists of the rear services subunits and operates efficiently and with consideration of the situation which is developing.

The pilot's report was heard in the dynamic loudspeaker. "Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Poplutin is making a landing approach," explains officer Zaika. "We have to warn the technician." And just then the number 85 (the aircraft number) was set up on the control panel and was lit up brightly on the light panel set up on the position. This was a unique signal for Lieutenant of Technical Service A. Potskalev: he hurried off to meet his airplane.

Preparation of a combat aircraft for repeated takeoff is an important matter. The volume of work is large. And in the squadron, each second was considered as they prepared a clear schedule for each working operation. Here the pilot taxied to the parking area, and right then the aviation specialist placed a new film in the onboard recording monitoring equipment. And the exposed film was delivered at the laboratory immediately where it is processed and the records are decoded. If any deviation from the norm is discovered in the operation of the power plant or adhering to assigned flight parameters, the chief of the recording monitoring group, Captain V. Antonov, reports this immediately to the senior flight engineer.

Teams of specialists under the direction of officers V. Mokhnatkin and F. Soroka also participate in preparing the equipment. Formerly, each of the men in the service group seemed to work by himself. Sometimes, a lack of coordination arose. For example, to check "his" onboard systems one specialist turned on the assemblies, thereby hampering the work of another. The team method of work excludes such disadvantages. There is a better opportunity to coordinate the work of people more effectively and accomplish operations with quality with considerably fewer personnel because now all servicemen possess allied specialties.

In the course of flights, the living pulse of party-political work in mobilizing the men for the struggle for the quality accomplishment of combat-training missions is constantly felt. Showing up as examples in soldierly labor, the communists conduct individual talks and tell their fellow servicemen about those who have distinguished themselves. Means for graphical agitation are also used here. Thus, an operational news sheet reported in detail about the mutual help and comradely mutual assustance which was especially manifested in preparing one of the combat aircraft. The means of graphical agitation widely reflect the competition by missions and norms. The atmosphere of publicity and comparability of results multiplies the efforts of the men and contributes to the successful accomplishment of missions on the ground and in the air.

Squadron Retraining Methods

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Col A. Sorokin, Red Banner Central Asia Military District: "Checked in Flights"]

[Text] Several pilots from the 1st Squadron were selected for retraining on new equipment. The forthcoming meeting with the mighty missile carrier and with the focal point of contemporary equipment and armament possessing tremendous combat capabilities pleased and worried them. But the fear also lived: what if they do not conform to the rather rigid times. Where could trained instructors be found at first? The technical engineering personnel and rear services specialists have their difficulties and problems....

At the open party meeting in the squadron which is headed by Major F. Kiselev, the communists unanimously expressed themselves in favor of the broadest use of the experience of aviators who had already mastered this type of missile carrier. On the recommendation of the staff and the aviation political section of the Central Asia Military District, the regimental methodological council together with the party committee worked out a large list of measures for the assimilation of everything which had been tested by flight practice and for the introduction of experience in the transition to the new equipment which had been generalized in the leading unit.

True, this unit is not nearby, in another district, but nevertheless the opportunity was found for representatives of the regiment to visit it and become familiar with the state of affairs on the spot. Commanders borrowed the experience in organizing flights and training procedure, while the technicians armed themselves with everything best from the practice of servicing combat aircraft while working as probationers among their colleagues. And a group of skilled rationalizers, regimental artists, and amateur photographers which was headed by the deputy commander for flight training, officer Zh. Gataulliya, was assigned the mission to copy and photograph everything best from the equipment of the leading regiment's training-material base and to rework some things creatively. These efforts were repaid a hundredfold: they succeeded in renovating the training-material base here in the shortest times which, unquestionably, affected the results of retraining in the most favorable manner.

The political officers and party activists of the unit also grasped much that was useful from the leaders. Without hiding secrets, there they were acquainted with the efficient forms and methods for an integrated approach to the training and indoctrination of the personnel and possible difficulties which arise in the course of mastering new equipment and weapons were not concealed. Much advice came in useful in the best possible way for the organizers of party-political work and permitted the avoidance of errors which were committed by those who trod the unbeaten paths to the heights of combat skill and the exemplary servicing of the new missile carrier.

In particular, thanks to an analysis of leading experience, the communists came to a conclusion: it is also necessary to conduct work in good time in restructuring in some measure the psychology of the aviators in their attitude toward the new equipment and in breaking former skills which may become a hindrance in piloting. For example, it was necessary to assist the pilots to give up the "manual" method of making a landing approach and to use the automatic equipment in this matter. Even wider use of automatic systems was to be ensured in flights for combat employment. And the flight personnel had to "face" the automatic equipment so that each one was imbued with complete confidence and respect for their electronic assistants.

The work which was initiated in this direction in good time brought the desired fruits. The airplane which embodies the latest achievements of scientific-technical progress did not cause a sense of timidity upon first acquaintance with it in the air even in the comparatively young pilot. The instructor could judge this not only from the actions of the trainee in flight, but also from the entries in the "notebook of impressions" where each one candidly expressed his opinion about the airplane and the training procedure. Of course, the aviators were thoroughly prepared for this first meeting with the new aircraft. The commanders strived to conduct lessons on deepening and checking theoretical knowledge and practical drills in simulators as well as the gaming of flights on a high methodological level in accordance with the studies which were conducted on the basis of the best unit's leading experience.

But in some matters they proceeded farther than their predecessors here. For example, in preparing for instruction on the new equipment the unit's methodological council devoted a separate session to each pilot--to a discussion of his individual features, capabilities, and attained level of ability. This comprehensive consideration of all data permitted determining with high precision the optimum number of familiarization flights which ensured the quality of retraining, the observance of its times, and a considerable savings in material resources. On tactical flying exercises the aerial fighters demonstrated their ability to utilize the remarkable advantages of the contemporary missile carrier, accurately destroying all ground targets. Also instructive is the fact that the aviators accomplished retraining without a single precondition for a flying incident.

Now the other group of pilots is to travel this path. They assumed the obligation for a significant reduction in the retraining times. For this, it was important to make active use of leading experience. Thus, for example, the technicians had already done their probationary work with their neighbors, the training material base had been created ahead of time, and most important--before the aviators was a living, graphic example of the pilots from the 1st Squadron with whom they are competing and whose successes they are zealously following.

The party committee headed by Major L. Plokhetskiy conducted important work to gather the valuable experience and place it at the disposal of those who were to master a type of airplane which was new for them. The experience of Captains I. Yeremenko and Yu. Koshkin, Captain of Technical Service L. Tarasenko, and other pilots and technicians was generalized. Well illustrated pamphlets with a detailed description of the very essence of the leading experience served as a great help for the aviators. Along with this, the method of narration and demonstration of the best procedures in their work was widely used.

A significant place in generalizing leading experience was devoted to such forms of moral encouragement, which were born in the course of the retraining, as awarding a pilot a memorial card in a ceremonial atmosphere after the first successful accomplishment of a solo flight in the new missile carrier and giving the technician the logbook for the combat aircraft assigned to him.

The commander and party activists strived to arm themselves with everything better that demonstrated its effectiveness in the practice of combat training. However, they did not perceive it thoughtlessly--they analyzed and improved some forms and methods. For example, corrections were introduced in the procedure for the conduct of the pilots' preflight preparations. And Major of Technical Service N. Kolesnikov decided to begin each preliminary preparation with the technical personnel with a critique of actions on preceding flights and was convinced that remarks are realized much better than formerly when the critique was conducted immediately after the flights. They were also concerned about increasing the effectiveness of competition. For this purpose, the effectiveness of information sessions on the course of the competition was increased. At the airfield, the results of flights for combat employment began to be reported over loudspeaker communications and this helped to increase the spirit of competition.

And the pilots accomplished the tasks in retraining successfully and in shorter times. However, someone was let down by excessive presumption:

one of the best flight commanders, Captain V. Saklakov, overestimated the abilities of his subordinate, Senior Lieutenant I. Krakosevich, and did not properly monitor his preparations for flight, and the latter committed a serious precondition for a flying accident.

But we must give the squadron's communists their due--they drew the necessary conclusions from what had happened and, with the aid of the party committee, they adopted all measures to prevent such blunders in the future. Subsequently flights took place here without any deviations. The pilots accomplished all combat training missions on a tactical flying exercise with high results, destroying the majority of the targets with an excellent grade and the remainder with a good grade.

The high level of aerial ability of the aviators who mastered new combat equipment in short times proves convincingly once again the great significance which is had by the effective introduction of leading experience into training practice.

Flight Support Battalion Activities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant M. Polyanskiy, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Two Paths to One Goal"]

[Excerpts] On the day in question, the motorized maintenance company arrived at the airfield before daybreak: flights were beginning at dawn. The practical tension did not leave the people. They were required to have outstanding skill in order to service the winged machines quickly and in a qualified manner.

At the end of the flight shift, when concerns subsided a little, I glanced at the duty officer for airfield technical service and maintenance. Warrant Officer M. Bukhachenko did not fail to share his joy:

"Not one airplane was late in taking off." He passed his hand over his tired face and smiled. "My ears are really ringing, but my attitude is excellent."

Attitude is excellent..... These words can now be heard more and more often in the separate airfield technical service and maintenance battalion. The people seemed to have been transformed outwardly and to have gotten their second wind. The most difficult and important tasks are being undertaken more boldly. Many communists correctly link these good changes with the arrival of the new commander, Lieutenant Colonel I. Burka, a skillful methodologist who possesses deep professional competence. But it is believed that this is not the only merit of Ivan Orestovich. The former battalion commander also knew the equipment like the palm of his hand and possessed good organizer's skills. The battalion was among the leaders for two years. The senior commanders spoke of it in a flattering manner for two years. But here is the paradox: in the collective they were not very pleased with their victories in the competition. Moreover, the former enthusiasm of the people and their initiative began to die down with time. Against a background of general well-being, these symptoms caused frank bewilderment among some of the senior commanders. And meanwhile, the "drop in temperature" of the moral climate did not occur without the influence of the battalion commander. In striving to accomplish the assigned missions efficiently, he armed himself for some time with so-called strong-willed methods of influencing people. In conversations with people he was coarse and forgot about sympathetic attention and warm words and what they are.

For some reason, he considered a scornful attitude toward subordinates and a preemptory shout to be almost the standard of behavior and explained it by the interests of the matter. The impression was formed that figures on the growth of experts and rated specialists and the number of certificates and pennants won seemed to shield the battalion commander from living people and from their worldly joys and grievances. And it is no surprise that the service zeal of the men began to die down more and more noticeably....

But then a new commander arrived at the battalion. Everyone immediately noticed his kindness and compassionate attitude toward his subordinates. The school through which Lieutenant Colonel I. Burka, who had been secretary of a party organization and a political officer, had passed was divined in his ability to win the favor of a person and engender frankness. But nevertheless, it is believed that the turning point in the attitude of the people occurred considerably later. Perhaps, after a memorable party meeting.

The communists went to it not without nervousness. They were accustomed to hearing harsh, at times offensive words from the rostrum. But Lieutenant Colonel Burka gave a speech on how to carry the men along together to new positions in combat training and return its former glory to the battalion. He did not begin to impose his opinion peremptorily, but seemed to share his alarm with the communists and called upon them to reflect.... I had not seen people so inspired for a long time. The conversation at the meeting turned out to be businesslike, interesting, and ordained good changes.

How keenly people respond to attention, to kindness! The spiritual inclination of Ivan Orestovich Burka toward his subordinates was reflected beneficially in the vital tone of the collective. The surge of initiative and creative tension, perhaps, told about the attitude of the people better than any words. Here are only several features.

The opinion may be formed that Lieutenant Colonel Burka is kindness alone. In fact, this is not quite so. Simply put, commander's demandingness is fortunately combined with respect for a person in him. And Ivan Orestovich compares each of his steps and each of his actions with the highest yardstick of party conscience. In my opinion, the following example is instructive in this regard. Representatives from higher headquarters were checking the condition of equipment in the battalion. It became the turn of the vehicle of driver V. Pugachev. The inspector was already prepared to place a high grade in the record but Lieutenant Colonel Burka stepped in. At the last moment, he discovered that that not everything was well in the preparation of the vehicle and he did not remain silent about it.

This was an instructive moral lesson which the commander taught to his subordinates. And they are learning devotion to principle and honesty from him on just such lessons.

Two battalion commanders. Two different approaches to the solution of the problem of training and indoctrinating subordinates. In the end, one suffered failure and inflicted substantial moral losses on the collective. But the other managed to create an atmosphere contributing to the development of initiative and devotion to principle. And the strength of the people seemed to be doubled while the results in combat training became more noticeable and ponderable. This confirms once more that the leader's work style must be built on a party basis. On that basis which presumes both high demandingness and a concerned, sensitive attitude toward a person.

Combat Tradition Importance

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Maj B. Abrosimov, 1st-class military pilot: "Stars on the Fuselage"]

[Text] The first trip to the airfield by Lieutenants V. Bakayev, G. Mashevskiy, V. Vostrikov, and other young pilots who arrived at the regiment after completing school is recalled. They looked at the rows of brilliant stars adorning the airplane fuselages with joyous wonder. These missile-carrying aircraft appeared to the lieutenants as if they had come down from photos of the front or were museum exhibits even if they remotely resembled the nimble "hawks" from the time of the Great Patriotic War.

But why did dense rows of stars appear on the sides of the supersonic missile-carriers? On fighter aircraft they can only mean one thing: the number of victories won by the pilot in battle. For these aircraft could not have participated in aerial engagements--they had left the plant gates comparatively recently. And the majority of the aviators flying in them are young. But there is not one among them who would not know the glorious frontline tradition. So the lieutenants, each of whom is is little over 20 years of age, know well that each star means a victory in aerial battle.

Yes, contemporary missile carriers have not taken part in war, but in them the pilots went into swift attacks and waged battles, true, training battles, but very intense missile battles. And they even shot airplanes down. Real jet aircraft, high-altitude and flying at speeds which would appear to be fantastic to the frontline aces. It is only that no one is sitting behind their control wheels--they are unmanned target airplanes which are controlled by radio. They maneuver and change course, altitude, and speed of flight. Such a hypothetical enemy cannot be called an easy prey! The dearer the victory. I know from my own experience: a pilot in observing how burning fragments are falling in the distance experiences the joy which, probably, is akin to the victorious feeling of the frontline fighter pilot when the latter sent the fascist aerial pirates toward the ground.

This tradition, which had been brought back, pleased us pilots. It lifts the spirit, inspires the youth, and really lets veteran aerial fighters feel that they are genuine fighters while giving strength in a difficult tactical search. Looking at such masters of missile attacks as Majors V. Maslennikov, and M. Ryabukhin, Captain A. Bashilov, and other aces of ours whose sniper strikes are evidenced by the stars on the fuselages of the airplanes assigned to them, the young pilots strive to be their equals.

Commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol activists are conducting important work in propagandizing glorious traditions which helps to instill in the personnel a will for victory and to mobilize their efforts for the taking of high positions in socialist competition. The activity of this work increases especially in the period for the preparation for flight with combat employment and with the accomplishment of actual launchings of missiles against radio-controlled target airplanes. Also participating in the competition for destroying targets on the first attack with the first missile are young pilots. By the way, in the current training year Lieutenants V. Bakayev, G. Mashevskiy, and V. Vostrikov about whom we spoke at the beginning took a large step in aerial training and were permitted to accomplish practical firings on the range against target airplanes. Shooting them down, they were awarded the honor or marking their first victory with a star on the side of the airplane.

This is a lofty honor. But not only for the pilot. For the contemporary aviation complex is a collective weapon. Specialists of many services participate in its preparation. The pilots even say that the basic guarantee of success in launching sniper missile strikes is in the faultless operation of all flight instrument and navigation systems and the armament of the aviation complex. And it is ensured by the technical engineering personnel. Therefore, each star on the fuselage testifies not only to the crew's flying skill, but also to the high technical style of the aviation specialists.

And the crew's aviation specialists experience pride from the consciousness that they also made a ponderable contribution to the attack's success. Here a fighter with the aircraft number "54" is noticed among the other airplanes on the parking area. It is distinguished by the fact that more than 15 stars are on its side! Different pilots flew in it to intercept high-speed targets. And here the very same specialists prepared the aircraft for flight: aircraft technicians Senior Lieutenants of Technical Service A. Trofimov and V. Dmitrenko and senior mechanic Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Kibal'nikov. The pilots know of no failures on the airplane which they prepared.

The technicians and mechanics of this outstanding crew are competing with the specialists who service the airplane with the aircraft number "08" and are holding on to first place.

The plan for party-political work in the regiment mentions many measures for indoctrinating the personnel in the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of our people, the Armed Forces, Soviet aviation, and their own unit. For example, not so long ago we held an exciting meeting with the first commander of our regiment, Colonel (Reserve) V. Sinyukayev, honored military pilot of the USSR who was decorated with many orders and medals for exploits in the war skies, and with the first commissar of the unit, Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) G. Gladchenko, also an honored veteran. They were both very pleased by the fact that a remarkable frontline tradition--marking the number of victories in aerial engagements with stars--is again in combat practice.

"Look at these constellations," say the veterans, "and it's as if you again see yourself on a frontline airfield. The combat record of the regiment's snipers is growing, and that means that we have passed the baton to reliable hands!..."

Fighter-Bomber Training Methods

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Stolyarov, member of party committee of an air regiment, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Contrasts of a Flying Day"]

[Text] On this flight shift the young pilots of the squadron commanded by Major I. Ivanov were to launch bombing strikes independently from a difficult type of maneuver for the first time. While the flights were in full swing, I dropped in at the laboratory where specialists under the direction of Warrant Officer [praporshchik] N. Yemelin were processing the records from the onboard flight recorders. It was here that Lieutenant Vladimir Shoshev examined the materials of the repeated sortie which had just been accomplished. I asked him about the bomb hits.

"I don't know," the pilot answered and explained: "The flight operations officer at the range will bring the grading sheets tomorrow. Then we'll know."

Running ahead of the story, let me say that the results of the lieutenant's practical bombing proved to be low. This was completely unexpected for him. But why? For from the photo film which records the sight screen while the bombs are being dropped, it could be determined immediately after the flight that the hits would not be distinguished by high accuracy. But having examined other materials from recording monitoring, Lieutenant V. Shoshov showed no interest in this photo film. He took off again, and again the same result.... Nor was his rival in socialist competition, Lieutenant V. Shishin, interested in the photo check data.

Where did the young pilots receive such a scornful attitude toward materials of recording monitoring? For these films help to determine the reasons for errors and to eliminate them in time, and they permit comparing the results of flights for combat employment, thereby raising the spirit of competition. But evidently, this has already been established in the squadron. When I asked a flight commander to make at least an approximate estimate of how the bombs hit from the photo film, he could not even tell me whether it would be over or short....

On this day, no publicity was provided for the competition although there were possibilities for this. For example, a flight commander, Major Yu. Vasil'yev, remained on the ground for the entire first half of the flying shift and he had sufficient time to keep Lieutenants V. Shoshev and V. Shishin, who are subordinate to him, informed about each other's deeds and, thereby, to maintain a spirit of competition between them. However, neither young officer knew the results of his competitor's flights to the range. One of them "placed" the bombs for a grade of "good," and the other--for a three. If an exchange of experiences had been organized between the pilots, and the commander had found the time to talk with his subordinates, there would have been no such contrast in the bombing results.

It is evident that the absence of a well-organized, effective exchange of experiences in this flight even affected 1st-class pilot Captain V. Krasnoyarskiy and he only hit the bombing target with a grade of satisfactory. As a result, the total grade in the flight commanded by Major Yu. Vasil'yev proved to be four tenths lower than in the flight commanded by Captain A. Poberezhets who effectively ensured the comparability of results in the actions of his subordinates. Being in the air in the area of the range, he noticed that the bomb dropped by Lieutenant I. Novikov lay at a considerable distance from the target. After landing, the flight commander analyzed the pilot's actions on the combat course and advised him to adhere to the assigned flight conditions more exactly. And he said at the end: "Keep in mind that your rival, Lieutenant Vladimir Datsenko, placed the bomb directly in the ring." The lieutenants met and discussed methods of operations above the target. On the repeated flight, Novikov launched an accurate bomb strike.

One may object: he would say that in the place of officer Poberezhets who had the opportunity to observe directly the actions of his subordinate any commander would have proceeded in the same way. And from the photo one can determine only approximately where the bombs landed. Yes, but the squadron commander and his deputy for political affairs, Major I. Fayzullin, have direct communications with the flight operations officer at the range available. They can learn at any moment the results of a sortie by any pilot and transmit the information to flight and group commanders. By the way, Major Yu. Vasil'yev did not have to wait for this information from anyone. For in heading the subunit's party organization, he himself is one of the first assistants to the commander in directing the socialist competition in the squadron.

Such contrasts in the actions of pilots and leaders of the competition in the squadron are even more impermissible when literally weeks remain to the end of the training year and each day is especially dear. A pointed, impartial conversation about this took place at a session of the party committee. Measures were adopted to improve publicity concerning the competition and the effective exchange of experiences in the flights and groups.

6367
CSO: 1801

MILITARY-PATRIOTIC TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 79 p 2

[Excerpts from the article by Gen Arm V. Varennikov, commander of the Red Banner Carpathian MD: "A Heroic Feat in the Carpathians"]

[Text] A high level of combat tension prevails these days on the tactical fields, the airfields, the tank parks, and at target ranges, in fact everywhere that personnel of units and subunits are improving their military expertise. The Carpathian soldiers do not lack the forces to successfully complete the academic year and to fulfill their socialist obligations. As always, in exercises and tactical training the unfading call is heard to act as on the front lines. This summer it carries special meaning for everyone. Personnel are carrying out combat training missions with the thought that 35 years ago battles raged here in the Carpathians. The L'vov-Sandomir strategic offensive operation was carried out here in July and August of 1944. The forces of the First Ukrainian Front added an impressive page to the history of soviet military skill.

For 35 years a new life has flourished in the Carpathians which had been scorched by battles. The famous achievements of the workers of L'vov and of other cities and villages of the Western Ukraine, who are persistently working toward fulfilling the historic decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress are a worthy continuation of the heroic feats of the frontline soldiers.

The western oblasts of the Ukraine which had been backward in the past have been transformed into a highly developed industrial and agricultural region. All of them have been awarded the order of Lenin for achievements in the building of communism.

Machine building, instrument making, power engineering and electronics have undergone extensive development in the Carpathians. Coal is mined in the L'vov-Volynsk coal basin using the latest equipment, and high quality sulphur is produced. The L'vov bus plant, the Rosdol and Yavorov mining and chemical combines, the Zhitomir "Electric Meter" plant, and many others have become the pride of the entire country. It is well known that an overall system for product quality control was developed and put into use for the first time in the L'vov plants. It has been approved by the CDSU Central Committee and has been widely disseminated throughout the country.

My duties require me to visit different areas of the Carpathians. One sees it is growing more beutiful and how this land of plenty is becoming richer from year to year. And everywhere one senses that the people fervently preserve the memory of the heroic feats of the frontline soldiers. For example, one of the brigades of the L'vov television plant includes in its list of workers the Hero of the Soviet Union Guards 1st Sgt A. Marchenko, a brave tankman who heroically perished while hoisting the banner over liberated L'vov.

The cities and villages of the Carpathians regularly hold special observance months for the popular defense effort, conduct walks to the sites of revolutionary, combat, and labor fame, hold regional, city, and oblast meetings for draft age and pre-draft age youth and soldiers' mothers. A ceremonial ritual has been created for conducting the youth into the Armed Forces. In many enterprises training points have been equipped for working with predraft age youth.

Veterans of the war and officers of the units and subunits of the district often deliver reports and lectures on military and patriotic themes in the enterprises of the western oblasts of the Ukraine. And the population lovingly protects the revolutionary and historical monuments and the communal graves of those who gave their lives for the freedom and independence of the Motherland!

A great contribution to the patriotic education of the rising generation is made by the museum for the history of the district's forces and by the museums for combat fame of units and subunits. Hundreds of thousands of students, workers, employees, and kolkhoz workers visit them yearly. Pioneer meetings are held here as well as admittance into the Pioneers and Komsomol. Military and patriotic work has acquired new scope since the appearance of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Education Work."

Three-and-a-half decades have passed since the successful completion of the L'vov-Sandomir operation. And the memory of the immortal feat of the frontline troops is passed from generation to generation as a holy tradition. This memory is active. The military feat is continued in the peaceful accomplishments of the people and in the creation of communism.

11,220
CSO: 1801

PHYSICAL TRAINING PROGRAM FOR OFFICERS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Aug 79 p 4

[Article by Lt Col M. Konfindratov, chairman of the Unit Sports Committee, Southern Forces Group: "Strong Participation in the 'Officers' Games'"]

[Text] It seems that the first "Officers' Games" competitions took place just recently. They were not without their sceptics then. "What is the purpose of this innovation," they said. "There are already enough sports programs." The competitions, however, caught on, and for the commanders they serve as a good aid in involving officers in regular physical training and sports activities. Here is a small illustration. During the first games it suddenly became apparent that in our unit several pilots and technicians did not know how to swim and were weak in completing even the simplest of exercises on the equipment. They felt clumsy in the company of their comrades, and it became necessary for them to begin training seriously.

However, the important thing was that the influence of physical improvement on the combat training of the aviators was noticeably strengthened. The principle was confirmed that where there is ability in sports, professional capabilities are also high. I will refer to the example of the squadron commanded by Lt Col R. Bakeyev. According to last year's results it was best both in training and in the "Officers' Games."

The example of this squadron and the experience gained in the unit bear witness to the fact that the officers' competitions are primarily strong due to mass, 100 percent participation; otherwise they lose their purpose. Therefore, when the members of the regiment's sports committee considered the problems of training for the coming games, they thought out measures which would eliminate or keep to a minimum the chances for officers to miss exercises in physical training. We conduct such exercises during the mornings in the course of one hour. This is the optimum time, and practice has indicated that it is convenient for everyone.

It is true that at the first sessions several officers (primarily headquarters and service workers), claiming urgent business, tried to avoid the training and participation in the competitions. They were strictly prevented from doing this, and this fact itself served as grounds for discussion in the party organizations where the communists who had underestimated the new form of organization of the physical improvement of officers were subjected to serious criticism. Now the situation is different. The officers prepare carefully for every championship.

In the efforts to develop the "Officers' Games" a great deal depends on the commanders of the subunits. Take, for example, the same Lt Col R. Bakeyev. He does not fail to be present at the physical training exercises, personally conducts the limbering-up exercises with the officers, and carefully monitors the actions of the team commanders who, in turn, control the training of subordinates for the competitions. It is well understood in this subunit that improvement in physical ability depends primarily on the general level of interest and timely answers to the many organizational questions.

Let us take, for example, the work with the ensigns who were included this year in the "Officers' Games." In this category of soldiers are older people and others who, for a variety of reasons, have not engaged in sports for a long time. They cannot be immediately expected, for example, to meet the standards for swimming. Needed here are tact, an individual approach, and demonstration by the commanders of pedagogical expertise. They must convince the man and teach him. Working in precisely this way is the chief of the equipment and maintenance unit, Engr-Sr Lt V. Samodurov. An energetic officer, he leads all training of the ensigns.

It is gratifying that the "Officers' Games" are held in the presence of all the inhabitants of the military post, which naturally produced interest in sports among the family members of the servicemen.

However, there is still much that must be done in order that such competitions become truly popular. For example, it is necessary to be more active in arousing interest and the desire to participate among the ensigns and to help them raise the level of their physical ability. Even at the present time it is sometimes difficult for some soldiers of this category to compete on the same level as the officers. In particular, they are inferior in firing practice accuracy and in the ability to swim well. Therefore, it is thought that the ensign schools should devote the most serious attention to improving training in the pool and to instructing the students in pistol firing.

In our view the evaluation system requires improvement. It makes no difference now how many of the unit participants in the competition fulfill the standards of the highest ratings; in practice it turns out that a collective is awarded the same number of points for the training of a first-rating player as for training a third-rating sportsman. It is clear that this point must be reexamined since it is important not only to achieve mass participation in the military competitions but also to devote attention to the constant improvement in the soldiers' sports expertise and to raising the quality of the training. Moreover, how, under the existing system, is it possible to encourage those who strive for the highest accomplishments?

The sports collectives are awarded cups and certificates. The individual soldiers, however, who have shown good results, judging by the present situation, are not mentioned at all.

Sometimes it is simply impossible to receive the first rating during the "Officers' Games." The right to award it is held by a referees' brigade which includes a specific number of umpires with qualifications not lower than the first rating. But where can they be found and how and where can they be trained? It is difficult to solve this problem in the unit using our own efforts.

We are in need of the appropriate methodological aids and the recommendations for organizing the training for the games, for carrying them out, and for selecting the types of sports. We are waiting for them first from the Military Institute for Physical Education.

Life suggests that it is necessary to expand the program of competitions and to organize them in the winter as well. For example, why not introduce skiing competitions for those units stationed in the snowy regions of the country. Perhaps it is worth reexaming the length of the competitions; 2 days for conducting them is rather little. Four days would be better, taking into account the performance of daily duty and other measures.

The "Officers' Games" have become popular now. They facilitate improvements in health and support a high level of combat training and work capacity among the personnel. Therefore it is very important to actively eliminate those factors which hinder their wide dissemination.

11,220
CSO: 1801

AKHROMEYEV DISCUSSES U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS POLICY

Moscow NOVOSTI DAILY NEWS in English 24 Dec 79 pp 1-6

[Text of NOVOSTI interview of Army Gen Sergey Akhromeyev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "What Is Behind the Pentagon's Concept of 'Strategic Sufficiency'"]

[Text] Question. What is the essence of the present-day American nuclear strategic doctrine? Judging by the statements of Western officials, the USA is banking on making a shift in its favour in the alignment of forces with the USSR. Is this conclusion connected with the nuclear doctrine of the Pentagon which is in effect now? Is this intention seen behind the concrete plans and moves of the US military leaders?

The analysis of the present US nuclear doctrine shows that underlying it is the concept of the so-called "strategic sufficiency." According to this concept, the American strategic nuclear forces are oriented to maintaining such quantitative and qualitative levels which would give the USA an advantage in strategic arms over the USSR and would enable it to work for attaining its foreign-policy goals from the position of strength in the event of any change in the international situation.

The American strategic forces are based on the idea of "a wide choice of the versions of combat use and of targets." From my point of view, this evasive formula actually means the USA's striving to be able to deliver preemptory nuclear strikes guaranteeing the destruction of the enemy or, at least, of its resistance potential.

This is not mere theory. The analysis of activities of US administration in the past few decades shows that such ideas have been continuously laid down into the programmes for building up strategic forces and polishing the methods to use them. The main stress in this field is being laid on the qualitative improvement of the so-called strategic "triad" of the USA.

First of all, it manifests itself in the equipment of the intercontinental land- and sea-based missiles with multiple warheads and in the buildup of the total number of the warheads, the number of delivery vehicles remaining unchanged. The USA has long switched from missiles with one nuclear warhead to missiles bearing fourteen warheads. While in 1970 the US strategic forces could deliver about 4,000 warheads to the targets, at present, according to Defence Secretary Harold Brown, they can hit targets by 9,200 nuclear warheads simultaneously. Melvin Laird, the former Defence Secretary, tried to prove way back in the early 1970s that in the interests of strategic parity with the Soviet Union, the USA had to possess six times more warheads than the USSR. This is how the Pentagon chiefs interpreted (and many of them are interpreting now) the principle of equality and equal security.

Large-scale work on raising the accuracy of missiles is under way. The past few years have seen the improvement in the accuracy of the Minuteman-3 land-based missiles and the simultaneous doubling of their warheads' yield. This year, submarines carrying new Trident-1 missiles, whose accuracy is much higher than that of the Poseidon missiles which are being supplanted by the Tridents, have begun to be introduced in the US Navy. The Pentagon's plans for the 1980s provide for the adoption for service of new MX land-based missile complexes as well as the submarine-carried Trident-2 missiles, whose greater accuracy, combined with enhanced range and yield of warheads is certainly designed to hit crucial small-sized defended targets. The new type of the nuclear weapons delivery vehicles--long-range cruise missiles--are now being intensively developed in the USA. These missiles will have the accuracy measured not in hundreds but in several dozens of metres.

The enhancement of the viability of U.S. strategic weapons is considered as another direction in the Pengaton's efforts to reach a "sufficient" nuclear potential. This is the aim of the work on developing the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles as mobile systems and of the programme for setting up Trident-2, a new sea-based missile system. The considerable rise in these missiles' range, compared with the existing one, will extend the combat patrol areas of the Trident-2 submarines, which reduces the vulnerability of the nuclear weapons of this type.

In the conditions of quantitative equality in the total number of strategic delivery vehicles (as it is laid down in the SALT-2 treaty), by establishing the strategic offensive forces of greater accuracy, yield and viability, the USA is claiming superiority and making efforts to change the strategic situation in the world in its favour.

In other words, the Pentagon views "strategic sufficiency" as the quite clear "surplus" of the American nuclear potential compared with the forces of the other side.

This is sometimes stated quite frankly: witness, the speech made by Defence Secretary Harold Brown at the Senate committee in September. Most often, they do not speak about it openly but much fuss is made about the "Soviet military threat." Every day the US newspapers write about the alleged menacingly soaring Soviet nuclear potential which is about to exceed the American. The sole purpose of all these lies is to cover up and justify the Pentagon's desire to achieve the wanted "surplus."

I would like to note that the Soviet Union does not pursue the aim of gaining military advantage over the USA, but it cannot remain indifferent to the buildup of such arms by the United States and allow the existing parity of forces to be upset. This has been clearly stated by Leonid Brezhnev, the head of the Soviet state, who said: "In this case we would have to take necessary additional steps to strengthen our security. There is no other way out for us."

Question. You have mentioned some new strategic systems which the USA is creating in pursuit of "surplus." What is the linkage between this concept of the Pentagon and its intention to station the so-called "Euro-strategic" missiles in Western Europe?

Answer. The military leaders of the USA and other NATO countries are making many efforts to hide the true sense of what is going on now from inexperienced people in Western Europe and the USA.

It is being claimed that the new American medium-range missiles are not classified among the US strategic weapons, that they are medium-range but not strategic nuclear weapons. True, the new US delivery vehicles--the Pershings-2 and the cruise missiles which the USA is going to deploy in Europe have a range of 2,600 kilometres. But the Pentagon intends to deploy these arms in Western Europe, close to the frontiers of the USSR, and to aim them at targets in the Soviet territory. The accuracy of this weapon is very high. This will make it possible to strike targets on a considerable part of the Soviet territory--up to the Volga river. It comes out that the geography of the deployment of this weapon drastically changes its purpose and possibilities. With regard to the Soviet Union, it is becoming a strategic weapon.

It is common knowledge that the new nuclear missiles in Europe will be fully controlled by the USA, serviced by the American military personnel and used by decision of US President. So the USA will receive a new nuclear weapon whose combat qualities and location relative to the Soviet territory will enable it to use these weapons to accomplish its strategic tasks to the detriment of the security of the USSR and other socialist countries. The US military leadership does not even hide the purely offensive character of the new missiles.

US Defense Secretary Harold Brown has recently stated in no uncertain terms in his interview with a correspondent of the TRIALOGUE magazine that this weapon is highly accurate and viable and can ensure a breakthrough the Warsaw Treaty defences.

Seeking to achieve an advantage in the nuclear forces on the European continent, the Pentagon sharply increases the nuclear danger for the countries of both Western and Eastern Europe. Such moves automatically make one give thought to whether they are in line with the aims of the talks and agreements on limiting strategic offensive arms.

As usual, the USA is trying to justify the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe, in addition to the US forward-based weapons already stationed there, by the "Soviet threat." Efforts are being made to convince the US Congressmen, the West European MPS and the public in America and Europe that the Soviet Union has developed and deployed the SS-20 operational-tactical missiles and that the USA and NATO intend to station their big-range Pershing-2s and cruise missiles to counterbalance these weapons. But this idea is false because the decision to develop these weapons and to deploy them in Europe was nurtured as long ago as 1975 when no SS-20 missiles existed in the west of our country.

It is often claimed by Western political and military figures, among them American ones, that the Soviet Union possesses a nearly threefold superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons. These claims are completely groundless and they deliberately warp reality.

While making an objective assessment of the alignment of nuclear forces in Europe, it is necessary to take account of the fact that the NATO military organisation and the armed forces of France have medium-range nuclear delivery vehicles. We list among them land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, the bombers of the FB-111 type, the Vulcan B 2 aircraft and some other delivery vehicles. Furthermore, the US forward-based nuclear weapons in some NATO countries, such as the nuclear-weapon-carrier airplanes aboard the U.S. aircraft-carriers performing combat duty in the seas and oceans near Europe--the F-4 and F-111 aircraft--number about 800.

The range of all these weapons allows them to deliver nuclear strikes at targets lying deep in the Soviet territory. Their total number in Europe is about 1,100.

The Soviet Union has much fewer medium-range missiles and the assertions about our quantitative superiority in such weapons are false.

In connection with the deployment of the new US missiles in Europe I would like to quote the English proverb, "Free cheese can be found only in a mousetrap." The US missile nuclear weapons, which are being forced upon the NATO countries by the Pentagon, are a trap for the West European countries and peoples. Seeking for the ways to accomplish its strategic tasks and to gain military superiority, the USA is misleading the Europeans. In actual fact, the territory of their countries is becoming a launching site. While the USA will use it to accomplish its strategic tasks, the Europeans will eventually pay for this. In this case the United States will find itself, as it were, on the reserve players' bench because the Soviet medium-range delivery vehicles are not stationed in the countries lying near the USA and cannot reach the United States from the territory of the USSR.

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the flight time of, say, the Pershing-2 missiles to targets on the Soviet territory is 4-5 minutes and the interval between the command to launch the missiles and their start is even shorter--1-1.5 minutes. It will be practically impossible to remedy the situation even if these missiles are launched unintentionally, by mistake. The peoples of Europe will face this dilemma should the US medium-range missiles be stationed in the territory of the West European countries. And as experience shows, Americans sometimes make such mistakes.

Question. What will be the reaction of the other side if the USA and NATO implement their decision to deploy the new weapons in Western Europe?

Answer. It would be naturally naive to believe that the other side will indifferently watch the military preparations against it. The dangerous stepping up of the nuclear arms race in Europe in order to enable NATO to gain military advantage over the Warsaw Treaty member countries will impel them to take retaliatory measures.

Europe is glutted with nuclear weapons more than any other area in the world. It has long become imperative to seriously embark on reducing the level of the confrontation of the two main groupings of armed forces located here.

However, if the NATO countries, in defiance of common sense, turn Western Europe into a launching site for American strategic weapons, they will meet with a strong and telling response from the other side. This warning has been made by the USSR Minister of Defence.

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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Warrant Officer Service Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank A. Ryzhenko, Commander of the large anti-submarine ship "Ochakov": "Really a Seagoing Man"]

[Text] Warrant Officer N. Yemelin hesitantly crossed the coaming of my cabin -- I was hearing personal problems that day.

"I have a request, Comrade Commander." He placed a sheet of paper on my desk. "The term of my commitment is nearing its end and I do not wish to remain on board."

I knew that in recent weeks as soon as Yemelin was off the ship he had been setting out to search for a "suitable" billet on shore. He deemed a position somewhere in the rear or in depot to be more suitable.

I tried to conceive of a reason for a naval warrant's not wanting to serve at sea but I could not arrive at a specific answer. Yemelin went out but his request remained. After a couple of days I summoned the warrant officer to discuss his request. It turned out that he had not changed his mind.

The word "michman" [naval warrant officer] came into the Russian language from English, where it denotes a rating in shipborne service. The very rating defines the service billet for this category of serviceman as being on board ship. His place of work is the sea. His calling is to sail.

Warrant officers represent a special category of personnel in the modern navy. Petty officers and seamen are subordinate to them. Electronic equipment, computer equipment, missile and torpedo weapons are all under their management. They are drawn together with officers not only by a common mission -- to ensure a constant state of readiness on the ship, unremitting vigilance of the watches, organization and naval order in all things. They also actually perform the responsibilities of officers, often substituting for them.

The party and the state show untiring concern for warrant officers and their material welfare. Vivid manifestation of this concern were creation of an institute and specialized schools for army and navy warrant officers and establishment of increased responsibilities for their ranks. This concern obligates each of them to exert maximum efforts to the mastery of equipment and weapons and to training and indoctrination of sailors.

V. Bukhov, who has served at sea for more than 20 years, is just such a warrant officer. He has maintained a master's proficiency rating for many years in succession.

His love for equipment and weapons is not ostentatious. Nor does he express it in words -- Vasiliy Ivanovich is a modest person of few words -- but in his deeds. The missile equipment which he judiciously and meticulously maintains is always in top operating condition, well-cared-for, fine-tuned and ready for battle and the next cruise. This warrant officer has made a significant contribution to the fact the the battery to which his team belongs consistently receives excellent evaluations on its firing.

And it is no less important that Warrant Officer Bukov is also a wise indoctrinator. He uses his rich worldly experience to the fullest in his work with people. Understanding the soul of the sailor, he always finds the way to the hearts of his seamen and knows how to motivate people and rally them around him. The sailors love him and reach out to him. For them his word is law.

We also have many other warrant officers on the ship who serve as reservoirs of the older generation's experience and the finest traditions of the navy. The constitute a reliable mainstay for the commander and the party organization.

Most warrant officers today come to ship from schools where they receive good professional training. But do graduates of these schools always satisfy the needs of commanders? Unfortunately, no. One of the reasons for this is improper selection of some students. There are cases where a young warrant officer starts to search for a billet on shore as soon as his initial sea-duty commitment expires. Here is one reason for this: until he received his warrant he had never sailed and did not know that sea duty was so difficult. Commanders who have vacant warrant officer billets often wait and worry: "Who will the send me?" In my opinion, the overall situation could be improved greatly if the ships will start to take a more active part in formation of the warrant officer contingent. What do I have in mind? That the commanders and party organizations send their best petty officers and seamen to the warrant officer schools and that these same people return to their own ships upon completion of the training.

Our crew has been doing just that for a number of years already. Moreover, we place selectees, especially petty officers, in warrant officer billets for trial periods before they are sent to training schools. This, to some degree, insures us against errors in personnel section and insures the candidates themselves against errors in choosing a specialty and charting the course of their destinies. And it is important too that with this approach the schools get good students and the crews get excellent specialists. This draws schools and ships closer together and increases their shared responsibility for the training of warrant officer personnel. And, above all, such warrant officers know the sea other than from books and know sea duty other than from hearsay.

We prepared two team leaders in this way in the past year. Warrant Officer A. Telenga, leader of the radiotelegraph team, has mastered his responsibilities with confindence. His team has an excellent rating, he is already servicing the equipment himself and his work on the equipment is at the first-class proficiency level.

Some commanders complain that it is not always the best seamen and petty officers who decide to remain on active duty. Such a problem does exist. But there is no basis for relegating it to the unsolvable file. We often do not know how to use moral stimuli or we use them very poorly, often resorting to such generalities as "Stay on; you won't regret it," which carry no obligation and do not speak of anything. But everyone should see that: warrant officers are respected on board ship; they are being carefully developed as specialists; sensitivity and attention is being shown toward them; their labor is highly valued. On the "Ochakov" we have the names of the best of them entered into the Book of Honor and their photographs are displayed on the board of excellent achievers. When warrant officers receive government awards or decorations for military valor the whole crew knows about it and shares in the joy. For example, when Warrant Officer V. Bukhov was awarded a medal "For Excellence in Military Service" the crew congratulated him at a large parade formation. The political officer told of the warrant officer's glorious record, his devotion to sea duty and the sea and his conscientiousness for the cause. An issue of the radio-newspaper was devoted to him.

We make the sailors aware of the privileges that warrant officers enjoy. Each of them knows that if he remains on active duty he too can continue his training and receive higher education. Almost all warrant officers on our ship who have served for several years are provided quarters.

Experience shows that warrant officers serve well where the commanders constantly work with them. We do not have a group or subunit commander who is not taking part in the development of warrant officers. Captain 3rd Rank-Engineer V. Fenenko is doing much in this area. He has more warrant officers subordinate to him than the other subunit commanders and he knows how to approach each of them and finds time to assist them. As a result their state of training is almost the highest on the ship. It has become tradition in this collective that they achieve master ratings in their third to fifth year of service. Most of them have the perspective of a technician or engineer.

We combine our concern for the warrant officers with strict demands on them. First of all we strive to ensure that they set flawless personal examples. Frankly, such exactingness does not please all of them. A warrant officer who lacks the willpower to pull himself together and become a model of discipline will strive to get off the ship. He thinks that things will be better in another billet. But who needs weak-willed and undisciplined people anywhere?

Once when I was in the city I by chance met former Warrant Officer V. Dvoretskiy. The memory of himself that the left on the ship was not the best: he drank and was frequently late for duty. Nor did his performance measure up on shore where he had fled to escape our exactingness. He is now in the reserves. The sea rejected him and the shore did not accept him.

Life is a stern but, in most cases, fair judge. Every commander has encountered a situation similar to this at least once: a warrant officer feels that his performance is not being rated on its merits and therefore transfers. As a rule, such a warrant officer is not really equal to the position assigned him. But some commander, concerned about taking care of the "specialist," gives him the most glowing performance appraisal one can imagine.

Warrant Officer N. Zakar'vayev came to us as a [bataler] with such an appraisal. In time it became clear that this man was careless and indifferent to his duties. This comrade left our ship with an objective appraisal and was soon released to the reserves.

But many find the inner strength to admit their mistakes and draw the proper conclusions. So it was with N. Yemelin, to whom I referred at the beginning of this article. Some time after he had left our ship he was once again in my cabin. He spoke with emotion about the sea, saying that he could not go on without it. It took me a long time to decide to write my instructions on the request he had brought to me. At last I wrote: "Approve the request. Issue the order."

Only time will tell whether Warrant Officer N. Yemelin will become a real sea-going man. Only his deeds can justify the confidence that has been placed in him.

Officer Scientific Education Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Rear Admiral-Engineer M. Soygin: "The First Step"]

[Excerpts] In 1952 students at the Naval Academy were presented with a new instructor. Many of those seated in the auditoriums knew this officer well. He had completed

> his course of study only two weeks before. And immediately, without completing graduate school, the officer was entrusted to give lectures and conduct classes.
>
> That instructor was Mikhail Fedorovich Sovgin, now a rear admiral-engineer, doctor of technical sciences, professor and head of the faculty at the Naval Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Uniion A.A. Grechko. His service to the country has been recognized by the award of five orders. The authoritative voice of this scientist is today addressed to young officers. How can they apply their engineering capabilities in the Navy? What should be their first step toward scientific creativity?

I never make a trip to the fleets during which I, as a representative of the academy, am not approached by officers -- most often junior officers, naturally -- seeking advice on how they can organize their scientific work under the circumstances of sea duty. I ask straight away what problems the officers want to become involved in. Often the answer is heat transfer or research in the physical fields or .... I am compelled to reply in such cases that it is beyond the reach of shipborne officers to undertake these problems. I advise them to seek out a more proctical field, closer related to their service responsibilities. And this answer is, unfortunately, not always understood. It will seem to some officers that it is impossible to find application for their engineering or research inclinations on board ship. On this premise they conclude that they must at all costs transfer to shore duty, to a large city where there are libraries, scientific institutions and laboratories.

This opinion is just as invalid as it is widespread. I suppose that this opinion owes its origin to that orientation toward "pure" science with a theoretical bias that, unfortunately, still prevails in some military-scientific student societies. We will not eliminate this trend quickly. It is therefore even more important today to address those opportunities to conduct scientific work that are available to shipborne officers who have an engineering education and are endowed with creative abilities.

What will the academy graduate, who right up to the day of graduation amazed his classmates with his scientific erudition and daring ideas, find on board ship? He will find, first of all, that his commander will hold him responsible for mastering and operating equipment, training and indoctrinating personnel, maintaining accounting documentation and a thousand other things without which shipborne duty cannot be imagined. Even if there is a scientific laboratory in garrison, it will be difficult for him to keep abreast of new developments because of extended cruises and the meager ration of time that a shipborne officer can allot to his life ashore. And laboratory equipment and an experimental base are, with rare exceptions, inaccessible to the shipborne engineer.

That is the way things are. I therefore advise young officers who are striving to show their capabilities to look not toward the moorings for a place to put them to use but to their own ships, their own departments and their own battle stations. Experience shows that the field for scientific endeavor here is of sufficient scope. Here, sooner that anywhere else, they can make their first serious step toward creativity, toward the quest.

My contemporaries and classmates went to sea in the summer of 1941. The navy was fighting. I was assigned to the destroyer "Gremyashchiy" as commander of the engine room group and served in that capacity for three years. The division mechanical engineer was G. Bogdanov-Kat'kov, who later became a rear admiral.

During the years of the war, quite naturally, it never occurred to any of the shipborne engineers that they were involved in problem study or rationalization. But this did not alter the facts of the matter. And it is altogether natural that from these battle-scarred ships many fine specialists came into the field of science.

As a naval officer I am pleased to see among the professors here in Leningrad officers that I knew when they were students -- doctors of technical sciences and institute department heads, Captains 1st Rank in Reserve D. Romanov and N. Solntsev. They came into science, by the way, not to use it to first comprehend the navy's problems and then undertake to solve them academically. Far from it! These officers came into science with a clear-cut knowledge of the urgent problems and practical requirements facing the navy. This knowledge was their initiation fee. Through the years it was the basis on which each of them made a name for himself in science. And had it not been for this first step it is hard to say how quickly my comrades would have managed to find themselves in science.

Leaving the service for science is far from always the ultimate goal of shipborne officers with creative potential. Life provides excellent examples of this. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported on Senior Lieutenant-Engineer T. Borisov who successfully defended his candidate's dissertation while serving on a submarine. And his sea duty continues, inspiring this young man to further scientific quest. I know that there are many other specialists in the fleets who have an enormous propensity for new theoretical developments. They send letters to the academy and when they are in Leningrad they visit the faculty to consult with them and discuss plans for their work in the field. What are they so concerned about? I am happy to nate that they are concerned about improving shipborne equipment, searching for optimum modes of operation and efficient methods for using their weapons in battle. As a rule it is just such engineers who come for training at the academy. They are already establishing a creative atmosphere -- a truly vivifying atmosphere -- at their duty posts. I cannot fail to mention the singular role of the flag officer specialists in ensuring that the young officer's service is interesting, that he is growing, that his erudition is being nurtured. I know for sure that where the flag officer specialist is conducting an engineering search, fascinating subordinates with his rationalization work, analyzing and systematically generalizing the experience of long cruises and submitting problems for general judgement and counsel -- there are no complaints about lagging behind the present day or behind the problems and achievements of science. Major discoveries are sometimes born here which have navy-wide significance.

For instance, the ideas of such mechanical engineers as M. Budayev, I. Kolton, N. Mormul' and V. Leont'yev were given high ratings by scientists. Putting these ideas into practice led to significant savings of energy resources, improved shunting features of shipborne power plants and improved tactical-technical features of ships. It is characteristic that the officers named here are still serving in the navy. In my opinion the scientific dgrees conferred on them after they defended their dissertations attest not only to their talent and industry. They attest also to the level of the demands that practice and modern equipment place on the qualifications of a naval engineer, especially an engineer of command rank. I see in the fact that the number of officers in the navy who are candidates and even doctors of science a manifestation of one of the natural principles of its development.

The navy has always been a forger of scientific cadres since it is itself a child of science and its "fiery furnace." And where else can we -- forgers of our own happiness, as the song goes -- shape this happiness if not at the forge, where everything is at hand -- the instrument, the material and the wise masters!

Antiaircraft Firing Test Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank S. Bystrov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special corresondent: "Mastery"]

> [Text] All missile firnings that the large antisubmarine ship [BPK] "Marshal Timoshenko" has had to carry out since it joined the Red-Banner Northern Fleet have invaribly received the highest evaluations. But the antiaircraft firings carried out during the past inspector's evaluation turned out to be the most memorable, not only for her crew but for the whole fleet whose honor "Marshal Timoshenko" was defending.

The target was coming in from the starboard at low altitude, intersecting the course of the "Marshal Timoshenko." From the bridge the ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank V. Samozhenov, could see it with his naked eye.

The commander expected that at any second the patrol ship "Rezvyy" -- the second participant in the firing -- would launch its missiles to intercept the target. But the commander learned from his executive's report that the SKR [patrol ship] had not received the order to fire so he gave the "go ahead" to use weapons. However, the launch did not follow immediately. The flag officer in control of the firing had, for the time being, left the right to fire the first missile at this target to the "Rezvyy."

After that everything happened in fractions of a minute.

From right under the BPK commander's feet a missile tore out of the forward launcher. It climed to an altitude significantly greater than that of the target. Captain 2nd Rank Samozhenov grabbed his microphone but only held it tightly in his hand. The launch lloked like an obvious miss. The general representing the inspection party stood to the rear and, just as intently as the commander, watch the action unfold. Suddenly the missile went into a steep dive and knifed into the target.

This made the third target shot down by the "Marshal Timoshenko" anti-aircraft [AA] crews in this one mock battle.

This time the always reserved and taciturn Captain 2nd Rank Samozhenov could no conceal his joy. He glanced at his watch. Very little time had passed since detection of the first target was reported to him and now three targets already lay at the bottom of the sea. Recalling these events, he turned to the general. The general smiled at him. Analysis and critique were still to come but it was already clear -- this ship knew how to fire.

Under the rules of mock combat the ship's commander had removed himself from an active role in firing against airborne targets. After all if the battle had been a real one Samozhenov would have been occupied with the important business of antisubmarine warfare against the "enemy." Therefore his influence on the success of the firing had to manifest itself in the level of preparedness that he had managed to achieve in his crew in the course of their training. The concrete responsibility for the firing now rested on the shoulders of his executive officer, Captain-Lieutenant A. Brazhnik, and the commander of the AA missile department, Captain 3rd Rank S. Pilentsov.

The first target was a high-altitude classical variant developed in average difficulty training exercises. It was shot down at long range by the aft launch complex. In essence this was a warm-up for the crew, primarily a psychological one. All the sailors without exception understood what an inspection firing means to a ship. A successful beginning took away their excess nervousness.

The second target presented the highest level of difficulty. It was a high-speed, low-altitude target that jammed the ship's radar scopes with countermeasures. They were not able to tune it out immediately. Executive officer Captain-Lieutenant A. Brazhnik, who was maintaining communications with the flagship, did not make the latter happy with his reports. The flag officer was in a hurry but the executive officer felt that he could not rush the BCh-2 [AA missile department] commander. The more tense the situation became the calmer Captain 3rd Rank S. Pilentsov appeared. And his confidence was perhaps the only possible form of assistance he could render to his subordinates. At the moment of firing one cannot supplement their knowledge nor their mastery of skills -- only their strength of spirit.

It is not without reason that Captain 3rd Rank Pilentsov is known as a man of character on the ship. One could say a man of firm and persistent character. This firmness and persistence takes on a particular acuteness in his attitude toward the mission. When he came on board two years ago, Pilentsov surprised everyone with his uncommon pedantry, which to many seemed excessive. Conflicts even grew out of this. One particularly sharp conflict was with the commander of the electromechanical department (BCh-5), Captain 2nd Rank-Engineer B. Buchatskiy. Pilentsov discovered that during equipment recycling BCh-2 was being supplied with reduced cooling, which meant that its equipment could not be fully recycled. The previous BCh-2 commander had not required that this be done, deeming it impossible. Buchatskiy brought this up right away when Pilentsov him the first time. Pilentsov, however, studied the cooling delivery capabilities, found users who had no practical shortage of cooling, proved that the cooling requirements of BCh-2 could be more than satisfied and presented these findings to the ship's commander. Order was restored.

... In this exhausting moment of uncertainty, when the only thing known was that the target was drawing inexorably closer, a hail of reports poured in to the BCh-2 commander, with which he formed a picture of what was taking place. Choosing the exact moment, he instructed the forward fire controller to switch search modes. A blip flashed on one of the scopes and the operator did not even have time to pass a second plot before the missiles, streaking out to intercept the "enemy," erased both the jamming and the target from the scopes.

Captain-Lieutenant Brazhnik reported to the flagship that the target had been destroyed. The crew could rejoice in a large success. But, as it turned out, the most difficult test was just about to happen.

The executive officer was in contact with the flagship when he received an unexpected "go-ahead" to fire on a "hostile" target. This was an unexpected tactical problem -- but then such things are always possible in real combat.

The complexity was in that the "Marshal Timoshenko" could not yet see the target. It was at low altitude, also employing countermeasures, and it was too close to leave much time to think about how to search it out. The BCh-2 commander gave his operators approximate data. Everything now depended on the mastery of the operators.

The target was flying so low that the operators, headed by Petty Officer 2nd Class V. Surovtsov, literally "snatched" the target blip out of returns from the water. All that remained was to push the launch button.

Captain-Lieutenant Brazhnik, without breaking contact with the flagship, ordered the AA crews to maintain firing readiness. And a second later that last missile, which forced excitement from the ship's commander, lifted off the guide rails of the "Marshal Timoshenko." Fractions of a second later the "Rezvyy" also launched its missiles and they too scored a direct hit. The contingent earned the highest possible evaluation on its firing.

Commentary

On request of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, the Commander-in-Chief of the Red-Banner Northern Fleet, Admiral V. Chernavin, made the following comments on the firing test of the "Marshal Timoshenko" and the "Rezvyy":

The inspection firing on airborne targets in which the BPK "Marshal Timoshenko" and the SKR "Rezvyy" took part was in many respects instructive and interesting. We disseminated their experience throughout the navy. In fact, the most difficult plan, both technical and tactical, that is possible to create in peacetime was created for both these crews. For example the level of power used to employ countermeasures was higher than could be expected in many real battles. All the conditionalities, which usually willy-nilly make the resolution of problems easier, were disallowed. As a result it can be said that any weakness in the crew's state of training or mastery of equipment would have been sure to show up.

Of significance in this regard was the moment of the dual firing by the "Rezvyy" and the "Marshal Timoshenko" on a single target. Both crews displayed not only masterful skills, but also an intense will to win, a profound sense of responsibility for the common success, judicious independence, initiative and decisiveness in all departments. This is perhaps the most important quality of a crew, without which victory is impossible in modern combat, where often fractions of a second decide everything, where each member of the crew at his own station must be able to show personal initiative and professional boldness without fearing the responsibility for decisive action dictated by the situation.

These AA firings have become not only tests of the skills of crews and the combat readiness of ships. They are also fine schools for flag officers of all ranks in the creation of conditions for combat exercises which approximate as closely as possible real combat in terms of complexity and psychological urgency.

Information on Submarine Commander

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank S. Bystrov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Ocean Overhead"]

> [Text] The nuclear submarine "60 Let Velikogo Oktyabrya" completed a long cruise, having fulfilled all missions of the cruise with an excellent evaluation. The admiral received the report of the submarine's commander, Captain 1st Rank V. Naumov, and shook his hand. The admiral thought: how surprisingly young this officer looks -- one of the best submariners in the Northern Fleet. The admiral, himself a submariner and long ago a submarine commander, understood very well what it means to have the ocean overhead, cruise after cruise, for your whole career.

The shunting locomotive approached unheard. In the dense haze of dusk the engineer, observing blackout rules, did not see the people on the track. At the last instant the mother managed to shove her son from under the wheels. This last touch of his mother's hand was permanently fixed in the memory of Captain 1st Rank Vladlen Naumov. In that year of war Vladlen was eight years old. His father fell at Leningrad. His grandmother Anis'ya learned of the opening of the Nakhimov Academy in Leningrad and brought the orphan here. Anis'ya Mikhailovna's son Vasiliy had in his own time gone into the navy on a komsomol levy. She decided to send her granson on the navy path as well.

Vladlen Vasil'yevich and I sat in his apartment on the very shore of the Arctic Ocean. A few miles from his home the nuclear submarine which Captain 1st Rank Naumov commands stood at the pier. The ship was at rest after a cruise and the commander was going on leave. A heap of photographs lay on the table. One was particularly memorable: a young boy in a sailor's hat and flannel uniform with the epaulets of a Nakhimov cadet. But his expression was not that of a child; it was an expression not seen on children of today -- it was the expression of a man who had known war.

"That was my fourth year of service," Vladlen Vasil'yevich smiled.

And so it was: "1949" was written on the back. But what was Naumov like in November of 1947 when he came to Moscow for the parade celebrating the 30th anniversary of October? The Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Admiral A. Golovko, invited 11 Nakhimov cadets to his office.

Small and a bit frightened they stood in the admiral's huge office and he looked upon them with both pain and warmness.

"You are not orphans -- you are the sons of our great Motherland. You are the future of our navy," the admiral said as he shook hands with the cadets in a grown-up fashion and gave eachof them a child's present. "You will command ships that are now hard to imagine."

The paving stones of Red Square resonded like thunder beneath the rhythmic footsteps of the line companies. But no matter how hard they stamped, the granite gave out only a light patter under the feet of the Nakhimov ranks. Still they held their heads high and kept the rhythm with sureness.

"When I am in Leningrad I always visit the "Aurora," said Vladlen Vasil'yevich. "I also intend to go there this time."

Four days later we met again. This time on the "Aurora." Did Vladlen Naumov the Nakhimov cadet, for whom the "Aurora" was home for several years, ever think that years later he would command one of the most modern of nuclear missile-equipped submarines, created by the labor of the Soviet people for defense of the Socialist Motherland, and that the honor of bearing the name of the revolution would be conferred on this very vessel?

In November of 1977 when the country was celebrating the 60th anniversary of October Naumov and his crew were far from their home shores. After a routine communications session the communications department commander, A. Bozhinskiy, delivered a radiogram signed by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy. Naumov himself made the entry in the ship's log: "... the submarine has been awarded the name "60 Let Velikogo Oktyabrya"."

The submariners rejoiced. Captain 1st Rank Naumov joined in the celebration with all the others. He received congratulations and gave out congratulations. He also asked himself a question: why did this commander in this place happen to be him?

Probably every person asks himself this question at some time in his life: "Why me?" But far from all of them ask it only when they are encouraged.

Naumov's father, editor of the plant newspaper at "Electrosila" in Leningrad, could not wait until he reached draft age; he went to the front as a volunteer. He went into the infantry where he was most needed. Just as at the time of collectivization he went as one of "the 25,000" to organize the kolkhozes. Well, then what next? Why not the navy? In those days men were more needed on land. He was killed in the early months of the war, with the rank of political instructor, leading troops into counterattack.

Once Naumov returned from a difficult cruise, reaching base at three o'clock in the morning. He had not even reached home before he was called back to sea. The commander answered "aye,aye" and departed. He did not even suspect that his superior was hesitant to make this decision. The flag officer understood how tired Naumov was but knew at the same time that he would fulfill his duty with honor.

After the academy Lieutenant Naumov began service in a garrison to this day is still known as a "god-forsaken hole." At first he told his wife, who was from Leningrad, "We'll stay here for two or three years and then we'll go to warmer places." But then later he began to tell her, "No, it is here that we are needed, Lyudochka. It is difficult here but that means it is interesting. Just wait and see."

In this he did not mislead his wife. The did lead an interesting life "at the end of the earth." They lived within a family circle, or more correctly a family-service collective of young officers and their wives.

The duty was hard but they filled their off-duty time with inventiveness. There was a competition for the best satirical cartoon, a competition for the wittiest quatrain and a ballroom dance party. All this took place in the Naumovs' small apartment which, to tell the truth, was at time considered very luxurious.

Since that time two decades have flown by. Position after position, ship after ship, garrison after garrison, frequent periods without a place to live, two daughters, many long cruises, and through it all his wife -- who also thinks like Naumov -- was always beside him. In recent years the arctic became counterindicative for her -- her health took a bad turn. "But why should I be the one to yield"? Lyudmila Petrovna rose up in indignation. The Naumov apartment is filled with dumbbells, exercise expanders an other such sports equipment. "My wife has declared war on the north," Vladlen Vasil'yevich explains. Irreconcilability is also a Naumov trait. Irreconcilabilty with weakness, the easy route and what he considers undeserved or unjust. True, at first this at times came out as arrogance. In fact the young commander of the helmsman group even suffered because of it. His first, and later favorite, ship commander V. Bets (now a rear admiral) held him back from promotion to senior lieutenant. This was a result of a curious incident.

They had embarked with a flag officer on board. Captain-Lieutenant Bets was speaking with the senior officer when he suddenly turned to Naumov.

"My young friend, do we have the communications chart"? He patted Naumov on the shoulder.

"I don't know," Naumov answered in an exaggerated casual tone.

The Captain-Lieutenant's mood changed instantly. "Is that the way you speak to your commander"?

"But I am not your young friend. I am Lieutenant Naumov."

The next conflict was more serious. Naumov evidently overdid his implacability, did not execute the commander's orders exactly and received a severe reprimand.

"Our job is difficult enough," Valentin Ivanovich Bets later told the Lieutenant, "without atificially making it more complex. The difficulty is understandable when it ensues from the mission."

On his first long cruise the commander proposed that the young officer pass the tests and assume watch duties on the bridge. This was unexpected because the path from helmsman commander to watch officer led by way of the navigator position. But very soon Lieutenant Naumov had proven himself worthy in this new capacity. Captain-Lieutenant Bets entrusted control of the vessel to Naumov during surfacing and taking on stores.

He watch the bud of a commander sprout forth in the young officer and the desire to exercise responsibilities beyond the limitations imposed by his position become more evident. At that time his party card was only three years old but his party matruity was already growing firm and gaining in strength.

A serious test of this strength came during his years as a commander. The submarine whose command Naumov had just assumed was rated as excellent. But, as he was soon to become convinced, the ship did not fully satisfy the standards of this high rating. The sailors thought they were ensured of an automatic plaement in the ranks of the outstanding.

Captain 2nd Rank Naumov understood that in the time remaining before the end of the training year radical changes could not be made on the ship. And he did not intend to hide its shortcomings.

"Do you understand the step you are taking"? Naumov's superior spoke to him harshly. "Refusing to confirm the ship's excellent rating! This is a fine beginning for a new commander. And have you considered what this will mean for the unit?

"I have considered everything," Captain 2nd Rank Naumov replied in an even but firm voice. "I feel that this is the only way to change the attitude of the collective."

Back on the ship the commander, as he always does in difficult situations, consulted with his deputy for politcal deputy. Captain 2nd Rank G. Tokarev admitted that only a fundamental self-appraisal could change the moral climate of the ship. Together they not only convinced the communists of the correctness of this decisive self-critical step but also targeted them on work toward a fundamental change in the attitude of all sailors to their mission.

The submarine did not confirm its excellent rating. But several months later it had improved drastically.

The nuclear submarine which Captain 1st Rank Naumov now commands gained an excellent rating overnight it seems. At least the sailors had not yet taken on the obligations for the rating although they set their goals very high. In the results of the year's training the submarine came out in first place in the unit while the whole subunit gained an excellent rating. In 1977 the crew took the Navy Prize in missile firning competition. The next year the crew was once again first in the navy. A missile launched by the nuclear submarine "60 Let Velikog Oktryabrya" hit its target with record accuracy.

"This is probably my last ship," Vladlen Vasil'yevich says. "My crew is now close to that for which I have strived all my years as a commander. With this crew even the ocean overhead is not heavy."

But the ocean overhead is always heavy. In youth it is heavy because one lacks experience, expertise and confidence -- in maturity because one no longer has the energies of youth. Naumov, just as the others whose service from academy cadet to ship's commander has been spent inside a rigid hull, knows this about himself. But the path, difficlut and consciously chosen, is a glorious path. In that year of 1947 -- the 13th anniversary of October -- in Red Square Naumov, still a young Nakhimov student, consciously decided that service to the motherland in the navy was the path for him. Now he is commander of a ship known to the whole country.

... Leaving the "Aurora," Vladlen Vasil'yevich made a note in the visitor's book. He wrote "With a feeling of profound emotion I have once again visited the legendary cruiser which is dear to every sailor and every Soviet citizen...." I imagined Naumov far away on distant meridians with the ocean overhead and thought that the "Aurora" is eternal due to his labors as is October, whose name is borne by his nuclear submarine -- the initiator os socialist competition in the navy.

PHOTO CAPTION

1. Photograph of Captain 1st Rank Naumov

On the Cruiser 'Aleksandr Suvorov'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 7- p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Polishchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA corresondent, Red-Banner Pacific Fleet: "Aleksandr Suvorov Conducts Firings"]

[Text] Routine activities were under way on the cruiser when the alarm peremptorily summoned the crew to battle stations. The "Aleksandr Suvorov" had been tasked to neutralize an "enemy" shore battery which was holding up the landing of an assault team.

A wall of fog stood around the target area. It precluded visual sighting of the target. The commander of the fire control department ordered the radar crews to give a situation report. It was not easy for the operators: the "enemy" was covered not only by fog but by countermeasures. Still the target was detected and its parameters defined. The data flowed into the command center continiously.

The senior officer asked the cruiser commander Captain 1st Rank V. Sergeyev, "At what range do you intend to fire"?

"At the maximum possible," answered the officer.

"That is commendable. But is it not too risky for a start?"

The flag officer had in mind the fact the guns of the "Aleksandr Suvorov" had been silent for quite a long time. During this period the servicemen who were experienced in firning had gone into the reserves. Some of the officer from the artillery department (BCh-2) had received other positions. All this meant that a third of the officers were taking part in a firing for the first time. The commander of BCh-2, Captain-Lieutenant V. Borisov, had himself come from a destroyer and had never directed the fire of a cruiser.

The day before the test firings the artillery department held party and komsomol meetings. Their decisions were similar: to step up competition in tasks and norms, for each specialist to assume increased obligations and to turn to neighbors for their experience.

A fine tradition exists in the navy: while competing, military collectives help each other, willingly share advanced methods and assist not only in word but in deed. And so it was this time. In the framework of comradely competition the crews of the cruisers "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" and "Aleksandr Suvorov" organized reciprocal assistance in combat training. The BCh-2 commander of the "Dmitriy Pozharskiy," master of military affairs Captain 2nd Rank I. Chernayev, greatly aided and shared his experience with Captain Lieutenant V. Borisov. (The young officer, by the way, assumed the obligation to attain first-class specialist qualifications). The turret commanders of the "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" went over all possible equipment failures and malfunctions with their colleagues from the "Aleksandr Suvorov". Gun commanders, fire team leaders, lockers and chargers all trained with crews from the other ship.

Officers of the cruiser "Aleksandr Suvorov" saw to it that their own capabilities were mobilized. In particual, the commander of the forward large bore gun crews, A Klubenko, competing with the commander of the aft fire control teams, A. Vezhnavets, helped him to set up a more intensive training schedule for his crews. Both fire control teams trained together and held joint training critiques.

Captain-Lieutenant A. Lifenko, chief of the radiotechnical subunit, taught the radar operators to detect targets in intensive countermeasures conditions. During his drills tactical problems followed one after another. They crews were continually changing modes and fighting for the viability of their technical equipment.

And the other departments trained just as intensely for the firings.

As we have already said, the radar operators were the first to go into action. It was not an easy matter for Petty Officer 2nd A. Lupanov, Petty Officer 1st A. Pryakhin and Seaman A. Goroklov to display the target on a screen cut to ribbons by countermeasures. But the experience gained during simulator training helped the sailors to successfully cope with their difficult mission.

It was now up to the gun crews. The turrets of Senior Lieutenant F. Khabitov and Lieutenant S. Kagakin did the firing. All 24 rounds cleanly covered the target. The "enemy" battery was neutralized, in fact it was already destroyed by the initial salvos. The remaining rounds completed destruction of the target. Evaluation of the firing -- excellent.

Construction at Naval Base Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Colonel-Engineer M. Simuni, Deputy Commander for Construction of the Red-Banner Leningrad Naval Base: "Pace and Quality"]

[Text] On Soviet Navy Day a joyful surprise awaited crews of the combat vessels standing on the roads at the mouth of the Neva. When the sailors came ashore they were met by the builders of the Red-Banner Leningrad Naval Base, who invited them to visit a new tearoom and shop situated in a light, spacious building constructed right on the dock. The unique structure, which required a number of new construction decisions, was erected by the UNR [Works Chief Administration] headed by Colonel-Engineer V. Kuznetsov a month ahead of schedule.

This is not the only example of successful resolution by the base's military builders of challenges facing them this year. They opened two apartment house, for a total of 114 aprtments, two months ahead of schedule and put anumber of other structures into use. All these projects, by the way, were completed with a high quality rating.

What is it then that helps the builders to successfully meet their socialist obligations? It seems that first of all it is the quest for efficient ways to organize construction and the use of internal production reserves. This is the case, for example, on one of the complex buildings being erected by the collective headed by Colonel-Engineer Yu. Skorikov. This collective, incidentally, has won the Red Banner challenge prize of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Central Committee of the Construction Workers' Trade Union and the Construction Materials Industry for six quarters. A provisional party group was formed here which included representatives of the customer, the general contractor and subcontractors. It was headed by Major-Engineer V. Tolmachev, chief of the building and installation sector.

At its meetings this group discusses shortcomings and accomplishments in the work of communists on the project and assists managers in resolution of organizational and indoctrinational problems. Recently the party group, with aid of the local radio and wall newspaper at the building site, helped to widely disseminate the experience of welder P. Krivov, who did a high-quality job of installing the guy webbing of a new building; carpenter P. Ivanov, who did the unique finish work on the building's activity hall; plasterer Ya. Il'yasov, who for the first time in Leningrad completed terrazite plastering of a 12-story building. As a result, construction is staying ahead of schedule and maintaining high quality of work.

The Zlobinskiy method is being actively spread throughout the base's building projects. Six contractor brigades are successfully working in the collective described here. And in the UNR headed by Colonel-Engineer I. Aleynikov the first composite management-contractor brigade of drivers has been formed under the leadership of Soviet Army employee N. Khabarov. The use of vehicles has improved markedly in this brigade. Hundreds of tons of freight in excess of the plan have already been hauled and hundreds of liters of fuel have been saved.

The introduction of advanced methods has served us well. It is having a particularly large impact, for example, on the progress of one joint project being conducted by the builders headed by Colonel-Engineer Yu. Skorikov and the repairmen-builders managed by Colonel-Engineer G. Lur'ye. The objective on which they are working is the dormitory and dining building of the Higher Naval Academy imeni M.V. Frunze which was built more than 270 years ago. The task facing these collectives is to make repairs during the students' summer holidays. This will not be easy to do. But the schedule is inflexible and the demands for quality are exceptionally high, inasmuch as the building is an historical monument.

But the military builders led by engineer V. Kuleshov and Soviet Army employees N. Krasnovskiy and Ya. Mikhaylov have rapidly mastered the required work practices. Thus, using advanced methods, the brigade of plasterers headed by Soviet Army employee A. Ivanov, consisting of 46 military builders, is already completing 500-600 square meters of difficult so-called "lighthouse" plastering each month.

And a large contribution toward perfecting the construction process is being made by our rationalizers. In only six months proposals have been implemented which saved several thousand rubles.

Of course the base's military builders are using far from all of their potential to improve the efficiency and quality of labor. However, it seems that the heat of competition will help them to successfully cope with the tasks of the second half of the year.

On the ASW Cruiser 'Minsk'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank G. Savichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special corresondet: "On a Single Deck"]

[Text] The commander of the antisubmarine warfare [ASW] cruiser "Minsk", Captain 1st Rank Viktor Aleksandrovich Gokinayev, stepped out onto the wing of the flying bridge which was suspended over the wide and unusually long -- like a city avenue -- flight deck. Some helicopters had just lifted off from the deck and preparations were under way to launch fixed-wing aircraft.

Everyhing went off without a hitch. Gokinayev, watching the clock-work actions of his personnel with satisfaction, recalled the time when it became necessary to adopt these new weapons -- deck-launched ASW aircraft. And he recalled how he had to resolve as whole host of problems, not the least of which was that of mutual understanding between the sailors and the aviators.

The Essence of the Problem -- Flights were being launched. Amid the flame and terrible roar of engines the aircraft were leaping off the deck and heading for combat training missions. The even, measured rhythm of the takeoffs and landings attested to the fact that flight organization was at the required standard and the entire "ship-people-aircraft" system was functioning like a well-oiled machine.

But suddenly there was hitch. From on board a aircraft that had barely lifted off the deck came the words: "Request landing clearance."

"Cleared," the flight controller answered without a second's hesitation. An immediately all communications were jammed with the report: "Unscheduled landing".

Just what had happened? The pilot said, "I am tired out. I could not sleep all night. There were incessant bells and commands on the ship's speaker system."

"But this is a cruiser, not a quiet dwelling house," one of the ship's officers who had witnessed the incident smiled wryly. He simply could not comprehend how bells and commands could disturb anyone's rest. The most common of things....

And there was a misunderstanding of a different type. They were conducting a "save-the-ship" drill. Naturally, all water-tight partitions, all passageways and all hatches were closed off. It was if the ship had died out. And only in the places where there was "fire" and in the compartments that "taking on" water the damage control team, without fuss or noise, was taking care of the damages.

One after another reports on the fight against fire and water came into the command center. But then suddenly an unusual request was heard.

"Help the aviation specialists make their way to their equipment."

This is the way it happened. When the emergency alarm signal sounded some of the aviators paid it no attention. Up to that time nobody had explained to them that saving the ship is everybody's business -- not only the ship's crew but everyone, without exception, on board the cruiser.

And so when the aviators needed to reach their equipment they could not do so because all passageways and crossways were tightly closed off.

All these examples, stroke by stroke, painted an overall picture of the state of affairs: not only did pilots and aviation specialists at times not understand some of the rules of the ship, but their state of mind was, on the whole, different from that of the ship's officers.

Beginning with his young years, from his days in the academy, the seaborne officer prepares himself for the frequent and long separations from his family. But then future flyers orient themselves toward a different way of life.

The incessant pitching and rolling, the monotony of the days, the frequent formations, the tightly closed cabins even in good weather, the bells, the commands and a mass of other things which are common for a ship's crew -- all these things are difficult for an unaccustomed person to understand and it is even more difficult for him to live such a life.

Moreover, it became clear that the sailors were in some areas unprepared for cooperative activities with the flyers.

When the sailors were told that the aircraft was a collective weapon this did not make a particular impression on them. Wasn't the ships as a whole a collective weapon? Besides that, if one addresses the particulars, not only the misslemen take part in missile firing. It involves the navigator, the radar operators and even specialists in the electromechanical department: after all it is they who supply power to the battle stations and the command posts.

No, this unique characteristic did not require the sailors to make any inner reorientation. The answer lay in the fact that there was not a man in a missile, in a torpedo nor in a shell. But an aircraft is piloted by man himself.

And everyone had to realize this, to feel it deeply with both mind and heart, in order to understand that this one condition places a particular reponsibility on all those who take part in flight support.

And a new concept made its way into the lexicon of the sailors: "flight safety." One had to show particular attention to the airmen. One had to consider the uniqueness of their activities and create the proper conditions for them.

But in order for such a moral-psychological reorientation to become permanent, in order for it to manifest itself not only during flight activity but in the course of day-to-day life, much work had to be done.

The Commander's Decision -- The time when the pilot, pleading tiredness caused by many bells and commands on the ship's speaker system, suddenly requested an unscheduled landing, when some of the ship's officers regarded this with scepticism (they said: what kind of woman's show is this?), Gokinayev looked upon the incident differently.

For the first time he saw with his own eyes that a difference did exist in the way the two categories of his subordinates approached and evaluated one phenomenon or another. But how was he to solve the problem?

"Perhaps they themselves will get used to one another and work things out," he began to think. But he immediately gave up the idea: time waits for no man.

Gokinayev carefully studies all the scientific works concerning interaction between sailor and aviators, refers over and over to the experience gained by other ships and directs the attention of all his subordinates -- both flyer and sailor -- to this problem.

And then the decision began to take shape: they must begin with a careful study of each other. They must learn all the circumstances of each other's lives, training, duties and lifestyles. And they must learn all these as well as possible. "This must be an interpenetration and striving to live with the same thoughts, feelings and desires," the cruiser commander reasoned.

Soon he assembled all the watch officers and went over in detail all signal and command activity broadcast from the watch during the 24 hours before the flight which had ended in an unscheduled landing.

The picture that took shape was instructive. It turned out that signals were being ground out almost continuously that day. And they were on all nets without exception: the seamen's, the officers' and the battle nets.

In response to the commander's stern admonition that this was not to continue many of the watch officers shrugged in bewilderment -- how can it be otherwise after all commands must reach their recipients without fail.

"We must strictly adhere to order in the use of the broadcast lines," the commander said. "After all, extraneous commands do work on the psyche of the airmen and disturb their normal rest and, in the final analysis, this has a direct impact on flight safety."

Thus Gokinayev analyzed in detail all other events, facts and incidents which appeared from his point of view to stand in the way of mutual understanding.

On the cruiser commander's instruction a special plan was developed which was known unofficially as the "mutual knowledge plan" and work began.

Voice of the Political Workers -- It is now hard to establish when the popular expression "Sailors must become aviators and aviators must become sailor" was coined, but today this expression has taken on an exceptional popularity in the Soviet Navy.

It is also being put into active practice on the ASW cruiser "Minsk". It is being promoted not only by the laborious and purposeful work of the ship's commander, the subunit commanders, the sailors and airmen, but also all the political workers and all party and komsomol organizations.

Once before the opening of a party meeting, political worker Captain 1st Rank V. Semiletenko asked the secretary of the aviation subunit's party organization, Senior Lieutenant Moseyev: "Why did you not invite any of the ship's communists to the meeting"?

"But what for"? Moseyev expressed surprise. "We will be discussing our own internal problems."

"You are mistaken; all problems on the ship are common problems," Semiletenko said. And he turned out to be right. Not a single one of the speeches (and they were at times sharply critical) bore a private character which concerned the aviators alone. They spoke, for example, about washing down the aircraft. This concerned not only those who actually wash the planes but also those in the electromechanical department responsible for water supply. They discussed the question of order on the flight deck during flight activity and this too was of general concern. One of the communists expressed this aptly: "We have different specialties but we have a single deck under our feet."

The next day, on advice of Vladimir Grigor'yevich Semiletenko, all questions that were broached during the meeting were carefully examined at an assembly of the officer staff.

The distinction between common and private concerns subsided. Joint activities began to be held more often: thematic evenings, technical conferences, sports competitions, discussions of films and literary works, lectures and discussions. The airmen were invited to the sailors' party and komsomol meetings; in turn the sailors took part in discussion of air problems.

Friendship Strengthens on Cruises -- Sailors come of age during cruises. Their will, their combat skills and their sea habits are forged in their battle against the elements. It is not for naught that they say that long cruises are schools of mastery. Comradeship is also strengthened on cruises. However, this does not happen by and of itself. Unity of the collective and creation of an atmosphere of true comradeship within the crew is furthered to a large extent by purposeful political-indoctrinational work. During the days that the "Minsk" was on cruise the CPSU Central Committee issued its resolution "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work." Its text was radioed to the cruiser and was carefully studied by all commanders and political workers, by all communists and komsomols. Ideological and political-indoctrinational work on the ship was significantly enlivened. Party and komsomol meetings were held, wall newspapers were published, some excerpts from the resolution were displayed on special stands. All of this, of course, helped to unify the participants in the cruise into a monolithic collective.

With each passing day successes in combat and political training grew more numerous. Friendship among those on the cruise grew stronger. One heard reproaches exchanged less frequently. More rare too were problems growing out of misunderstanding. All this had a favorable impact on the unity of the collective and on the overall state of affairs.

No, the problem of mutual understanding between sailors and airmen is not a simple one. But the experience of the ASW cruiser "Minsk" and other ships on which aviation has been deployed provides visual evidence that it can be successfully resolved. And this is possible due to well-reasoned and purposeful efforts of commanders and political workers.

On the Large Missile Ship 'Smelyy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Dobrovol'skiy, Commander of the Large Missle Ship "Smelyy": "What Does the Sonarman Report?"]

[Text] This was in the Mediterranean Sea. As a part of a search-strike group the "Smelyy" was taking part in an exercise. During debriefing I, as the commander, was to hear many negative comments directed toward the ship's ASW team (KPR). We wasted a lot of energy and time classifying bogus contacts. Consequently, the length of time that we maintained contact with the real target was shorter than expected.

Everything that was said corresponded to the actual state of affairs -- one that was far from customary for the "Smelyy", which up to that time had a standing reputation as a ship with a refined and skillful ASW team. What had happened?

The only thing that had happened was a change of sonarmen. An experienced warrant officer had been released to the reserves. A young warrant officer -- diligent and capable but not very experienced -- had taken his place at the console.

This example appears to me to give visual testimony to the role of each rank-and-file specialist on a modern ship. It seems that with all its specificity the subject of working with sonarmen can also have a certain methodological value. Everyone knows that the operation of a main command post [GKP] of a large ship is today supported by dozens of radiotechnical positions. And success in battle to a large degree on how smoothly organized and reliable communications are between the GKP and the radiotechnical equipment operators. For example, some commanders -- who are in my opinion overly categoric -- consider the sonarman as an ace; that a highly qualified sonarman provides for 80 percent of the successes in resolution of ASW problems. This figure is, without question, exaggerated. But it is in its own very characteristic. Specifically, it expresses the craving of commanders to have highly qualified sonarmen at their disposal.

But how does one explain such a high "specific weight" attributed to the sonarman as a member of the ASW team, which also includes the ship's commander and many other specialists? It can be explained by the fact that the sonarman is the very one who obtains information on the submarine situation.

Modern equipment complexes permit one to monitor the ocean depths in a radius of many kilometers around the ship. However, the question is whether capabilities of the operator are equal to the capabilities of his modern equipment.

This is not easy to achieve. The qualifications of a sonarman are a fusion of his innate qualities (thought, memory, hearing, spatial imagination and volitional qualities) with theoretical and practical training. Unfortunately, recruitment of candidates for the acoustics specialty in warrant officer schools is not always sufficiently selective to eliminate straight away those people who lack the requisite qualities. Knowing this, ship commanders are themselves looking for a way out of this situation.

This is the way we solved the question of the acoustics team chief on our ship. We sent a first-term sailor to warrant officer school and he returned to our ship after the proper time. Team chief Warrant Officer G. Tarabuyev is still serving on the "Smelyy" to this day. He is now a first-class specialist and it can be said that he has fully justified the hopes we placed on him.

But this was not done immediately, not in one day. The episode which I related at the beginning of the narrative relates specifically to Warrant Officer G. Tarabuyev's period of development. Inasmuch as it is not especially pleasant to be rebuked by one's superiors, the temptation is always great to unleash our anger one the "culprits" and we ship commanders do not always resist thie impulse. But then the damage done to the development of the sonarman by reproaches that are not altogether justified and the whole argument comes down to intonation can be great or it at least undermines the psychological basis on which the commander's relationship with the sonarman is built.

I consider mutual trust or, if you please, mutual professional respect to be such a basis. It is essential that a situation be attained wherein I, as the commander, am sure of the competency and objectivity of reports from the hydroacoustics compartment. It is equally important that the sonarman correctly interpret my commands and advice so that corrections that I make to his work, on the basis of my more complete familiarity with the situation, do not come across as expressions of distrust in him. If they did then the sonarman would become nervous and make mistakes.

Objective, argumentive critique of a sonarman's performance during training and sea exercises is the surest way to establish the optimum psychological climate in the "commander-sonarman" link. Material for such a critique must be provided by objective monitoring equipment.

And it took dozens of films and many reels of tape to rid Warrant Officer G. Tarabuyev of his "growing pains." But this was of great benefit -- and not only for the sonarman. The efficiency of training using objective monitoring devices turned out to be so high that we extended this method to instruction other types of teams. It was also highly beneficial for me to break down each battle in meticulous detail and analyze missed opportunities.

Of course I had to thoroughly learn the equipments that the sonarmen have at their disposal and even their operator duties. I spent dozens of hours in the comapartment with Warrant Officer G. Tarabuyev and his fellow watch standers. We tracked targets together but, more important, during those hours we formed a mutual understanding.

It is not enough that a sonarman be able to simply see and hear; more is needed. He must be able to forecast the development of events and understand the maneuvering of his own ship as well as that of a submarine. Otherwise confused reporting cannot be avoided.... Sonarmen can acquire this quality only through a wealth of practical knowledge. And in my opinion nobody is capable of conducting the tactical training of sonarmen better that the ship's commander. I explain the tactical backdrop of events to the sonarmen at the critique of each exercise. Of great aid to the operators are formalized tables which help to speed up reacquisition of contact with a maneuvering submarine. These were formulated on board the ship on the basis of our calculations.

What paractical use is this? Take the situation which, unfortunately, almost every ship commander encountered from time to time. The superior officer thinks that the sonarman is "reporting the weather, not the situation" and that the target which the ship is tracking is bogus. This leads to the necessity of terminating the contact to go on searching in another area. If he cannot confirm his data by data from another ship in the search-strike group the commander often finds himself in a ticklish situation.

It goes without saying that not one commander and not one sonarman is insured against mistakes. But then the senior commander, unless he has assumed command of the ship, does not bear a direct responsibility for his advice nor for his possible error. On the other hand the ship's commander, unless he has been relieved of command, bears full and complete responsibility for each order, no matter under whose influence it is given. So what then? The excitement of the search is so great that at times advice to the commander, especially if the staff is embarked on his ship, pours forth as if from a horn of plenty. Much psychological tenacity is needed to resist the influence of rash advice. And where do you derive it -- this tenacity -- if not from the very deepest conviction that your sonarman is right again this time.

It goes without saying that acoustics reports are adjusted and cross-checked by the combat information post and the navigator. But if the ASW team is developed as it should be and if the sonarman is well-trained there is almost no need for corrections to his reports. And also of no small importance is the fact that a highly qualified sonarman saves the whole ASW team an enormous amount of nervous energy. This is true in those instances when, still at the initial classification stage, the sonarman has the courage to declare a contact bogus. Taking into account that a submarine ship can last for days and that dozens of bogus targets can be picked up during this time, it would be foolish to underrate the importance of this initial processing of information.

And finally, a highly qualified sonarman also means seconds of combat advantage that can be gained in classification of real targets. Attack of a submarine or repulsion of a torpedo strike under combat conditions will be high transient events and success or failure wil be decided in seconds.

What has the return been on the efforts and attention that the "Smelyy" has devoted over a period of several years to increasing the state of training of its acoustics team? In 1978 the ASW team of the "Smelyy" was acknowledged as one the best in the combined unit. And here is and episode from a recent exercise.

As part of a search-strike group the "Smelyy" headed for its assigned area on a submarine search. Suddenly Warrant Officer G. Tarabuyev reported to the GKP that he had echo contact with an unidentified target -- presumed to be a submarine. Under conditions of the exercise, it seemed to us that there could not be a submarine there. But then there was no way that the chief of the acoustics team was confused. The team quickly classified the contact. It turned out that there was indeed a submarine there.

This was in the Mediterranean.

Flag Officer on Naval Service

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank M. Korenevskiy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "Concerns of a Flag Officer"]

[Text] The large antisubmarine ship [BPK] had dropped anchor at the designated pointed and awaited the escadra commander.

"He will probably not come over today," the senior assistant commander expressed his supposition. "The wind is not very strong but a transfer is a troublesome matter. The spectacles are keen sometimes, you know."

Those who have not had the occasion to transfer from one ship to another on a restless sea cannot understand just from a few words why even the seasoned sailors dislike "these acrobatics." Like giant dishes suspended from a balance scale the decks bob up and down as the "beam" which connects them -- a narrow, grill-work gangway -- creaks and groans. One only need to make a few steps to get across it but those steps are taken over a chasm with sheer, moving walls which are like huge millstones trying to grind away the damper-fenders that annony them. It is best not to look down from the gangway!

"No, he won't come over today," the officer concluded with more sureness as he glanced once again over the side of the BPK to the whitecaps that had thinned out somewhat during the night.

But the vice admiral did not bring himself to wait long. And there was no "keen spectacle": with a sailor's gait he lightly and gracefully walked across from the shaky little auxiliary vessel onto the combatant. He received the report, greeted the crew and in a friendly, interested manner scrutinized the sailors. And a few minutes later I mentally underlined in my notebook the first questions of my planned interview with the flag officer. In a few well-chosen words he briefed the crew on the situation for hundreds of miles around and the main features of the cruise in progress. Thus the escadra commander personally and throughly brought each sailor up to date on the situation. All this in a few minutes of muster on the quarterdeck. And it occurred to me how fruitful these minutes of openly expressed trust and attention to people had been. Minutes of direct contact idoctrination. Minutes that intensified all feelings -- particularly the feelings of responsibility and duty.

One of the notebooks that I had filled over the years here in these waters included a photocopy of the "Map of Vigilance" which was used by Mediterranean propagandists in their on-board presentations. I do not even need to open the old notebook: that map has long since been imprinted in my visual memory. It was marked with the obvious strongholds of imperialist aggression -- naval and air bases, dispositions of large contingents of NATO troops and points where nuclear weapons storage had been established overtly. It looked just as if these symbols on the map were sneaking up to draw an ominous semicircle around the territory of the USSR. Written in black ink at the bottom of the map was the statement of a highly-placed Pentagon "hawk" that with the transfer of U.S. missile-equipped nuclear submarines would leave few objectives within the USSR that could not be reached by submarine-launched "Polaris" missiles with nuclear warheads. Since the time that this complacent martinet pronouncement was making its way around the world the American missile submarines have replaced the "Polaris" with a more powerful system. Thus from time to time intensification of the feelings of responsibility and duty here is most appropriate.

The escadra commander was not one of those impenetrable military leaders on whose faces you cannot read anything. It was obvious that someone had disappointed him just before I came in and he wore an offended frown.

"Comrade Vice Admiral, perhaps we should change our interview to another time; you are concerned about something else...."

"At another time I will still be concerned about something. Worries crop up constantly. First from above, then from below."

This time, as it soon became clear, it was from below. The flag officer and the BPK commander had been talking. They were having a good conversation, the ship's commander was answering sensibly and conducting himself with dignity. The conversation was drawing to a mutually pleasant conclusion when suddenly the officer asked, "Will you be letting us go home soon"?

"What about that! "Mama, I want to go home" coming from the mouth of a commander. He should be glad he came here, where we have such a good school...! Very well, ask your questions."

> The dialogue between the correspondent and the flag officer which follows was compiled from notes on several conversations held on the Mediterranean.

Correspondent: Two young officers under the same conditions (they were on the same ship) were far away from home shores. They logged thousands of miles and a good dozen storms enriched their nautical biographies. And one returned from the cruise noticeable more mature, his experience enriched with the firmly engrained habits of commanding his subunit in difficult circumstances. The other, quite naturally, had also grown up. But he got incomparably less out of the voyage that did the former. He is more tired than the rest -- tired beyond natural norms. And he is somewhat wrought-up over the long separation from home. The first officer is ready, after a short rest, to return to the seafor many long weeks. The second one is bored with the thought of the next cruise. We will not address special and therefore understandable circumstances such as an unsettled family, the illness of a dear one, long-nurtured plans disrupted by long absence, etc. Everything is fine "on the home-front" for both our officers. Their experience and capabilities are also practically equal. Why then such a difference in the "baggage" with which these two officers returned from the long cruise?

Flag Officer: First of all, let me say that instead of the arbitrary "first" and "second" officers I could easily name real people. And not only junior officers. And not only one or two in each category. In fact, different people make different uses of the opportunities that a long cuise offers. Much here depends on the officer's self-motivation toward the cruise. One will set goals and high targets for himself. Another will draw squares on the calendar so he can mark off each day one by one. One will be most interested in whether he will have an opportunity to check out in practice some of ideas and concepts in the realm of tactical maneuvers. Another, like the commander of this ship....

> I understood that I was about to go beyond the bounds proper for a correspondent, but still I could not resist trying to remove the "cloud of flag officer disfavor" that hung over the officer. I said that the BPK commander makes a good impression and commands his vessel calmly and confidently. And he is no novice in the Mediterranean -- this is his tenth cruise beyond the Bosporus.

"His tenth, yes! But his ninth was a long time ago -- count them -- two years ago," the vice admiral did not soften. "In order to become a good sailor," Makarov wrote in his famous 'Discussions of Questions of Naval Tactics', "one must stay at sea for long periods and thereby become accustomed to being between the shy and the sea and consider the sea his home"."

> The dictum of Admiral Makarov, so well-known that at any other time it would have passed right through my ears, sounded somehow special as it flowed from the lips of a man who had spent a significant part of his adult life between sky and sea and attained the height of escadra commander, as they say, right before my eyes. After all, still fresh in my memory were visits I made to him as a correspondent when he was a department commander, then senior assistant commander, the ship's commander of one of the best ships in the navy. For this reason I wanted to delve still deeper into the vice admiral's statement.

Correspondent: Self-motivation toward a cruise, as you noted, means to set goals and targets. But are they not always implicit in an assignment given by the commander? And every commander -- both the one who goes to sea with enthusiasm and the one who counts the days until he is back in port -- will strive to do the best possible job. Is this not true?

Flag Officer: Yes, but not entirely. You must understand self-motivation as something broader than simply attitude. To motivate oneself properly means to think of more that what the cruise plan requires of you, more than what is absolutely mandatory to get the job done no matter what your attitude. Not just in one plan but in many, you will find the phrase "Improve training of hydroacoustics operators". And all these plans will be fulfilled. But one of the enthusiasts for training skilled ASW personnel left to the escadra a new method for training hydroacoustics operators. Yes, a new method! It was unusual and unexpected but it was very effective. It is noteworthy that this man came to us here in the Mediterranean firmly attuned to a quest for something new. And he found it!

Correspondent: In your words "He should be glad he came here, where we have such a school!" What makes this school unique? How is it better than schools of the "home seas"?

Flag Officer: The officers that serve in the Mediterranean have already gone through the school of various fleets. This means that the best of the experience gained in one fleet can here be passed on the alumni of other fleets, as they say, from hand to hand. Experience passed on in written form is also a treasure if it is generalized conscientiously, from the heart, and not just "scribble" work dashed off as quickly as possible. Yes, it is a true treasure. But still the hand-to-hand way by a living person in face-to-face contact -- this is an incomparably greater treasure. And, take note, we vaulue highly those who love to pass on their experience. Those that do not simply conscientiously and patiently share it, but literally love the process of imparting experience.

The first of such people that the flag officer names is Major V. Filin of the ASW helicopter pilots. Nothing pleases him more that to "raise" a beginner or to impart to a younger person something of himself, something from his "golden reserves." A high conception of duty is multiplied by sincere generousity. He has long since gone over to the ASW cruiser "Kiev" (to again pass on his experience!) and then I hear that he went on to the academy. But he has not been forgotten in the escadra and his name is recalled with respect.

The escadra commander has an equally high regard for those officers who constantly remember that it is their obligation to to be receptive to the valuable experience of others. They remember this and therefore do not wait for any special instructions. You notice in someone else's work something still unknown to you but something you think is interesting and forward-looking. Why not adopt the practice and make it your own? It is just such an approach that has enabled V. Dobrovol'skiy, G. Baldenko and other officers to make such fruitful use of the opportunities offered by long cruises.

Somewhat later, this time on the radio, the flag officer asked that officers N. Pakhomov and N. Proyavko be named among the finest officers of today. With good self-motivation the came to the Mediterranean -- industrious, inquisitive and innovative.

Correspondent: The uniqueness of this "school" obviously opens up still other possibilities for the escadra staff....

Flag Officer: Absolutely. Take the exercises. When ships of one combined unit or even fleet are matched against those of another, then for the umpire, or commander, there are friendly forces on one side and there are friendly forces on the other. And one is somehow partial to his own friendly forces. Your ship receives and "unsat" and they tell you, the commander, that you trained them poorly. We are firmly resolved not to fear this. Herein lies the principle of no compromise.

> The vice admiral recalls a case when a submarine commander played into the hands of an ASW crew. Although they could not say that it was effortless they detected the submarine easily. First of all the submarine commander was given an unsatisfactory mark for his maneuvering. Later at the critique his "helplessness" was pointed out to everyone, but he would not accept this. Although he could say nothing in his defense, he uttered only: "Very well. Let us see how helpless I am next time." And in the next exercise he "performed such acrobatics" that the ASW crews had a bad time of it. But they derived incomparably more benefit from this contest than they did from those in which everything went along in text-book fashion. Exercises conducted under simplified, standardized conditions must be eliminated. Totally eliminated!

Correspondent: What recommendations would you make to commanders who are preparing to sail to the Mediterranean?

Flag Officer: First of all, do not permit any lessening of attention to the standing watch. I asked junior BPK officers about this and their answers were most general. But here is something to think about. Who stands the watch when they are showing a movie in the mess? On this BPK it is the junior officers! But then who stands the watch when the chief is inspecting? The old-timers! During the inspection they turn in their descrpancies -- that is wrong, that is out of uniform -- and the conduct is far better. But is it permissable to distribute experienced and beginning specialists among the watches depending on movies or inspections? When the situation is tense there are no inspections. But if there is an inspection that means that everything about is calm. Then why are most experienced people on watch at this very time? And there are many such "whys" concerning the watch here. Why on this ship of radiometery operators are the radiomen cosidered practically loafers? Who is the messenger? The radiometery operator does not know his job hands down. But in my opinion a watch at the machines is simpler than a watch in the radio room. The watch of the radiomen who work intensely is easier than that of those who for weeks at a time seem to have nothing to do but wait for an arbitrary signal. This is enormous tension! Yes, this BPK commander and his officers have much to think about. Right up to revising the daily routine and making it subordinate to ensuring that a sailor going on watch is fed, rested and in a good frame of mind. And excellent watch is the key to everything.

The flag officer is now in the wheelhouse. The staff officer spreads a map, which covers an enormous territory, on the navigators table.

"Request permission to report, Comrade Vice Admiral."

"Invite the ship's commander. Let him see and hear this."

The "disfavored" commander is there right away. He carefully follows the tip of the pointer as it travels from American carrier to English. One of them has launched 79 sorties in 24 hours. NATO is becoming active; it is beginning a show of force in connection with a certain international political development.

"There you see the situation as it is today," the flag officer says. "And some are saying: "Will you be sending us home soon?"

"Comrade Vice Admiral, you misunderstood me! I would stay at least six months," the ships commander said with emotion. "I would gladly stay."

"Gladly -- that is the word. That is as it should be."

Technical Training Importance Stressed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Vice Admiral N. Shablikov, member of the Military Council, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Twice-Distinguished Red-Banner Baltic Fleet: "Man and Equipment"]

[Text] The force of modern weapons has grown immeasurably. One finds evidence of this in sea exercises and cruises, particularly when sailing on ships of the "youngest" generation and newest design. Remarkable command and control equipment has appeared, including computers.

But no matter what level of perfection weapons and technical means have achieved, we know that they are powerful only under the hand of man. It is altogether evident that this complex equipment can be mastered only by people who constantly expand their military-technical skills, people who possess a deep realization of their place in the overall process of development of the Armed Forces and who view their role and their purpose from and position of high civil awareness.

The perspective, ideological education, discipline and moral culture of the serviceman all become to a great degree accelerants to his military-professional and technical training.

The CPSU Central Committee's resolution "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrinational Work" requires that each Soviet citizen be inculcated with an awareness of the importance to society of his personal participation in the strengthening of the might of the Motherland. And our front in the fight for communism is in persistent striving for mastery of military excellence and constant readiness to skillfully employ weapons and equipment in modern combat. And the experience of leading military collectives provides obvious evidence that military equipment and weapons are mastered most successfully where party-political work is conducted well and where concern is shown for the composite indoctrination and harmonious development of people. Unfortunately, some commanders and political workers poorly understand this relationship and wander down the wrong path, thinking they are taking a short-cut to their desired end.

I will clarify this idea with an example. On the ships where Captain-Lieutenant A. Pavlenko serves one can hear the leaders report with a hint of pride that in preparation for a cruise their people literally "did not climb out of the holds" but worked even at night making urgent repairs and regulating equipment.

Of course if trouble comes up it must be corrected energetically and in the shortest time. If sailing time is imminent and things are not in order down to the last detail, then it is no sin to "borrow" an hour or two sometimes from the crew's free time budget to prepare for the cruise.

But I emphatically do not condone cases where people sometimes actually "do not teat away from the Iron" and do not have the time to satisfy their spiritual needs and rest. One must consider that sailors spend the principal part of their time in the rigid hulls of submarines or on battle stations and command posts of surface ships, surrounded by a world of instruments, systems, mechanisms and complexes. This in itself can to a certain degree affect the psyche of these people. And if, on top of this, a kind of "sacrficial attitude" is cultivated wherein the highest disticnction is that they "do not crawl out of" their positions then how can one expect them to achieve the desired results?

No, this is not the way to search out unused potential! It is far more important, albeit more difficult, to make scientific-technical progress in the navy, technical creativity and the quest for more rational ways to rapidly master equipment and weapons the romance of our life; it is far more important that we strive for a deep understanding by each serviceman of the particular importance of his technical training to raising combat readiness, thereby strengthening his active patriotic position.

Just such an approach to this important matter is maintained in the leading collectives of the navy. Take, for example, the combined unit in which Captain 2nd Rank P. Gnatyuk commands one of the ships. The pace of life and military labor is no less intense here than anywhere else. But the mission is accomplished more successfully than on the ships mentioned earlier; the people know their jobs better, there is hardly ever trouble on the positions and nobody is "scrambled" in the night to take care of them. The sailors get normal rest and have time to satisfy their needs, among which an important place is occupied by their interest in technical questions. The essence of the matter, it turns out, lies in the style of work, the tenor of life and the proper conduct of the indoctrination process.

"Gaining an understanding of the person and properly orienting him toward his equipment is no less important than training him," said communist Senior Lieutenant-Engineer Yu. Morozov, commander of the hold and boiler room section of the outstanding patrol ship "Silnyy." These words import to me personally how this young party member understands his mission. In fact, if you do not know how a person relates to his duty and his equipment you cannot understand the motivation for his conduct and your training of the person will be ineffective. That is why the commander and party organization of the "Silnyy" strive for unity of political-indoctrinational work -- both overall and in concrete terms -- and military-technical training of sailors.

One of the recent cruises was instructive in this regard. At sea they systematically used not only all forms of specialist training but also technical knowledge discussion groups. They held discussions and quiz sessions on the ship's weapons, equipment and systems and the military-technical lecture group was in action. For example, the communists of the electromechanical department (they are all communists) gave lectures on the development of the diesel industry in our country, its latest achievements, trends and long-range prospects. The technical discussion groups also broached questions which significantly broadened the professional horizons of the sailors.

During the cruise many officers wrote papers which covered not only useful recommendations, based on the experience of operating equipment in the tropics, but also pedagogic reflections on how best "to orient a person toward his equipment." These works contained much of value in that one could see the engineer's philosophy in the practical recommendations.

By the way, not only in the unit under discussion but in the navy as a whole, writing and discussing papers on ways to accelerate equipment and weapons training a the search for more efficient use of their combat capabilities became, we should say, a fine tradition. Submarine missileman Captain-Lieutenant V. Bokov recently presented an interesting work for the judgement of his comrades. The faculty of the Naval Engineering Academy became interested in papers that were written by Captain 2nd Rank-Engineer Ye. Andrusenko and they were published in abridged form in MORSKOY SBORNIK. The author received a favorable response from readers.

This, we think, is an effective form of propaganda and promotion of advanced methods of military-technical crew training. One can only hope that in similar works: the social motivation for actions of servicemen will be shown more clearly; the psychology of personality formation will be treated in more depth; a moral appraisal of combat expertise will be given; and, advice will be given on how to attain harmony in the professional and spiritual development of the sailor.

We are establishing a clear-cut system of froms and methods of military-technical propaganda. Technical universities with several departments are functioning, as a rule, in the Officers' Houses. Several technical schools for warrant officers have proven themselves worthwhile; for example, the one for submariners in which each of the professional areas is headed by an appropriate flag-rank specialist. As we have already noted, many technical discussion groups for seamen and petty officers are functioning successfully.

But we would be committing a sin against the truth if we began to contend that everything in this area is being done as it should be. Some schools and discussion groups at times pattern themselves, and not in the best way, after the forms of planned specialist training. But their mission is something else -- expansion of perspectives and elevation of the levels of scientific-technical thought, in order that trainees, who have already received the knowledge, can creatively translate it into their own practical actions. It is vitally important today that nor only officers, but warrant officers, petty officers and, to a certain degree, seamen take on the philosophy of an engineer and study its basis. It is most essential that every officer, and each political officer even more, be conversant with the questions which delve into the relationship between man and equipment. If we begin to study the make-up of a missile or a diesel in our school or discussion group from the same aspect as this is done in the specialist training schools, then we are hardly satisfying the requirements of military-technical propaganda. In a word, the planning and organization of these important forms of military-technical propaganda leave much to be desired. Some party organizations, primarily at the staff level, have a weak grasp of these questions, taking at times a position of non-involvement.

Meanwhile the significance of the role of staff specialists in intensification of the training process and inculcation in servicemen of love for their equipment and pride in their weapons is obvious. And it should be said that many of these communists do function fruitfully on the ships as organizers and indoctrinators. At the base of the working style of such comrades lies a deep involvement in the problems of the subunit and a desire to instruct people, aid in the organization of competition and planned forms of training and to take an active part in military-technical propaganda.

But there are also those whose work on the ships is, figuratively speaking, is around the flywheel. What a surprise! After all some of them were formerly ship's officers with reputations as indoctrinators and party activists. But once they went to staff they somehow decided that they were now "free from personnel."

This fundamentally wrong. It is the duty of each communist-leader to instill in his people a high sense of conviction and a class approach to all phenomena and processes in the world and to do everything possible to ensure that each of our servicemen, part and parcel with his ideological and spiritual growth, acquires professional and military-technical preparedness to defend the Motherland and that he masters to perfection the science needed to be victorious in modern combat.

Air Crew ASW Training Methods

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Major V. Nepomnyashchiy, Military Navigator 1st Class, Red-Banner Northern Fleet: "Torpedo Planes Attack"]

[Text] An exercise was in progress. A few hours flying time in the clouds and the crew, headed by air detachment commander and aviator first class Major V. Kryakin, had covered a distance over the ocean equal to his ASW aircraft's operating radius. Only upon reaching the mission area did he break out under the dark clouds that hung heavy over the water.

The gloomy polar twilight, the nearness of the icy waves.... It was an inhospitable picture. But it was a common sight to these northern fleet flyers. Major Koryakin, as always, was carefully analyzing the situation in which his crew was to enter into a duel with an "enemy" submarine. There are no reference points out here and even on the distant shore there is little in the way of radiotechnical means needed for air navigation. But still the commander had no doubt but that they would come out exactly at the search zone. Time and again he had been convinced of the expertise of his navigator, Captain V. Dmitreyev. A first-class specialist who had been decorated for his successes in combat training, Dmitreyev always made maximum use of the capabilities of the on-board navigation system.

The commander was preoccupied with how best to conduct the target search. Should they use the on-board magnetometer? This was the most economical method. And, as a rule, it was an effective one: on the prceeding flight they succeeded in detecting the submarine in a short time. But its use was limited at this time. Having first talked it over with Dmitreyev, Koryakin decided to employ another search variant.

The airborne subhunters have everything they need to detect and defeat an "enemy" submarine: refined instruments and powerful weapons, deep knowledge and considerable experience in the use of combat equipment. To the point, Major Koryakin's crew is rightfully considered a leader. It is one of the best in our regiment which bears the Pendant of the USSR Minister of Defense for valor and military excellence.

It is an honor but not an easy matter to be the leader of a socialist competition. One must perform without the slightest indulgence to hold the high rating of a master. And communist Major Koryakin shows a party concern for increasing the efficiency and quality of his subordinates' military labor. He demands, for example, that during preparatory flight training they score nothing less than excellent when rehearsing all aspects of the upcoming mission in the composite simulator.

Major Koryakin devotes intense attention to development of his crewmembers' volitional qualities and prepares them psychologically for accomplishment of their responsible mission, indoctrinating them in the heroic traditions of northern fleet aviators. Thus before the air-tactics exercise began he related the following front-line episode.

... October, 1944. Crews of the 36th Torpedo Bomber Regiment was given a mission: attack a heavily defended enemy convoy on a distant sea route. Fighter cap was out of the question -- the distance was too great. All hopes rode on surprise and airmanship. Deputy squadron commander Captain I. Volynkin led a flight of five bombers.

Included in this group was the crew commanded by a young pilot and communist, Lieutenant V. Vel'dyaskin. Clouds forced the aircraft down on the deck. But Vel'dyaskin was holding formation well.

"The sea ahead is already raging with antiaircraft fire," recalls Volaykin, who later became a Hero of the Soviet Union. "My plane is shaking all over. 'The right wing is on fire,' I hear the voice of my gunner. Vel'dyaskin's plane is also burning. But why is he side-slipping to the right away from the formation? Suddenly the fire on our other four aicraft slacks off. The wingman has decided to draw the fire away from us. But no, he had not turned of the attack heading! Like a flaming arrow his plane continued dead on target. 'Release!' Vel'dyaskin's torpedo struck a 10-12 ton transport. Strikes from the other aircraft sunk an escort and a trawler. Then the burning torpedo bomber piloted by Vel'dyaskin swooped down into the center of the convoy and rammed into another large transport...."

The heroic traditions of the front-line fighters.... They are always present in each formation and they motivate young aviators to decisiveness and daring in modern combat. Selflessness in fulf-llment of military duty is inherent in officer-communist Vitaliy Koryakin and his service colleagues.

And now in the exercise this crew found itself in a difficult situation. The decision had been made to use buoys instead of the magnetometer. This means of conducting a search for submerged targets is most effective when the buoys are placed in a faultlessly chosen direction, exactly in the prescribed pattern.

The best means of combating difficulties are expertise and self-control. The navigator-operator, Senior Lieutenant G. Yermakov, had already succeeded in singling out a submarine detection signal from amid the heavy interference during the first hour the crew was on station. In the dark depths the "enemy" was employing radical maneuvers, striving to break the contact and confound attempts to sight in on it.

But Captain Dmitreyev rapidly plotted a new heading to lay down the "barrier." Major Koryakin steered his aircraft to this exact heading. Buoys of a second type plunged into the water. They help the crew to determine parameters of the submarine's movements.

Without a single drop-out, Senior Lieutenant Yermakov tracked the target blip until data for the torpedo attack could be computed. "Release!" The steel cigar ripped a wave apart and streaked into the deep toward the target.

Objective monitoring equipment later confirmed that aiming of the torpedo as well as all other aspects of the flight's mission were executed with excellence. All members of the outstanding air detachment commanded by Major V. Koryakin maintain close formation with their leader. Sixty five percent of the personnel hold first-class specialist and combat master ratings. The collective cut by three percent the time required to bring their aviation equipment to combat readiness; they cut the average hourly expenditure of radio-hydroacoustic buoys by five percent. The detachment's crews hold the highest score in the squadron -- 4.82 [out of a possible 5.0] -- on the combat weapons-use exercise.

But, as everyone knows, there is no limit to perfection of combat readiness. Detachment commander-communist Koryakin, as he ably indoctrinates his subordinates in the spirit of high awareness of military duty, is preparing them for accomplishment of still more difficult missions in the concluding phase of the training year.

Submarine Crew Training Methods

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Shirokov: "Evaluations Must Educate"]

[Text] The socialist competition score chart gladdens the eye: the color of red predominates. This means that excellent evaluations have taken the dominant position. But on the submarine, where Captain-Lieutenant V. Kuvatov is secretary of the party organization, the ship's commander, his political deputy and the communist collective decided to treat such charts more critically. Excellent evaluations are numerous, but are they equitable and do they fully reflect the expertise, initiative and enthusiasm of the people?

The party activists, on recommendation of the commander, analyzed the charts reflecting socialist competition between the combat watches during their last period at sea. The difference between the early phase of the cruise and its final phase was striking. In the early days there were many threes [satisfactory] -- the sailors were going through a period of acclimatization and settling-in. How acute the battle between the watches is can be seen even on paper -- every point won is valued. But then the crew went into cruise mode, habits become firmly established, the quality and discipline of watch duty improves and the fives [excellent evaluation] began. Nothing but rare, chance lapses by one crew or another began to decide the outcome of the competition. In fact, these "universal" fives leveled the efforts of the bulk of the crew: one stood a watch with no discrepancies -- five points; another showed initiative on his watch -- still another five. But then simple conscientiousness and conscientiousness-plus are not really of equal significance. It is important to keep this fact in mind when evaluation the achievements of competition.

Captain-Lieutenant V. Kuvatov proposed changing the evaluation system, which should have a greater stimulative influence on the competitors. The one who performed his duty competently without discrepancies, showed discipline and proved himself positively across the board would receive a four [good]. But special criteria were set for the highest score: for example, ensuring increased reliability in equipment operation, exhibiting professional and political erudition in classes, taking confident and bold action in difficult situations, showing initiative and keenness of wit....

Officer Kuvatov's proposal was discussed by the party bureau and was approved by the ship's commander. They decided to hold a party meeting on the subject. After all, appropriate explanatory work should be done among the personnel in order to help people understand the usefulness of a stricter approach to evaluation of their labors.

The open party meeting that was held just before the cruise was active and business-like. The communists said: it is good that the crew's state of training has reached a high standard but excellent evaluations, having become so prevalent, do not really open up new vistas for the competitors but lose their motivational influence. It is necessary, they said, to raise the "ceiling" of the highest score.

They then conducted the appropriate explanatory sessions among the crewmembers.

... Several days into the cruise and not one excellent evaluation. Everyone anxiously waited to see who would be the first to be distinguished with a five -- the evaluation that had become so inaccessible. Lieutenant V. Kalashnikov was the first.

The lieutenant's watch was almost over. The officer had stood his watch in his characteristic manner: he kept a careful eye on the instruments and reported all changes to the central post. The cruise area was relatively quiet and no unexpected tactical problems had come up. Suddenly the officer caught a suspicious noise coming from one of the console's equipment units. The instrument dial showed an increased voltage level. "Something is wrong with the power," the thought flashed into his mind. Kalashnikov rushed to the power distibution panel, quickly made a cross switch and immediately reported what had taken place to the central post. The officer's decisive actions averted a possible equipment outage. The lieutenant got permission from the department commander to undertake alignment of the instrument. The watch ended but Kalashnikov did not leave his duty station for a long time -- until he brought the matter to a close. The ship's communists saw to it the young officers skilled action were given wide visibility.

As a result of such an approach, after some time it became noticeable that the creative activeness of the submariners had grown and the competiveness between watches had taken on a new intensity. A wide-scale movement took shape among the personnel to exceed combat norms, raise proficiency qualifications, master related specialties and develop interchangeability on the battle stations.

Everyone knows that undeserved belittlement of the achievements of people can affect the moral climate of a competition just as negatively as can undeserved inflation of evaluations. Therefore the ship's commander, his deputies, watch officers and department commanders tried to be as objective as possible when summing competition results.

Once one of the helmsmen expressed doubt in the correctness of evaluations he had received. He contended that his knowledge and work habits were not in the least inferior to that of helmsmen on other watches. The sailor needed to be convinced of his wrongness. The party group organizer on the watch, Captain-Lieutenant N. Losev, proposed using readings from the course recorder. They started displaying the course recorder graphs of helmsmen on all three watches alongside the competition score charts and the "offended" helmsman admitted his error. This had a profound positive repercussion throughout the crew. There were no more cases of sailors expressing disagreement with evaluations given them or their watches. All efforts were channeled toward correcting lapses and achieving higher results.

... The submarine's cruise was a long one. The competition between watches bore a keen combat character during all phases of the cruise. Toward the end of the cruise the color of red once again began to predominate on competition score charts. However, this now attested to a higher intensity of the competition and the fully developed expertise of the personnel. The submarine met all its combat training objectives and the crew made a large step toward their goal of entering their ship into the ranks of the excellent.

Submarine Commander Describes Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank A. Gusev, Submarine Commander: "Who Creates the Microclimate?"]

[Text] We won the submarine duel although the "enemy" was skillful and tried very hard for victory. He showed prudence, sureness and boldness and made several non-standard tactical moves. But at a critical moment he allowed on insignificant lapse, after which the initiative changed entirely to our side. As it was pointed out in the critique, the combat crew of our ship proved better coordinated and unified and therefore performed more reliably.

The duel was one of the episodes of a long cruise when the crew's readiness to act in difficult situations was put to a strict test and the error of a single sailor could substantially affect the outcome of the duel. It was a pleasure for me as the commander to see the desire of each submariner to not only cope with his own assignments but also to help his comrades.

I noted with satisfaction that the more difficult the situation on the cruise became, the more perceptible the atmosphere of principle and attention to each person became. In a word, that moral atmosphere which helps to maintain a responsible attitude toward duty and a spirit of real comradeship.

The crew met all obligations of the long cruise with a high level of quality. In particular, the work of the harmonious acoustics collective during the cruise was beyond reproach. At the most critical moment of the submarine duel Petty Officer 2nd Class S. Panarin succeeded in "cutting off" a bogus target, detected the "enemy" submarine at maximum range on a background of interference and maintained reliable contact with it until the attack was executed. This success was no doubt aided by the sailor's sure knowledge that, if the need arose, team chief Warrant Officer V. Lyubeznikov and other experienced specialists stood ready to assist him.

You see, up until just before the cruise began Panarin used to become confused during drills even in quite simple situations. He would become nervous upon receipt of even easy tactical problems. He wanted to do everything well but he would get confused. Then, anticipating reproach from the team chief or ridicule from his comrades, he would make even more serious mistakes.

Warrant Officer Lyubeznikov took note of this character trait in his subordinate. At sea he endeavored, both during drills and during drill critiques, to create a calm, business-like situation and an atmosphere of mutual trust. Being a master himself, not once did he stress his own superiority over the novice nor did he allow the other experienced submariners to do so. When he noticed that the young sonarman was becoming nervous and confused over some routine misfortune, he recalled with a smile similar "punctures" in his own experience and told the sailor in detail the quickest way to eliminate the problem. Goodwill and mutual respect between the sailors created within the team a microclimate in which the novice, once he was confident of his own abilities, began to mature quickly. And those who had already excelled on many cruises before felt an inner desire to encourage the young sailor, following the example of the warrant officer.

But it must be confessed that one sometimes encounters experienced specialists who look down on novices. Such "indispensable" specialists may call a young seaman a "simpleton" and offend him with crude jokes. During drills they constantly pour out remarks of dissatisfaction but they do not, however, explain intelligently the proper way to do things.

One also finds from time to time team leaders and group commanders who are quick with a sharp word and hasty conclusions. And some hasten to put their personal faults off onto their insufficiently trained subordinates. This causes understandable resentment in the novices. And attitudes that are a far cry from mutual trust and understanding begin to build up between subordinates and superiors and between novices and experienced servicemen. We kept record of each such incident during the cruise. And, although these cases were very few, the communists and the komsomols gave each of them an evaluation of principle and then strived to ensure that the microclimate in the collectives where the errors occurred was changed for the better.

Achieving sincere trust and mutual understanding in relationships between servicemen with different service dates, different levels of specialist training, diverse characters and backgrounds is not as easy as it may appear at first glance. When one becomes familiar with the experience of ships which have attained lasting success in unifying their collectives one becomes convinced that this is a result of the purposeful, persistent and daily efforts of commanders and political workers, warrant officer and petty officers, party and komsomol organizations.

The role of the commander shoudl be stressed in particular. If he takes the wrong position in the subtle and delicate matter of the interrelationship between superior and subordinates then it will be difficult to expect success. After all, examples can be cited where young officers pattern themselves after a commander who is prone to coarse language and castigation and lacks self-control in his treatment of people. And the young commanders "learn" from these officer to raise their voices at subordinates. Sharp words and crudeness are never acceptable but on a long cruise they are perceived with a particular sensitivity and give rise to acute resentment and reticence.

A mature commander will never allow himself to substitute coarseness for exactingness. And if he happens to offend someone by chance in an unforeseen situation, then he must take steps to correct his mistake.

Once one of the ship's best specialists, Warrant Officer M. Lugovenko, did not, it appeared to me, react to an instruction from the senior assistant commander in a timely manner. The cruise was going through a difficult situation and there was no time to specify details. And so, talking with the warrant officer, I raised my voice. Mikhail Savel'yevich was taken aback -- so unexpected was this abruptness. As he left the cabin he said with a sigh: "But you, comrade commander, are considered by the crew to be a cordial person...."

A bit later, when the situation had reurned to normal, I had to give some good thought to what had taken place. Moreover since it became clear that the delay in executing the order had not been the fault of the warrant officer. But even if he had been at fault would that really have given me grounds for such abruptness? I looked in on the warrant officer at his post -- he was without his former fire. He was taking the undeserved offense very hard, attempting to keep to himself away from his comrades. I went up to him and apologized for the outburst. The warrant officer became cheerful right away and I felt as if a load had been lifted from my heart. From then until the end of the cruise I had many occasions for free and open conversation with him on many questions.

Creation of a healthy moral atmosphere on board ship is aided in large measure by the commander's trust in his subordinates. Does it not sometimes happen this way? A job, which a warrant officer or junior officer is fully capable of handling, is suddenly assigned to a department commander. On a crucial cruise, they say, he is more reliable and confident. But this formula can be deciphered easily: the commander does not trust his subordinates. And such a commander is forgetting that trust lends wings to a person, compels him to labor even harder and take a more active part in helping his colleagues. I remember how enthusiastically Warrant Officer Ye. Shershnev worked, with what initiative and sense of responsibility for success of the collective he labored, during the cruise which we trusted him to temporarily assume the responsibilities of commander of the hydroacoustics group. The warrant officer handled the job in an excellent manner and became surer of his own strength, which had a positive affect on his later service.

We strive in every way possible to increase the authority of warrant officers and petty officers, although these junior commanders are not bad at looking after their own authority. Most of them are highly rated specialists or masters and pioneers of socialist competition. And if someone compromises the high ranks of petty officer or warrant officer by his conduct he is in for a bad time. A healthy moral atmosphere presupposes not an all-forgiving attitude but a strict, uncompromising demand. When, for example, a young team leader, Warrant Officer V. Tokunov, dragged out mastery of his specialty because of a lack of personal organization his comrades invited him to a meeting of warrant officers. A strict, but at the same time benevolent, conversation ensued. As the cruise showed, Tokunov drew the proper conclusions from this comradely criticism.

I am convinced that the strength of our crew, which has been decorated with the Pendant of the USSR Minister of Defense for valor and military excellence, lies primarily in its combat and spiritual unity. This last long cruise showed once again that the healthy moral atmosphere that has been firmly established on the ship does much to promote excellent-quality resolution of the most difficult problems.

12184
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TANK UNITS: COMMAND AND CREW TRAINING

Underwater Training

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 16, Aug 79 pp 3-5

[Article by Col. A Yegorov entitled: Always on the March]

[Text] The local tank base never rests. Permeated with smoke and dust, it conscientiously works what are called two shifts - day and night. Lines of tanks, enveloped in clouds of dirty yellow dust, tear along the course.

One of the tanks, arriving at a gate, is stopped.

Standing nearby, a warrant officer shook his head and said: "How many seconds are uselessly lost?"

During the pause the tank crewmen started talking about the speed of the tank. One young driver-mechanic became very excited: "At high speed the engine knocks, and if at every bunker you shift down to the necessary gear ratio, you will plod along like a tortoise."

The dispute of the tank crewmen was settled by the warrant officer. The essence of his judgement was that one cannot lower the speed. Then the engine will not knock. He explained how this is done in minute detail.

Thus we made the acquaintance of warrant officer Ivan Nikiforovich Stepankov. Stepankov has been in the army for forty years. He has been awarded medals for bravery and combat service. He went from Kiev to Prague in his own tank. And to this day, he will not part with his tank helmet.

"If you add up all the kilometers I have driven behind the controls," chuckles Ivan Nikiforovich, " it would encircle the globe."

For many years Stepankov has worked here as an instructor training tank crews in the principles of driving tanks. He has prepared and educated hundreds of high class specialists. The warrant officer also actively participates in the public life of the subunit (podrazdeleniye). He is a member of the battalion party bureau and the propagandist of a platoon.

"Until the war, at these places where there now are tank bases," relates Stepankov, "there were cavalry regiments where my grandfather served.From here he went away to war. In '43 he did not come back from a routine mounted reconnaissance."

"Our squadrons galloped around these mountainous places." continues the warrant officer. "Now our'horses' are different," Ivan Nikiforovich emphasizes not without pride. "And such is the maneuverability, fire power, and armor of these steel 'horses' that even the famous thirty-four horse team can't touch them. Each of us has a diploma from our tekhnikum or ten-year secondary school, and not infrequently from an institute of higher learning. There still is a strong memory of the war. To be alert - about this we are always remembering."

"Our tanks," declared warrant officer Stepankov one day, "can serve much longer than specified by the technical standards. I pledge myself to demonstrate this in practice."

And he has demonstrated it.

During his service Stepankov has worked on machines of various types. Upon assimilating one, he was transferred to a second - a third. On each, the interval between repairs was extended by tens or hundreds of kilometers.

In the unit they say: "Stepankov gave the country a tank!"

Yes, exactly, he gave one. He did it in terms of the saving in the useful life of the machines. This is equivalent to a saving of expenditures on the operation of a tank from its production to its capital repair by avoiding the intermediate repairs. He saved almost as much money as the cost of a combat tank.

We are sitting with Ivan Nikiforovich in a class for training in shallow diving. He speaks with emphasis about the duties of tank crewmen, about the romance of their service, and about how they are fulfilling their socialist obligations. With satisfaction he tells how much attention is being given by those in the unit to the psychological training of soldiers.

This is understandable. The engine roars continuously; there are the sharp jolts that are unavoidable during movement of a tank over rugged terrain; gun powder gases accumulate in the fighting compartment during firing - all these difficult circumstances require from a tank crewman not only skill, but also a very strong will. A crew in these conditions for a long time clearly is fulfilling its obligations by not losing its fighting spirit. Tank crewmen operate confidently by night and by day in winter and summer; they overcome water obstacles; and they complete long marches.

"In modern combat, tanks, as before, remain a formidable weapon." says Stepankov. "Therefore, in peace time a tank crewman must prepare for combat from every point of view including the psychological. Picture to yourself a man spending many hours in a tank working the control levers and time after time driving a heavy shell into the gun. Is it not necessary to prepare him for psychological overloads?"

"You ask: what are the ways of teaching high morale combat qualities?" continues my interlocutor. "The ways,in my opinion, are many. But the main one is - in every lesson in tank gunnery training, to teach the tank crewmen in circumstances approximating combat without simplifications or indulgences."

"Of course, in the first periods of service, young tank crewmen when placed in complex conditions often find themselves at a loss, and then are completely afraid to carry out a particular procedure. This is because of an insufficiency of teaching, experience, and training."

"To prepare a soldier for action in a complex situation, one must proceed sequentially and patiently, taking into account the strong and weak aspects of his character. For example, in training tank crewmen for underwater driving, which is by far more complicated than driving a tank around the tank base, just such a sequence is adhered to in our unit. There is the study of the special systems and their practical application, the development of the ability to enter the water in a protective respirator, the mastery by the crew of escape from a flooded tank, and, finally, the crossing of a river or lake along the bottom. During such a sequence some tank crewmen initially experience fear and tension and then, after the training, a calmness and confidence emerges. If a man has a strong character he easily overcomes the psychological barriers. As for soldiers who are not sufficiently strong, it is necessary to conduct additional training as we do."

"Once I was present at lessons on shallow diving training." says Stepankov. "The company commander" Sr. Lt. Nazarenko"conducted these lessons."

Shallow diving training for tank crewmen is the key to successfully crossing water obstacles along the bottom. When finding oneself underwater in an isolating protective respirator, an unpleasant and alarming sensation develops.

'Breathe in the same way as usual.' the senior lieutenant admonished his subordinates. 'If you feel that water has come in behind the mask, do not be frightened, nothing will happen to you.'

"The tank crewmen listened attentively to the commander. I noted how the cheerful and always calm rating, Tkachenko, boldly approached the ladder of the little footbridge, quickly put on the mask, hung the weight over an arm, and fastened the end of the line with the signal float around his waist. It seemed from all his actions that he would successfully carry out the training. But, during the submergence the soldier lost his nerve; he did not hold out; he pulled on the end of the signal line and was lifted to the surface."

'What is the matter?' asked his senior lieutenant.

'The respirator works poorly' the embarrassed and faint Tkachenko replied. 'I could not breathe.'

"Now an entirely different man stood before the commander, but only because of having met a danger which he might not be able to overcome."

"But the officer was cunning - he apparently replaced the protective respirator, and Tkachenko began to work underwater confidently."

'Now this is an entirely different matter,' said he, getting out of the water after the specified time, 'the respirator works normally.'

'What I gave you was the same one.' smiled the officer.

"The tank crewman was embarrassed and was compelled to recognize that the first time, he had become frightened although, to him, it had seemed he was on the point of suffocating."

"With each training session Tkachenko felt more confident of himself underwater. He quickly overcame his timidity. And when the company forded a river, he was one of the first to drive his tank along the bottom."

"Not only young tank crewmen sense fear, but even people with lots of experience." observed Ivan Nikiforovich. " I know one of them. This warrant officer, Selivanov, is a master driver - an experienced tank crewman. But he seldom succeeded in crossing an antitank trench in third gear. Yet he overcame it skilfully - with enviable mastery."

"But one day it became necessary to drive a tank underwater, and to Selivanov this was not easy. Time passed. The warrant officer trained himself, toughened his will, and began to drive his tank along the bottom of the river confidently."

"To control a tank is not an easy matter." says Ivan Nikiforovich, "It is still more difficult to carry out accurately aimed firing underway, but the most difficult is to keep a tank constantly in a condition of combat readiness. No matter that it is at night, in rain, or in a blizzard that the command rings out - you already are on the march, prepared at any instant to open fire. This is difficult. But our people must know that the tank crewmen will never let down as they did not let down in the dark days of the Fatherland War."

We are walking around the little military town - it is clean, green, and pretty. That it is so exemplary is also a credit to warrant officer Stepankov. Along the asphalt roads are brightly colored tulips. Ivan Nikiforovich stoops down to a bright flower and carefully touches its petals.

"A beautiful flower." he says dreamily.

Ivan Nikiforovich and all his military comrades in arms solidly stand guard over the peaceful work of the Soviet people.

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Officer Academy Activities

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sept 79 p 6

[Article by Lt. A. Stepanov entitled: Academy Men, the Principal Strike Force]

[Text] It is an early Moscow morning. The asphalt is wet after a nighttime rain, and there is a laminated fog above the Yauzaya. But near the old building with the severe architecture on Krasnokursantskiy way there already is no quietness. The massive light brown doors are thrown open for business. The guards, checking passes, return the salute of the entering officers who,in age, are no more than ten years older than the guards, but already have had time to complete higher military schools, to command combat subunits (podrazdeleniya) and are now to begin as students at the Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy of Armored Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy.

There are gold tanks on the officers' shoulder pieces and on the black velvet collars. In the vestibule of the building the first thing that strikes the eye is a bronze model of a tank mounted on a pedestal.

Together with the students, I walk along the resounding corridors. Soon they will begin classes. The officers of the day are opening doors on which little signs gleam: "Office of Tactical Training","Office of Operational Practice", "Faculty of Tanks". I go into one of the laboratories of this faculty.

In the middle of the spacious classroom is a tank, a real one, in its full armored stature. So perfected are its lines that they seem surprisingly simple, straightforward, and without intricacy. But, to master the armor and the cannon with the machine gun requires three years at the academy!

Under the steel shell are hundreds of instruments, sensors, mechanisms, electronic assemblies, and the most complicated optical sights. Certainly all this equipment is well-known to the students, but at the academy they are faced with not only mastering it in the smallest detail, but also with comprehending it on what may be said to be a different scientific level. In fact,one of the academy's principal missions is to inculcate commanders and military engineers with analytical habits and creativity in the skill of troop leadership. It is not by chance that in their time, the designers of Soviet armored tank materiel finished at the academy and then worked within its walls.

I go out into the corridor which now is empty. From the auditoriums are heard the talk of the officers of the day to the student groups with the invariable appellation: "Comrade Officers!". They get up saluting the instructors, first classmen and "oldtimers". One of them recently returned from military maneuvers, others from furloughs, but there was none who, this summer, would not have been at the suburban training center of the academy where there are also auditoriums, laboratories, and classrooms; but the basic events take place outside their walls in the field. It is especially for tank men. There are trenches with water; specially created areas that are difficult to traverse; almost perpendicular ascents; head spinning descents; deep ditches; rutted bridges; springboards; and this is far from the full list of the surprises that await tank crews while driving. But the field also is for gunnery, long marches, and tactical lessons.

I remember my first training at the tank base. This was in my student years. You did not slow down before coming to obstacles or "vlip" [translation unknown] with an interphone headset into the hatch. And how can I describe the sensation at that instant when you literally are falling with a heavy machine into the depths of a ditch! You not only overcome the obstacle, you test yourself for strength and endurance.

What I am saying is that the equipment does not free the tank man from heavy work and sweat interspersed now and then with oil and smoke. It is true that at the suburban training center of the academy the students sometimes succeed in going not one but tens of kilometers without mud on the tank tracks, without smoke, and without exhaust fumes. But this is not in the field - it is in the motion picture trainer.

There is the usual seat for the driver-mechanic, but underneath, instead of a caterpillar track, there is a rocking bar, and in the foreground is a white fabric screen. The road, included in the film projection, "runs by" on the screen. Your perceptions are as though you are on the scene.You dash into a trench, you shake, you do not have time to turn away from an age-old tree or a rock, you crash and how! Your skills actually increase, and the sweat you pour out is absolutely real.

However the field is still the field. Precisely there is the training, working, and also,if required, the combat post of tank men.

"Perhaps not since the first day I served in the tank troops have I experienced such stresses as at our training center." said the third year student, Major Aleksandr Shaveko in a conversation with me. "At retreat, sometimes you are so exhausted that it seems you will not move a hand or foot tomorrow. Everything in the field drags out: the tracks clank, the engine roars, the mood is peculiar - but we are not making jokes, we are training to fight."

My second interlocutor is Major Yuriy Sivov - a tank man by heredity.

"My father sometimes told how they went into an attack at the front, how they would bid farewell to the others before a battle. Of course, it is impossible to compare our situation with theirs, but from time to time I feel as if I am in my father's place. Tank men never let the country down, and our generation,likewise, will not let it down."

Yes, the academy counts on its graduates to overcome any obstacle and to be victorious in the most difficult battles. Among its graduates are the Marshals of the Soviet Union S. Sokolov and V. Chuykov, General of the Army I. Chernyakovskiy, and many other noted Soviet militaty leaders. More than 200 former students achieved the honor "Hero of the Soviet Union" and ten men became Heroes twice.

Accounts of their victories were put together in a golden collection of portraits in the academy library. And, on the wall in front of its entrance is a marble slab annually enriched with new names and with new gilded lines for the surnames of the superior graduates. This summer the names of Major I. Bel'magin, Col. G. Golubev, Engr.-Col. A Krivitskiy, and Col. V. Nikolayev were inscribed in the marble. Together with their comrades they honorably upheld the high title of "Academy Men", the main striking force of dry land troops - Tank men.

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MOTOROTORIZED RIFLE UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Air Support Measures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Colonel V Filippov: "Support From the Sky"]

[Text] Pursuing the retreating "enemy," the motorized rifle battalion quickly broke through to the river. It was not a large, turbulent river; but it was all the same a serious enough obstacle in the path of the attackers. But now if you are slow here with your crossing, the "enemy" may be able to bring up fresh forces; and the success of the offensive may become subject to serious doubt.

But no hitches developed. Fliers came to the assistance of the motorized rifle troops. They had been assigned flight missions for that day connected with crew preparation and training for their squadron tactical air exercise. The senior officer had taken care to insure that cooperation with aviation was organized as part of the tactical motorized rifle battalion exercise. Aviation and combined-arms commanders and their chiefs of staff had held comprehensive prior discussions concerning the joint subunit (podrazdeleniye) operations to be executed in the training area. Matters connected with the planned cooperation were clearly and precisely worked out and coordinated with reference to times, lines and objectives.

So now, while the motorized rifle troops fight their battle to seize and occupy a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the river and construction operations in preparation for the crossing are being completed, the first pair of fighter-bombers appear over the battlefield.

...Soviet front-line fighters fearlessly and heroically battled fascists here during the Great Patriotic War. Among them was the soldier Vasiliy Mel'nikov. His son, Senior Lt Vladimir Mel'nikov, communist and combat pilot 2d class, is now a member of the group led by combat pilot 1st class Lt Col Yuriy Frolov. Their fighter-bombers are supporting the motorized rifle subunit's assault river crossing with accurate combined bombing and strafing attacks.

So here they are approaching in pairs at low altitude the point where the river crossing is about to be executed. At the previous evening's party meeting, at which was discussed the communists' tasks in connection with upcoming exercise, Yuriy Aleksandrovich Frolov declared that he himself as well as his men would be putting forth all their energies, all their efforts to insure their skilled and effective performance and that their fighter-bomber attack would be in keeping with those carried out here 35 years ago against fascist invaders by fearless Soviet ground-attack aircraft pilots.

The aviation over the battlefield on this particular day was operating in three echelons. In the lowest echelon, nearest the ground itself and above the motorized rifle battle formations, were the fire-support helicopters. Above these in the second echelon were the fighter-bombers. Fighters occupied the third, the highest, echelon. There were air battles there at those stratospheric altitudes as well. The interweavings of the inversion spirals, which resembled stretched white springs, eloquently testified to the skilled maneuvering of the missile-carrying fighter aircraft.

Conditions were difficult for everyone. At all echelons. But perhaps the helicopter pilots had the hottest time of it. Leading one of the fire-support helicopter groups was communist and combat pilot 1st class Lt Col V. Pshenichnyy. Viktor Arkhipovich accomplished his flight mission with an outstanding rating. But all the other crew commanders performed equally well. Flying in the same formation with V. Pshenichnyy was the aircraft piloted by the communist Senior Lt A. Rakovitse. The crew operator in this instance was Lt A. Khramov, the flight technician Senior Lt of Technical Services V. Akushkin. The commander and flight technician are new communists, the operator a Komsomol member. A young crew. And it is also a youthful crew as far as its professional training is concerned. Rakovitse is just now preparing for only his 2d class examinations, Khramov for his 3d class and Akushkin for his 2d class examinations. But the crew nevertheless performs with diligence, enthusiasm and efficiency.

Also demonstrating skilled combat operational performance are the crews led by the combat pilot 1st class and communist Major Yuriy Robul. This young commander serves in the squadron whose personnel took on the obligation to achieve an "outstanding" rating by the end of the training year. The flyers are fulfilling their obligation in creditable fashion. Almost all the crew commanders are now prepared to take their examinations for the next class.

The accurate strikes made by the helicopter pilots against the ground targets indicated by the combined-arms commander affirmed in convincing fashion their readiness for serious testing.

The fighters patrolled in the highest echelon. Combat pilot 1st class communist Major V. Alkhimov and his wingman skillfully executed their missions of providing cover for the motorized rifle subunits against the "enemy" in the air; they battled his fighters with boldness and determination.

Seeing with what effectiveness all three fire echelons of courage in flight, skill and professional training executed their missions over the battlefield, the motorized rifle troops strove with all the greater effort to accomplish their own missions. They were able to negotiate their water obstacle in record-breaking time. They were soon carrying on the battle in the depth of the "enemy" defense.

The senior commander attending the exercise rated highly the tactical maturity demonstrated by the commanders, the ground subunit personnel and the combat aviators and took special note of the efficiently organized cooperation between them. He emphasized that these exercises are especially valuable and that the experience and knowledge acquired during the course of these exercises will provide a good basis for further development and improvement in levels of combat training of both motorized-rifle and flight personnel.

Company-Level Training Successes

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Col V. Denisov, Group of Soviet Forces Germany: "It Begins in the Company"]

[Text] On one of the days at the firing range, one could have observed a group of senior officers, representatives of the formation (soyedineniye) staff and political section. Lt Cols V. Nikityuk and M. Stepanyuk, Majors A. Semin and Tomnikov and others were attentively observing the course of the exercise under way involving the motorized rifle company commanded by Senior Lt A. Durnayev. They did not interfere here in the activities of the instructors and their trainees, but simply took notes on all that was taking place and only occasionally elaborated with a few details. In order to understand the significance of this visit, we have to go back a bit, to the past training year.

On the basis of its final rating among the formation's companies and equivalent subunits (podrazdeleniye), the outstanding motorized rifle company commanded by Senior Lt V. Bashkov was designated the leading unit. There was much to be learned here--skilled organization of the training and indoctrination process and socialist competition and a striving to achieve model internal unit procedures and routine. Personnel displayed a gratifying enthusiasm and interest in achieving ever higher levels of success in combat and political training.

What were the factors of this company's success? Bashkov organized his work with his NCOs in the proper manner. There was no field exercise, for example, when he would not hold a detailed and comprehensive critique with his squad leaders, the exercise leaders at the various individual "points." They introduced into their practice here the use of an active manner of providing incentive to their leading methods specialists--they initiated the practice of placing their photographs on special display boards in their Lenin corner. No little else instructive could be found in other spheres of company life as well.

The experience accumulated by competition leaders also caught the attention of the formation staff and political section. Specially designated officers made a thorough study of Bashkov's operational style and familiarized themselves with the activities of the party and Komsomol organizations. Advanced experience accumulated here was given widespread publicity in generalized form. This was accomplished on the occasions of an assembly on training methods held for all company commanders, at a meeting of the formation's party aktiv, official staff conferences and officers' meetings. There was a profound conviction that this company's achievements had become an example attracting the interest and enthusiasm of other military units. Then in the winter, when several other units "passed" the leading company (although it itself had not simply marked time), we viewed this as in the very nature of things, as something entirely to be anticipated. Proving to be among those achieving notable progress was the subunit commanded by Senior Lt Durnayev, a company, we might add, incidentally, from a neighboring regiment. Displaying great interest and enthusiasm, and taking "local conditions" into consideration, this unit's personnel had incorporated into their own practice the experience accumulated by their comrades-in-arms and with assuredness had taken over first place in the formation.

People began to have a look at this subunit's practice with reference to its training and political indoctrination activities--this is why the officers from the formation command mentioned above were to be found at the firing range--and found there, too, much to be disseminated to advantage among other military units. Worthy of attention here, for example, was the organization of instruction within groups specially devoted to the study of weapons fire and technical and related matters. Extensively utilized here are training films. the titles of some of which speak for themselves--"Preparing BTRs [armored personnel carriers] for the Negotiation of a Water Obstacle," "Firing at Moving Targets".... It may be that Durnayev outdid Bashkov in building up his training materials and equipment base as well. The company commander himself made up a model of the firing range which can fit on a table. Here he can create the greatest variety of possible training target layouts for situations which his submachine gunners, machine gunners, grenade launcher operators and PTURS [antitank guided missile] gunner-operators may encounter in combat. This makes possible more effective instruction of personnel in matters relating to weapons firing. The miniature target range created by Sgt S. Mazhirnyy is another contribution toward achieving the same goal. The actively functioning creative thought of the innovative personnel here has, in a word, made it possible to improve the quality of the training process and its final results in the basic areas comprising the training program.

A division is a large, complex military organism. Many factors determine its success in combat and political training and in progressing toward becoming a leading formation. And right up toward the top of the list I would put the organizational efforts of staff and political section personnel to insure the transformation of the company into a center of training and political indoctrination activities. No matter how great the scale of division-level achievements, any success achieved there stems from success achieved within the company and the battery.

The decree of the CPSU Central Committee on "Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" poses the task of insuring the achievement of a high level of ideological indoctrination work in all units; of creating an atmosphere of principledness, comradely exactingness and attentiveness to each human being and of finding the path by which to reach his mind and heart. It is entirely clear that the accomplishment of this task is for us inseparably linked with the task of enhancing the company's role as a center of training and indoctrination activities.

What occurs within the company is not simply the development of the unit's ability to function as a well-coordinated military team. Here we also observe the development of troop morale. Here is laid the solid foundation for skilled battalion and regimental battlefield performance. Why, we might ask, are the battalions commanded by Lt Col D. Agayev and Major N. Tikhomirov thought to be the best in the formation? Yes, because they are strong at the company level. Why does the Chertkovskiy Guards Tank Regiment occupy a leading position among the formation's units (chast')? Again, because it has been successful in insuring that the efforts and energies of its staff and all regimental services be governed by the interests of the tasks involved in developing the companies' ability to function as well-coordinated military units.

It is within the company that we see opened up the most favorable conditions for working with personnel on an individual basis. For in fact nowhere else is it possible to get such a good look at a man--his strong and weak points, how he relates to his comrades, his conduct, his aptitudes and inclinations and so forth. But the opportunities offered in this regard are, unfortunately, not everywhere utilized.

I recall the following incident. I was visiting one day the practice firing under way in the company commanded by Senior Lt P. Proshunin. To be frank, I must say that the firing here wasn't coming off to well at that point. Only one of the crews, perhaps, could be singled out as excelling in any respect, that led by Sgt N. Gasanov. It provided a gratifying display of real mastery. There arose the question of what the problem was here, why were all the tankers not well trained and prepared? We didn't have to look to discover the reason.

It was found to be contained primarily in the inadequately high level of tank fire-training exercises. Thought had occasionally been devoted to the people involved "in general," but frequently without any attention given to the gunners' individual characteristics or without taking into consideration their individual levels of training and preparation. What was required was a thorough reexamination of attitudes toward training exercises and an improvement in their quality; and then, primarily by intensifying activities conducted on an individual basis and by adopting a differentiated approach to the trainees involved, there were immediately some positive results to be noted. This company then later recieved an outstanding rating at the final record-fire testing.

Unfortunately, though, we can make no claim for an equally high level of training on the part of all companies and batteries without exception. There are subunits which are still lagging behind. There is a variety of reasons for this. The primary factors involved here, of course, are the organizational abilities and the level of individual training and preparation on the part of the company commanders and platoon leaders themselves. From the point of view of the quality of personnel training, not everything is entirely satisfactory, for example, within the company commanded by Senior Lt V. Ulanov.

There are no few officers among company-level commanders who clearly lack experience in the organization of training exercises, particularly company-level exercises. Not all have mastered to a sufficient degree the method of organizing socialist competition and indoctrination activities. They of course pick up much of use during training methods assemblies. We are not limited to assemblies alone, however. Activities conducted with them on a daily basis by their immediate superiors, the chiefs of the service branches and regimental services and by their formation commanders are the most important way to raise the level of methodological training and preparation of new officers.

Here is an example of the kind of thoughtful, painstaking work we are talking about. On the occasion of a visit one time in the course of specialty exercises being conducted in the battery commanded by Senior Lt A. Dzyavoruk, Lt Col S. Chubkov observed that the competition in meeting regulation standards had not been organized on the proper level. His experience helped the lieutenant colonel to spot the weak points, and he suggested a method of eliminating the deficiencies. Together with the battery commander, the staff officer worked up a record-keeping form to use for monitoring the achievement of individual and group norm requirements, which made it possible more accurately, more categorically to maintain a comprehensive and objective record of personnel training in the various specialty areas. This method has now won acceptance in other artillery subunits as well. This is an example of concrete, well thought-out work at the company level on the part of experienced senior officers.

Political section officers are doing a great deal with regard to generalizing and introducing into practice the experience accumulated by leading subunits.

One of the formation's companies recently conducted a meeting for its personnel with an agenda on the theme "Let us add greater glory to the name of our regiment and formation." Those speaking at the meeting emphasized that concern for the division's name, for its reputation, is the concern of each individual. This attitude toward their duties and responsibilities on the part of our personnel is one of the primary factors of success in progressing toward the goal of becoming a leading formation.

Mountain Training Exercise

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Romanov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Battle on the Side of the Pass"]

[Text] One slow step, then another.... The mountain boots with their toothed steel plates on the soles ("trikoni" [trans literated]) held well on both the grassy slopes and the rocky soil. From time to time the ice axe helped find a "third point of support." I was following along behind motorized rifle company commander Senior Lt S. Polozov. There he was, smiling broadly as he turned and wiped the sweat from his forehead with his sleeve. He had the plain, straightforward Russian face with alert, sharp-sighted eyes; his weather-protective suit couldn't conceal the powerful chest and shoulders of the fighting man and weight lifter.

The climb became ever steeper, the altitude higher and higher.

"Air!"

The column of motorized rifle troops disappeared right before my eyes. Preparing their antiaircraft weapon for action, the soldiers concealed themselves in the crevices of the cliffs, behind rocks and in the green, spiny-leaved Ephedra shrubs.

We were then on the march again. We were met with the danger of avalanches.... Front-line mountain climbing troops are probably the only ones capable of fully visualizing the endurance, courage and strength of will a climb "against a tactical background" requires in the Tyan'-Shan' mountains.

The order read as follows: "The 'enemy' violated the border early this morning.... The battalion is to move to the designated area, launch an immediate assault from its march column and destroy the 'enemy' in cooperation with the subunits of our forces conducting operations there."

Through the laminated safety glass of the commander's BMP [infantry combat vehicle] I saw that the narrow, extremely steep and winding road led up through the canyon. And then it turned into a path.... With their weapons and all their mountain gear, the soldiers advanced at a hurried pace. The infantry combat vehicles took up positions favorable for providing the troops with fire support. The battalion commander, Capt V.Neyfel'd, briefed the company commanders, passing on more detailed information on the mission. The motorized rifle troops moved off in their designated directions in company columns. Patrols maintained a vigilant watch; communications personnel were at work, commands and reports being transmitted concisely and efficiently. We found ourselves in a gray haze here at 2200 meters' altitude. Our movement beyond the clouds had begun.

Rapidly moving, maneuverable helicopters cut this down in some training exercises. But on this one we have been under way now for an hour or two, and it already seems like an entire eternity. I thought about Polozov, and my memory took me back to our meeting yesterday at his house.

Being shown on the TV was a film on the partisans based on the epic "The Great Patriotic [War--TR]."

"My grandfather on my father's side," Sergey remarked emptily after one of the episodes, "has already seen the entire series at the motion picture theater; he became very disturbed. It's all true and they've shown it like it was!, he said. He himself earned two Orders of the Red Banner during the war; he's got wounds all over him."

"And was anybody fighting from your mother's side of the family?"

"The fascists shot my grandfather and my grandmother....," declared five-year-old Natasha.

"For communication with the partisans," her mother added, joining in the conversation. "That was at Novgorod...."

"But we won out anyway!" declared with a frown this descendents of men who fought with Aleksandr Nevskiy. "He who comes at us with the sword will die by the sword."

The following report came in over the radio: "The 3d company is to flank the 'enemy' from the left, seize the Pass Without a Name [Bezymyannyy--TR] and hold it until the arrival of main battalion forces."

We had to push the "enemy" back out of the pass. So here we were pushing into the clouds.

As we advanced, Polozov pulled a map out of his plotting board.

"See here?" he said, turning to me and pointing up and over to the right. "Tha-a-t's the cliff. Beyond that we'll turn and that'll be the battalion's assault position."

Authoritatively and assuredly, instructions were issued to the platoon leaders; and the company now moved quickly, insofar as that was possible at that altitude, over several paths up toward the rocky saddle.

...Storming up the steep slope of the ridge, we then moved on out of the saddle. The haze dissipated, the sky became blue again and an eagle flew by almost overhead.

"Company!" Polozov commanded. "Tie up by squads."

We saw the snow across the top of the ridge. That told us that we had reached a great altitude and that we would soon be launching our assault on the pass. Off to our right, the main battalion forces were beginning their engagement with the enemy.

Our legs were filled with heaviness, and breathing had become difficult; but the company quickened its pace.

A training drill back at the mountain combat training center came back to mind.

"Request permission to begin, comrade senior lt," declared Lt Yu. Chepurdey.

"Go ahead," returned Polozov.

Chepurdey waved his hand signal flag. A few seconds went by, and then a soldier with his weapon began his slide on the suspended support out along a 100-meter cable stretched 20 meters high across a churning mountain stream. After him came a second man, then a third.... An entire squad went across. The 9 men then began their "primary obstacle course"--a dizzying mountain slope. They moved with remarkable assuredness, speed and skill. The figures of the soldiers shrank in size before my very eyes. Formidable slopes alternated over the training courses with rocky banks and piles of sharp rocks. A little bit longer...and the first man had conquered the summit. I looked through my binoculars...that was a familiar figure: machine gunner PFC G. Arutyunyan.

A short while later the rest of the squad appeared at the top. Another flag signal...and the squad, returning to its line formation, stepped up the pace of its movement toward its designated firing line.

They have still another, special-purpose weapon in their combat arsenal.

"If necessary," declared Lt Yuriy Chepurdey, "we can artificially create rockfalls, a mud stream, snow avalanches...."

We began to encounter more and more snow. Up ahead, according to the map, we would begin our descent down to the pass. The "enemy" was on the near edge of the "saddle." How should we approach him? Assigned this mission was the squad led by Sgt S. Ponomarev. The soldiers skillfully concealed themselves behind rocks, advanced in a low crawl and had soon noiselessly wiped out the "enemy" machine gunners. The company then massed at the pass and suddenly open up with aimed fire.

"Charge! Forward!" Polozov commanded. After a brief engagement, the motorized rifle troops occupied the pass.

Catching the snow on my parched lips, I for the first time took a look around.... The sun-bathed mountains and valleys of the Tyan'-Shan'! Even after seeing them only once in a lifetime, who would ever be able to forget the festive colors of these mountains, the sky and the vast, crystal-clear blue expanses gleaming with perpetually snow-covered peaks, vistas whose reflections in the sky-blue waters of the lakes you simply can't look at and admire long enough! For off in the distance down there a city sprawled free and unconfined. The people there lead a happy, peaceful life.

Polozov came over to where I was. The cold current blowing through the pass and the blinding mountain sun quickly dried out our sweat-soaked weather-protective suits, and a white salt residue formed on our chests, backs, even on our faces.

Looking at this strong fighting man from Novgorod, squinting in the bright sunlight, I could not help but admire him. The victorious assault on this high mountain pass which I had just had the occasion to witness presented itself to me as a concentrated product of the highly refined and perfected combat skills, courage and endurance demonstrated by this young officer and the motorized rifle troops he commands. What did I know about him? That Polozov was 24 years old, a communist, the commander of the best company in the regiment, a candidate for master of sport in Greco-Roman wrestling....

This simple notation from the efficiency report prepared upon his completion of his higher military school work may perhaps be seen as suggesting principles that would underlie his future course: "Industrious, efficient, honorable...." This is not the first year in his still young career that Polozov has participated in an assault on a pass. And the previous day he had won praise as commander, training officer and teacher.

"On our last battalion mountain training exercise," related battalion commander Capt V. Neyfel'd, "Polozov's company was operating under extremely difficult conditions--it was a night operation on unfamiliar terrain involving the use of night vision instruments. But this company insured the success of the entire battalion. The regimental commander and I were especially pleased with the assuredness with which Polzov's drivers performed, that his NCOs demonstrated a "feeling" for the tactical situation and that each man had an understanding of his own maneuver."

Day and night, in their combat vehicles on the edges of the precipices and linked together as they scale the cliffs, these soldiers are working to improve their mastery of mountain combat skills.

Mountains extend along many stretches of our motherland's borders. Practice drills and training exercises are conducted throughout these areas; standing watch along our borders everywhere are heroic fighting men like Senior Lt Polozov and his men.

PHOTO CAPTION

The company commanded by Senior Lt S. Polozov advances toward the pass.

Regimental Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Lt Col N. Kalmykov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, KRASNOZHAMENNYY, Central Asian Military District: "Time Does Not Wait"]

[Text] Capt Mikhail Andreyevich Sidlyar is party committee secretary in a motorized rifle regiment. At the present time, however, he is performing on a temporary basis the duties of the deputy commander for political affairs. There is a great multitude of responsibilities; literally every minute has to be turned to account, but the scheduled trip to the field is not to be canceled: the party committee will meet in a day or two and discuss the communists' responsibilities in connection with the task of improving the state of motorized rifle troop fire training.

Regiment personnel had taken on themselves the obligation by the end of the training year to add their unit (chast') to the ranks of those designated "outstanding." But the final totals prepared at the end of the winter training period showed that these motorized rifle had achieved results which were actually much lower than those on which they had counted. One weak point among the others proved to be troop fire training.

We were going into the field together with Capt Sidlyar to the area in which the 2d battalion was in training.

On the way, the party committee secretary told about the 2d battalion and its commander, Capt N. Tarakanov, who had been in this assignment for about a year and in the course of that period of time had been able to tighten things up in that subunit considerably. But it still has plenty of unresolved problems.

"We are disturbed by things in the 6th company," declared Mikhail Andreyevich. "Early training for new personnel is still not being properly conducted. Then when it comes to fire training, the situation gets complicated--they're lost."

We found Capt Tarakanov in the middle tower. He had a toughened, weathered face and a stern, unsmiling look. Something had disturbed the battalion commander. He frowned, then jotted something down in his notebook. In contrast with Tarakanov, the smile never disappeared from the face of the 4th company commander, Senior Lt B. Yertayev. His company is outstanding, one of the best in the regiment; over the course of the field training period, his men had accomplished all their qualification test exercises with outstanding ratings--why shouldn't he be pleased?

BMPs were conducting competitions on the base line for the best squad. The signal was given. The troops quickly mounted and the combat vehicles began their acceleration, traces of fire immediately streaking over the ground.

"Those are mine firing. Sgt Shapovalov," declared Yertayev. "That's it! Outstanding! There's 5!"

"Verify it with the instructor anyway," the battalion commander directed, dampening his subordinate's spirits. "What difference does it make?"

"But what is there to verify? You can see," Yertayev replied with some heat; but then he picked up the receiver and called: "With the first one? And what about the time? I understand...."

Turning back to us he declared with some pride: "What was there to verify? Five points. That was Shapovalov...."

Other troops were now taking their places in the BMP. But we were already no longer observing the activities of the motorized rifle troops. The party committee secretary had engaged Capt Tarakanov in a discussion concerning the tank fire training, interesting himself in the organization of party political activities conducted in the course of the fire training exercise, of competition between the companies and how the commander himself evaluated things within the unit kollektiv on this particular day.

The battalion commander pulled no punches in replying. It was true that they had begun to make more use of the simulators, that they had organized training on an individual basis and that the communists had been able to mobilize and stimulate personnel to turn in first-rate performances in each exercise. But the newer troops were still coming up with low scores and certain NCOs lacked the ability to act with sufficient independence, in consequence of which officers had to concern themselves with squad-level activities.... How are we to resolve these difficulties?, the captain was thinking, deliberating. "Yes, here's what we'll do. We'll get all the communists together; we'll talk things over with them, compare the results of our observations and work up some recommendations. We still have a week of field training ahead of us. We can accomplish a lot."

He stopped. He looked inquiringly at the secretary.

"And the party committee will be helping out, too, I hope."

"Of course it'll help out," agreed Mikhail Aleksandrovich. "But you have to be more decisive yourself in eliminating these deficiencies. Why up until now have you made such little use of technical means of propaganda? It's all well and good that you devote many editions of your radio news programs to your outstanding personnel and to leaders in competition. But you have to give more coverage to deficiencies as well. Broadcast, let's say, the outcome of unannounced Komsomol inspection campaigns over the radio network, or information concerning decisions by the party and Komsomol bureaus. There will be talks dealing with these matters with the aktiv, but commanders need to be taking full advantage of the potential offered by party and Komsomol organizations."

Their discussion lasted some while longer. The party committee secretary offered the battalion commander some practical suggestions. We then moved on to the areas in which company-level training exercises were under way. Capt Sidlyar had a wide-ranging plan: he would meet with political workers and activists, speak with people, listen to their views, look into the club's work under the conditions prevailing on the training range....

The party committee secretary is capable of sizing up a situation quickly, identifying the key aspects and of avoiding spreading himself too thin. I was struck by Mikhail Andreyevich's ability easily to move a person to candor, to create an impression on him by both word and deed. He knows many troops and NCOs by name and with an apt remark or a joke is able to relax tensions and bring on the smiles.

More than anything else, of course, Capt Sidlyar was interesting himself in the 6th company. He was able to speak with many people. And have a personal look at a lot of things as well. Came the end of the day, and he drew the following laconic conclusion: the unit is lagging behind in its methods training for NCOs.

Here was the conversation he had with the secretary of the company party organization. "Take a look at the exercise performance of Senior Lt Yertayev's NCOs," Capt Sidlyar observed to Lt V. Romanikhin. "Skillfully, competently, demonstrating an ability to act with initiative. But now, what about yours? Cautiously, with an eye on the officer, with an expectation of some prompting or guidance. Organize some exchange of experience. Invite Sgt Shapovalov, for example, to take part in squad-level training exercises."

Before leaving the training center, we met once more with the battalion commander.

"There have been some obvious changes for the better. There'll be some pointed discussion within the party committee, though," Capt Sidlyar observed to the battalion commander, showing him the numerous notes he had made in his notebook. "You have not yet fully exploited all your available potential for improvement. And time isn't waiting."

Time isn't waiting.... These motorized rifle troops well understand this, too; the regiment's communists are thoroughly aware of it. (Red Banner Central Asian Military District).

Heliborne Assault Landing

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by V. Zhitarenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Combat Study of the Army and Navy"]

[Text] Forcing the "enemy" back, the leading subunits broke through to the river. Guards Capt Shamil' Gabbasov, whose battalion had been held in reserve for the past 24 hours, realized that the time had now come for the men to initiate their active operations as well. He didn't have to wait long: an order arrived to execute a landing on the opposite bank and seize a bridgehead.

Flight after flight of transport helicopters set down on the landing site, which had just been cleared of "enemy" forces. Approaching this point was a battalion column. There were only a few minutes left until the troops would be boarding the helicopters. Guards Capt Gabbasov strove to make the best possible use of them. He verified flight route data with the squadron commander, Guards Lt Col V. Usov, and went over in greater detail the plans for cooperation.

Training drills were being organized at the landing site. Motorized rifle personnel were learning how to exit the helicopters, to "dismount" in the quickest possible manner. For the fact is that there is the "enemy" rear, even seconds may be of decisive importance. The troops performed skillfully: they had already accumulated experience in the execution of assault landings. But in this instance, the formation contained some new troops. Everything they encountered today was new and strange. Devoting special attention to them were platoon commander Guards Lt A. Tsymbalyuk and flight commander Guards Maj V. Kochetkov.

While these training drills were under way, the battalion commander was trying out possible alternative plans for the defense of the "patch" of terrain which had been seized and verifying procedures to be followed in cooperating with the artillery, which would be delivering fire across the river in support of the assault landing force. Everything possible had to be foreseen and provided for ahead of time. The experience of previous training exercises had taught Gabbasov this lesson.

The rotary-wing craft were now in the air. They moved along at low altitude, taking advantage of natural terrain features. Fire-support helicopters joined them at a designated point. Employing heavy fire, they were to achieve a "break through" with the establishment of an air corridor and destroy the "enemy" in the area of the landing site. By neutralizing his fire weapons to a great depth, the artillery also "worked" on behalf of the interests of the landing force.

The helicopters executed a maneuver for the purpose of countering the "enemy's" air defense. It will be no easy matter for him to determine where the assault force will land. Out the portholes it can be observed that one of his subunits which had been advancing toward the river had now halted its movement and changed its direction of advance. This indicated that its mission was to prevent the landing of the assault force.

But these motorized rifle troops had not anticipated any easy going in their operations in the "enemy" rear.

After landing their troops, the helicopters moved off back across the river. The battalion was left one-on-one with superior "enemy" forces. But then, why "one?" Aircraft were supporting the assault troops with bombing strikes on advancing "enemy" reserves. Then at the request of Guards Capt Gabbasov the artillery was delivering supporting barrage fire.

The assault troops themselves were demonstrating boldness in the execution of their own operations. By tying down substantial "enemy" forces, they were facilitating the main force assault crossing. At midnight, an advance detachment of the attackers joined up with the assault force. The bridgehead beyond the river had been seized. The skillfully executed air maneuver had been the key to the successful accomplishment of this complex combat training mission.

Poor Camouflage Discipline Criticized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Col E. Babynin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Southern Group of Forces: "Ignoring Camouflage"]

[Text] Raising cloudy trails of dust behind, the armored personnel carriers moved down into the ravine. At that point, Senior Lt N. Fomenko, commanding a company in the advance party, received a scouting report: an "enemy" column had been spotted. The officer decided to move under cover to the ridge along the high ground dominating the terrain in the area and meet the "enemy" with a surprise attack.

The motorized rifle troops dismounted, took up favorable positions and prepared to open fire. "Enemy" reconnaissance and security subunits then appeared off in the distance. But then, unexpectedly for Fomenko, the tanks which had been attached to the company rolled out onto the top of the height and stopped a short distance behind the motorized rifle troops, who had hit the ground and moved into position. Now that's concealment for you: the "enemy" combat vehicles opened fire immediately.

"Who ordered you to bring these tanks out into plain view like this?" the frustrated and embarrassed subunit commander inquired. As it turned out, the senior commander had criticized the tankers for falling behind the motorized rifle troops. So they decided to rectify the situation. Important advantages had thereby been struck from the hands of Senior Lt N. Fomenko: concealment in maneuver and surprise in attack. But the officer had yet to drain his cup of annoyance and frustration. A few minutes later, the battalion commander's armored personnel carrier pulled up and stopped some 30 meters behind him, also in full view of the "enemy." Coming up alongside was the regimental commander's vehicle. Then to top it all off, the umpire's big radio-equipped vehicle rolled out onto the height.

"There isn't anything more we could do for the 'enemy' reconnaissance," the company commander declared bitterly. "They've just canceled out my plans."

At the officer's request, the command APCs were moved back; but the umpire's vehicle remained in place: it "wasn't part of the game," he said.

Some conventions have to be allowed in the course of an exercise; they simply can't be eliminated entirely. But does this mean that we can ignore camouflage altogether? Of course not. In the meantime we really don't need in this instance to go into the matters of concealment, secrecy and the desire to outwit the "enemy" and impose one's will on him. The following was in fact the situation: prior to the beginning of the meeting engagement, the commanders of the opposing sides met on the hilltop and exchanged a few jokes, and it was only after this that they began operations in command of these subunits. What, if you will please excuse me, a sudden turn of events this was....

How are we to account for such a blatant disregard for the laws of combat and the requirements imposed by the Field Manual? Some comrades are of the opinion that the most important thing is to master the subject matter and let the rest take care of itself. The subunits involved in the exercise conducted tactical marching drills the evening before. And they were intensive. The motorized rifle troops solved the greatest variety of problems. Not to mention those connected with camouflage, utilizing protective terrain features and insuring operational security and concealment.

A strange break in activity occurred in a number of the battalion's subunits when the commanders went out on reconnaissance. These motorized rifle troops failed to take any camouflage measures whatsoever. They had their equipment located in fields open to air reconnaissance.

Each minute in the field is of especial value. We are all very well aware of this. But the personnel involved in this instance failed to attach the requisite value to the time they had available. They failed to utilize this opportunity to work on a number of norm categories important in connection with their field training standard or to review the Field Manual provisions which personnel had not yet sufficiently mastered.

Something about one of the other episodes occurring in the course of the training exercise is also highly instructive. In addition to looking better than any of the others participating in the exercise, Senior Lt N. Fomenko's company in spite of everything achieved success in its duel with the "enemy" advance party and destroyed it. But then something entirely unexpected occurred: Senior Lt A. Cholovskiy's company then launched its own attack on the GPZ [advance party], which had just been destroyed. Now there was in fact not the least necessity for this attack. But what won't happen when shortcuts and oversimplifications have become a part of the prior training?

Follow-Up Comments

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Nov 79 p 2

[Text] Published on 17 August was an article by Col Ye. Babynin entitled "Ignoring Camouflage." It dealt with a negligent attitude toward camouflage demonstrated in the course of a tactical training exercise by a unit of the Southern Group of Forces and with the unit's indulgence in oversimplification and toleration of shortcuts in the execution of camouflage measures.

As reported to the editorial staff by the unit commander and deputy commander for political affairs, the article was discussed at a meeting of officers and warrant officers. In the process of summing up the results of the training exercise, assemblies of battalion commanders and their deputy commanders subjected to a critical analysis the actions of the motorized rifle battalion commander who permitted this display of neglect of camouflage, Guards Maj V. Shchelokov. The question was raised at a meeting of the unit party committee of the need for more persistence and a greater sense of urgency in steps taken to deal with the simplistic approach, the short-cutting and the slackness visible in the training process.

* * *

The editorial staff considers it necessary to state in publishing this reply that it did not arrive until two months after the publication of the original article and then only after a reminder. It is impossible not to declare that this reply is of a purely formal nature. It does not make clear what specific steps have been taken in the course of the past two months to eliminate these deficiencies and how the measures taken have been reflected in training results. None of this does any credit to the person who signed the reply. A reminder is also in order in this connection that any instance of an improper response to criticism must trigger a sharp, prompt and effective reaction on the part of party bodies.

Staff Work Effectiveness

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Aug 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen A. Bezotosov, chief of staff of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Staff Effectiveness, Efficiency and a Creative Approach"]

[Text] The defenders were intensifying their resistance with every passing minute. They were bringing up reserves with the intention of launching counterattacks to recover their lost positions. The flow of information coming in to regimental headquarters had increased sharply. But there, as it turned out, the staff was falling behind in processing and analyzing data the commander required making his decision. Disruptions and delays developed in the command and control process which the "enemy" turned to his advantage.

All this came as a surprise. The staff of the regiment commanded by Guards Maj N. Kiyashko enjoyed the reputation of being a well-coordinated, well-trained organization. Its performance under stationary conditions, if we might use that term, had been typically well-organized and effective. So why was it that things fell apart in a combat training exercise?

Analysis showed that the regimental staff had not kept abreast of the course of events in large part in consequence of passivity on the part of battalion staff personnel. Reports concerning substantial changes in the situation had not been being received on a timely basis from the subunits involved, and then only following inquiries. The information which was finally reported was then not distinguished by any concreteness or detail. The staff officers concerned avoided formulating any independent judgements and failed to display that initiative which was so necessary in the current situation.

What explanation was there for the passivity of the subunits? Insufficiently high levels of professional training on the part of their senior officers? No, these were competent, conscientious officers fully capable of accomplishing in a first-rate manner the tasks they are assigned. The reasons were to be sought elsewhere. The mutual relationships prevailing between the staffs in the course of the regiment's daily routine had been of a one-sided nature: with respect to any given matter, the higher headquarters had been attempting to provide exhaustive instructions and explanations, while lower-level staff personnel were barely, and that only with difficulty, able to carry out the orders they had received. But this special form of tutelage accustomed the lower command echelon to expect orders and instructions from above to act while keeping a cautious eye continuously trained over its shoulder. These psychological nuances then left their mark on subunit staff performance in a combat situation.

Also having its effect was the fact that battalion staff personnel had routinely been being allotted only a minor role in command-staff exercises and staff training, in which the entire burden fell on the shoulders of subunit commanders. Finding themselves left in the background, as it were, they carried on their operations without requiring of their officers the mobilization of all their knowledge, skills and creative powers.

The connection between the manner in which staffs operate on a routine, daily basis and that in which they accomplish their tasks in a dynamic combat situation is an obvious one. Practical experience has demonstrated convincingly that where independence and initiative are supported and encouraged and where superiors avoid resorting to unnecessary control over inferiors, it will be found that there the staff officers accumulate their professional knowledge quickly and acquire sureness and confidence in their own abilities.

Instructive in this respect is the manner of operation displayed by the staff of the Nth Motorized Rifle Regiment. The staff in this instance provides a reliable source of support for the commander in the process of resolving all problems and routine matters arising in the course of the daily routine.

Subunit staff personnel, too, demonstrate a high level of energy and efficiency. This all comes as a result of thoughtful, painstaking work with the staff officers involved. Their professional training is carefully subject-oriented and related clearly and closely to the practical matters concerned. Regimental-level personnel adopt prudent views of innovations, anything representing an advance or improvement emanating from within the subunits and support any reasonable and intelligent initiative directed toward enhancing the effectiveness of the training process and the effectiveness and efficiency of the conduct of socialist competition.

The battalion commanded by Guards Capt A. Komyak, for example, has long help a leading position in socialist competition. Its success has been continuous. Its motorized rifle personnel have been awarded "outstanding" and "excellent" ratings in all test performances. Upon what have these achievements been based? What may others find instructive in the operational performance of this battalion commander and his staff?

For the purpose of answering these questions, regimental staff officers looked into all aspects of subunit life and routine here. Senior comrades visited and observed training exercises and drills, meetings for personnel of the various services as well as party and Komsomol meetings. They spoke with each of the battalion's officers. They were able as a result to identify no little interesting and instructive. The battalion, for example, has developed a unique sequence in the training of its gunner-operators. It could be described in its essentials in the following terms: "combat vehicle--simulator--training area." This was proved to be a highly effective method, yielding as it does benefits in time saved and economies in the utilization of equipment. It is to the credit of this very group of staff officers at work within this battalion that their training procedure has now been adopted by other regiment and formation subunits. This indeed is practical industry and effectiveness.

The compilation of operational work results on a regular basis has become routine procedure within unit and subunit staffs. Also paying off have been the regular staff conferences which provide occasions for the discussion of interesting newspaper and journal articles, the exchange of opinion and sometimes discussion of the substance of problems brought up in the press. In this atmosphere where prevail a high level of exactingness and confidentiality, staff personnel quickly develop those leadership qualities referred to in clear and persuasive terms in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on "Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." A deep sense of responsibility, devotion to party, boldness and adherence to principle in the drive for combat readiness, an attentiveness to people--without these qualities it would be difficult to conceive of oneself as a staff officer.

But as the staff personnel in all units as industrious and efficient as those in this regiment? Unfortunately, this isn't the case. An aimless stirring and bustle and attempts to solve a multitude of problems simultaneously are passing in some instances for industriousness and efficiency. Some regimental-level comrades lack the patience and tolerance required in working to raise the levels of training and preparation of new battalion chiefs of staff. As a rule, these are in fact new officers. Having a background of command experience, they are now developing the skills and know-how required for staff work and familiarizing themselves with the procedures and routine involved. But is as much attention always devoted to them as to subunit commanders? No, they are not infrequently done out of their fair share of it, left, so to speak, to stew in their own juice; and in consequence they have to discover the truth and learn the ropes at the expense of mistakes.

A great staff concern is the effort to insure a high level of combat and political training. Unfortunately, however, higher-level staffs quite frequently fail to provide subordinate command echelons with models of good organization and planning and operational regularity and consistency in this regard.

I recently encountered the following case. One of the regimental staffs had planned a number of interesting activities to be incorporated in the command training system. Staff training exercise, group exercise, practical study of the organization of combat operations on marshy-wooded terrain.... It was planned to conduct all these activities in the course of a single month. But the organization of even one of these activities is an involved and burdensome affair. How in the world did the staff personnel involved here expect to be able to manage all these things in such short periods of time? There was no way they could, as it turned out. What they were trying to do was simply to insure that they came up with an interesting plan. As far as any implementation of it was concerned, most of the items it contained remained right on the paper. Now is this not a graphic object lesson in formalism presented to lower-echelon staffs?

The efficiency and level of intensity of staff work are, unfortunately, occasionally judged on the basis of how long the lights burn in staff windows. But the fact is that these windows are often lit up until midnight not because the interests of staff work require it. I somehow had occasion late one evening to drop in on the battalion staff where serving as chief of staff was Capt A. Komkov. The officers were all at their work areas.

"Some new communications came in unexpectedly," the chief of staff reported.

But what kind of "communications" were these? Even though it was after the end of the official duty day, regimental headquarters had requested the figures on the results of company fire training exercises. A quarter of an hour later, it was suggested that Capt Komkov give some thought to the possibility of conducting a demonstration exercise in one of the subunits and requested that he submit a report that same day. Then finally, but again urgently, the chief of intelligence requested data for a report he was to present to a meeting of officers. It goes without saying that all these figures, all these ideas and all this data are indeed staff-related matters. The senior officers involved knew exactly where to go for the information they needed. But the fact was that these higher-echelon staff personnel knew beforehand that they would need this information. Their requests could have been submitted in a timely manner; they would not then have become unexpected "communications." Occurrences like this are, in my view, indications not only of poor organization, but of a lack of respect for subordinates as well. Without actually desiring it as an end, of course, these senior comrades are transforming lower-echelon staff officers into mere executors of their orders without any initiative of their own.

It also happens that the sluggishness brought on by inertia prevents a higher-echelon staff from taking advantage in the interest of its mission of anything innovative or representing an improvement over current procedure emanating from a subunit-level organization. The following incident occurred in the course of one tactical training exercise. Having gone over to the defensive in goodtime, one motorized rifle battalion made the unusual decision to organize a fire system within company strong points. The regimental chief of staff would have had only to look into the whole point of the thing...he would then surely have discovered the rational kernel contained within this unconventional decision. But the regimental staff would then have had to modify its own plans, work up certain pieces of documentation again.... So the battalion headquarters received the following order: execute the plan "handed down from above" and don't try to be clever. Now can't we imagine that after this incident the battalion staff in the next training exercise would passively await the receipt of ready-made plans and decisions made by others?

A great deal associated with the improvement of a manner of operation depends on the unit staffs themselves. But higher-echelon staffs, the district staff in particular, cannot remain on the sidelines in this matter. We have long since adhered to the practice of having district staff officers participate directly in the preparation and conduct of unit-level command-staff exercises, on-site staff training exercises involving the use of communications equipment and other activities contributing to increased mastery of professional skills on the part of staff personnel. We try in the course of our drills and exercises to impose rigid time frames on the trainees and concentrate our attention on matters connected with subunit and unit command and control in dynamic combat situations. Working at subunit level, district staff officers such as D. Nazarenko, A. Mironov, V. Yanovskiy and Ye. Dabolin, for example, provide young comrades with models of true staff skills and know-how, thorough, penetrating analysis of developments and a creative approach to mission performance. Their personal energy and efficiency and the tact they exercise in their relationships with other people provide good examples for the officers of the staffs under observation.

Staff personnel solve multitudes of problems every day. But their primary concern is to do everything possible to increase combat readiness. It is in this main direction that open up vast horizons for the demonstration of creative initiative on the part of every officer working at no matter command echelon. The summer period of intensive combat training is the most favorable time fully to discover his capabilities and talents and to accelerate his development. We need to make maximum use of it to achieve further improvement in the mastery of their professional military skills on the part of staff officers and further development of their ability to demonstrate initiative.

By exercising its influence on the manner and methods of staff operations, the nature of their mutual relationships and the effectiveness of their creative initiatives, the district military council is supporting everything new or representing an improvement in their operations, discovering the causes of deficiencies and taking effective measures to eliminate them.

To increase the effectiveness of staff operations at all echelons in connection with the accomplishment of the tasks lying ahead of personnel in the summer training period is to make a substantial contribution to the execution of training plans and the fulfillment of socialist obligations and to raise to new levels the combat readiness of our units and subunits.

River Crossing Exercise

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Saranchev, Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "Crossing a Taiga River, Troop Field Training"]

[Text] Under its cover of fog the opposite bank of the river was almost invisible.

"That's when," reasoned Capt D. Volvenko, "we can achieve security from observation for our assault crossing." It was true that the mission would be complicated by the fact that between the bank itself and the small hills where the "enemy" had consolidated his position lay a difficult stretch of marshy floodplain. Negotiating it would be no simple matter. So it was a good thing the fog was depriving the "enemy" of the possibility of observing the surface of the river. This opportunity had to be exploited.

After analyzing the situation, Capt Volvenko put the final touches on a plan of operation he had devised: cross to the island under cover of darkness and then at daybreak begin the assault crossing of the main stretch of the water obstacle. Engine noise in another direction had to be simulated to mislead the "enemy."

This is what was done. The motorized rifle troops secretly, under the cover provided by darkness, crossed over to the island. The battalion continued its skillful performance in accomplishing the next phase of its operation as well. Each combat vehicle afloat became an awesome fire weapon. It happened in this instance that the BMP [Infantry combat vehicle] commanded by Junior Sgt V. Lavchenko ran aground. But the crew and landing force personnel kept their heads at this critical moment. While the driver worked the vehicle off the sandbank, the landing force troops and the gunner-operator delivered aimed fire on the "enemy" positions.

Also demonstrating a high degree of self-control was the crew of another vehicle, which the swift current began to sweep toward a steep bluff. But the driver was nevertheless able to moor the vehicle to the bank and locate a point suitable for continuing the advance up out of the water. The motorized rifle troops had been delivering intensive fire the entire time.

And so it was throughout all phases of the assault crossing. Under these difficult conditions the troops had demonstrated resourcefulness, initiative and boldness. It had been felt that they would never become accustomed to the nature of the Far East's rivers. But the subunit's training procedures had been proven reliable.

Are the personnel everywhere so well trained and prepared to negotiate water obstacles? Not everywhere, unfortunately. There has been occasion to encounter the following deficiency. Some officers believe that the main burden in the execution of an assault crossing falls on the driver, while the rest of the troops are simply passengers of a sort. Their training programs reflect this point of view. Only for the drivers is training conducted dealing with the BMPs capabilities afloat, vehicle operating procedures, methods of negotiating various kinds of obstacles and barriers and safety measures.

But it is not really necessary for the rest of the crew members, including those personnel crossing as part of the landing force, also to be able to deal with these important matters? They are in addition of no small importance in connection with the psychological conditioning of the troops.

An incident occurring in the course of another training exercise comes to mind in this regard. When it came time for the execution of the assault crossing, the company commander, Senior Lt V. Zinchenko gave out the following tactical problem: "The combat vehicle has been damaged. Execute an assault crossing of the river by swimming or floating across utilizing any available means." This tactical problem did not take the BMP crew by surprise. It had been prepared for it by its training exercises. But it produced confusion among the landing force personnel. What these soldiers knew was that they could not remain inside the vehicle, but neither did they decide to abandon it and run it into the raging river. They had never before had occasion to have to deal with a situation like this. It was clearly to be concluded that training to take skillful, effective action under conditions presented by water obstacles was necessary not only for the specialists and vehicle crews, but for all the rest of the troops as well. A river poses a serious challenge for all of them.

I recall how Senior Lt B. Glinskiy's men performed in a difficult, dynamic combat situation. These motorized rifle troops had been assigned the mission of gaining with a quick assault the sea coast occupied by the "enemy" landing force. But following heavy rains, the terrain had meanwhile become impassable for their armored personnel carriers. The subunit commander decided to abandon the vehicles and advance on foot. A swiftly flowing mountain river presented an obstacle to the motorized riflemens' further movement at one point. It was decided to swim it. The risk involved was minimal, because subunit personnel had previously undergone intensive and effective swimming instruction and exercises, with their equipment included. The troops were taught to jump from a tower, utilize any material available in the river as means of support and to provide mutual assistance to one another in the water. So no one in this difficult situation faltered or hesitated. And the mission was accomplished.

The taiga's rivers are an ill-tempered lot. To be able to count on success in undertaking assault crossings across them and in victory on the battlefield requires thorough and comprehensive training.

Battalion Training Results Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by motorized rifle battalion commander Capt A. Khayrulin, Central Group of Forces: "Rigor in Analysis"]

[Text] As he analyzed the course of the tactical training exercise, the senior commander took note of the battalion's well-coordinated operations and the good field training standards of its personnel. Then he began to dwell on its deficiencies and gave it a "good" rating.

I experienced a sense of annoyance and disappointment following the exercise critique. The evening before, battalion personnel had taken on the obligation to achieve an "outstanding" rating in their combat training exercise. But now, as it turned out, we hadn't kept our word.

My disappointment and annoyance were then all the greater after speaking with the battalion's officers. I realized that these exercise results were not a source of concern for all of them. Obligations are obligations, some comrades were reasoning, but a "good" rating also does the subunit credit. They didn't attach any particular importance to the deficiencies the exercise had revealed. They didn't amount to much, they said.

But was this really the case? I recalled several incidents. The company under the command of Lt Yu. Serkov executed its missions on the march. But irregularities were to be observed in the column's movement which were the result of its drivers' nonuniform training backgrounds. The BMP under the command of Sgt B. Sanchev, for example, would lag behind every now and then, disrupting the column's movement in the process. Can we view this deficiency as not really amounting to much?

Or take another incident. Senior Lt A. Lukavskiy's company was assigned to take up defensive positions on some hills which had steep slopes. It was too late at night. The vehicles began their descent, moving down as if on the steps of an enormous stairway. But then it turned out that some of the drivers were unprepared psychologically for this challenging test; they were afraid their BMPs would turn over. They had previously never had to operate their vehicles on slopes this steep. We could hardly view this gap in our training, this oversight, also as insignificant.

To make a long story short, both I myself and the secretary of the party organization have since had more than one occasion to come back to the results of this tactical training exercise and turn the attention of all personnel to the problems that remain unresolved.

What we are talking about here really involves personnel indoctrination as well. Considering that it in fact sometimes occurs that a subunit has not achieved the level marked out for it in competition, but this then occasions no concern within the organization. The obligation has served its purpose, people say; it made the troops gung-ho and helped stimulate the required enthusiasm for combat. The fact that a full 5-point rating might not have been achieved is no disaster; we should also be proud of a "good" rating.

It is indeed true that a "good" rating can be achieved only with a great deal of effort. But if obligations call for the maximum achievement, the actual accomplishment should then be evaluated in accordance with the strictest standards.

Competition is oriented primarily toward helping personnel learn to exploit to the limit the full potential incorporated in their weapons and equipment by the underlying design philosophy and conceptions involved. But as the reaction of some officers to exercise results indicates in particular, this notion has begun to lose its concrete relevance for some people.

No little effort is now required to develop in personnel a more stringent, more exacting attitude toward their own work and achievements. And this primarily on the practical level. The nature of our daily drills and exercises has become more complex. They have begun to involve a greater number of norm rating categories. Our training conditions are now such that any given mission can be executed only by fully exploiting the entire range of combat capabilities offered by the equipment involved.

We are devoting special attention to the tactical training of our drivers. For the fact is that it is not enough for them to be able simply to operate a vehicle skillfully; they have also to be capable of conducting observations of the battlefield, competently evaluating its protective terrain features and selecting advantageous positions from which to deliver fire. In the course of their tactical and marching drill exercises, drivers are carefully drilled in their procedures connected with the dismounting and mounting of assault troops on the BMP.

Gunner-operator training has also become more practical and operations-oriented. Individual work and exercises supplement their regularly scheduled training. The efforts expended are not to be regretted. The weapon in the hands of today's gunner-operator is the equal in firepower of the capabilities of an entire rifle company in the period of the Great Patriotic War. Regularly conducted competitions for the title of "best specialist" and prompt and timely analysis and generalization of the experience accumulated by those who have turned in outstanding performances in the most difficult operational areas exercise a positive influence on personnel in their efforts to achieve increased mastery of their combat skills.

The latest test and qualification exercises indicate that following the exercise which we have not allowed its personnel to forget, the battalion to which we have referred has achieved substantial progress in improving its combat skills. Not only the officers, but the troops as well, have learned to be more exacting in evaluating their own performances. This indeed is an essential condition of first-rate performance in the process of fulfilling the training plan and programs and socialist obligations.

Mountain Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Aug 79 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Ladin: "Battle at Red Rock"]

> [Text] Capt Ladin, Anatoliy Petrovich has been named permanent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Red Banner Central Asian Military District. We publish his report below.

Senior Lt A. Rozhkevich estimated how long it would take to cover the remaining stretch of the route--three hours, no more. But anything could happen in the mountains, so a little extra time in reserve wouldn't hurt.

Step by step the little company chain worked itself higher and higher up the mountain. Its members had twice to move literally in one another's footsteps in crossing a rocky scree. Here, you have to keep both eyes open, as the saying goes. One false move...and the rush of an avalanche of mountain rock springs to life and pours down the slope sweeping away every living thing in its path. But these motorized rifle troops negotiated the obstacle with confidence. As he observed his men, Senior Lt Rozhkevich did not conceal his pride. How they had progressed and developed their strength during their past months in the service.

The company had been assigned the mission of operating as a flanking unit. Its route was no easy one: it had to negotiate rocky trails and in the process cover territory where the foot of man had long since or never trod. In the course of a halt, PFC A. Tarlykov observed:

"How far we must have come without seeing a single bird. They surely wouldn't fly all the way up here, would they?"

It's entirely possible that they don't. And then to think what it must be like for a man up here.... Rozhkevich recalled the first time he had led new troops up into the mountains. Many had seen only pictures of them before. The senior lieutenant looked over his men and sensed that here was an unknown, fairy-tale world beckoning to them. But not all of these troops were able the first time up to see with their own eyes the surrounding expanse from the height of a bird in flight. Many new men lacked the necessary endurance. After that there began the intensified training. Senior Lt Rozhkevich and other company officers exerted no small effort to develop the necessary qualities in their men, to toughen their muscles and to steel their will. The process of "conquering the mountains" advanced from the simple to the complex. It began with a period of acclimatization, mastering the basics of rock climbing and training exercises in a mountain sports training area.

Platoon-level field firing exercises could soon be conducted in the mountains. And now lying immediately ahead is the opportunity to advance to a new level of achievement--the company is participating in a tactical training exercise. Yesterday's green troops experiencing fear and timidity in their first encounter with the high mountains are not to be recognized in these strong, physically well-conditioned fighters decked out in their mountain-climbing gear. It was with some pride that they now received the news that their subunit had been assigned the mission of completing their maneuver among the rocks and crags, advancing on the high mountain pass and attacking the "enemy" from the rear.

As he recieved the mission, Senior Lt Rozhkevich noticed the steady gazes fixed in his direction from Senior Lts A. Plakan and A. Alayev--comrades in arms and rivals in competition. Visible in their eyes was a good-natured envy and the warning: "Don't you let me down." But knowing Aleksandr's obsession with the service and his drive and industriousness, they believed in their success and had confidence in their comrade.

After verifying the company's location, he decided on a brief halt. A glacier lay up ahead. The troops could already feel its cold breath. Visible up ahead in the form of enormous white fingers were the tips of its melted layers. Further on its wind-polished surface. Even during their halt these motorized rifle troops let no time go to waste: they tightened the straps and laces on their mountain boots and prepared their ice axes and emergency ropes for use. Faultingly, disapprovingly, the commander inspects each man's gear and reminds all of their safety procedures and basic methods of providing one another with support and assistance. He had already decided to negotiate the glacial slope in linked squad formations. He planned to include himself in the first group. But at that point platoon leader Lt Yu. Chernen'kiy came up with: "I request to be allowed to go with the first group..."

The company commander satisfied the young officer's request. And down inside he was pleased with him. Lt Chernen'kiy had not been seriously involved in mountain climbing prior to his assignment to the company. He had a hard time at first. But he took up the business with a passion, and within a year he had mastered everything a mountain training instructor was required to know and be able to do.

After negotiating the glacier, Lt Chernen'kiy, who had led a reconnaissance patrol, soon reported that an "enemy" column below was advancing along a mountain river bed. The plan was clear: the "enemy" had decided to strengthen his defense of the pass by bringing up reserves. The company's mission had just become more complicated. There was no more time for hesitation. Senior Lt Rozhkevich quickly plotted on his map the coordinates of the column which had been spotted and calculated how far it would have advanced by the time his motorized rifle troops reached the pass. His pencil stopped at the point where the map indicated the narrowest spot along the canyon. Rozhkevich knew this spot. Rising up over the narrow gap between spurs was a cliff covered with a brick-red deposit. This was the kzyl-zhar--red rock.

His decision took shape in an instant: he would leave Lt Chernen'kiy's platoon to lay an ambush at Red Rock. He would cut off to the "enemy" vehicles their route of further advance by blowing up the cliff and attack the infantry from the dominating height with grenades and rifle fire. The other two platoons would meanwhile continue on toward the pass.

The company commander's bold operational concept was implemented successfully. At the close of the training year this provided good confirmation of the fact that personnel were successfully fulfilling their obligations in competition.

...High up in the mountains the bonfire began to blaze up in the twilight, a smoky haze stretching lazily away from the field kitchen. Gathered together there were both those who had defended the pass and those who had launched their attack against it via the hairpin turns and steep mountain slopes. The day just coming to a close had become for all involved yet another step on the way to the summit of their combat maturity.

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AVIATION UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Helicopter Maintenance Deficiencies

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 79 p 2

/Letter to editorial staff from Maj O. Chomtosh, deputy chief for political affairs of a technical maintenance unit /TECh po politchasti/, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "They Knew, But They Remained Silent"/

/Text/ Capt V. Shevyakov speaks in his letter about the various forms in which violators' unreliability and connivance are manifested. Recently I had occasion to encounter one of such manifestations--silence instead of strict censure and sharp criticism of a violator of regulations.

Specialists in a group led by Tech-Capt A. Gubenko were performing routine maintenance on a helicopter engine. The protective cover over the inspection hatch had to be taken off. The group chief entrusted this operation to a specialist first class, Warrant Officer V. Bachinskiy. It turned out that he was unable to twist the cover off with a wrench. What was to be done here? In this case, he was counting on dissolving the carbon deposits which had formed with a special liquid or boring through the cover. The warrant officer decided to do it with a hammer and chisel. As a result, the outer casing of the engine was damaged seriously...

Being engaged in competition, Warrant Officer V. Bachinskiy wrote in his pledges: "To carry out routine maintenance with quality and on time, and to strive for a high technical standard." These are the words. But in fact the specialist is beating this very technical standard with a sledgehammer, figuratively speaking.

At the end of the work day I stopped in at the group's laboratory, where the aviators had gathered to discuss what had happened. My attention was struck by the estranged and reticent expression on their faces. There was a painful silence. Just two persons broke it:

Officer Gubenko informed his subordinates about what had taken place and Warrant Officer F. Motol'ko noted with a sigh: "Now the engine will have to be taken out and repaired..." And again silence fell. Bachinskiy's rival in competition, Warrant Officer V. Mashchenko, is sitting here. His voice does not stop in the work area; he is not saying a word here. Nor was a word heard from Rafid Yarov, a reenlisted sergeant who gives no quarter to his twin brother Rashid, a mechanic in this group, and does not overlook his slightest error. But they are holding their tongues here... At the same time, each one is well aware that the engineering violation by Warrant Officer Bachinskiy means failure in fulfilling the group's pledges in competition. So why were no words of reproof heard for the aviator who led the entire collective?

It appears to me that the position of Tech-Capt A. Gubenko did not play the final role here. In fact, Warrant Officer Bachinskiy used the hammer and chisel before his eyes. True, the group chief did not instruct his subordinate to use a hammer and chisel. But he did not prevent him, either.

The incident described here is not the only one of its type, unfortunately. Once A. Zinovin, a reenlisted sergeant, suggested to his comrades in the group--his neighbors in the room they shared--that they spend the evening in a bar. They kept him company. True, they themselves refused to drink, but they did not stop Zinovin. The next day he came to work late. He left work without waiting for the end of the work day. Some of the aviators knew the reasons for such conduct, but kept quiet. Zinovin received a severe disciplinary penalty and was excluded from the ranks of the Komsomol. Now it is clear to everyone what kind of service the "silent ones" rendered to him.

We must strive to ensure that each member of a military collective actively expresses his own attitude and intolerance toward the offenses of his colleagues. After all, silence and indifference in such a case stand for connivance with the one who violates regulations. This is not the best way to have an effect on the success of a military collective. Here the group led by officer Gubenko also lost the title of excellent in the winter training period.

But the main reason, it seems, is that they slackened individual work with persons here. They are not using the educational role of competition to the full extent.

At a recent session of the party bureau, officer Gubenko had to answer for his deficiencies in the leadership of competition. A conversation based on principle was held. About responsibility for work that has been assigned. About the high duty of a communist officer.

After analyzing the reasons for the shortcomings, the communists of the technical maintenance unit outlined specific measures to clear the atmosphere in the group collective. They put the principal emphasis on creating conditions of strictly mutual demand for unfailing observance of the requirements of manuals and regulations.

Interceptor Squadron Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sep 79 p 1

/Article by Capt A. Gatilov, deputy squadron commander and military pilot first class, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "From a High Altitude"/

/Text/ The tactical flight exercise was held under conditions as close as possible to real combat. A group of crews from the squadron commanded by Lt Col S. Arbuzov landed at an unfamiliar airfield after completing the flight. Now we were to carry out bomb strikes against targets on the range.

Before the exercise a party meeting was held at which squadron communists discussed how to best carry out the tasks assigned and the socialist pledges made. The tone was set by Capt Yu. Silonov, secretary of the party organization. "This will be an examination for us on the eve of the final check for the year," he said. "And we communists are obliged first of all to demonstrate excellent tactical flight training."

The party leader backed up his appeal with a personal example. He mastered operations on the simulator until they were automatic in a critical period of time, placing himself under the most difficult conditions. He carefully marked out the tactical situation on the flight chart and plotted and computed his route. He studied the "enemy's" means of air defense, and thought out ways of overcoming them. All the pilots also prepared themselves painstakingly.

Captain Silonov was the first in our group to climb to a high altitude and, coming out at the assault position precisely on time, he hit the target like a sharpshooter. Now it's my clearance for takeoff.. Shortly before this the political worker had announced in a special release of the radio newspaper that my rival in competition--Flight Commander Capt Viktor Shabalin--had performed excellently on the range. I was glad for my comrade's success...

I engage the engine's afterburner. The aircraft entered dense clouds hanging low over the airfield. The airspeed increased rapidly. It was important to hold the angle of pitch proportionate to the climb, to pilot the aircraft without the slightest deviations from the assigned flight regime. One cannot do without thorough knowledge and strong skills here.

For this reason, much attention is devoted in our squadron to advance preparation for flights. Taking into account the nature of forthcoming missions, the aviators extend their knowledge of appropriate sections on practical aerodynamics and examine peculiarities in the operation of aircraft systems in detail. The commander assigns experienced officers to deliver a report on the most timely topics. Naturally, in preparing for the presentation, the pilot will strive to examine the substance of the matter thoroughly. Before flights in this exercise, for example, Capt I. Mishurov delivered a report. In the course of preliminary preparation we also were trained in working out engineering and navigational calculations for the flight.

...The sun's rays poured into the aircraft's cockpit in a brilliant stream. The clouds remained far below. The color of the sky changed right before my eyes in proportion to the increase in altitude. At first it appeared colorless, then it darkened to a dark blue and took on a violet hue. Flying at ordinary altitudes near the ground, you become accustomed to the fact that the earth's surface appears darker than the horizon, penetrated by sunlight. This, of course, helps when performing rapid maneuvers and orienting one's self in airspace correctly. But in flight at a high altitude, the earth and sky appear to change color. And a false impression that the aircraft is flying in an inverted attitude may sometimes be created for a pilot. In order to avoid control errors, he should rely not on sensations but on instrument readings. And I did not doubt the accuracy of these readings for an instant. I knew that the aircraft equipment had been readied excellently by our technicians. And regular, persistent training on the ground had enriched my experience in flying on instruments.

The fact that Maj N. Mirzoyev, the combat control officer, is helping me to perform complex maneuvers also has inspired me with confidence of success. Previously a military pilot first class, he is well aware of the peculiarities of every mission. He always prepares for flights together with us. And now his voice is ringing out in the ether calmly, clearly:

"On a combat great-circle flightpath, course computed."

This means that the aircraft has left for the assault position. I maintain the assigned flight regime exactly. In case the parameters are changed, the automatic equipment of the sighting device will enter corrections, of course. But we must be prepared to work with a sight manually. After all, the fact that automatic equipment can be rendered inoperative under real combat conditions is not ruled out. For this reason, we often receive introductory instructions in exercises to operate after switching it off. By the way, Capt V. Sokirko had to perform under precisely such instructions. And the pilot proved to be well [illegible] prepared for the difficult situation both psychologically and professionally. He performed the sighting quickly, accurately and skillfully. The strike turned out to be effective.

The critical moment is approaching. With my report on the radio, authorization follows to work on the range. As soon as the aircraft reached the point calculated, the bombs rushed down on the target. At the same time I felt as if there were a light push from below--the aircraft had ballooned up after the heavy load was released.

I had to make a landing approach under minimum weather conditions. But the report received in flight that the main element of the mission had been carried out successfully--the target had been hit--was like adding to my strength. I was happy to realize that I also had made a contribution to the overall success. Carrying out each mission with an excellent rating and fully straining every effort in our work--each one of us sees his duty in doing this.

Maintenance Technicians Praised

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Sep 79 p 2

/Article by Col V. Izgarshev: "The Hands of the Technician"/

/Text/ "The dinner proceeded noisily, happily. There were toasts and songs. Pokryshkin sat silently, with his own thoughts. And suddenly he said to Grisha Chuvashkin, sitting next to him:

"'Let's drink to the technician's hands...'

"Chuvashkin bashfully drew his swollen, chapped hands, impregnated with grease and dirt, back from the table.

"'Yes, yes, to these very paws, a hundred times frozen and two hundred times burned and tanned with gasoline! Here... Do you think I've forgotten how you took the tank from my MiG to all the sovkhozes for cooking in the summer? Here the Germans are approaching, and he...is rambling over the roads with this tank, full of holes...'

"Grisha turned red. He remembers this story well. He was nearly surrounded because of this tank then, in fact. While they did not succeed in welding up the hole, the technicians contrived to tightly patch up the tank with percale fabric and cellulose dope. Thus the MiG survived to the end of its days with this patch.

"'There you are, comrades,' Pokryshkin said, raising his voice. 'I drink to the technician's hands that helped us to earn the Guards banner.'"

These lines are from the documentary story "Odin MIG iz tysyachi" [One MiG Out of a Thousand] by Yuriy Zhukov. They tell about the festive dinner on the day that the fighter regiment was changed to a Guards regiment. At the formation Captain Pokryshkin, on behalf of the regiment commander, read the congratulatory telegram from Maj Gen Avn K. Vershinin, commander of the Southern Front of the Air Forces. And here is this toast by a pilot at the festive dinner of aviators. A profoundly symbolic toast!

The hands of a technician... The golden hands of an aviation worker! However, the famed Soviet ace Aleksandr Ivanovich Pokryshkin, three times Hero of the Soviet Union and future Marshal of Aviation, knew the true value of these good, skilled hands perhaps better than anyone in the regiment then. In fact, he was one of the technicians. Not 1 year before entering flight school, Aleksandr Pokryshkin served as the technician for a flight...

Lt Gen Engr-Tech Serv Aleksey Alekseyevich Paramonov, deputy chief engineer of the Air Forces, followed the path of combat during the war from the Don to the Spree, all the time as a senior technician of an aircraft squadron. He knows about the hard days and nights at frontline airfields and not by hearsay.

The general cannot speak about his fighting comrades--the technicians and mechanics of wartime--without emotion. What specialists--they were priceless! A pilot would fly in sometimes from a combat mission and the airplane would be riddled with holes, oil pouring out, the cockpit canopy smashed, the control-surface rods hanging on by a thread... You would not know how to set about it. You would think that it wouldn't be simple to restore such an aircraft even at the plant. You would spend the night and in the morning the airplane would be ready for flight. The pilots didn't call the technicians magicians for nothing!

Today's Air Forces are a qualitatively new branch of the Armed Forces. The basis of their combat might are the missile-carrying aircraft, provided with the latest navigation equipment and armament, means of detecting targets and systems for ensuring accurate strikes against them. In battle formation are multimission airplanes with variable-sweep wings and vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. Aviation has become jet-propelled, supersonic, and all-weather.

The airplane of today is not a simple fighting machine but a most complex system embodying the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress. Maintaining such a system, keeping it in constant combat readiness and releasing it for flight is far from a simple matter. It requires thorough, versatile technical knowledge and high skill from the persons engaged in this. It is not a coincidence that the proportion of officers with engineering training among aviation technical personnel is increasing.

Graduates of higher engineering schools also are coming to the positions of technicians in aviation now. As an example, Guards Engr-Lt V. Sokolov is serving in the Proskurovskiy thrice-decorated Guards Fighter Regiment imeni Leninskiy Komsomol. The son of a military pilot, he completed the Riga Higher Military Aviation Engineer School imeni Yakov Alksnis last year and now is working as an aircraft technician. Things are going well for the young officer. Squadron commander Guards Maj V. Bokach and his deputy, Guards Maj S. Bezlyudnyy, have more than once noted the diligence and skill of the competent specialist.

In another aviation unit, Engr-Lt Yu. Kudryavtsev and Engr-Lt B. Gusev have proven themselves to be excellent airplane technicians. I recall how they both readied aircraft to fly out again in the shortest times in the "Berezina" exercise. Several times a day their commanders took off in the fighter-bombers. And the technicians did not hear one remark about the readiness of the aircraft.

But many technicians for airplanes and flights and maintenance group chiefs are specialists with a secondary technical education. However, with secondary school and 3 years of study in an aviation technical school behind them, they also have thorough knowledge, and their skills are such that it is possible for them to be qualified multiskilled specialists. Tech-Sr Lt Anatoliy Myasnikov, one of the best technicians in the unit, is serving in the same regiment as Vadim Sokolov. Last year he was given a high trust—to be among the personnel of our squadron of fighters which made visits to Finland and France. I saw how Anatoliy worked there. The high personal responsibility and discipline typical of him as a communist, the thorough knowledge of equipment and first-class skill in its preparation contributed to a considerable extent to the success of our pilots' demonstration flights.

It was last winter during a tactical flight exercise in one of the squadrons of the Belorussian Military District. Accepting an aircraft from repair, Tech-Sr Lt A. Dyul'din detected a barely noticeable fuel leak in one of the subassemblies. Should the flight of this aircraft be excluded from the planned schedule for tomorrow? Should the aircraft be sent to the technical maintenance unit? But after all, this may affect completion of the exercise tasks! They made the decision in the squadron to correct the trouble by their own efforts under field conditions. And here are officer Dyul'din and his comrades in the cold and the howling wind, without closing their eyes all night, dismantling a number of subassemblies and components in order to reach the location of the trouble and eliminate the malfunction. Later the engineer estimated that under normal conditions this operation would require not less than a day and a half. Right here, in the field, they had spent a third as much time. At the same time, the work was carried out faultlessly.

The pilots received the usual excellent evaluation in the exercise. They rightfully attributed it to the technicians who had succeeded in ensuring that the aircraft was made operational before the beginning of the exercise.

Tech-Lt Nikolay Orlov also distinguished himself in this exercise. He was working as a member of the commander's crew. The commander was flying out to check the weather, and was leading a group of fighter-bombers into combat. Several times he took off. And each time his aircraft was ready for the next flight ahead of schedule: the technician was performing on the ramp beyond all praise.

Communist Tech-Lt Sergey Ruban serves as an aircraft technician in the "X" aviation unit in the Baltic Military District. He is an excellent specialist, the best technician in the unit. The district's commander for aviation often flies in the aircraft which he maintains. And each time he warmly thanks the technician of the excellent aircraft for the exemplary condition of the combat machine. Incidentally, the shelter housing the excellent aircraft also is maintained by the technician in an exemplary manner. Sergey Ruban is one of the activists in the unit's party organization. As a member of the council of the unit's junior officers, he enjoys the high respect of his comrades and senior officers.

Tech-Lt Gennadiy Samokhvalov, an aircraft technician, is a member of the party committee of a fighter regiment. I was a witness when the regiment commander (also a party committee member), after returning from a flight in the aircraft readied by Samokhvalov, consulted with the lieutenant on the procedure for discussing the question of propaganda of military and technical knowledge among junior officers and warrant officers at the forthcoming committee session.

"The technician always has been respected in aviation," Aleksey Alekseyevich Paramonov told me. "Now his role has increased even more. An engineer is an engineer, but the specialist immediately responsible for an aircraft who releases it for flight, and who is able to set a rivet, weld and solder is, in a word, a person with the golden hands of a skilled craftsman who will always be needed and will always be surrounded by the respect and honor of aviators..."

After a pause the general continued to reflect aloud:

"Consider this fact. As many technicians as I know--all have strong families, all have well-bred, diligent children. And this is not a coincidence: the technician is also a skilled craftsman in everything. The radio, television, and household appliances in his apartment always are in good repair. And the small children, looking at their father, become accustomed to work from childhood... Technicians, if they study further, turn out to be the best engineers. That is a fact."

But understandably, everyone cannot be engineers. The majority of technicians remain technicians throughout their entire service. Of course, their professional training increases. The become high-class specialists and receive the qualifications of an expert.

I recall the words of a letter received by the editorial staff. It told about the service and the family of an aviation technician--a person who loved his work to the point of self-forgetfulness. His oldest son had already completed secondary school. And here the father was as if he were standing still--serving in one rank--the rank of senior lieutenant. The writer of this letter understands that there are, and apparently always will be, positions in the army in which one will not advance to high ranks. But is it impossible, the writer asks, to think about distinguishing the persons who hold positions like the technician in some way, all the same? Perhaps we should somehow provide better incentive for advancing the class level of the aviation technician.

Take such a question, for example. In our country the correctness of a person in a once selected profession is highly valued--honorary titles have been established. There are honored artists and doctors, teachers and agronomists, cultural workers and machine operators... In aviation, including military aviation, honorary titles are awarded to pilots and navigators. Is it impossible, the writer of the letter to the editorial staff asks, to give incentive for the many years of selfless labor of aviation technicians in such a manner?

Further. Flight personnel--pilots, navigators, flight engineers and flight technicians--have individual flight logs. This is the face of the aviator, His entire flight service has been reflected on the pages of this logbook. But is it impossible to establish a similar logbook for the aircraft technician as well? How many times has he released an aircraft that he has checked for flight? What evaluation has he received for the quality with which equipment has been readied? This and much else would be reflected in that logbook. It seems that this document also would be a great incentive for the technician's professional growth, a subject of his pride and fond memory for his entire life.

Before putting an end to this article, I called on Mar Avn A. Yefimov, first deputy commander in chief of the Air Forces and twice Hero of the Soviet Union:

"Comrade Marshal, do you remember the technicians for your own airplane during wartime?"

Aleksandr Nikolayevich answered without hesitation:

"Still! Yuriy Mikhaylovich Konovalov, who lives now in Sverdlovsk, and Mikhail Ivanovich Yermakov, who lives in Arsen'yev, Primorskiy Kray. Golden hands, real craftsmen!"

Potential Flight Accident Analyzed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Manushkin, Transbaykal Military District: "When the Situation Became Complicated"]

[Text] The missile-carrier piloted by Maj S. Turchin went off the concrete after touchdown. Then it touched the concrete again and went off again. So-called progressive "bouncing" of the aircraft had developed. It stopped only when the flight supervisor gave the command to the pilot to release the landing deceleration parachute. There was no accident, but the conditions for it were serious, and it became the subject of a detailed discussion at the postflight briefing. Just what was the reason for the error permitted by the pilot?

The answer is simple: the pilot brought the aircraft down to the runway at increased speed, which in turn was caused by the steep glidepath descent. But members of the unit's methods council did not confine themselves to such a review of the incident at their session. In fact, they referred to the miscalculations of an experienced aviator. A more thorough analysis was needed here. As a result of it, the following was developed. When Major Turchin departed on his mission, the weather was relatively good. When he returned to the airfield, it had deteriorated substantially: a strong crosswind had started blowing. The pilot did not expect this and did not react immediately to the changed condition. Some haste appeared in his movements. In the process of descending, he was concentrating his main attention on the accuracy of his approach, lined up with the runway, but he overlooked other parameters, airspeed in particular.

Didn't Major Turchin really know the procedure for a crosswind landing? Of course he knew. But precisely the unexpected nature of the abrupt change in the weather had a substantial effect on his psychological condition. The errors were a result of this.

Are such situations a rarity? By no means. And not only in the air, but even during preparations on the ground. Such an example was brought out at the methods council session. Sr Lt V. Semernin was carrying out an ordinary "flight" with a simple mission on the simulator. He was performing confidently in accordance with the accepted standards of an excellent evaluation. Suddenly the instructor gave the introductory condition: the engine has stopped. And the pilot's actions became unrecognizable: hasty, confused. Only after prompting by the instructor did Semernin once again find composure, self-control and collectedness in his actions. Just why did he lose his nerve in the beginning? The entire point is that the introductory condition had not been envisaged in the program for this "flight" and the officer had not been psychologically prepared for it. But now and then even experience and training do not help without this readiness.

Lt Col V. Antonets, a member of the methods council, also analyzed another type of example at this session. It has been observed, he said, that a pilot is sometimes especially collected and concentrated when he is assigned an unusual and complex mission. Prepared for a difficult flight, he also is internally prepared for the onset of any unforeseen situations. But after all, a dangerous situation may take shape in any flight, even in such a brief and, it would appear, simple flight as one in the traffic pattern. The elements are the elements. And they must be taken into account. This is why it is so important, regardless of the degree of complexity and frequency with which a drill is repeated in the air, to prepare for it on the ground, taking the possibility of any circumstances into account so that no surprise can lead to the pilot's confusion, even if only for an instant.

A number of measures to improve the psychological tempering of flight personnel were examined at that session of the methods council. In particular, special studies were written by the regiment's best methodologists. They contain recommendations for junior flight commanders and instructors on the organization and conduct of training exercises with flight personnel in actions under special circumstances and in training aviators to have the qualities of stability and determination.

During the preliminary preparation for flights, commanders now have begun to devote more attention to the crew's psychological readiness for an abrupt change in the tactical and weather conditions and for possible failures of the engine, radio, or navigation and control instruments. It is necessary to stipulate here: modern aviation equipment is perfected and reliable, and any breakdown is exceptionally rare. In the unit, however, they believe: there may be no special situation in the air, but the pilot must condition his actions until they are automatic, in order to control the aircraft faultlessly and confidently in any difficult situation. After all, flight in a supersonic missile-carrier often is conditioned by a shortage of time; consequently, any sudden complicating of the situation in such moments requires instantaneous reaction.

During "flights" in the simulator, commanders of flights strive to give their subordinates introductory stipulations more frequently. They may be very diversified. Let us assume that an aviator is approaching for a "landing." During the descent on glidepath the instructor suddenly tells him: "High-lift devices have failed." And the pilot already is counting on a landing without the use of slats and flaps. If he permits an error as this takes place, the exercise is continued until the procedure for actions is carried out completely.

A major role in aviators' psychological preparation is assigned to the interchange of advanced experience. So officers I. Mineyev, N. Datsenko, A. Varenov and V. Baranov spoke before their colleagues. They not only told about instructive episodes from their own flying experience, but also explained why a situation had become complicated, what helped them to maintain self-control, and how to function better under the conditions which had developed.

At postflight briefings, the discussion now frequently turns to the pilot's psychological condition as the primary cause of errors which were permitted or were possible. This helps commanders to make a thorough, detailed analysis of subordinates' miscalculations in piloting technique and to more rapidly correct the shortcomings that have been identified.

Recently the regiment's aviators intercepted rapidly maneuvering radio-controlled drones and subsequently destroyed them with missiles. The very first flights demonstrated that the pilots are capable of emerging as victors in single combat with a strong enemy. Under the difficult conditions of a tactical and weather situation, the fighters of the air have displayed decisiveness and self-control and the will to win. The aviators have carried out all combat training assignments with high performance and without reasons for flying accidents.

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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Submarine Crew Training Methods

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Yermolayev: "Interest in Drills"]

[Text] While still a young commander of the missile department on a submarine, I often had the occasion to encounter what at first glance was a rather strange phenomenon. The rapid growth in the seamen's practical skills suddenly began to slow down. It would appear that having mastered their functional duties, the missilemen should have worked with even greater enthusiasm but they, on the contrary, behaved passively on drills. And attempts to make the training process more active were not very successful.

At the same time, there were no grounds to reproach the missilemen for indifference toward the subunit's affairs. The department held firmly to its outstanding position, and any good undertaking found a lively response in the entire collective. But as a missileman-specialist, I saw that there was no genuine tension on our drills. It was difficult for the ship's commander to recognize this, but one day I turned to him for advice (at that time, the commander was Captain 1st Rank Yu. Lazarev). He had been the head of a crew for many years, had many long cruises behind him, and enjoyed the authority of a competent methodologist and teacher. Lazarev did not begin to say anything ahead of time, but he came to the department on the very first drill.

"Everything is correct, but uninteresting," the commander recapitulated briefly, taking me aback. "It is worth pondering over this."

What does "interesting" mean? For this is work, not a game. Difficult, complex, requiring the complete straining of attention, will, and physical strength. But nevertheless, on the advice of the commander I began to read military-educational literature and visited drills in other departments and on adjacent ships, which I had never done before. I also became interested in the methodology of drills and in their psychological atmosphere. The view from the side provided much. First of all, I came to the conclusion that preparation for a drill is not simply understanding the order and extent to which the subordinates should work things out. It was necessary to think out how to make it effective and cognitive to the greatest degree specifically for each of them and how to attract specialists with the training process.

At first, work on preparations for drills increased significantly. But satisfaction with results also grew. The missilemen began to work with increased interest, competing actively with one another. The first suggestions on improving the quality of the drills appeared and the department's rationalizers were disclosed here. The seamen built a trainer which permitted the realistic working out of those actions which formerly were only accomplished provisionally. And really, I myself as department commander felt increased interest in lessons with the personnel.

Unquestionably, in the life of the crew the primary task is the mastery of weapons and equipment and obtaining firm skills in their combat employment. And when the commander of a subunit receives young replacements, he strives to teach his new subordinates as quickly as possible and to train full-fledged replacements for the experienced specialists who have departed. And although this process bears a cyclic nature, much in it is repeated each year but objective requirements of life are such that the general level of the ability, skill, and technical style of the subunit, unit, or ship must be constantly improved despite the renewal of the personnel.

Once, I had the occasion to visit a submarine on which I served several years ago. The equipment had not changed--the same strong hull, the same mechanisms and weapons. But now this ship accomplishes missions about which we didn't even think at one time. I jealously looked attentively at the submarine's present crew. It seems that they are the same seamen and officers, but then, they are able to do more. However, this is not their only merit. All those who served on this ship and on ships of the same type accumulated experience little by little and constantly looked for ways to improve the quality of drills and exercises and this permitted raising the level of the crew's skill. And the trainer which we created and at one time seemed to be a great achievement became a regular device for our successors. They had already thought of how to proceed farther.

Unfortunately, not each forthcoming specialty drill for which an officer prepares is as yet always planned as a new step in the mastery of equipment. But you see, it is the new which is genuinely interesting. And it is not by chance that as soon as they master their functional duties sufficiently well, the seamen begin to lose interest in the drills if they are organized without consideration of their growing skill. A mechanical, monotonous repetition of actions and operations already known alone cannot cause creative activity.

Interest in the drill in each of its participants is a necessary element of training which testifies primarily to the conscientious attitude of the men toward the matter. Yes, firm practical skills are acquired as a result of numerous repeated actions, but in this case their content should constantly be enriched. Turning to new material mobilizes the intelligence of the serviceman but, at the same time, it also affects his feeling. In principle, gravitation toward the unknown and the striving to move forward are inherent in a person. And this factor should be considered both in combat training and in political-indoctrinational work

For four years the submarine of the Red Banner Northern Fleet on which officer Potapov serves has won first place in the Navy for one of the types of combat training. The secret of this success is primarily in the high state of training and teamwork of the ship's combat crew (KBR). The ship's commander utilizes every opportunity at sea or at the base for drills. As a matter of fact, the same elements of combat exercises in the search for the "enemy," classification of targets, tracking them, and going into the attack are worked out.... But it is hardly possible to find two out of the innumerable set of these drills which repeat one another. The skillful simulation of the tactical background, the full-fledged use of all the situation's possibilities, an individual determination of the nature and extent of the load for each crew member, and well organized competition permit the commander to attain a lively, interested attitude of the submariners toward drill which increases its effectiveness perceptibly. And during the entire four years the crew does not simply confirm its former high results, but it demonstrates the progressive growth of its combat skill as it successfully accomplishes all the more difficult missions.

Now and then, one may hear complaints of lesson leaders that there are no conditions for the interesting conduct of drills. They say that it is necessary to conduct drills on combat equipment, especially during cruises, only in an extremely provisional manner. Trainers, training-drill stations, and various operating diagrams and models also have limited possibilities.... It goes without saying that the more improved the training-material base, the easier it is to organize a full-fledged drill. But nevertheless, its effectiveness depends primarily on the methodological and professional skill of the commander, on his creative aspiration, and on his profound understanding of the goals of the training which is directed toward raising the combat readiness of the ship.

I had the occasion to see dull, unproductive drills in damage control in excellently equipped training-drill stations. Sea water lashed against holes, a flame engulfed a compartment, but nevertheless the conventionality of the drill was felt in all the seamen's actions. They had become accustomed to the station, to its holes and fires in stipulated places and most important, to the monotony of drill with outwardly effective attributes. But at the same time, frankly I often had the occasion to be surprised how, with the most modest material support, officers conducted absorbing drills which were full-blooded in their result. This is how Engineer-Captain 3d Rank V. Spitsyn was able to create a background of real actions under any conditions. He always thought the special situations through carefully in order to eliminate excessive conventionality and intensify the spirit of competition in the combat work of the seamen. Already by its content, the simulation of battle and emergency damage required of the seamen nonstereotyped decisions, boldness of thought, resourcefulness, and coolness in considering a situation. And even if at times there was some shortage of physical loads, the psychological atmosphere of the drills always approximated a real combat atmosphere to a high degree.

Today, we cannot limit ourselves to the acquisition of purely mechanical skills, whether this pertains to the precision and speed of calculations, observation of instruments, or the performance of certain operations. It is necessary to develop in the specialists the skill of a creative approach to the accomplishment of the tasks which arise before them. But creativity is awakened in those cases where conditions are present for the display of independence and when, in the training process, the seamen face difficulties the overcoming of which must be done independently, mobilizing knowledge, ability, and experience.

The lesson given to me at one time by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Lazarev was especially recalled during my years of service as a squadron specialist. For it was namely this staff officer who bears responsibility for the excellent state of training of the seamen in their specialties. The squadron specialist teaches subunit commanders to raise the quality of lessons and combat drills and exercises; the most interesting experience is concentrated in his hands. And each drill which the squadron specialist conducts with the officer personnel himself must be a model not only of methodological clarity and skillful organization, but also of an accurate psychological calculation from the viewpoint of being interesting, and this also means the productivity of the lesson.

Each long cruise requires of the ships crews a high level of combat readiness and the ability to accomplish the most difficult missions. And this means that the seamen must be irreproachably trained and ready to operate confidently in the situation which may develop suddenly, as occurs on well thought through drills which are conducted in a combat manner.

Competition Between Ships

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Zlydnev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "All Reserves--Into Action"]

[Text] "We are keeping our competitors in our wake, as they say," said political officer Yu. Korsakov with slyness in his voice when I became interested in the course of the competition between ships.

"Yes, this time we lost first place," agreed the secretary of the party organization of another ship, Captain 3d Rank Pushkin. "But we have not lost the hope of victory. The final checks will be soon. The finish will show...."

At the finish of the training year, both crews were to accomplish difficult firing missions. There would be new facts to compare the achievements of collectives equal in strength and capability.

The competitors visit one another. True, this does not happen as often as desired, but there is a telling reason for this--the ships are doing a lot of sailing. But when they stand side by side, such visits are regular.

It was learned that on the ship where BCh-2 [department 2] is headed by Captain 3d Rank A. Pushkin the seamen know their duties in accordance with the ship's bill a little better, and among the colleagues of officer Yu. Korsakov the technical style is a little better. However, establishing indices in which the competitors differ in one direction or another is still only half the matter. It is important to determine the reason why the leaders attained success, and what is even more important --to equip the competitor with leading experience effectively. This is how they proceeded on the ships.

The organization and procedure for the special training of the seamen were improved on both ships through common efforts, in the course of the exchange of experience: consultation posts were established for young seamen where masters of military affairs are on duty, and the system of special situations on drills was reviewed with consideration of battle's requirements. The most effective procedures for preparing weapons for action were worked out. Here, commanders of missile departments Captain 3d Rank A. Pushkin and Captain-Lieutenant V. Rychkov did much work. Together with the squadron specialist, they made a detailed analysis of where precious minutes are lost during the reception and check of a weapon, and they introduced a number of suggestions to condense the standards.

Good contacts also developed between the engineer officers of the ships. They regularly exchange experiences in the operation of assemblies and systems and in the organization of competition for the mastery of allied and second professions. Great credit here belongs to officer-communists V. Gradusov, T. Moskalenko, A. Isayev, and B. Buzin. On their initiative work of the technical study groups became more active on the ships and contests for the best specialist began to be conducted more often. Competitions of the seamen in allied specialties were organized for the first time. As a result, for example, all subordinates of master of military affairs and communist Warrant Officer [michman] V. Chigarin mastered an allied specialty while a member of the ship's party bureau, Warrant Officer N. Marchenko, confirmed the highest qualification in two specialties.

The atmosphere of good competition and comradely mutual assistance is also having a beneficial effect on the work of the rationalizers. Each of their suggestions is discussed publicly at conferences and in study groups. Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant S. Shalanin, who has been adjudged the best rationalizer in the unit, has to his credit 18 suggestions which improve the operating effectiveness of the mechanisms.

All this is good, But nevertheless, it must be said with all definiteness that the possibilities contained in the competition between ships are still far from completely utilized here.

Even now, for example, it is clear that not all officers and warrant officers who have the right to take the examinations for master of a combat qualification are ready to capture this position. When talk turns to this, they usually refer to the sluggishness of the master candidates themselves. But is it true that this sluggishness cannot be overcome? Talks alone which are similar to persuasion are not enough. It is necessary for commanders and political organizations of ships to increase exactingness toward people, propagandize the experience of the masters more widely and, as required by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement in ideological and political-indoctrinational work," to use more completely the indoctrinational capabilities of socialist competition.

It was stated earlier how the exchange of experience between missilemen and the engineer officers is organized. Unfortunately this cannot be said about officers of other departments.

Both competitors win from the participation in the competition, but there is only one victor; someone nevertheless lags behind. Now the ship where the party organization is headed by officer A. Pushkin found itself "in the wake." He believes that the reason for lagging is hidden in the temporary drop in the activity and efficiency of a number of officers. Serious costs in the work style of the senior assistant, officer Yu. Malinin, had a noticeable effect on the moral climate in the collective, in his opinion. He was captivated by "dressing downs," hampered the initiative of people, and was indifferent toward their suggestions which were directed toward improving the state of affairs in the departments and toward increasing the effectiveness of the competition.

But now, the situation has changed: officer Yu. Malinin has been relieved of his post. And the task now consists of making effective use of the training year's remaining weeks and achieving the unconditional accomplishment of socialist obligations. It should be supposed that the staff and political section of the unit will help the crews of the competing ships to eliminate errors in organizing the exchange of experiences and will put into action in each department the still unused reserves for raising the combat ability of the seamen.

On the Escort Ship 'Sil'nyy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Yelovskiy: "In the Channel of their Fathers"]

[Excerpts] Each time that the "Sil'nyy" crosses the imaginary line which connects the Taran and Rozeve beacons its crew, following naval tradition, salutes the heroes who died in the Baltic in battles for the motherland. The formation of the seamen in solemn silence stands stock-still on the quarterdeck. The man-of-war ensign is lowered to half mast. The high note of the bugle sounds.

Here, in the southern part of the Baltic, submarines under the command of I. Travkin, S. Bogorad, and A. Marinesko won brilliant victories.

When crossing the meridian of Syrve beacon, the men of the Baltic Fleet salute the victories of the older generation which were won over fascist convoys in the Irbenskiy straits. The destroyer "Sil'nyy" whose name our escort ship inherited became famous in these battles.

Yes, in turning to history we learn to live and perform our duty in accordance with the irreproachable moral norms of the frontline fighters and to fulfill the oath and protect the motherland just as sacredly as they did. All Soviet seamen follow this channel.

For example, Senior Lieutenant N. Troshin, commander of the antiaircraft battery, holds to the correct course. In the summer training period and period of competitions his battery confidently increases its ability. Here is a fresh example. A diving target was to be destroyed on an exercise. This mission was assigned to the group of ships. The radar operator, Petty Officer 2d Class P. Karp, was the first to detect and confidently track the "enemy."

It was very important not to become confused and lose the target during its separation from the airplane when the blip on the scope split. And here, the operators functioned irreproachably. With the target's approach to the range for opening fire, the battery of Senior Lieutenant N. Troshin was the first to hit it and obtained an excellent grade.

The development of the commander of the antiaircraft missile battery, Senior Lieutenant A. Brykin, is proceeding just as confidently. His father, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, is still serving in the Navy. The example of the wartime fighter inspires the young officer.

Recently, the first deputy commander of the fleet, Vice Admiral I. Kapitanets, went to sea on the "Sil'nyy." Two groups of ships competed in the search for the "enemy" submarine. The leader of the sonar team, Master Warrant Officer [master michman] A. Ryabokon', was the first to establish contact, and the miners, as always, worked clearly as they "destroyed" the target with depth-charge rockets. The admiral noted the traditionally high ability of the miners on the "Sil'nyy" and remained satisfied with the crew as a whole although he made several remarks about the work of the main control room.

The wartime chronicle of the destroyer "Sil'nyy" contains proof of the fact that the men of the engineering department (BCh-5) were distinguished by high ability and repair training. In the autumn of 1941, receiving major battle damage, the "Sil'nyy" was repaired twice under the most difficult conditions. At the shipyard, the enginemen of the destroyer were called "Stakhanovites." And Warrant Officer M. Khazina was called a professor of hull repair work.

Our seamen of BCh-5 are continuing this good fame. Not so long ago, the ship completed a successful ocean cruise, one can say, on economized engine capacity. Our engineer officers greatly extended the times between repairs. It is not by chance that the commander of BCh-5, master of military affairs officer Yu. Bozhkov--his rank is now engineer-captain-lieutenant--was awarded this rank ahead of schedule. The school of the "Sil'nyy" for the engineer officers is also felt in the professional "handwriting" of the group commanders. Engineer-Senior Lieutenants S. Romashechka, Yu. Morozov, and N. Pavlov are first-class specialists; they all are ready for independent control of a department.

It was my good fortune to command the "Sil'nyy" for several years. This was responsible, honorable, and difficult. A large role belongs to the glorious traditions of the ship in the fact that our escort ship is outstanding.

I wrote these lines on the eve of my departure to study at the Naval Academy. The officer who would take the escort ship "Sil'nyy" under his command was already known. He is Captain-Lieutenant A. Petrov. His grandfather took part in the revolution and went into the reserves in the rank of captain 1st rank. His father, Captain 1st Rank I. Petrov heads one of the fleet's services. His brother serves as the assistant commander of a cruiser. With the valorous attitude toward military duty, which has become a tradition with the Petrovs, it can be hoped that the young commander will hold the "Sil'nyy" in a reliable and proven channel. I wish him success with all my heart.

Aviation Crew Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Biryukov, squadron commander, 1st-class military pilot, Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "Crew Solidarity"]

[Text] When theysay "Coordinated crew," they are thereby noting the outstanding ability and irreproachable smoothness in the work of the aviators in flight as well as, of course, the spiritual cohesion of the people and their loyalty to friendship and military comradeship. There are many excellent, coordinated crews in our unit which are capable of any most difficult combat-training mission. Of course, in the development of each of them they had their special features, and that perfected coordination in actions, the basis of which is made up of irreproachable discipline and mutual understanding, was not acquired at once.

Here, for example, is the crew where the commander is Captain Yuriy Borisov and the navigator is Senior Lieutenant Petr Shevchenko. Both are trained specialists. Although each one has, as they say, his own abilities and special features of character. Captain Borisov is a man of few words and punctual in everything which pertains to training and service. Evidently, at first his demandingness did not impress Petr Shevchenko, an energetic and emotional person, in everything. There was a breath of coolness in relations between them.

Once, after a landing on an alternate airfield the commander of the crew wanted to give the navigator an assignment. The latter, without listening to the end, flared up: "Why namely me? Did you find a scapegoat?" Captain Borisov gave the officer punishment. Then he reported this to me as squadron commander.

After a while, when the passions had died down somewhat, I called the navigator aside. I reminded him that inasmuch as the commander is personally responsible for the crew's preparedness for flight, in the interests of the service he is required to impose demandingness as called for by the regulations on his subordinate. It was here that the attempt was made to understand the reason why the officer did not behave quite tactfully in the conversation with his superior. The navigator reluctantly admitted that, he said, he was at fault and was hasty. In short, it was evident that the person did not completely realize his error. How to proceed here?

Consulting with the political officer, we talked with both of them. We tried to explain that there were no grounds for a falling out. The navigator simply must control and restrain his emotions better. And the commander of the crew must always consider the psychological nuances of joint work both on the ground and in the air and must not forget that even the very tone in which a remark is made plays an important role because it affects a person's attitude and, consequently, his readiness to operate with full return. Of course, we did not limit ourselves to a talk alone. We intensified the monitoring of the crew members' preparations for flights. At the same time, we did not lose sight of people's behavior and their ability to combine mutual demandingness with kindness and tact. It is to the honor of the officers that they displayed a sincere aspiration to eliminate the shortcomings which were present and they managed to establish correct mutual relations.

In the many-faceted work of rallying a crew as a military collective and molding a healthy moral atmosphere in it, we devote constant attention to spreading the experience of the best commander-teachers. Deep analysis and the graphic demonstration of their procedures and methods in flight training serve as good lessons for young officers. For example, they drew much that was instructive for themselves after becoming acquainted with the work style of the commander of an outstanding crew, Captain V. Reshetnikov. The experience of this military sniper pilot and skillful methodologist confirms convincingly that stable and high indices of the crew which he heads in training and service are ensured primarily by purposeful organizational and political-indoctrinational work with people.

From the way that officer Reshetnikov's subordinates prepare assiduously for each assignment in the air, one can already judge correctly the sense of each aviator's great responsibility for the assigned matter and the comradely assistance and mutual help for the attainment of the common success. Together they draw up the flight documentation and think out their actions in the air carefully and comprensively, in the dynamics of the forthcoming assignment. This is a creative matter, and here anyone can express his opinion apropos of the effectiveness of one or another combat maneuver. The commander of the crew properly corrects and objectively evaluates each sensible suggestion. He does not overlook even the slightest misunderstanding.

It is pleasant to fly in such a crew: clear rhythm, not one unnecessary word. If a commander's reminder is heard over the intercom, there are no angry undercurrents and the tone is even and calm, what is called approving. It is not for naught that they say about Reshetnikov that in flight he controls both the deeds and the attitude of the crew.

What distinguishes our leading crew commanders? Methodological skill, pedagogical tact, and the ability to win people over and instill in them a confidence in the successful accomplishment of the most difficult assignment. They maintain a healthy moral atmosphere and mutual understanding by personal example, one can say, by their line of behavior in service and in daily life. Take Captain Viktor Shopin as an example. The crew which he heads is a harmonious combat family. The aviators' families are friends, they spend their leisure time together, and a community of spiritual interests and aspirations draws them together.

To rally the crews, officers Reshetnikov and Shopin make active use of socialist competition. Making an objective evaluation of the actions of each specialist in flight and at his work site, at the same time they also give strict consideration to the aviator's observance of flight rules and his discipline and exemplary behavior in training and in service. They compare and contrast the results of their own crews and those of the competing crew scrupulously and, as they say, down to the smallest details.

One day, the crew of Major A. Barkevich, with which Captain Reshetnikov and his subordinates are competing, accomplished a flight mission under difficult conditions in an outstanding manner. And although he has the reputation as a master of flying affairs, this time it turned out a little worse for Reshetnikov. The commander analyzed exactingly and self-critically why they functioned below their capabilities under identical conditions. Thoroughly analyzing the reasons for the shortcomings, he also stated what the crew should learn from the competing crew.

It happens that some leader, in defending verbally his successes in a competition, limits himself only to the fact that instead of painstaking organizational work he only reminds and "demands" that the lead not be lost. But officers Shopin and Reshetnikov seem to invite people to reflect and to raise questions for general advice: why, let us say, couldn't the navigator plan for a higher position--to struggle for the title of best in his profession in the squadron or in the regiment; or how the navigator-operator could prepare better and pass the forthcoming check of communication knowledge and skills with an excellent grade; or how the co-pilot could master piloting under difficult conditions more rapidly, and so forth. Specific ways for a further increase in the abilitiy of each one and the attainment of common success are sought in such a confidential comradely exchange of opinions.

Questions of improving the coordination of the crew and the moral-psychological training of the aviators are deeply analyzed at post-flight critiques and during methodological lessons. Along with showing the experience of the leading commanders, here the causes of various errors are analyzed in detail so as to prevent them in the future when organizing the training and educational process. For there are no trifles in flying. The commander of the crew was not interested in the way his subordinates feel prior to takeoff, the navigator became unnecessarily nervous on the combat course, causing many unnecsssary shifts in the aircraft's direction, the aviators did not work in a coordinated manner at some stage of the flight.... What was behind each such situation and what must be done to eliminate the shortcomings--an objective and useful conversation is conducted on all this.

We also devote great attention to the selection of crew personnel. Unquestionably, this problem is important. Of course, it is necessary to consider both the men's degree of ability and their individual characteristics. But, in my opinion, here we should hardly regard psychological compatability as of paramount importance. Really, there are no people who are similar in every way in their character and their personal qualities. This means that it is the duty of the commander to improve the effectiveness and quality of indoctrinational work in molding in the men moral maturity and the best features of military comradeship and combat friendship.

The decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement in ideological and political-indoctrinational work," is a guide to action for all of us. In our unit, along with other means of ideological influence wide use is made of scientific-practical conferences, lecture cycles at which experienced commanders speak, and meetings with combat veterans.

But as yet not all reserves have been thrown into the matter. Why, let us say, couldn't a lecture bureau on the flight crew be organized in the Officers House in which questions on leading experience could be investigated in a theoretical as well as in a practical plane? In my opinion, this would contribute to the solidarity of the military collective. Everything depends on the clear creative determination and quality of measures conducted which must be closely linked with the practice of flight training and indoctrination.

Pipe-Laying Battalion

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Zlydnev, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "At the Eighth Channel"]

[Text] Breaking through the ashy-gray clouds, the sun caressed the ground. Thousands of tiny rainbows played in the droplets of moisture on the leaves of trees and on the rose-colored candles of the rose-bay.

Slowly drying out, the sailors' striped shirts were covered with soot. Sitting down on the thread of pipeline which had just been assembled, the seamen rested. Senior Seamen O. Kuchuk and A. Tsoller who had recently returned from a short leave were telling their comrades about their home towns. The chief of section, Junior Sergeant G. Perevozchikov, stood at a sharp bend of the stormy channel and estimated how to throw the pipes across it better and faster.

The channel which was named the eighth during the reconnaissance was narrow at this point, but swift. Here and there, half-sunken snags stuck out of the water. The swampy opposite bank was densely overgrown with low, clinging brush.

The instructor in pipeline equipment, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] A. Zverev, walked up to Junior Sergeant G. Perevozchikov. He has several hundred kilometers of installed pipes and dozens of channels and rivers which required of the pipeline layers high skill and precise calculations as well as bravery and sharpness to his credit. In the subunit, the warrant officer has the reputation of a jack of all trades and a demanding and thoughtful commander.

"We can't manage before evening, comrade warrant officer," said Perevozchikov. "The men are soaked through, tired, and it will be difficult to fasten the screw jacks in this rapid water. The river proved to be a surprise," and saying it, the junior sergeant measured the depth of the channel with a pole.

"Is this really the river? The river is ahead. And I think we can get by without the jacks. We'll adapt those snags there instead of them. They are reliably fastened to the bottom, I checked. All this should be reported to the company commander, and it seems that he has arrived over there...."

A pipe-carrying truck stopped near the group of resting seamen and an agile officer, short in height, jumped lightly from its cab. This was the company commander, Captain I. Mikulyak.

"Are we drying or baking"" he gaily asked the seamen. "I come to you with good news. The battalion received a high grade for the march. The command is confident that we will also accomplish our primary mission successfully, too."

...The pipeline layers rose at dawn. Brief assemblies--and the column of vehicles left the post. Using their wealth of experience, the battalion commander, Major of Technical Service V. Yefremov, his deputy for technical affairs, Major N. Stepchenko, and the chief engineer, Captain of Technical Service V. Dynnikov, organized the march clearly and achieved complete secrecy of the column's movement.

Despite the difficult roads and bad weather, the column arrived at the designated point at the established time. And soon carefully camouflaged tent cantonments equipped with everything necessary for the normal life of the men under field conditions sprang up at the disposition areas of the companies. The veteran of the subunit, Warrant Officer Yu. Karkhanin, displayed administrative smartness and flexibility here.

They began to work at once. And they immediately encountered difficulties. There were many of them: Heavily broken terrain which abounded with numerous channels and swampy soil sectors, continuous rain and a dank wind, a great distance from the supply base and, finally, rigid times for laying the pipeline. Much effort was required to organize the work clearly. Socialist competition between subunits and between individual specialists which was intiated under the slogan, "High reliability for the line," played its mobilizing role here.

The results of the competition were summed up at the end of each day, and in the morning a red flag was raised at the tent where battalion headquarters was located in honor of the leading subunit. The name of the platoon commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Bystrov, could be read on a small plate fastened to the flag pole more often than the others. As a rule, his subordinates exceed the daily assignments with excellent quality of the work. Nor do the leaders forget about their competitor in the competition--the platoon which is commanded by Lieutenant G. Nefedov. It so happened that in this platoon the majority of the men still do not possess sufficient experience in work under field conditions. Therefore, at times they get "steamed up." And then Senior Lieutenant Bystrov's subordinates, having accomplished their assignment, arrive to help their friendly competitors.

The secretary of the party organization, Captain I. Mikulyak, does not miss an opportunity to inform the men of the successes attained in a day or week, to cite those who especially distinguished themselves, and to publicly criticize those who are lagging behind.

Today, there was no one to reproach for lagging and the officer, having announced the grade for the march, issued the latest newspapers to the seamen and commented on the news published in them.

Warrant Officer A. Zverev sits down next to the captain and tells him his plan for forcing the eighth channel.

"Operate just as you proposed the matter," says the officer to the warrant officer. "But don't forget about safety measures and work style. Don't contaminate the channel and don't cut the trees and brush. As you know, the grade is reduced for this, you see...."

"Take places!" the warrant officer orders.

The seamen join the pipes quickly. A rubber sealing ring, steel sleeve, several turns with a box wrench-brace--and the nuts are tightened and the joint is ready. The first section is laid on a snag which is sticking out of the water. The next one--also. Step by step, overcoming the strong current, the pipe-layers advance toward the opposite bank.

The wind from the sea grows stronger. The sky is again densely curtained by the clouds. It began to rain.

"Now we have a customary situation here," jokes the warrant officer as he dons his work jacket. "Things will go more cheerfully...."

After several hours both the eighth channel and the swampy sector of the zone near the bank were left far behind. The steel thread of the pipeline stretched along the steep slope of a cone-shaped hill beyond which is located the combat equipment which is experiencing an acute need for fuel. And it arrived in time because the men of the excellent battalion worked with full exertion, as if in actual battle. Exceeding the standard, the pipe-laying battalion received an excellent grade.

Shipboard Maintenance Officer Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Engr-Capt 1st Rank B. Kalistratov, staff officer: "A Line in a Diploma"]

[Text] The commander of the ship invited Engineer-Captain 3d Rank A. Kuznetsov to the commanding officer's battle station. The day before, he had been ordered to explain the reason for the breakdown of a mechanism. The allotted time had passed but the report did not follow. The engineer officer arrived in a worried state.

"Well, what happened?"

"A serious malfunction...."

"Who is at fault?"

"I missed it, the watch slipped up."

"I demand that you fix the mechanism at once!"

The engineer officer tried to execute the order which he had received. But he did not have enough knowledge, ability, or engineering know-how.

This is not today's example. But it has not lost its instructiveness. It is remembered on the ship and presented at conferences and lessons of the engineer officers. They learn from it the possible consequences of technical incompetence of a ship's officer.

Today, not one ship and not one department on a ship accomplishes its missions without the active participation of engineers having the appropriate specialization. The need for engineers is caused objectively--equipment is becoming more complex, weapons are being improved, and the content of training missions and duration of cruises are increasing. It is proper that now our higher naval schools are issuing the diploma of military engineer to their graduates.

The line in the diploma concerning the award of the qualification of military engineer to an officer imposes many requirements. It is a unique calling card of a lieutenant which he presents upon arrival on a ship. It works for his authority even when he has done nothing yet for the crew or subunit. He receives the special attention of the commander of the ship who hopes that such an officer will learn the contemporary complex equipment and weapons thoroughly and in a short time. The commander of the ship is correct to count on obtaining an intelligent leader of lessons in his specialty from a young engineer officer. He sees in the young engineer officer a competent operator who will provide the ship with power and the assigned speed under any sailing conditions.

I have the occasion to do much sailing on service duty, to see young ships engineers in fact, and to teach and indoctrinate them. As a rule, they are competent specialists and people who are devoted to the sea and ships service. In my opinion, Engineer-Lieutenant A. Kurkovich is one of them.

Upon completion of the higher naval school, he was appointed commander of the engine group on a large missile ship. It was not necessary to hurry him in assuming his post. He received the authority to control the subunit twice as fast as called for by the documents. But this alone is not enough to justify the entry in the diploma. In the end, the main task of ships engineers is to ensure the reliable operation of equipment under any sailing conditions, to train and indoctrinate his subordinate specialists skillfully, and to be a fervent advocate of a high technical style on the ship.

During a very strained and long voyage, the output parameters of one of the engines began to change unexpectedly. The commander of the engineering department (BCh-5), Engineer-Captain 3d Rank V. Sitnikov, called on Kurkovich (then an engineer-lieutenant) first to disclose the reasons for the malfunction and then to work on its elimination. And right here the young engineer's grasp and his ability to analyze and find the correct technical solution were disclosed. Even then, it became clear that with time Kurkovich would become an outstanding engineer officer. And to be sure, with the passage of a few years of service he received authority to control a department and became a master of military affairs. On the next long cruise the young officer performed the duties of commander of BCh-5 successfully.

Great in the confident professional growth of the officer is the service of his immediate chief and commander of BCh-5, Engineer-Captain 3d Rank V. Sitnikov. But is each of the commanders of subunits able to boast about good specialized training of his subordinates, to include repair training, as can Sitnikov? Unfortunately, no. But why? Who is at fault here?

The department commanders themselves are among the first. Far from all of them are able to utilize the time for the planned repair of ships under shipyard conditions where it is possible to adopt the experience of the professional repairmen. As a rule, in training their subordinates such leaders use only the analyses of standard malfunctions which are compiled by the staffs and recommendations for their elimination under cruise conditions. But this is insufficient. The systematic repair training of ships engineers is necessary.

Much depends here on the work style of the squadron specialists on the ships. It happens that with the appearance of any, at times trivial malfunction the young engineer requests the assistance (to put it simply, come, he says, and do it) of the squadron specialist. And the staff officer visits the ship, and there he begins with what is equipped with a wrench, screw driver, or soldering iron--with what is necessary--and by the sweat of his brown he does what falls within the direct duties of the ship's engineer and his subordinates.

Individual ships commanders have also become accustomed to this: it is more than a guarantee that everything will be done reliably. This work style of some squadron specialists, in particular before long cruises, unfortunately, does not cause the proper censure in the staffs.

On a long cruise from which I returned recently, an officer of the cruise staff, Engineer-Captain 2d Rank A. Aladkin, was invited on board the ship: the engineers had encountered an unforeseen difficulty. One of the compartments in the holds was periodically flooded with water. It was learned on the spot that the ship's engineers didn't even try to find the reasons why water entered the hold. "We don't know what the matter is," was all they could answer. It is said correctly that the ones who don't know have a headache while those who are unable hurt their hands. Engineer-Captain 2d Rank Aladkin found the reason and eliminated the malfunction, that is, he did what the ship's engineers should have done.

Is it surprising that with such an approach toward matters dependent attitudes appear among some ships engineers? They do not add to their store of technical knowledge and do not accumulate experience in repair training.

I should like to turn attention to one more phenomenon. On arriving on a ship, some young officers with an engineering diploma limit the range of their concerns to the operation of the mechanisms and systems and avoid daily indoctrinational work with people. It's as if they are too busy to think of how to develop in the seamen a love for equipment and weapons and punctuality in implementing the requirements of the Navy Regulations. They say that it is the business of the engineer to be occupied with the equipment while the indoctrination of the seamen is the concern of the political officers. Here the ships commanders and party organizations that are called upon to arm the young officers with an integrated approach to the entire matter of training and indoctrinating the seamen have something to think about.

The ships engineer must constantly supplement and expand his knowledge. Meanwhile, some of them quickly forget about the line in the diploma and about their primary purpose--to be the carrier of engineering thought on the ship and the fighter for a high technical style. With such officers, theoretical knowledge often proves to be lower after several years of service than it was upon completion of school. This does not permit them to find correct solutions when, for example, at sea it is necessary to accomplish repair work of increased difficulty, calculate the use of power resources, fuel, material substitutes, and so forth. At times, the change over to the ranks of "pure" practical workers becomes a serious hindrance when the question is raised concerning the advancement of an officer to new ships where complex equipment requires not only practical experience, but also excellent theoretical training. If such an assignment takes place, then the engineer often takes a long time to learn the job or even fails to cope with his new duties.

This is exactly what happened with Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant V. Korobnichenko. Advanced to a post with a promotion, he just could not understand the complex equipment. It was necessary to return him to his former place of service.

At the same time, conditions for the improvement of engineers are to be found on each ship. Its paths are well known. They are the active participation in planned special training, independent study, and rationalizer's search. Many utilize these possibilities completely. They develop and introduce innovations which increase the reliability of equipment operation, reduce expenditures of fuel and electric power, and lengthen the periods between repairs.

The most gifted and industrious engineers of the ship element develop and substantiate new procedures for the employment of weapons and investigate ways to increase the distances of detection and accuracy in destroying targets and the effectiveness in using ships power plants.

Commanders and staffs should work more objectively on the training and indoctrination of engineers. There is a reason for a more exacting approach to the formation of the socialist obligations of officers who have, let us say, the qualification of a 1st-class specialist and confirm it from year to year without special efforts. Squadron specialists and commanders of ships are required to make more active use of the mobilizing capabilities of competition in raising masters of military affairs and engineers of the highest qualification.

The line in the diploma of a ships officer which states that he is a military engineer requires him to work in an inspired manner, creatively, and at full strength on mastering equipment and weapons in the name of the further raising of combat readiness. This is his highest duty and calling.

On a Minesweeper

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Glagolev, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "For Economy and Thrift in Large and Small"]

[Text] The situation on the cruise became more difficult and the minesweeper's return to base was delayed. The ship's commander assembled his assistants to hear their reports about supplies. There was sufficient water and fuel. But there was enough bread remaining for one meal. It was right here that the zealous attitude of the ship's administrative officer, Warrant Officer [michman] I. Protopopov, toward his service was manifested. Anticipating the possibility of a delay at sea, he ordered the preparation of biscuits from the bread which remained after feeding the men, and he did so in a timely manner. Thanks to the warrant officer's thrift, the crew could remain at sea for the required time and accomplish its combat-training missions.

This example is extremely typical of this collective. The following principle has been strongly confirmed on the minesweeper: economize in the small, gain in the large. By the way, it evidently would be more correct to say that in the struggle for thrift there are no trifles at all. Here, everything is essential, and everything has the most direct bearing on the maintenance of the ship's high level of combat readiness.

Warrant Officer N. Samara devised a device which was quite simple. He made special drip pans to collect used oil and fuel. And what an effect the innovation provided! The repeated use of the valuable products became possible after the appropriate purification, order in the holds improved, and the ship's fire safety was increased. What is also valuable is the fact that Samara made and introduced the improvement without any "promptings from above," on his own initiative.

There are many such useful initiatives in the collective. And all because the ship's commander, communists, and Komsomol activists are objectively engaged in the organization of the competition for economy and thrift and they are attaining an increase in the return from its indoctrinational effect.

At one time, things were not getting on well with the engine personnel. They planned high goals in the struggle for economy, but they did not go beyond this. Fuel not only was not saved, but it was even overexpended.

It cannot be said that the people displayed negligence and squandered it. The causes were to be found in something else: sometimes the engineers permit the diesel to overheat just a little, sometimes they permit a small leakage of oil, and sometimes they even permitted some "minor" violation of the engine's operating conditions, and the "minutia" turned into many kilograms of unjustified losses.

This occurred because in the engineer department obligations were assumed in the struggle for thrift only for the long term, but the contribution each seaman was to make to their accomplishment at his battle station, not over the course of a year but today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, was not clear.

The situation changed when a chart of the competition for economy between engineer shifts appeared in the crew's compartment and when the commander of the department, Engineer-Lieutenant V. Ivanov, began to enter data from each watch on it. Of course, the bustle at it increased. It was necessary to calculate how much fuel was expended and with which speed of the ship by one or another machine, how much is obtained per mile on the average.... But such arithmetic immediately began to provide a substantial return. Those who formerly listened to the commander's demands with a sceptical smile and who thought whether, they say, it is worthwhile to talk about so many grams of fuel are now participating most actively in the movement of the thrifty.

Thus, on the eve of the last departure for sea, the engineers headed by the commander of the engine room, 1st Class Petty Officer S. Zemlyanykh, carefully adjusted all control and measuring equipment and placed additional sealing on the pipes. This contributed to a reduction in the unproductive consumption of fuel.

Of course, the struggle for economy and thrift presumes not only well-organized accounting but also increased demandingness toward each serviceman. In order to learn to economize in things large and small, one should be exacting in both large and small things. Toward oneself, toward comrades, and toward subordinates.

One day, the following incident occurred on the minesweeper. The damage control party showed up well at a routine drill. The seamen accomplished all norms successfully. Imagine their amazement when the saw that they had received a low grade on the competition chart.

The leader of the drills proceeded in this manner because after completing the training the damage-control tools were not put in the authorized places. This could lead to their damage.

One of the seamen considered such demandingness captious. Then it was decided to speak about this case at party and Komsomol meetings. The discussions turned out to be pointed and based on principle. In the course of them the men came to a single opinion: the higher the demandingness in grading the results of the competition, the better.

The following rule was firmly established among the crew: no matter how well a seaman responds on lessons, he will not receive a high grade if he has a slipshod attitude toward wearing the uniform, and however high the training ability of one section or another may be, it will not become outstanding if the post is in disorder and the equipment is carelessly maintained.

This is the law. The law thanks to which the minesweeper's crew firmly holds first place in the unit in the competition for economy and thrift and marches among the leaders toward the completion of the training year.

On the 'Minsk'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Savichev: "The Coordinates of Authority"]

> [Text] This ship is striking not only by its dimensions and the power of its mechanisms and weapons, but also by its external contour and architecture. It is not by chance that during cruises on open oceans foreign warships which are encountered going in the opposite direction report: "Your ship is beautiful."
>
> Yes, the antisubmarine cruiser "Minsk" is beautiful. Beautiful not only externally, but also in its interior appearance. The wardrooms, messes, cabins, and crew's accomodations are finished with taste. Decorative lattices, panels, and hundreds of canvases of famous Soviet artists seem to crown the perfection of the equipment with the perfection of high art.
>
> The cruiser embodies the latest achievements in the field of Soviet ship- and aircraft-building. Yes, aircraft-building too, because the "Minsk" is able to carry jet aircraft. And its crew consists of not only seamen, but also pilots.
>
> And the commander of the cruiser commands both. This sketch is also devoted to him.

Squall

Nothing predicted bad weather. True, as often happens in the tropics, giant flashes of summer lightning flashed every now and then all around in the impenetrable, inky darkness. And then the clouds and outlines of the near shore were visible for an instant. The sight was impressive. And no one assumed that after a while genuine confusion would begin.

The cruiser stood in open roads, firmly gripping the bottom with the powerful blades of its anchor. Its massive hull, gleaming lacquer-like in the deck illumination, seemed to be as steadfast as a rock. But suddenly a wind of terrible force struck the starboard. The ship listed sharply. At the same instant lightning flashed. Not over there, somewhere at a distance, but quite near, gliding along the superstructure and the deck.

The downpour came in torrents. Streams of water conclusively covered everything around. The summoning sound of the bells of the loud battle could not be heard on the upper deck. Here it whistled, echoed, and splashed. But it was clear to the seamen: at such moments the place of each crew member is at his battle station.

Reports were already arriving at the navigation bridge. Bulbs of the intercoms flashed as they demanded attention, and bells tinkled as they called the officer of the watch for communications. And he, deafened by the roar of furious elements, rushed from one handset to another in a confused manner, lost himself in shouting, and at times issued contradictory orders. Such a skirmish with the ocean was the first in his life. A one-on-one skirmish. The watch officer's nervousness was also transmitted to others. This is why the atmosphere on the bridge was far from calm. But suddenly, it somehow changed elusively. The lack of confidence was replaced by confidence, and anxiety--by calm: the voice of the cruiser's commander, Captain 1st Rank Viktor Aleksandrovich Gokinayev, rang out on the bridge.

"Navigator, follow our position," he issued his first order. And then he switched over to communication with another station. "How's the anchor cable, boatswain?"

"Anchor cable is taught. It points to the starboard."

And the wind rushed at the ship ever more furiously, ever more violently. It no longer whistled in the superstructure but growled, choking with the downpour. The weather forecasters continuously reported its force and direction. They changed. And this was worst of all because the commander could not say with confidence how events would develop. But nevertheless, he was required to anticipate their development.

"Boatswain, pay out the cable."

Giving this order, Gokinayev immediately called the power and damage control central to the intercom and he ordered the commander of the engineering department, Engineer-Captain 2d Rank Aleksey Nikolayevich Gorovtsov:

"Put the main engines into operation as soon as possible."

"Aye, aye, comrade commander."

A report from the navigator: position is changing. The ship is drifting toward the shore.

There is nothing more unpleasant than this report. It meant that the anchor was no longer holding and the cruiser was being carried to the shore by the wind. Thoughts flashed across the commander's mind like lightning: "What to do? Cast the second anchor? But the wind is constantly changing direction. It seems to be screwed into the ocean. And the ship is turning. No, it is better to wait a while before casting the second anchor."

Weighing all the pro's and con's and calculating the speed with which the ship was drifting, Gokinayev said to himself: "The main thing is not to hurry. There is still time to adopt the necessary measures."

"Boatswain, pay out the anchor cable more energetically."

He based his entire estimate on the preparedness of the personnel in the engineering department. Will they be able to put the engines into operation in the shortest possible time?

As always, the engineers did not let him down. Soon Gorovtsov reported: "Ready to get under way." The commander glanced at his watch. The standard was considerably exceeded.

"Good," he answered and immediately gave the order to get under way. The drifting stopped. The squall was broken.

Later, when everything had ended, when the wind was calm and the stars were shining, Gokinayev said as he addressed the crew:

"Today you proved that you are excellent seamen. Thank you!"

No one gave him a grade, but nevertheless the commander of the cruiser showed himself to be the most competent seaman on that stormy night.

A Duel

Naval seamen call such a battle a meeting engagement. The ships, separated by a considerable expanse of sea, were moving toward one another. The equipment for the detection and for processing data of all types was already working at full capacity and the ships, feeling for each other with electron beams, were preparing to launch mutual strikes.

The skill in conducting such an engagement also consists exactly in launching these strikes in good time and at the "enemy's" most vulnerable point.

On board the cruiser "Minsk" was an energetic admiral, a person with a sharp mind who is sometimes inclined toward sarcasm. During preceding cruises, while observing Gokinayev's actions, he suddenly exclaimed one day:

"Most sincere thanks to you!"

"From whom, comrade admiral?" Viktor Aleksandrovich was surprised.

"From the enemy," the answer followed. "For clumsy actions."

Descending from the bridge, Gokinayev analyzed his decisions thoroughly and was convinced that they really were not the best.

And here is a new exercise. The commander of the cruiser "Minsk" prepared for it with special thoroughness. He also considered all the remarks and advice which the admiral had given him on the preceding exercise. And this advice was worth remembering. "The primary task of the commander of any ship," taught the admiral, "is always to be focused in on events which are taking place on the ship and off it. The commander is required to meditate, but he must also act, act, and act. As regards the watch officers, neither should they lag behind events. It is their sacred duty to 'obtain' the situation and make their suggestions actively."

On the day when the meeting engagement entered its decisive phase, the watch officers of the "Minsk" operated extremely actively. The other officers also displayed the same activity. The navigator approached Gokinayev:

"Comrade commander, I think we are in an area which is especially dangerous."

Requesting hydrological data on the area, Gokinayev bent over the map: yes, the depth, and the hydrology, and the time of day and weather--everything indicates that it is here that submarines may undertake attacks. Right then, he approached the admiral:

"I recommend sending up helicopters."

It seems to be simple--give the command to the helicopters to take off, and they will execute it at once. But you see, it was necessary to perform important work prior to this; Gokinayev himself had to study the aviation which was entrusted to him and be imbued with the sense that the aviation on the cruiser is not a "side horse" and not an appendage, but a powerful weapon.

When the helicopters, jumping off the flight deck like ping-pong balls from a table, disappeared in the distance, Viktor Aleksandrovich began to await results not without excitement. And it should be said that this time the helicopter men of the "Minsk" functioned clearly: "enemy" submarines were discovered in good time and destroyed.

But a great number of other problems were to be solved: how to avoid an "enemy" surface strike and how to attack him successfully ourselves? With what weapons? Aviation, torpedoes, missiles?

In the solution of these problems, an exceptionally large role is played by the ship commander's conviction which is based on a deep knowledge of combat weapons and on a competent analysis of the situation. The "Minsk" launched missiles and then launched jet aviation which inflicted the final blow.

Style

The agenda for the party session was important. The report was given by member of the party committee and commander of the cruiser "Minsk," Captain 1st Rank Gokinayev. The indoctrination of young officers was discussed.

The report was dynamic and saturated with examples, facts, and comparisons which, it seemed, exhaustively illuminated the subject. But nevertheless, when Gokinayev had finished the representative of the senior political organ who was present at the session asked:

"Here you said that the work style of commanders and political officers in the course of indoctrinating young officers should be active. How should this be understood?"

Viktor Aleksandrovich glanced at those present. He met the glance of Captain-Lieutenant Yuriy Milent'yevich Polyakov, navigator of the cruiser. He thought to himself: "Maybe I can tell about Polyakov, about how his development proceeded."

The commander remembers well the navigator's first steps on the ship. One was struck by his business-like efficiency and the seriousness of his approach to the solution of problems. It was just these qualities of Polyakov which suggested a bold idea to Gokinayev: and why not train the young officer for independent handling of the cruiser?

The squadron specialist waved his hands amicably:

"A captain-lieutenant to handle such a colossus as the 'Minsk' independently?!"

But the commander of the ship did not retreat from his idea. He decided to train the navigator personally. He reasoned as follows: "Examinations will change the minds of the sceptics."

But what does it mean to pass the examinations for the independent handling of a cruiser? It is even difficult to imagine it. The fact that this ship is tremendous, that it is really a colossus, and that it is therefore difficult to control it is one side of the matter. The other is that it is saturated with the most modern equipment. Moreover, it is intended to carry aircraft. The commander controlling the ship independently must know all of this and must understand everything correctly. It is his duty not only to steer the ship over the boundless ocean expanses, in so doing overcoming bad weather, but also to be the main authority on the ship in the matter of using any weapons and operating the equipment.

Polyakov began to prepare for the examinations, but not without some doubts.

Gokinayev did not spare his time when it was necessary to help the young officer to understand one question or another.

After a time, the commander of the cruiser turned to the command with the official request to give Polyakov the examinations.

"And you are stubborn," said one of the squadron specialists, and Gokinayev understood that Polyakov would not have an easy time.

By the way, the skepticism of some of the officers began to dissipate as Polyakov passed one examination after another: five, five, five....

And the admiral himself gave the examination in the practical handling of the ship. And he remained very satisfied with Polyakov. And later, by now in an official order, it was stated that he was permitted to take independent control of a cruiser.

Viktor Aleksandrovich Gokinayev glanced once again at all those present at the party committee. No, he did not begin to tell the story of Polyakov, for in his practice of indoctrinational work with young officers there are many such stories. But he answered the question as follows:

"An active style, in my opinion, is a creative approach to indoctrination. One must trust the young officers more and place them more boldly in those situations where they can display themselves more completely."

Submarine Officer Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank D. Chumak: "Fifth Attack"]

[Text] The sea was storming. Captain 2d Rank A. Chadovich stood in the submarine's fairwater and awaited permission to dive. Distant stars twinkled over his head, and waves rumbled violently against the ship's side. The deserted night sea was disturbed from time to time by the flashes of the searchlights of ships which were passing on the horizon. The commander accompanied them with an indifferent glance and again lived with the expectation of working in the depths.

He selected the initial point for diving himself--as far as possible from the pulses of the all-seeing and all-hearing "enemy" locators. In essence, it was also the initial point of his concept for the forthcoming training battle: to keep from being detected prior to the start of the search of the group of landing ships, and then--noiselessly, at low speed, to break through the line of antisubmarine defense undetected; with the precise classification of the contact, to attack the "enemy" at maximum possible speed.

"That's how Ponomarev proceeds, and he is lucky each time,"thought Chadovich as if convincing himself that he is proceeding correctly.

It is not by chance that Chadovich recalled Captain 2d Class A. Ponomarev, his fellow-serviceman, at these tense minutes before the search and attack. Ponomarev is a master of the torpedo strike. Without copying him blindly, Chadovich adopted the best from his colleague's practice on critiques of exercises, lessons, and drills. He did it with partiality and with great interest. There were ponderous reasons for this.

In the submarine force, they reflected for a long time on how to organize paired competition between ship commanders more effectively. Its old forms were no longer useful and it proved difficult to find new ones. The staff and political section conducted a commanders conference. The suggestion was received to compete for the title, "Commander--master of torpedo strikes." Criteria which the claimant for the title of master must meet were worked out. Their basis was the level of the commander's tactical training, the quality and number of drills of the ship's combat sections, and the quality of accomplishment of combat exercises.

The flagship's combat section became a unique base of leading experience. Lessons and drills were conducted here by staff officers Captains 2d Rank L. Kirsanov and V. Snopikov, experienced ship commanders.

Young commanders are now permitted to accomplish torpedo firing at a real target only after the accomplishment of a certain number of training attacks in the torpedo firing trainer room with excellent grades. As a result, the intensity and effectiveness of training of the submariners on shore increased sharply and the quality of training of commanders for the accomplishment of combat exercises at sea was raised.

Captain 2d Class A. Ponomarev--the commander of an excellent submarine and participant in many long cruises--was declared the first master of torpedo strikes in the force. Ponomarev was honored ceremoniously. The political section generalized his experience. Pomomarev's photograph and a photo of the seamen from the combat section were placed in a special display which reflects the course of the commanders' competition.

Captain 2d Rank A. Chadovich was sincerely happy with the success of his comrade, really envied him, and in the inmost recesses of his heart he already nurtured the thought of also deserving the right to be called master of torpedo strikes. But this proved to be beyond his capabilities in the last training year. The ship's combat section was renewed. The mine-torpedo subunit was headed by a young officer, Lieutenant A. Lozovoy. Some sonarmen did not have enough experience, either. Chadovich felt this very acutely during a torpedo attack at the finish of the training year--then the crew lost its previously won positions.

The failure served as a good lesson. For this training year, Captain 2d Rank Chadovich assumed high personal obligations including--to become master of torpedo strikes and lead the submarine out among the excellent. In the summer training period, his crew accomplished four torpedo firings for record and all tactical and other missions only with high grades. And now the next fifth attack was to take place, the "prestige" attack, as it was defined in the headquarters: from the results of the attack, in accordance with the provisions for the competition of commanders Chadovich could become master of torpedo strikes.

"Granted" for diving was received at about midnight. The submarine set its course to close with the "enemy." Captain 2d Rank Chadovich summoned to the central station the officers on whom the success of the attack depended to a tremendous degree--the chief of the radio service, Senior Lieutenant V. Zabela, and the mine officer, Lieutenant A. Lozovoy. The officers reported laconically on the readiness of the sections and equipment for the search and attack of the "enemy."

Chadovich thought with satisfaction of how Lieutenant Lozovoy had grown during his year in the post of commander of Department 3. Standing before him now was a submariner who had been tested by cruises, a leading watch officer and rated specialist. Interchangeability had been completely worked out in all combat sections of the department and the basic and alternate methods of firing had been mastered. Using the example of Lieutenant Lozovoy, the commander was convinced again how much the competition of the officers provides when it is organized specifically and efficiently.

Prior to the establishment of contact with the landing ships, Captain 2d Rank Chadich was occupied with a preliminary analysis of the situation in the area of the forthcoming battle and a forecast of its possible changes. At this time, his senior assistant handled the ship.

At this time, Senior Lieutenant Zabela again came to the commander. From the reports of the sonarmen, Captain 2d Rank Chadovich already knew that the first contact with the "enemy" had been established and, much as he regretted it, thought that the young officer had come to brag about this success of his subordinates. However, Zabela did not come for this. He held a sheet with the surface situation plotted on it.

After last year's failure, Senior Lieutenant V. Zabela together with Warrant Officer [michman] V. Pluzhnikov philosophized for a long time on the creation of a screen of the surface situation. And they created it. Now, the sonarmen ceased to be passive "listeners" to the voices of the underwater depth. Each of them strived to think tactically and to have a visual perception of what is occurring there, above, where the "enemy" is maneuvering.

The screen of the situation helps this in a fair way. Zabela now came with it to the central station in order to express his assumption concerning the possible location of the main target.

Later, in reflecting on this seemingly insignificant fact, Chadovich noted behind it something greater than simply exceptional initiative. In the course of competition the officers grow morally, and each one worries not only for the success of his subunit, but also for the matters of the entire ship. Both the crew's combat coordination and its moral solidarity become stronger. And this, perhaps, is the main source of all preceding outstanding attacks. And now, having heard Zabela, the commander noted laconically that his suggestions are "very much to the point."

Having complete and reliable data on the surface situation, Captain 2d Rank Chadovich was able to exploit what seemed to him to be the protracted maneuver of the "enemy" ships on the next tack and guided the submarine through the antisubmarine line unnoticed.

If Chadovich, who now was more than completely occupied, could have glanced at himself from the side and compared himself with the commander who, at the end of the last year, just could not completely understand the surface situation as he went into the attack, then except for the outward similarity he would not be able to discover any other similarity. Now, the commander was well grounded in his analysis of changes in the formation of "enemy" ships, and he took as the basis of his concept not only the reports of the sonarmen but also all other information which formerly was considered unessential. He involved the entire combat section in the working out of the optimum decision, noting with satisfaction that the majority of the officers who make it up think unusually and creatively.

They attacked from the depth at midnight. After the accurate destruction of the main target, the submariners launched several strikes at the escort ships. Each of them was marked by high skill. A staff officer who was on board the submarine came to this opinion. But Captain 2d Rank Chadovich waited with excitement to see how this engagement would be evaluated by the commander in chief of the Navy, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov.

The commander in chief evaluated the fifth attack as creative and extremely instructive from the standpoint of a night engagement of a single submarine with a group of surface ships superior in armament and he awarded the commander inscribed naval binoculars.

...Returning from headquarters where he was congratulated with the title of master of torpedo strikes and with winning the competition of commanders, Captain 2d Rank Chadovich stole a glance at a display. His portrait had now been placed in the spot where the photograph of Captain 2d Class Ponomarev had hung quite recently. And alongside, a group photo of the ship's combat section.

Escort Ship 'Razitel'nyy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Balashov, commander of escort ship "Razitel'nyy," Red Banner Black Sea Fleet: "The Crew--A Combat Family"]

[Text] Seeing that the work clothing and boots of Seaman Viktor Boyko were soiled with mazut, Petty Officer 1st Class Viktor Dedushchenko did not try to find out why the seaman had such an appearance and the source of the mazut which suddenly appeared in the hold. He undertook to "educate" the seaman with a rush, sometimes employing expressions here which a person who respects himself and other people would never begin to use.

The commander of the engineer department, Engineer-Captain Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy, who dropped into the hold, calmed Dedushchenko. Well, he calmed him but did not report to me what had happened.

In general, even earlier at times I formed the impression that as yet not everything is in order on the ship in regard to the interrelationships between seamen, but neither I nor my former deputy for political affairs, Captain 3d Rank V. Balibardin (he is now a student at the military-political academy) had exact facts available. Therefore, we were not specific when engaged in rallying the collective on the ship and individual work with people was conducted poorly.

Later, it was learned that the violators of order as prescribed by the regulations sometimes were concealed not only by Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy, but also by other subunit commanders and crew chiefs. But certainly! For behind each instance of discipline violations and non-military mutual relations stood their own omissions in indoctrinational work with the seamen. At times, their false notion concerning the honor of the serviceman pushed them toward bargaining with their conscience.

The incident described above forced us to be occupied with questions of interrelations between the ship's crew members in real earnest and in a different manner. Many shortcomings were discovered, and most of all--in officer M. Verpakhovskiy's department. Here, the subunit commanders virtually never talked with the newcomers who had arrived on the ship, and the officers did not know who was called up and from where, in what family he was brought up and what inclinations and enthusiasms he has. Even after the lapse of two weeks from the newcomers' arrival on the ship the commanders, it turned out, still did not know their names. Moreover, in considerable measure many officers transferred the task of training and indoctrination work with the youth to the petty officers, among whom there were people who do not possess either sufficient methodological skill nor pedagogical tact and who were nominated for such duties at one time but hardly in accordance with the single principle: a good specialist.

All these errors and omissions in indoctrinational work with people became a subject of a serious and detailed conversation at party and Komsomol meetings on the ship and at conferences of officers, warrant officers [michman], petty officers, and seamen in the last year of service. I reported on the status of indoctrinational work, on my personal omissions, and about shortcomings in the work of the ship's officers in rallying the collective to the political section and turned to the unit commander with the request to deprive V. Dedushchenko of his petty officer rank, while the Komsomol committee gave him a severe reprimand.

Yes, I'll honestly say that this was a difficult time for all of us. Of course, I may be asked: and where were you earlier, why were you occupied with questions of rallying the collective in real earnest only now? The question is completely reasonable. I can answer it in only one way: our collective had still hardly begun to be formed and the people--seamen as well as officers--had barely become acquainted, and so to say, there was taking place a polishing of characters and habits and the strengthening of such qualities as are needed for the successful accomplishment of missions on difficult sea cruises.

Now, when much time has passed since those days, I firmly know: if you want the collective to be a single, harmonious, combat-effective family you should begin with rallying the officers, with the creation of an atmosphere of amicability, confidentiality, frankness, mutual respect, and mutual demandingness among the officers. Unfortunately, at that time, at the very beginning we had little of this. Here is an example. Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy and Engineer-Lieutenant A. Yegorov, as they say, did not get along. The young officer committed an error, and the more experienced one was not able to behave tolerantly and tactfully and help the person find his place in the collective. And it is a well-known thing that under such conditions the indoctrination of subordinates also suffers. But the collective was molded all the same.

We also accomplished this task--the rallying of the collective--with the entire collective, making full use of the capabilities and authority of the ship's party and Komsomol organizations. We tried to see that each officer, warrant officer, and petty officer not only knew the principles of pedagogy and psychology, but also was able to employ his knowledge in a specific situation. It would appear that we didn't even overlook insignificant deviations from the requirements of the regulation--whether on the part of the officer, warrant officer, or seaman, and much attention was devoted to setting up the organization of service on the ship. All this and much more provided their results.

Today, I again look at these people: its as if they had not changed but, nevertheless, they have become quite different. Here is Engineer-Lieutenant A. Yegorov. He received permission to handle a group and mastered the duties of watch engineering officer. The young officer has already accumulated experience in working with people and become an intelligent organizer of the training process and socialist competition in the subunit. Why, this is a great success. And rightfully sharing it with Yegorov is Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy, thanks to whose interested and benevolent attitude the young officer became as we know him now.

Here is Petty Officer 1st Class V. Dedushchenko. Yes, yes, petty officer, I did not make a slip in speaking. Dedushchenko was restored to his former duty and rank. It is difficult to say when this person began to change. Perhaps, after a long talk with him by the commander--officer Verpakhovskiy? Or after Dedushchenko apologized to Seaman Boyko? Or.... By the way, the turning point probably began because work with this person was conducted constantly and pointedly.

I cannot fail to tell about one more thing which tells graphically of the status of work in rallying a military collective: the subunit commanded by Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant M. Verpakhovskiy is now excellent and the best in the force.

Yes, the people whom we bring up change noticeably. But you see, this process is, so to say, two-sided: we also change. Officer Verpakhovskiy now began to work with each person, got to know his subordinates closely, and managed to present himself in such a way that people come to him for advice and assistance at a difficult moment. And really, how can one not go to a person who, by his own example, shows up as an example in the accomplishment of military duty and his obligations. I recall that on one of the long cruises when a malfunction occurred and it was even difficult to think that it could be eliminated under gale conditions, M. Verpakhovskiy carried people along behind him on this difficult matter. He did not leave the hold until everything had been put in order. The seamen then were sincerely delighted by the endurance, coolness, knowledge, and persistence of their commander. And once again, it is not surprising: another time Engineer-Lieutenant A. Yegorov showed up in the same way under difficult conditions.

I cannot fail to mention a tradition which has already been formed on the ship--to have a tactful, attentive, and concerned attitude toward one another and to be mutually demanding and exacting. And this, in my view, is extremely important. I thought a great deal about the reasons by which nonmilitary relations between seamen arise once in a while. It seems that I know one of them completely accurately: it is the crudeness and tactlessness of seniors. Look here: an officer treated a warrant officer coarsely in a fit of temper. The latter offended a petty officer, and the petty officer--a seaman. The echo of ill breeding does not roll on with decreasing force but, on the contrary, with increasing force.

At the time of our collective's establishment, we conducted a decisive struggle against crudeness and we made the officers responsible first of all for its manifestation just as strictly as for omissions in combat training and socialist competition, of course. Of course, we are not ceasing this work even now: the lesson which the entire crew received was not lost on it.

The last long cruise was a test for the crew, not only of its combat maturity, but also of solidarity and psychological steadfastness. No one made a mistake. The people were united by the unity of the goal: to accomplish all missions successfully. The goal was attained. I think that we are also coping with the other missions. Because today we are one harmonious combat family which lives according to a lofty principle: one for all and all for one.

6367
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GUARD SERVICE: IMPORTANCE STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Col A. Khorev and Lt Col V. Filatov: "Notes by a Military Writer: The Sentry is an Inviolable Person"]

[Excerpts] There are moments in a soldier's life which mean especially much for the shaping of a fighting man's character and for instilling the high moral-combat qualities needed by a person called upon to defend the honor, freedom and independence of the Motherland with weapon in hand. Performance of guard service is one such moment. The USSR Armed Forces Garrison and Guard Services Regulation approved by Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet equates guard service juridically to the performance of a combat mission.

The Regulation prohibits the assignment to guard duty of service personnel who have not taken the military oath, who have not mastered the young soldier's training program, or who are sick... This is logical and natural. Performance of a combat mission is assigned only to those who are capable and ready for combat and who see themselves as citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who have joined the ranks of the Armed Forces and who have solemnly sworn to defend the Motherland courageously, capably, and with dignity and honor, without sparing their blood or life itself.

Defense of the Motherland is a vast concept full of meaning. For the sentry to perform the combat mission of guarding and defending an assigned object is the protection of the socialist homeland and of its state interests and security. This is why the exploits of sentries are honored just as highly and sacredly as those of the frontlinesmen. That is why the imperious word--Sentry--has a proud ring and radiates a romantic aura. And probably every person who has been appointed to guard duty at least once in his life also remembers, on hearing this word, the popular regulation formula: A sentry is an inviolable person.

For this formula contains all the special, specific features of a sentry's legal status. His inviolability, rights, personal dignity and unhindered performance of his duties are secured by law. He is subordinate only to strictly defined persons--the guard commander, his assistant, and the corporal of the guard. Everyone except for persons to whom the sentry is subordinate are obligated to follow implicitly his demands as defined by the service for guarding the assigned post. A sentry must guard his post vigilantly. Even when there is the threat of death, he does not have the right to abandon it until he is relieved or removed under procedures established by the Regulation. The right given a sentry to employ arms in instances spelled out in the Regulation is of special importance.

These are the specifics. They are what define and give rise to the special meaning of guard service for shaping the soldier. As we know, people are not born soldiers, they develop into them. They do not, of course, develop all at once, overnight. They mature, come to manhood, and develop day by day, month by month. And just as people become convinced of an ability to swim only by being in the water, so they establish themselves in the calling of soldier by testing themselves in the performance of guard service, by being in the position of a sentry, and becoming convinced that their difficult obligations are within their ability, the extraordinary rights are reasonable, and the high responsibility is within their power. People do not undergo such a test in an impromptu manner. The personnel have to be prepared very carefully for it. In the units where this is well understood and capably done, it is not only the guard service which goes smoothly. The entire process of political and military indoctrination is better there. The role of our Armed Forces as a remarkable school of labor and military schooling, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship is accomplished more fully there.

For example, that is just how matters are arranged in a majority of units of the Belorussian Military District. Guard training is carried out here in strict conformity with requirements of the Regulation. Commanders personnally handle the selection of guard personnel. Classes are held in a practical manner, with consideration of the peculiarities of guarding each object, at areas specially outfitted for this purpose. Political entities and the party and Komsomol organizations see that party and Komsomol members set a personal example in the performance of guard service. They do a great deal to popularize those who distinguish themselves, and they generalize and propagandize the experience of the best commanders and staffs. The entire atmosphere of guard training and the ritual of posting and relieving the guard--everything attunes the soldier for a responsible attitude toward service and for performing it vigilantly and precisely. Soldiers perceive assignment to the guard as a great honor and trust. They affirm their right to this by faultless conduct, by an irreproachable knowledge of the provisions of regulations, by capable mastery of weapons, and by coolness and self-control in difficult situations.

Regulations are written by those who themselves have experienced all the burdens of service and who have understood from their own experience all its fine points and all its secrets. There is no subtext in the Regulation's articles. It cannot be interpreted this way and that way--only as it is written! There is no gap here between word and spirit. There are no recommendations here which may or may not be carried out. Here there is only the law.

A display of excessive credulity even in everyday life is not a praiseworthy quality. The credulity of a person at a post is a crime.

There are different kinds of malefactors and each one who heads for an object guarded by a sentry has his own goal and his own tactics. The sentry can counter these different malefactors only in one way--by acting strictly by the Regulation and as the Regulation commands: competently, decisively and fearlessly.

We have spoken with soldiers who have occasion to perform guard service regularly. When the talk turned to what might be of special interest for a malefactor attempting to penetrate a post, they mentioned aircraft, if they themselves had guarded an aircraft hardstand; they mentioned tanks if they had guarded tanks; and they mentioned missiles if they had guarded them. But only one out of ten mentioned, for example, the submachinegun--the weapon with which the sentry stood his post.

Yes, malefactors vary. Some sneak up to a military installation because they have a spy mission. Others penetrate the same installation with a completely different purpose: They don't need a tank, a gun or a military secret. They need the weapon of the sentry himself--the submachinegun. Because they simply are highway bandits and need the submachinegun for robbing.

In order to get a sentry's weapon, a malefactor has to close with the sentry without fail and come into contact with him without fail, if only for a very brief time. And here the criminal's chief trump is his reliance on the sentry's credulity, on his negligence, and on a dulling of his vigilance.

It has happened at all times where sentries have perished because of their negligence, because of incompetent, indecisive actions during an attack on the post, and because of confusion and an inability to use the weapon correctly and opportunely. There have been instances where they also perished because of cowardice. The sentries themselves are at fault here, of course. One must prepare for performing a combat mission just as if it were a combat mission--without any allowances or conditionalities. The fact is we really are speaking about life and death, and not about a stroll arm in arm with the submachinegun. But much blame for all deficiencies in the performance of guard service lies with commanders and staffs who are responsible for training the guards.

Some of them unfortunately relax attention to matters of organizing guard service. They do not always view it as performance of a combat mission and do not present the proper exactingness toward preparing guard personnel. The "small" sentry with a submachinegun at times seems to be lost among the hulking missiles and nuclear-powered vessels, among the supersonic and all-weather fighter-interceptors, and among various intelligent complexes and automated systems. Some soldiers are trained to master electronics, automatics and telemechanics. They are on speaking terms with electronic computers. But they do not know, nor are they capable of this age-old soldier job of knowing how to act practically during an attack on a sentry or on the installation he is guarding.

Formalism is intolerable in any matter. It is mortally intolerable in the matter of organizing guard service and in preparing sentries for performing a combat mission.

6904
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CRITICISM: REPORT AND ACTION DISCREPANCIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Sep 79 p 4

[Satirical article by Lt Col Justice I. Vashkevich: "Behind the Cloak of Reports"]

[Text] Thoughts and decisions, pledges and plans--what good ones we have! And we would so much like to see all of them implemented and embodied, fulfilled and overfulfilled as quickly as possible. What wouldn't one do to bring nearer the day when one can report through channels about a remarkable achievement of one's entrusted collective. And it seems that the congratulations and applause already can be heard...

Then you open your eyes and on the desk is a complaint about deficiences in a subordinate establishment, subunit or institution... Some petitioner whom no one knows is spoiling such a dream and such a song!

Not long ago a letter came to the editors from a training support subunit of the Chelyabinsk Higher Military Navigators School about serious shortcomings in the organization of messing for subunit personnel. The editors sent it to the staff of aviation of the Ural Military District. Then came the answer: The shortcomings had been eliminated, the cooks replaced, guilty parties admonished. The petitioner's pun... Oh, reader, you so long for an evil rhyme! But usually prose is written in official answers. "A discussion was held with the personnel who addressed the newspaper," Lt Gen Avn V. Gorbachev informed the editors.

The word for which the rhyme was lacking was pronounced by those with whom the "confidential discussion" was held. In their next letter to the editors privates first class Yefimov and Tkach stated that it reduced to telling the people "not to write any more such letters." "But we believe," continued the authors of the letter, "that there are no limitations in our regulations, nor can there be, for military personnel to turn to their newspaper, and references, for example, to certain provisions of the Code of Disciplinary Punishment are inappropriate here."

But I believe it would be hasty to rebuke the author of the response to the editors for not clarifying with members of the commission for checking the complaint, headed by Col S. Yermakov, the nature of their discussion with the petitioners. Subordinates have to be trusted. But the district aviation staff probably could have taken a more exacting attitude toward the commission's work. Otherwise it might happen that shortcomings which have been eliminated for the present will reappear tomorrow, were one to look.

In short, one must trust, but also check, for without proper supervision over the execution of decisions which are made, heaven only knows what revisions might be made. For example, to a situation such as occurred in Garrison "X" of the Moscow Air Defense District, where sick people had to walk several kilometers, and all through the forest, to obtain a sick slip.

...The circumstances because of which the medical station of Unit "X" would not be able to receive members of servicemen's families soon became known to the appropriate commanders, the political entity and military medical personnel in good time. The responsible comrades should have assembled and decided what to do, but there was no time for assembling. And from the moment the doors of the unit medical station closed to the wives and children of officers and warrant officers, complaints went to various echelons.

The echelons intervened. They could not expand the existing medical station, and so the question of organizing, as an exception, an emergency medical aid station of the local health department at the remote garrison was raised at the next session of the local soviet of people's deputies. There was essentially no discussion on this matter at the session: The people's elected representatives unanimously decreed that there be such a station with the right of issuing sick slips for up to three days. It would appear that the officials now had to make up for lost time and implement the soviet's decision as quickly as possible. But this did not happen. And five months after the March session, the members of servicemen's families still were walking from the military post over familiar paths for the sick slips.

On the other hand, there was no lack of triumphant reports. In response to the editors' query, Lt Col A. Kokosha heartily reported the opening of the medical station, and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA informed the readers about this. Maj Med Serv A. Volkov informed his superiors about the same. Col Med Serv L. Dernin, acting chief of the military medical department of Moscow Air Defense District, was absolutely sure that the matter really had been corrected right up until the phone call from the editors, when it became known that the triumphant reports had outstripped the course of affairs considerably. After promising to recheck the fulfillment of his instructions, Leonid Afanas'yevich meanwhile deemed it necessary to remark that the servicemen's wives from the remote garrison in general were complaining... in vain (?!)

"There is a most excellent hospital there," said Leonid Afanas'yevich. "A bus runs eight times. And it is only 4½ km from the military post! I measured it myself from the speedometer..."

Well, what could be said? That eight buses is one every two or three hours? That 4½ km on the speedometer is not equivalent to the same distance measured from the pedometer? And with a sick child in one's arms at that. Aren't the sources of the unprecedented red tape with the opening of a medical station at the post in such indifference of some comrades to the needs of people? Doesn't such indifference of the officials to the end results of their work reflect a similar approach to that very job which they are called upon to perform?

For it is only one step to direct eyewash from the desire to see everything in rosy colors, to avoid sharp corners and not to consider the actual state of affairs.

The present year was marked by a serious lag in implementing planning quotas for many tailor shops of the Moscow Garrison. Signals are coming to the editors about an excessive delay in deadlines for filling orders for making uniform jackets, trousers and overcoats. Clothing for one officer was being made in one shop from December 1977 through June of this year! What can be said here about coping with the plan?! But if one looks at the accounting documents, the picture is not so depressing. Everything normal! Everything in accordance "with the plan"! Everyone is getting bonuses! The slogan of the All-Army Competition in Military Trade, "Work without Laggards!" is being implemented successfully!

The explanation is quite simple. There are people in the capital garrison who are working. For example, the collective of the Moscow Experimental Military Uniform Store is fulfilling and overfulfilling the quotas. As a rule, they sew uniforms quickly here and turn them over to the customers at the first request. Honor and praise to such people! Praise and... regular increments to the plan established at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan, the year and the quarter. This year alone the quota for the local masters was adjusted upward twice (apparently as an experiment): in February and in May, for an overall sum of 14,000 rubles. It is as if to say let them work under the fear of losing the bonus, and on the other hand, others will get bonuses without any difficulty...

We really have remarkable plans, and many of our pledges and decisions really contribute to successful realization of what has been planned. To this end there must be painstaking, purposeful, effective work by each person. There must be a knowledge of the true state of affairs, including on the basis of a study of letters, petitions and complaints of the workers. There must be a check and supervision over the execution of decisions which have been made, and fervent interest in seeing that work goes well not only in the accounting documents, but in practice as well.

6904
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SHORTCOMINGS: MOTOR VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 79 p 2

[Letter to editors by WO I. Yaunzem: "Out of Repair... Into Repair"]

[Text] I had to drive several hundred kilometers to the automotive repair enterprise headed by Engr-Col N. Samonin. I drove in a hurry, for the message sent from the enterprise to our unit commander stated that repairs had been completed on one of our vehicles and it was necessary to receive it urgently. But it turned out I hurried in vain. Forty-five defects were revealed in an inspection of the vehicle! But it was supposed to be driven to the unit under its own power. I had to demand that the heads of the enterprise perform additional repairs on the vehicle, but to no avail. It was necessary to complain to the higher echelon. On learning about this, the repair personnel began to fix the deficiencies.

Perhaps this unpleasant episode is a random occurrence? I would be happy to think this, but I cannot. The fact is that such a thing also occurred last year and the year before last, when I traveled several times to pick up vehicles turned in for repair. The vehicles "repaired" at the enterprise had up to 80 defects.

Just when will such a faulty practice of how an enterprise treats its customers finally end?

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COMMAND TRAINING: NEED FOR INITIATIVE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Col A. Shcherbakov: "A Commander's Development: Execution and Initiative"]

[Text] Lt V. Maksimov was appointed senior officer of a column of vehicles proceeding to an exercise area with fuel. Subunit commander Capt K. Volkov briefed him and pointed out the movement route on the map.

"There have been heavy, torrential rains in recent days," he reminded Maksimov. "Some sectors of the road may become impassable. So act as the circumstances require."

The column did not arrive at the area by the designated time. It had become stuck in a low area on a soggy forest road. At the same time, vehicles from other subunits bypassed the low area to one side and covered the entire route without complications.

Lt Maksimov did not make excuses. He simply did not see that he was to blame for what happened:

"I followed the order exactly--I took the column along the route indicated by the subunit commander."

But the subunit commander intended that, in case of any complications, the lieutenant would make a decision with consideration of the specific conditions.

On beginning the descent into the low area, Maksimov could not help but see that fresh automobile tracks went off from it to the left. That meant there was a detour here. And the driver believed that he should turn to the left, but the lieutenant did not dare take that step:

"It's not our job to complicate matters. We'll take the road given us."

In my opinion, this incident is a rather convincing illustration that the practical value of execution which is not reinforced by independence or initiative is degraded substantially. The habit of acting in expectation of prompting may lead to nonfulfillment of an assigned mission.

The role of creative initiative in an officer's official work is growing constantly. Let's take an ordinary class, practice session or practice battle. In their course it is impossible to foresee all situations ahead of time and provide unambiguous recommendations on how to act in a particular instance. Figuratively speaking, existing instructions and manuals determine strategy, but tactics is wholly in the hands of the performers. They are required to have speed of thinking and action, decisiveness, independence and initiative.

Experienced commanders proceed from this assumption in planning the introduction of young officers into formation and in giving them assistance in development as commanders. For example, the creative style of work in Unit "X" can be said without exaggeration to be inherent in a majority of officers, including young ones. Flexibility of thinking, speed of action, an ability to avoid stereotyped decisions made according to an established scheme, and the ability to outfox the "enemy" and seize the initiative are qualities developed in the officers in classes, practice sessions and exercises. Here they strive to achieve the important element: for a specialist to ponder the problem at hand on his own and definitely try to find a solution to a difficult situation. This is why lieutenants A. Burma, A. Novikov, V. Malykhin and others are growing rapidly in the professional sense. They act decisively and with initiative in problems and exercises and achieve success.

The contemporary level of technical outfitting allows a substantial increase in the quality of the training process. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that specialists show certain results in the training room, but show other, lower results during combat work. The unit where Officer P. Roslyakov heads the training methods council conducted research into why this happens. Staff officers, subunit commanders, leading specialists and young officers took part in this work. Some had doubts: "But what can yesterday's school graduates propose?"

But that was just how the problem was posed: to take a broad look at the problem, from different points of view. And it was not only the suggestions of the experienced methodologists which proved useful, but those of the young officers as well. The study showed that some specialists become confused during combat work. It became clear that insufficient attention is given to shaping volitional qualities in them.

Taking account of the proposals and recommendations made, the unit proceeded to improve training methods, to make practice sessions more complex and to make broad use of simulation gear. A positive result was achieved.

Special emphasis should be placed on the role of a commander's tact in instilling initiative in subordinates, for it happens that an officer has decided to display initiative, but nothing comes of it. If the commander does not control himself and gives his subordinate a good scolding: "Who needs your independent action?", one can be almost certain that the next time the officer will prefer to act cautiously and await prompting.

Independence and initiative. When we do not discover them in an officer's character, our favorable impression of him fades. Of two candidates for advancement, we will not choose him--efficient but without initiative--but the other, the one who is not afraid to assume responsibility and act imaginatively. From a purely humane point of view, though, it is a pity about the first candidate. His immediate superiors should have directed attention earlier to shortcomings in his character and in his work style and helped him get rid of them. But this did not happen and so it is their immediate fault in addition to his own.

Sometimes a young officer who has not received support in carrying out some kind of undertaking acts at his own risk, as they say. That is what happened with Lt I. Lyashenko. He gave the subunit commander a suggestion on improving training methodology. Hardly having listened to what was being said, the commander said with disappointment:

"We have enough of other problems... But if you would like, use your own methodology."

Lt Lyashenko of course sensed that the commander simply had waved him off. Nevertheless, he did not give up his idea. Two weeks later he brought the commander a thick notebook with an inscription on the cover: "Experimental Methodology for Accelerated Specialist Training." The commander kept it and promised to look into it. And as a matter of fact, he opened the notebook several times in an attempt to delve into the essence of the suggestions, but urgent affairs kept interfering. And so he returned the notebook to the lieutenant and said vaguely:

"Work a bit more on your methodology, give it good thought and we will discuss it later..."

The lieutenant was offended and decided to test the new methodology on his own. He wrote one thing in the lesson plans, but conducted the classes in his own way. It stands to reason that not everything went well for him.

When the staff officers studied the young officer's proposals in a most careful manner, they found a rational element in them. They also pointed out Lt. Lyashenko's methods mistakes. The methodology was improved. Subsequently the time for specialist training managed to be reduced. Sensing the trust, Sr Lt Lyashenko (he recently was advanced in rank and position) is seeking new ways for increasing the intensification of classes.

It would appear to be clear that to trust someone is one thing, but to leave subordinates on their own is quite a different matter. Nevertheless, not every commander chooses the correct line in his practical work.

Officer S. Nikitin has commanded a subunit for more than just one year. He cannot be reproached for lacking experience in working with people. In recent months the collective invariably has been among the leaders in competition. The commander naturally was praised as well. And it was here that he become self-complacent without noticing it.

When young officers arrived in the subunit he chatted with them and immediately concluded that they were trained personnel and things would go well for them. Alas, they encountered great difficulties, for even the plan for introducing young officers into formation had been drawn up hastily and existed only on paper. Signs of their lag in training for taking the test for authorization for independent work already had begun to appear, but Nikitin kept saying:

"We don't have to clip their wings or coddle them."

The words essentially are correct. It is unfortunate only that Officer Nikitin was not able to back them up with deeds. Lack of supervision and absence of assistance on the commander's part led to the dates for command development of some young officers being extended. Intervention of the senior commander was required in order to eliminate the deficiencies and assist Officer Nikitin in rearranging his work style.

Imagination, initiative and independence are not innate qualities. Continuously instilling them in officers means struggling for a further strengthening of discipline and an increase in vigilance and combat readiness of subunits and units.

6904
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COMBAT TRADITIONS: IMPORTANCE STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Arty Ye. Stroganov, chief of staff of rocket troops and artillery of the Ground Forces: "School of Life, School of Indoctrination: Concreteness in the Propaganda of Traditions"]

[Text] I recently had occasion to participate in a discussion about traditions in one of the artillery regiments. The officers spoke well about the grand traditions of our Armed Forces and the need for augmenting them in units and subunits. I also supported them with all my heart. The remarkable traditions which have taken shape in the Armed Forces also are inherent to every military collective individually. But at the same time, every unit and every subunit also must have its own traditions.

For example, I only had to ask those present about the traditions giving the regiment a special, unique appearance, and a pause arose immediately and the discussion began to lose concreteness. Some doubted whether or not the question could be posed in such a plane: Traditions allegedly are general and common to all.

Yes, there are such traditions, and they represent a powerful force. The heroic past of the people and the experience of older generations who fought the enemy and built a socialist society were embodied in the grand revolutionary, combat and labor traditions. V. I. Lenin saw in revolutionary traditions a powerful factor in indoctrinating the people.

More than one generation of Soviet military personnel has been indoctrinated on the remarkable traditions which took shape in the Army and Navy. We are obligated to augment them by the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work."

Commanders and political officers in the regiment in question do a great deal to propagandize traditions. There are impressive displays dedicated to the heroic history of the Armed Forces in the unit room of combat glory and in the reading rooms of subunits. Traditions are mentioned in political classes, lectures and discussions. Nevertheless, one cannot help but notice a weak link in this work: Concreteness is lacking in propaganda of the traditions of the unit itself. Commanders reduce everything to telling about the regiment's combat history. But the fact is that some features inherent only to this unit formed and were reinforced on the front roads and in the fields of peacetime training. If they are not mentioned or propagandized, then how can we fulfill the requirement of Article 53 of the USSR Armed Forces Internal Service Regulation in this case, which stresses: "Maintaining and augmenting unit (ship) traditions and passing on foremost experience represent very important obligations of all commanders (chiefs)"?

All the traditions of our Army were inherent in the 40th Artillery Regiment, 4th Bezhitsa Rifle Division, in which I had occasion to fight. But there also were our own regimental traditions. Among them, for example, was the following: to help young soldiers master combat specialties in the shortest possible time. It stands to reason that other units also worked painstakingly with the young replacements. In this instance we are not speaking simply about attention or readiness to assist and support a new recruit. In our 40th Artillery Regiment this was a deeply perceived inner need for each soldier and comprised an object of special pride. We knew that any of our compatriots enjoyed the reputation of a thoroughly trained artilleryman in other regiments as well, and we cherished this a great deal. The tradition which formed grew stronger thanks to the support of commanders and political officers and turned into a force which exerted a constant influence on personnel.

The 80th Separate Antitank Battalion of our division had its own tradition: to hit enemy armored targets with the first round. I am not speaking about a slogan or a wish, but specifically of a tradition. An enormous amount of work was necessary to bring the expertise of gunners and the cohesiveness of gun teams to perfection. And not only bring it to perfection, but maintain it at this level. The fact is that after every battle the teams had to receive replacements. And it was not just the commanders, but all soldiers who instilled in the new recruits the immutable principles of the battalion's life: A round fired meant a target.

Traditions also form in peacetime in any unit which are characteristic only of that unit. They naturally do not form of themselves. As is correctly stated in the Regulation, they must be maintained.

I am very familiar with a battery which for eight years now has affirmed the title of outstanding from year to year. It has been commanded by Maj I. Sandovenko for the last five years. Doesn't stability and invariable success really provide cause to speak of a tradition which has been formed? I believe that a tradition is apparent. To propagandize the supreme achievements in training as a tradition means to touch people to the quick and inspire them to achieve new goals. Neither the commander nor a private can allow the subunit to lose the positions it has won during his period of service. This is already a question of honor.

The very same can be said about many other subunits. For example, the battery commanded by Capt N. Velichko has distinguished itself for four years in a row by exemplary internal order. For several years the company commanded by Capt K. Irenev has received the highest grade for equipment upkeep. And indoctrination work in these subunits would lose a great deal were the commanders to forget to emphasize the succession of achievements or the link between the past and present or were they not to cherish a tradition which is taking shape as an important achievement of the collective.

In short, every subunit and every unit must have its own traditions inherent only to it. They supplement traditions common to the Armed Forces just as, for example, the traditions of some one family supplement the traditions which are nationwide.

One can only regret that propaganda of a unit's own traditions clearly lacks concreteness in some units. If a collective has achieved some kind of success, it is spoken of as a separate, special achievement. But the interests of indoctrination also require an analysis of preceding events and of the organic link between past results and what was achieved. I stress once again that traditions form over a lengthy period of time. It is difficult for them to gain a foothold and firmly capture the awareness and hearts of soldiers without the support of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations. Traditions require official recognition and reinforcement, if one can express it in this manner.

It often happens that a unit or subunit speaks a great deal about success in a final check while forgetting to emphasize the link between what was achieved and the work of people who already have completed service. For example, a company showed itself to be outstanding in an inspection parade. That also was the case a year ago. This indicates a tradition. Who if not the commander should direct everyone's attention to this fact and spark the subordinates' desire to reinforce what was achieved and to achieve more? And let there appear a line about the company tradition of being first in formation as well in the reading room and on the display propagandizing the traditions of the Armed Forces.

Propaganda of traditions is a very important sector of ideological and political indoctrination work. The effectiveness of this work depends largely on the ability of commanders, political officers and the party and Komsomol organizations to propagandize and augment concrete traditions of the native unit and native subunit which can be perceived by every serviceman.

6904
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ARMED FORCES: SOCIAL ROLE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 79 pp 2-3

[Article by Col K. Vorob'yev, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "Theory, Politics, Ideology: The Armed Forces and Social Progress"]

[Text] Problems of social progress and the question of mankind's future are troubling people's minds to an ever greater extent. This future is linked both with the direction in social-economic development chosen by each country, and with the outcome of the opposition of two opposite social systems, and with the question of war and peace.

The Armed Forces as a specific state entity always have occupied an important place in social life, and do so now. Being a tool of the politics of dominant classes, they have exerted and are exerting a profound influence on the course of social development. And the fact is completely obvious that the social-historical direction of this influence depends on whose hands control the armed forces and the will of which class they are carrying out.

Bourgeois ideologists attempt in every possible way to conceal this truth from the people. They consciously confuse the question of the armed forces' role in social development and pass them off as some kind of "nonclass" institution. Contemporary propagandists of imperialism, and theorists of a reformist and right-revisionist leaning along with them, attempt to prove what cannot be proved and depict the armed forces of a capitalist state as politically neutral and a kind of tool for preserving "harmony between different social forces."

The falsity of such kind of assertions was revealed long ago with all thoroughness by V. I. Lenin. In the article "The Army and the Revolution," he wrote: "The armed forces cannot and must not be neutral. Don't drag the army into politics is the slogan of hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie . . . who in fact always have drawn the armed forces into reactionary politics..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy [Complete Collected Works], XII, 113). At all times the armed forces have been the primary tool of the military coercion and politics of the ruling classes.

The problem of armed violence is also not viewed abstractly in Marxist-Leninist theory, but concretely and historically, from a position of progressive social forces, from the standpoint of the interests of the working class. Such violence is justified only when it overcomes the resistance of reactionary forces and contributes to a progressive development of society. In so doing, the armed violence of revolutionary masses bears a forced character and is wholly caused by military resistance of the obsolescent social forces opposing them.

Objective conditions play a determining role in social progress. First of all, they give rise to the very need for resolving particular problems of social development and, secondly, they create real opportunities for this. It has long ago been proven that if there are no objective conditions for a revolutionary overthrow and a revolutionary situation is absent, then no efforts of the class or party will lead to social transformations.

But when objective conditions have matured, then the subjective factor acquires decisive importance: the capability of the revolutionary class to undertake decisive actions; the party's capability to direct these actions and lead the masses; the presence of a military organization and its ability to break the armed resistance of forces being overthrown and to defend the revolution. V. I. Lenin said that "violence can be employed without having economic roots, but then it is doomed by history. But it is possible to employ violence relying on a leading class and on higher principles of the socialist system, order and organization. And then it can temporarily suffer failure, but it is invincible" (XXXVIII, 369-370).

Marxist-Leninist propositions on the correlation of objective and subjective factors and on the essence of armed violence permit a proper understanding of the role of the military organization in society's social development and in the contemporary world revolutionary process.

The question of the influence of the armed forces on the life of society bears two aspects in a class-antagonistic society, including a bourgeois society: an internal and an external aspect. The former is connected with the use of the armed forces to defend the interests of the exploiters against "their own" people and with protection of the existing order. The latter aspect is the predatory activity of such armies and their gendarme function in the international arena.

Ideologists of the monopolistic bourgeoisie strive in every possible way to conceal both these functions of their armies. They love to speak of "a person's freedom and equality" in the world of capital and his constitutional rights. But everyone knows the price of these rights. They are thoroughly trampled and remain formal, on paper alone. And today the conclusion drawn by V. I. Lenin with regard to the world of capital is just as current: "There is not one state, even the most democratic, where there are no loopholes or stipulations in constitutions providing the bourgeoisie with an opportunity to move troops against the workers, to declare martial law and so on" (XXXVII, 253).

Take the U.S. Army, for example. It is used within the country along with other punitive entities to suppress demonstrations by American workers and students, especially blacks. Troops are in constant readiness to employ weapons against the people. The following figures are known. In the 25 years since World War II, the American Army has taken part in putting down demonstrations by workers within its country over 700 times, i.e., around 30 times a year. The armies of other imperialist states also perform such a role within their countries.

Ruling circles of imperialism give the armed forces a very important role in preserving their state and strengthen this bulwark of their authority in every possible way. Revolutionary-democratic forces in countries of capital set the task of drawing the armed forces to their side in the struggle for social progress. And where this succeeds, success of the liberation movement is assured (Portugal). The further course of revolution naturally also depends on other factors. But where the struggle for the armed forces is insufficient, they are used by reactionary forces for their own purposes, as was the case in the counterrevolutionary overthrow in Chile.

The opposition of imperialist armies to social progress in the international arena is varied.

First of all, these armies are the chief tool of wars and aggression of imperialism. In the modern era they are targeted against countries of socialism, and the Soviet Union above all.

Secondly, imperialism carries out the policy of "containment" and "repelling" of the entire world revolutionary process, especially the national liberation movement, with the help of armies. For example, after World War II the United States sent its troops and other punitive forces abroad for putting down national liberation movements on an average of every 1½ years. In the 200 years of its existence, the U.S. Marine Corps has participated in more than 300 military campaigns and police operations in various countries. A special "quick reaction corps" numbering 110,000 officers and men now is being set up in the United States to perform gendarme functions.

Thirdly, the chief imperialist powers provide an enormous amount of military assistance to reactionary political regimes in a large number of countries where they are threatened by the revolutionary movement of popular masses. For example, during the period from 1973 through 1977 the United States granted $4.3 billion gratis and as credits to ten repressive governments, including Chile, Thailand, Korea and Uruguay and sold them over $17.5 billion in weapons. Around 13,000 officers now serving reactionary governments have been trained in U.S. military educational institutions.

Fourthly, the monopolistic bourgeoisie is integrating military efforts on an international scale and creating military-political blocs for its own selfish interests in conformity with its expansionistic, aggressive policy, trampling on the interests of the broadest popular masses.

Reality thus confirms the correctness of the conclusion drawn by the 25th CPSU Congress: If a real threat arises to the domination of monopoly capital and its political henchmen, imperialism will go to all lengths, casting aside all appearances of any kind of democracy. It is ready to trample on the sovereignty of states and any legality, not to mention humaneness. And imperialism places chief reliance in conducting its expansionistic, aggressive, predatory politics on the armed forces, which thus act as the tool of regression and a brake to the progressive development of society.

The armies of young liberated states now play a specific role in social progress. Within their countries they are an important political force exerting profound influence on social processes and on the development and replacement of forms of state authority. The role of armies in the political life of the nations of young national states is growing in our time. By virtue of their high organization and discipline and possessing the right to have weapons, the armed forces can exert a decisive influence under specific conditions on the course of the country's social development and change its direction. But in each specific instance the question of what kind of change this will be--progressive or reactionary, contributing to social progress or retarding it--depends on what forces are managing the armed forces and providing them with a program of action.

Practice shows that the role of the armed forces in a national liberation movement and in the development of young states is far from identical. In those countries oriented on capitalism, armies act as a support to reactionary-bureaucratic regimes in their struggle against revolutionary-democratic forces. Noncapitalistic development was interrupted in some countries in recent years (Egypt) or a withdrawal from a progressive course was observed (Somalia). The armed forces here were transformed into a tool of the reactionary ruling circles.

Armies in countries with a socialist orientation are an anti-imperialistic, antifeudal force and stand up in defense of national independence and the revolutionary-democratic achievements of the people. For example, the armed forces of Angola and Ethiopia defended the right of their people to build socialism in a fierce struggle.

Progressive tendencies of the development of society are reflected in armies of countries with a socialist orientation. The officer corps is filled with workers' representatives. For example, the Syrian Army now has almost 80 percent of officers who are former peasants, workers, artisans and minor employees. National-democratic governments devote much attention to ideological indoctrination work in the armed forces. Service personnel take an active part in accomplishing various social-economic tasks. For example, the Algerian Army plays an important role in carrying out the "agrarian revolution," and armies of Angola, Mozambique and other countries play a large part in eliminating illiteracy among the populace and educating the workers.

Consequently, armies of countries with a socialist orientation act as an active, social force in the struggle for social progress. But it must be borne in mind that even with its most progressive activities, an army cannot replace the revolutionary activities of the proletariat and its party. Only the working class headed by the Marxist-Leninist party is capable of taking socialist transformations to their conclusion.

Armies of socialist states play a qualitatively new role in social progress. This role is determined by their social nature and by the historical purpose as an armed force of the working class and toiling masses.

The army of a workers' and peasants' state serves socialism, which personifies the supreme level of social progress in the modern era. The army serves the working class, which has the historic mission of freeing labor of capital and creating a society of the social equality of people. Service to the cause of the working class and all toilers objectively makes the socialist army a progressive force in social development. The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces serves as an example of this.

From the very beginning, our Army was created as an Army of the workers, as a tool for protecting their interests in the struggle against exploiters. All wars which the Soviet people and their Armed Forces were forced to wage were just. We bared our sword only against those who encroached on the Land of Soviets and on its freedom and independence.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war, our Army defended the revolutionary achievements of the Soviet people and their right to build socialism against domestic and foreign enemies. In this way the USSR Armed Forces also fulfilled their international duty. They defended the socialist homeland--the beacon and bulwark of workers around the world, the base of the world revolutionary process.

Such was the social-political essence and meaning of our armed struggle against fascist Germany--the chief shock force of international imperialism. Victory in the Great Patriotic War was a triumph of the Soviet social and state system and of the forces of progress over forces of reaction. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev writes in his memoirs entitled "Malaya Zemlya": "Our victory is a milestone in the history of mankind."

Mankind's social progress was further accelerated under the effect of the Soviet Union's victory over fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. There was a sharp weakening and narrowing of the sphere of capitalism and a deepening of the general crisis of capitalism. The forces of socialism and democracy developed and grew strong. Socialist revolutions were victorious in a number of countries of Europe and Asia.

The victorious procession of socialism after World War II provided a powerful impetus to development of the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries. The colonial system of imperialism crumbled under its blows. Favorable conditions also arose for the development of the world communist and workers' movement.

The USSR Armed Forces made and are making a tangible contribution to the cause of social progress in the postwar period. This also was reflected in the assistance which the Soviet Union gave in the fifties and sixties to the people of Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in defense of their revolutionary achievements against external enemies and internal antisocialist forces.

The enemies of socialism attempt to pass off this activity by the Soviet Army as some kind of "expansion" and "export of the revolution." The Swiss political scientist Jacques Fremont presented just such a line in his speech at the 11th World Congress of the International Association of Political Sciences held in Moscow in August 1979. This line received a worthy rebuff on the part of Soviet scholars. Our assistance to brothers in class was given at the request of their governments and in the interests of defending the achievements of socialism, and consequently in the interests of social progress.

The assertions by bourgeois politicians and ideologists about an allegedly increasing "Soviet military threat" are absolutely absurd and slanderous. Yes, our country is forced to strengthen its Armed Forces in the face of military preparations being forced by imperialism, but this is being done for the sole purpose of making them a reliable guardian over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of general peace, and thus to contribute to social progress.

Socialism and peace are deeply interconnected. Socialism needs peace, not war, to reveal all its advantages and set an example of social progress for nations. By acting as a mighty obstacle in the path of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, the Soviet Armed Forces thus make a contribution to the progressive development of socialism and the overall progress of mankind.

Our Army performs this role in close unity with armies of other fraternal countries of socialism participating in the Warsaw Pact. By defending socialism and constraining the aggressive forces of international imperialism, armies of the fraternal countries exert a progressive influence on the course of world history and on the world revolutionary process.

The Soviet Armed Forces also play an important part within our country in the development of our society itself. This is reaffirmed very specifically in the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." This very important political document notes that service in the Soviet Army and Navy is a remarkable school of labor and military training, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship.

The Soviet Armed Forces are a military organization of a new, higher socialist type. They are profoundly progressive in their nature, in their purpose and in their activities.

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GENERAL GORCHAKOV'S ADVICE TO JUNIOR OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Col Gen P. Gorchakov, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Years as a Lieutenant: The Authority of the Political Officer"]

> [Excerpts] Senior Politruk P. A. Gorchakov was appointed regimental commissar at age 24. He passed over the roads of war from Yel'ts to Prague. He took part in combat operations in the Bryansk, Central and 4th Ukrainian fronts. The political officer's organizational talent, courage and valor were recognized by many orders and medals. In 1943 Lt Col Gorchakov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. He is a participant of the historic Victory Parade, in which he commanded a company of standardbearers of the composite regiment of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Col Gen Gorchakov now is Member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Strategic Missile Forces.

Our political officers among the troops perform combat duty on an equal with the commanders. Their direct participation in the performance of important tasks and their personal example have an enormous indoctrinational significance. The fact is that this is very important if a political officer who has mastered the specialty to perfection and has a good knowledge of the specific nature of the missilemen's work calls for the need to be constantly on guard. One can be sure that his words will not go unnoticed.

It is true that the understanding of the personal example often is narrowed in the minds of some indoctrinators. There are among the political officers even those officers who always are ready to show how to perform an exercise with the submachinegun. And should the need arise, they will also run a crosscountry distance together with the soldiers. They can do a great deal, and they try, but the trouble is that some of them have slight influence in the collective. What is the problem?

And it is here that we probably come to the important element, to that which I would call a determining trait in the political officer's personality. Speak with people who have completed service in the Army: What did they value in political officers above all? Sincerity and moral purity. It is not by chance that sensitiveness, party principle and honesty displayed literally in everything are in first place. Sometimes unobtrusive and not immediately perceptible, they comprise the firmest foundation for the political officer's authority. We speak and write a great deal about this. It would seem that everything is clear. But how difficult the spiritual and moral development of the young officer sometimes is and how costly the mistakes and errors here.

Not even two years have passed since Sr Lt V. Sanovnichenko was assigned deputy commander for political affairs of a subunit. He now is a respected person in the collective, but there was an incident in his service which could have played an unseemly role in the further development of the political officer and party member.

This happened when Sanovnichenko was acting as the commander for the first time. A commission was working in the subunit at that time. During the check it was discovered that the team commanded by Officer F. Men'shov might not fulfill its pledges and reaffirm the title of outstanding. At least Sr Lt Sanovnichenko decided that such a danger existed, inasmuch as the specialists did not demonstrate those results which everyone expected of them in an integrated practice for the record. On the other hand, the team commanded by Sr Lt K. Abramov proved on top of the matter, as they say.

Sr Lt Sanovnichenko realized that the subunit could not be declared outstanding if Officer Men'shov's subordinates did not fulfill their pledges. And life forced the political officer to make a choice: Either everything would happen in just that way, and then the subunit commander would be annoyed and disappointed and would be dissatisfied with his deputy, or... And he made a decision. He summoned Men'shov and proposed: "Rewrite your collective pledges and exclude the point that the team must become outstanding. Sr Lt Abramov's team will make this pledge in place of yours and the subunit will lose nothing."

The step most damaging to the political officer's authority thus was taken: He prompted his comrade to scorn that for which he himself was obligated to fight. Party Member Men'shov firmly objected: "We will not reject our pledges. Our conscience does not permit it. And I make bold to assure you that, despite the first failure, the team still will prove it is worthy of the title of outstanding."

And that is what happened...

These were difficult days for the political officer. His egotism forced him to make excuses for some time yet: Allegedly he was attempting to make it better for the entire collective. He thus counted on support and sympathy.

But the imperceptible shadow of silent condemnation already hung over him. The young officer had to be given his due--he managed to cope with this moral ailment. His senior comrades helped him in this persistently and delicately. I am convinced that the lesson the senior lieutenant received will be a "notch" in his memory forever.

Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin said: "In order to genuinely educate, one not only must have a good knowledge of his job, but also have a pure soul. . . . For the educator influences the subjects not only by the fact that he gives them specific knowledge, but also by his behavior and way of life...

This is why I would like to say once more to my young colleagues and my comrades in work: There is nothing more important for the political officer than moral purity, high ideals and principle, close contact with people, and a sensitive attitude toward them. And the sooner the young political officer acquires these qualities, the more satisfaction service will bring to him and the more often the joy of success will come to him in his difficult and surprisingly excellent career.

6904
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PUBLICATIONS: ERRORS IN AIR DEFENSE JOURNAL CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Arty A. Sherstyuk, professor: "A Reader's Remarks: Vexing Inaccuracies"]

[Text] The military journal VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY has won the recognition and respect of military readers for its meaningful articles and for posing problematical questions. It is the more vexing that recently the journal published a number of articles which not only have inaccuracies, but mistakes as well.

It is known, for example, that AAA of the Ground Forces during the Great Patriotic War destroyed over 21,000 enemy aircraft, and a large number of them with the fire of the Model 1939 37-mm automatic antiaircraft gun. But we learn with surprise from the article by Col V. Klevtsov entitled "Ground Forces Air Defense in the War Years" (Issue No 7 of the journal) that this gun was not used in the war, since it was only being tested in 1944-1945. The author further states that the 25-mm automatic antiaircraft gun also came into the inventory after the war. In reality, however, the Model 1939 37-mm automatic antiaircraft gun and the Model 1940 25-mm automatic antiaircraft gun were accepted in the inventory even before the war.

The article states that air defense personnel and weapons were not organizationally formed on the eve of the war. In reality, however, they were organizationally formed into AAA battalions, which were part of rifle divisions and corps and into AAA regiments, which were part of armies. The crux of the problem lay not in the organizational structure of the troop air defense system, but in the fact that the troops lacked AAA, especially of small caliber.

The author's statement that air defense personnel and weapons of the Ground Forces were part of the National Air Defense Forces also is erroneous. Ground air defense weapons assigned to screen the troops were fully independent of the ground air defense weapons which were screening the country's rear area installations, although they were associated by common control both in the district and at the Armed Forces level. Moreover, prior to

November 1941 the National Air Defense Forces did not exist as a branch of the Armed Forces.

And Col Klevtsov's statement that fighter aviation was part of the air forces of combined-arms armies on the eve of the war also is quite incorrect. The air forces, which were an independent branch of the Armed Forces, were not part of combined-arms armies either on the eve of or during the war. The combined-arms armies only were reinforced with aviation, including fighter aviation from the front air force.

There also are certain mistakes in the generally pithy article entitled "How Hitler's Plan for a Strategic Air War Against the USSR Failed," published in the sixth issue of the journal. Col D. Gorbatenko states that the radius of the fascist German Heinkel-177 aircraft allowed making attacks against rear area installations to the entire depth of our country's territory by landing on airfields of Northeast China, captured in those years by Japanese militarists. Even using the airfields situated on USSR territory occupied in 1941-1942, the Heinkel-177 bomber could not have made a "shuttle" operation for a distance of 5,500-6,000 km, since its range was considerably less. The presence of this mistake can be explained by an uncritical attitude toward publications which appeared in the West, the authors of which falsify the history of the past war and cite many far-fetched data.

It would appear that the editors of VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY would do everything necessary to ensure that such mistakes in the journal's pages do not confuse the readers.

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USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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TANK UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Tests of Armored Vehicles

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Maj G. Miranovich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Army and Navy Combat Training: Armor and Men -- at an Armored Equipment Proving Ground"]

[Text] The tank slowly crawled through the open gates of the tank parking compound and halted, as if inviting inspection and amazement. As recently as that morning it had differed in no way from the other tanks, gleaming with their freshly-painted hulls, but.... It was covered by burn marks, scratches, scrape marks, reminiscent of a soldier returning from the battlefield.

"Sergey Kapanov tried his best," commented test driver Pvt N. Rogov, stroking a dent on the turret. "He knows his business...."

Parking the shell-battered vehicle on the spot indicated by the compound duty officer, the test personnel, headed by platoon leader Lt A. Dem'yankov, made for the barracks. Firing could still be heard in the direction from which the battered tank had limped in -- people were still testing armor.

One can hardly enumerate all the operations performed every day by the people at the proving ground: they test every vehicle down to the last nut and bolt. In order to reduce testing volume, time and cost, some stages are simulated by utilizing various simulator systems. But testing under actual conditions forms the bulk of the work done at the proving ground. What is the maximum grade a tank can climb, and what will its top speed be across sand and swampy terrain...? The testers provide answers to many questions of interest to the designers. Their joint productive quest is one of the great traditions of the proving ground, dating back from the prewar years.

Veteran proving ground personnel recall how greatly their labor was appreciated by M. Koshkin, chief designer of the famed T-34 tank, and how attentively he listened to their every comment and suggestion.

...A task of the tank designers was to provide the vehicle with reliable armor protection. A solution was found -- sloping the armor plate. But was the slope angle optimal? The armor must be tested by shooting at it. And the chief engineer went out to the proving ground and observed closely while the test personnel "shot" the vehicle with a 45 mm antitank gun, offered them advice, and listened to their opinion -- they jointly refined the design. The result is history: the T-34 became the world's finest tank.

Many tanks of Great Patriotic War vintage began their career at the proving ground. Instructions and guides for tank crews on equipment operating and maintenance procedures also went out from here to the line units. The most effective methods of combatting enemy tanks were developed here. And when necessary, the testing people themselves went to the front. Seventy-nine of them were killed in action.

Years passed. Armored equipment continued evolving and improving. Generation upon generation of combat vehicles have passed through the skilled hands of the proving ground people. Standing today in the ranks of testing personnel are the sons and grandsons of those who came here more than 40 years ago. The proving ground itself has also changed so as to become unrecognizable; it is equipped according to the latest advances in military science and technology. But the experience and know-how of building famed tanks is not being put out to pasture. Shots ring out on the proving ground -- reliability of armor and weapons is being tested. The ability of vehicles to negotiate water obstacles afloat and under water is tested in special pools and under natural conditions. Running gear and hull strength are tested in many miles under various road and climatic conditions and on antitank obstacles....

The armor is tested by fire, and men become skilled veterans. Yesterday's novices from a training subunit become genuine tank experts. Such as Private Kapanov, who was mentioned above. An experienced gunner, he has never once missed the target when testing the reliability of tank armor protection.

The newcomers are assisted in becoming such specialists by their commanders, political workers, proving ground veterans, of whom there are many here. They pass on to the young men their own experience and know-how, conducting training classes in gunnery and technical training groups. Various forms of party political work aim at improving the occupational skills of testing personnel; party-political work is distinguished here by aggressiveness and a close link with the tasks of personnel.

"It could be no other way," stated political worker Capt A. Dobrodomov, "for the proving ground is, so to speak, the front line of the struggle for the armored might of our Ground Forces. It is our obligation to ensure that each and every man feels personally responsible for this."

As we drove out to the tank moving target gunnery range, where they were testing combat vehicle weapons, Captain Dobrodomov named quite a few outstanding men.

Our homeland greatly appreciates the skill and selfless labor of the testers of armored equipment. Many proving ground personnel have been awarded medals and decorations, including officers V. Prazdnikov, V. Osipov, A. Sevast'yanov, Yu. Livanov, and others.

There is a term "testing to the maximum" in the vocabulary of proving ground workers. This is when both men and machines are working under maximum load.

A tank was roaring down a track-polished concrete strip. Sparks showered out from under the tracks on the turns. The driver was "squeezing" the absolute maximum speed out of the vehicle. But the test supervisor was checking not only the tank's speed capabilities. He was also testing the driver's ability.

Slower speeds are employed in the gunnery area. Other performance indices are of interest to Engr-Lt Col Yu. Amelin, combat vehicle weapons testing supervisor, and his assistants. But the imposed loads here are considerable also. The crew headed by Engr-Capt P. Chernets functions like a well-oiled clock mechanism.

The tank advanced swiftly toward the target. They were firing a standard round. Electronic devices precisely recorded every hit. The test supervisor, however, does not rely on their readings, as is usually the case at a gunnery exercise. Equipping himself with the requisite tools, he drove out on an armored personnel carrier to inspect the target. This "distrust" of electronics is understandable: for the tester it is especially important personally to examine everything.

Every member of the crew performed skillfully this day. The driver guided the vehicle along a highly complex route confidently and precisely as ordered. At the maximum range, just as the task required, the gunner hit the target with the first round. This is natural, for the right to take part in testing had been earned by the men in competition with other specialists. The first thing noted by Engr-Lt Col Amelin when grading performance was the high degree of crew discipline.

"I have been working at the proving ground for more than 20 years now," Yuriy Petrovich Amelin later remarked, "and I have long since become convinced that the main thing in our business is iron self-discipline. In my opinion this is one of the features of the profession of tester: it does not tolerate thoughtlessness or slackness but demands of an individual extreme composure, courage, and determination."

The veteran is right: it is not only machines which are tested at the proving ground: volition is toughened and character forged. These people are members of different generations, but they are united in the kinship of a feeling of responsibility for the assigned task, pride in their profession, and total dedication to it.

Battalion Rail Movement

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Lt Col E. Chagunava, Northern Group of Forces: "Tanks on Flatcars"]

[Text] A movement by rail.... Many of the men presently serving in the regiment pictured it only on the basis of war movies they had seen. And now the tank crews had received orders to execute a combined-mode march. Part of the way they would travel by rail.

Giving thought to the matter of how best to carry out the mission received at regimental headquarters, battalion commander Capt V. Divenko realized that the forthcoming march would be a serious test for the men. In addition, the mark received by the tank crews would be considered when determining the overall performance for the training year. At the same time he had reason to expect a successful operation. In the course of summer training the men of the battalion had not forgotten about march preparation, so that on the whole the men were prepared for long-distance marches and for rapid transition from one mode of travel to another.

Much had also been accomplished in direct preparations for the exercise. The crews worked on perfecting their practical skills in loading and off-loading combat equipment from railroad cars. This work was done in close contact with military rail transport service officers. Maj Yu. Nosachev and Sr Lt P. Bobrovskiy, for example, helped the battalion commander and his executive officer detail and refine the necessary calculations for transporting a subunit by rail and the procedures of working in coordination with the train crew. The most efficient variants of loading and off-loading equipment under various conditions, ensuring organizational integrity of subunits and their readiness for combat, were also examined.

Having assigned tasks to his subordinates, Capt V. Divenko led the battalion into the transit area precisely on schedule. Here they once again thoroughly checked equipment securing gear, and the officers reviewed safety procedures with their men. Vigorous party-political work was conducted in the transit area.

Wherever the tank crews were working, one sensed intense enthusiasm of competition. It was particularly strong where the main task was being performed -- at the equipment loading point. Of course everybody had the same objective -- to load and secure combat equipment on the flatcars as rapidly and proficiently as possible. The course of competition was immediately reflected in a graphic manner in combat lightning-leaflets.

Sited somewhat off from the flatcars were the attached antiaircraft weapons. They were in a continuous state of readiness to repulse "aggressor" airstrikes.

The tank crews were working under conditions maximally approaching actual combat. And they did not shirk difficulties. They worked swiftly, without unnecessary bustle. This was the result of well-planned placement of manpower. On the tank crews experienced enlisted men and noncommissioned officers worked alongside the new men.

The skill of the officers and the effectiveness of the techniques and methods they utilize for training the men were also tested here at the loading point. The battalion commander displayed a fine example of composure, efficiency, and ability quickly and efficiently to resolve all problems which arose. Company commanders and platoon leaders sought to emulate his example.

Among the first to approach a flatcar was the platoon under the command of Lt M. Chernushenko. The young officer directed his men confidently. He had come to the subunit comparatively recently and had never taken part in a troop movement by rail, but the battalion commander was not worried about this lieutenant: the men of his platoon had performed well during training drills. As soon as the vehicle rolled to a stop, the crew proceeded to tie the tank down. Lieutenant Chernushenko's men were the first to complete the tiedown. This fact was reported by a "lightning."

Finally the last tank was secured to its flatcar. The regimental commander, accompanied by representatives of the military rail transport service, inspected to determine that the train was ready for departure. They had no adverse comments to make. The diesel locomotive sounded its horn, and the military train pulled away from the station.

Completing the rail movement, the battalion engaged without a halt in attack position, having beaten the "aggressor" in seizing an advantageous position.

Battalion Training Shortcomings

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Maj F. Savel'yev, Red-Banner Odessa Military District: "They Worked on Enunciation"]

[Text] Emerging from the recently planted forest, the tanks deployed into an extended line. Targets appeared immediately. The targets popped up not directly in the path of the vehicles but somewhat to the side. Vigorous maneuver and firm fire control were required. Practically no commander voices or requisite orders, however, came over the radio. Only a few crews opened fire in a prompt manner. The tank commanders did not always correctly assess the character of targets. A considerable portion of the "aggressor's" antitank weapons did not receive fire.

At this exercise the battalion was commanded by Capt V. Blazhevskiy, the subunit's executive officer. In a situation which is typical of present-day combat he unfortunately failed to display solid commander skills. Some of the other officers also performed below par. Errors in control also resulted in the battalion receiving a poor mark and failing to meet the pledges adopted for the exercise.

What is the reason for the poor level of officer preparation for mock combat?

To answer this question, let us return to the events preceding the exercise. Work with the officers prior to initiation of the attack was handled as follows, for example. The battalion commander displayed a map containing the tactical situation. The company commanders diligently transferred it to their own maps. This essentially ended preparation for combat. Reconnaissance, independent decisions, and their graphic formulation in combat documents were not needed: everything was known in advance and planned in final form. But in the course of combat targets appeared in places other than where they were expected.

One can see the connection between performance in the exercise and a training drill in the commander training system at which the officers were supposed to improve, in particular, their fire control skills. The training drill began an hour and a half later than scheduled: the instructor, Lt Col G. Shubin, was late. When he finally arrived, he merely displayed a map carrying situation data, and the officers conscientiously copied it. After this Lieutenant Colonel Shubin left, claiming urgent business. The officers then proceeded with practical problems. It was immediately obvious that the map from which the tactical situation had been transferred was totally different from the exercise terrain. It was necessary to improvise, as they say. As a result everything boiled down to issuing abstract commands and instructions which were unrelated to the terrain or the concrete tactical situation. "We worked on enunciation," said one of the officers, assessing the exercise. One hardly need state that good diction alone is insufficient in combat. What is needed is the ability quickly and intelligently to estimate the situation, to make rational decisions and to carry out those decisions firmly. It was precisely these skills which the officers lacked.

The higher commander was aware of the errors of omission in organizing the training drill with the officers. But these facts were not properly heeded. A reassuring conclusion was drawn, that they would be able to make up lost ground. Tactical drills and the exercise itself lay ahead. But subsequent drills were also organized hastily: the same copying of a ready map, the same adjustment to standard situations and working on enunciation....

The training year is coming to an end. Every hour and every minute is precious. Unfortunately in the unit under discussion organization of training activities remains poor at this critical stage as well. This unit is failing to achieve high-quality completion of training schedules and programs, nor are personnel carrying out competition pledges.

One must assume that serious thought will be given to this at higher headquarters and in the political section.

Kiev Tank-Engineering School

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Parfenov: "Although It Is a Technical Department...."]

[Text] The department chairmaned by Engr-Col L. Solodyannikov is one of the technical departments at the Kiev Order of the Red Star Higher Tank-Engineering School imeni Mar SU I. I. Yakubovskiy. At the report-election meeting the Communists naturally spoke about accomplishing their specific tasks and analyzed the activities of the party organization and the contribution of each individual toward the common cause.

At the same time there was one theme which was clearly stressed throughout the meeting. It was particularly emphasized in the report by the party bureau secretary, Engr-Col A. Zuyev, and many of the speakers mentioned it.

"I see as the significance of our work," stated Engr-Lt Col N. Khlestun, "to impart profound technical knowledge and to form in future military engineers a Marxist-Leninist philosophical and ideological outlook as well as a vigorous life position."

Yes, it is a technical department, but the problem of political influence on the students is considered a very important item here. It finds concrete expression and embodiment in concern for the party-mindedness of the teaching, a clear-cut ideological-political thrust of the lectures, seminars, and discussions, and activation of the indoctrinational activity of the faculty.

Of course such concern begins with profound awareness of the indissolubility of training and indoctrination. Among some instructors, teaching "their own" subject, there will sometimes appear "autonomy" attitudes, to the effect that their job is to teach the finer points of electronics (or quantum mechanics, or tactics), and that the course curriculum is densely-packed in any case....

At one time such attitudes also occurred among this faculty. The party bureau did not ignore this situation. Working in close contact with the department chairman and with the professional assistance of the school political section, the bureau was able to establish a different atmosphere in the faculty, an atmosphere in which an instructor was constantly aware that he was an ideological warrior. An atmosphere in which tanks do not shield the men and the might of military hardware is inconceivable without the spiritual force of those operating it, where special questions are not examined "in a vacuum," isolated from social and political matters. And, we must add, the members of the bureau which was now submitting its report inherited this position from their predecessors.

Party members speaking at the meeting commented that the bureau focused constant attention on the party-mindedness of teaching and participation by party members in ideological indoctrination work. Methods seminars were held on a regular basis, and the following tradition was firmly established: all prepared class lectures would be group-discussed. And the party bureau did a great deal to ensure that this took place in an atmosphere of high principledness and comradeship, in an innovative atmosphere. In such cases emphasis is always placed on the indoctrinational content of a lecture, on the clearly-expressed party-mindedness of the presented material and the methods skill of the instructor to create the ideological background of a training class.

These items are also stressed during presentation of reports by party members, during group classroom visitations, and during discussion of open classes.

"The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled 'On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work'," emphasized the principal speaker at the meeting, "presents us with new prospects for improving the training and indoctrination process. Securing a high scientific level of propaganda and agitation, making them more purposeful and concrete, increasing their link with daily life, and giving them a fighting, aggressive character -- these demands should find embodiment in our training and indoctrination work."

Criticism at the meeting was leveled at those who continue to view party-mindedness of teaching in an unnecessarily simplified manner, boiling it down to quoting two or three political citations in a lecture on specialized training.

"One can place in opposition to a mechanical interpretation of the question," stated Engr-Lt Col N. Shul'yev, "only a scientific approach to its resolution. It is necessary more thoroughly to master the entire wealth of methodology and to take more active part in its innovative elaboration as applied to the specific features of the department."

Here are some corroborating examples. Recently the party bureau synthesized the experience and know-how of Engr-Lt Col N. Khlestun. I also remember a discussion of the indoctrinational effect of classes conducted by Engr-Lt Col T. Shevchenko.

Acquaintance with the "secrets" of their innovative methods proved to be especially useful to their young colleagues. They saw with their own eyes how an instructor's lecture on advanced Soviet science or an important event in international affairs can organically enter the very fabric of a class "on a purely technical subject"....

"The Central Committee decree on ideological matters," stated Engr-Lt Col N. Tarasov, "focuses each and every one of us toward more lively, sincere ideological indoctrination work among students."

Others also spoke about this aspect of sociopolitical activities of party members. Officers B. Krasin, T. Shevchenko, and that same N. Tarasov were named, who can frequently be seen with their students even outside of regular school hours. They attend their Komsomol-youth activities, present lectures on political topics, and engage in friendly discussions of their future work in line units. The speakers stressed that it is important to deepen all forms of ideological indoctrination work with the men and to continue increasing activeness of Communist-instructors in this work.

Of course other questions were also raised at the meeting. But they were without fail examined through the prism of party influence and people's attitude toward their job. I believe this explains to a considerable degree the fact that this department is one of the best at the school.

Battalion Economy Measures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Col N. Petrov, Red-Banner Odessa Military District: "For Thrift and Economy -- Strict Accounting"]

[Text] The tank crews of the battalion under the command of Capt V. Ganyushkin had in past years as well made socialist pledges for thrift and economy. As a rule the target was to reduce expenditures and consumption in the men's daily life in the military, as well as better running of military housekeeping operations. The situation changed in this year's summer training period. Enthusiastically supporting the initiative of the Baltic tankers, the men of the battalion also specified concrete targets in competition to conserve fuel, vehicle use, ammunition, spare parts, etc. And it is evident as the training year comes to an end: the tank crews achieved greater combat proficiency improvement than last year, while material expenditures not only did not rise but on the contrary decreased. What reserve potential had been put into operation?

First of all the methods skills of the instructors have risen to a new and higher level. At instructor-methods classes the battalion commander and his staff devote more attention to economy of the training process and give officers concrete recommendations in this area as well. In the second half of the year simulators are more extensively utilized, which make it possible for the trainees to learn the requisite skills without taking the actual equipment out into the field.

The morale factor also plays an important role. Much has been done in the subunit to explain to personnel the essence and goals of the economy campaign. Each and every man knows the value of a liter of fuel, an artillery round, and of various replacement parts and assemblies. The commanding officer and party organization have begun imposing greater demands on those who are guilty of wasteful consumption of supplies.

After a certain tactical exercise, for example, company commander Sr Lt Ye. Stanovov deserved a reproach for wasteful fuel consumption. The battalion commander was thinking about the following incident. The company had approached a river. While the crew of the scout vehicle looked for a ford, and this exercise took almost half an hour, the company's tanks were standing in a grove of trees with engines running. Upon learning of this, Captain Ganyushkin appropriately downgraded the performance mark and did appropriate remedial work with the company commander. Today the company under the command of Senior Lieutenant Stanovov is successfully accomplishing its economy and thrift pledges and has been awarded a special pennant.

The following incident was also treated severely. In the company in which Lt V. Sintserov was serving as acting commander, poor performance was being shown at gunnery exercises. There were firing delays due to poor readying of weapons. Runs had to be repeated, and this involved additional, unwarranted fuel consumption and vehicle mileage. The incident at the tank gunnery range was discussed at a battalion party meeting. Lieutenant Sintserov drew the proper conclusions -- he now thoroughly prepares for each and every training drill.

The tank crews expend ammunition economically. No firing exercise is conducted until the men are thoroughly prepared for it. In the past as many as one third of the gunners would fail a gunnery exercise, but this did not particularly bother anybody: their attitude would be that it was merely a practice drill, that the real test still lay ahead, and that they would catch up. But nobody thought about the fact that vehicles and ammunition could be utilized more beneficially at this stage as well. Now the situation has changed. Commanders do not tolerate attempts to increase the number of exercises and drills to the detriment of quality performance. When the training process is running smoothly and uniformly and when careful planning and execution is observed in all activities, material resources are also utilized more efficiently and economically.

The campaign for thrift and economy is inseparably linked with the adoption of advanced methods and improving the proficiency rating of specialists. An excellent fuel economy figure attests to the high degree of skill on the part of the drivers, while economical expenditure of ammunition confirms the ability of gunners to hit the target with the first round, and decreased expenditure of replacement parts and assemblies attests to skillful, intelligent equipment operation, careful maintenance and storage.

Tank crews are working particularly hard on these final days of the training year. Perfecting their military skills, they are endeavoring optimally to utilize material resources, in which considerable labor by the people is invested.

Wartime Experience Used

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Goryavin, Order of Lenin Transbaikal Military District: "Enriched with the Experience of the War Years"]

[Text] The tank crews in the company under the command of Gds Sr Lt O. Pozdnyakov were to work on a combat drill involving an attack on a built-up area. On the eve of the exercise the tank crews reported to the regimental combat glory room. Here the battalion commander, Gds Capt V. Zaytsev, related to his men the tough battles fought by the men of their regiment during the Great Patriotic War in liberating Kiev, Vienna, and Prague. He then analyzed in detail one of the engagements. In November 1943, during the liberation of Kiev, a particularly outstanding job was done by a member of the regiment, Gds 1st Sgt Nikifor Sholudenko, whose tank was the first to enter the Square imeni M. I. Kalinin. How did this come about? Guards Captain Zaytsev showed the men on a diagram camouflaged enemy tanks, buildings set up for a perimeter defense, and antitank guns in basements.... Considerable skill was required to penetrate such a defense. The men of the regiment had plenty of skill. The battalion commander's narrative brought to life episodes from the history of the regiment, pages from the unfading past.

A few days later, when preparing for a training drill, Guards Senior Lieutenant Pozdnyakov recreated in the tactical training area much of that which he had presented in the combat glory room. The company performed enthusiastically in the mock engagement.

This is not merely an isolated instance of success on the part of instructors. In the Port Arthur Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment they study and utilize war experience in practical combat training on a daily basis and in an effective manner. They painstakingly recreate the tactical situations in which regimental personnel fought. They help understand precisely in what was expressed the tactical skill of the combat veterans, their ability to make maximum use of the capabilities of the equipment.

Conducting a drill with drivers, for example, Gds Maj V. Semka told of an engagement in which tank driver Gds 1st Sgt I. Mozzhalov had distinguished himself, subsequently being awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The point of discussion was the ability to utilize the protective properties of the terrain, to run a vehicle along a highly complex route, etc.

At a training drill for regimental scouts I heard the story of how on 12 October 1943 Gds Lt N. Polyanskiy, subsequently named Hero of the Soviet Union, mounted with a group of fellow soldiers a bold raid on the headquarters of a fascist infantry division and wiped it out, capturing valuable documents. In this instance as well they set up the situation, analyzed in detail the actions of the raiding party, and analyzed the feat from the standpoint of tactical skill.

Obviously today's subunit capabilities are immeasurably greater than in the past. Radical changes have also taken place in the character of combat. The Port Arthur guardsmen, enriching themselves with actual combat experience, more thoroughly understand these changes and seek the most effective means of employing new weapons. Utilization of war experience makes activities within the commander training system more interesting and memorable. A certain scientific-practical conference, for example, evoked considerable thought on the part of the officers. The regimental commander presented a report on the comparative characteristics of penetration of a fortified defense by a motorized rifle battalion in the final stage of the Great Patriotic War and under present-day conditions. The report was especially valuable in that it compared not "averaged" figures but concrete engagements from the regiment's actual history. In particular, an engagement in 1944 which was directed by front-line commander Gds Sr Lt I. Usik, and a battalion mock engagement, directed by Gds Maj V. Semka, held on the eve of a conference.

Much is done in the regiment to study thoroughly the unit's combat history. Active correspondence is conducted with war veterans. A letter from Maj (Res) M. Kantar from Ľvov (during the war years he served as the unit's chief of intelligence) helped detail several engagements. Additional symbols appeared on the diagrams.

The regiment's combat experience not only broadens tactical horizons and inspires the men to an innovative approach to solving combat training problems. Acquaintance with the heroic past is of enormous indoctrinational significance, helps the men become more deeply and fully aware of the essence of the glorious traditions of the army and navy and engenders a strong desire to be worthy of them and to add to these traditions with selfless military labor.

Soon the Soviet people will be celebrating the 30th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The Port Arthur guardsmen, worthily completing a tough but fruitful training year, are making preparations for this anniversary celebration. According to the calendar schedule, each year, prior to the beginning of training exercises, commanders and political workers relate to personnel how the men of this regiment lived and what tasks they performed 35 years ago, and what ordeals they experienced on the road to victory.

War experience is priceless. It lives on, serving the cause of achieving perfection in combat and teaching courage, fortitude, and total devotion to the socialist homeland to the successors of the deathless fame of the war veterans.

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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Submarine Crew Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jan 80 p 1

[Text] Sr Lt V. Gromak--The time to change shifts was approaching. The seamen that were take over the action stations froze at attention in smart formation. The submarine commander checked their readiness and carefully briefed the soldiers. Soon the briefing came to its end. But the commander was in no hurry to dismiss the formation. He still had a few minutes to spare. The officer used the time to remind the seamen of their socialist pledges, and to tell the people about the successes of the personnel in the other two combat shifts. The soldiers went off to their duties charged up for victory in the socialist competition.

This pattern became customary within the crew. The combat shifts actively competed among themselves in the recent cruise. The best shift was determined each day. The winners were given a special pennant. The combat shift headed by Capt 3d Rank Yu. Slesarev won this honorable award more often than the others. It was also announced to be the best in the crew on the basis of the long cruise's results.

The seamen of this shift are distinguished not only by high proficiency but also combat coordination, unity, and friendship. A strong collective evolved here during the cruise. Communists Capt-Lt O. Baranov, PO 2d Class Yu. Il'kayev, and others helped the commander a great deal to unify the collective. They held readings from Lenin and evening discussions on specific topics for the combat shifts. The communists in many ways promoted creation of an atmosphere of healthy rivalry in the collective, and it was on their initiative that competitions on combat standards, competitive reviews for the best compartment, and technical quizzes were held.

When the seamen took to their watch, nothing, even the strong steel bulkheads separating the people, could prevent them from feeling that they were a single collective. And when evening came, Slesarev gathered the people together by the graph showing the competition results for the three combat shifts. The results of the current cruising days were thoroughly discussed at this time. Everything was analyzed: in what ways they had beat their rivals, where they were still behind, and what they could glean from the best experience.

The submariners are meeting the new year in a good mood. They are entering it mature, enriched by the best experience accumulated in hard, lengthy cruises. The seamen face new nautical miles, and new long cruises. And this means that a stubborn fight for the coveted pennant will flare up in the crew, the proficiency of the soldiers will rise even higher, and the combat shifts will become even better coordinated.

Antisubmarine 'Marshal Timoshenko'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 3d Rank S. Bystrov radioed the commander of the large antisubmarine warfare ship "Marshal Timoshenko", which was on a long cruise, asking him to relate what the crew was doing to celebrate the new year on the ocean.

Responding to our correspondent's request, Capt 1st Rank V. Samozhenov said:

"Today, at a time when new year trees are sparkling in every Soviet apartment, and winter frost leaves its imprint on the windowpanes, our ship is lit up with navigation lights and the warm sea beats constantly against its side. It is to some degree a pity that the holiday caught us away from our native shores, though at the same time the seamen are even proud that they are meeting the new year in the navy way, on the ocean. Incidentally, for many officers this is not the first new year celebrated at sea; as an example, this is the third one for me. The holiday atmosphere aboard ship is unique, and it is long remembered. Of course, we do not smell the pines, and artificial traditional trees stand in the ward-room, mess decks, and cabins, the living spaces are resourcefully decorated, and we do have our own Grandfather Frost. At exactly midnight he will visit the action stations to congratulate those who served the first watch in 1980.

"In a word, the ship entered the new year in full combat readiness. The cruise demands constant alertness from the seamen--this is another way that this holiday at sea is noteworthy. And even when off-duty officers convene in the ward-room for their holiday dinner after congratulating their subordinates on their mess deck, when the discussion turns to those who wait for us at home, all will still remember that we are on a cruise, that the motherland is far away, and that it will soon be our turn to take the watch.

"Nevertheless, our program will be the same as on land, and we will even have a little request concert. Sr Lt V. Danil'chenko, the secretary of the ship's party bureau, will play the piano. He will be accompanied by accordionist Lt A. Gagarin. We will hear our favorite melodies and songs, songs about the navy, with which we have tied our fate forever. And though we may be far away, and although we do not receive mail in the way that others do, the crew will still receive many messages of congratulations. There will be radio messages from the command and from relatives, and letters that wives had written earlier and given to Capt-Lt A. Rimkos, the deputy commander for political affairs, for later delivery. Before the cruise, he visited the families of many of the officers and warrant officers and taped their holiday wishes. Even I had prepared my words of congratulations to the crew.

"There are many kind things I want to say to each subordinate, but as the commander, I sense a special debt to the commander of the ship's best fire control division, Capt 3d Rank S. Pilintsov--it was in many ways owing to him that the ship completed all of its missile firing practices last year with an outstanding grade, and retained the navy prize; I am indebted to Engr-Capt 3d Rank N. Vyatkin, the commander of an outstanding electrical and engineering division, for the dependability with which the ship travels; I am indebted to Capt-Lt Yu. Pechenykh, commander of an outstanding navigation division, since it is his proficiency and his experience as a navigator that help us to keep true to the course in all situations.

"In a word, the crew of our ship put a great deal of effort into the past year in order to achieve perfect mastery of the combat equipment and weapons, and to complete all missions with high quality. The antisubmariners, who competed stubbornly for economical consumption of POL, are standing their watch alertly.

"The 'Marshal Timoshenko' has very important things to do in 1980. Having taken first place in the formation three times now, our ship has pledged to become an outstanding ship in the year of the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of our victory. And this cruise, during which we celebrated the new year, was the first and very important step toward this lofty goal."

On the Cruiser 'Admiral Ushakov'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Capt 2d Rank L. Buchinskiy, Capt-Lt S. Malikhov--Much time has passed since the cruiser "Admiral Ushakov" held its party election meeting. But party committee secretary Capt 3d Rank I. Mel'nik feels as if it was held just last night, so fresh is his memory of the events of that day: the sharp criticism levied by the communists against the party committee, and their words to the effect that things cannot go on like this any longer.

Mel'nik took the remarks of his comrades as a personal reproach. He felt them hard. He analyzed his work again and again. He pondered. And his thoughts invariably returned to the incident that in a sense erased everything good the party committee had done previously.

This is what happened. At the end of the training year a group of senior staff officers visited the cruiser to check the ship's readiness for a test exercise. They were interested in the proficiency of the gunners. Mainly the officers. There was nothing unusual in this choice. After all, the success of the forthcoming exercise, in which the main guns were to be fired at naval targets, depended mainly upon the proficiency of the gunnery officers.

Capt 3d Rank Mel'nik had no doubt that the inspection would end favorably. How could it be possibly otherwise! The fire control division (the BCh-2) bore the outstanding title, and it was said to be the best aboard the cruiser. All gunnery practices prior to the finals invariably earned good and excellent grades. Twice in the past the cruiser won the navy's perpetual prize. There were more top-class specialists and masters of combat qualification in the BCh-2 than in any other subunit aboard the ship. The party committee secretary was secretly proud of the division, and he felt that the cruiser's party committee deserved a great share of the credit for its achievements.

But the inspection was a painful blow to Mel'nik's ego. Just discussions with BCh-2 commander Capt 3d Rank A. Ryabchenko, battalion commanders capts 3d rank A. Klimchev and Yu. Siluanov, and other officers showed that the level of their special and technical training deserved only a satisfactory grade in the best case. Moreover they were not asked anything very difficult--only that which they had to know if they were to successfully perform their duties. Here they were, top-class specialists and competition leaders, and now it was all in shambles!

The party committee secretary could not believe this at first. "This cannot be!" he exclaimed. "There must be some mistake here." But there was no mistake.

The deeper the inspectors delved into the tactical and gunnery proficiency of the subunit's officers, the more deficiencies they uncovered. It was found in particular that some of them had an extremely weak knowledge of the guidelines governing artillery training. It was no accident that the subunit committed gross violations of the requirements--it failed to adhere to the mandatory program of gunnery exercises in preparation for the finals. Significant shortcomings were revealed in the course of the exercise. The men were unable to prepare all of the main guns for fire, or to complete the rapid-fire training battle.

The following question naturally arose: How did the subunit ever earn such high grades for the gunnery practices preceding this test exercise?

The real reason came to light later: These gunnery practices were conducted in maximally simplified conditions, with the guns, turrets, and crews operating in the "standard" ways. The gunnery tactics were not diversified.

As the inspectors validly noted, outstanding grades could be earned in such a controlled environment. But what would the true value of these grades be if we gauged them against the needs of real battle?

It stands to reason that the blame for the sins in gunner training lay mainly with the division staff, the ship commander, and the commander of the BCh-2, Capt 3d Rank A. Ryabchenko. But being the secretary of the party committee, Capt 3d Rank Mel'nik also felt responsible for what happened. And now he tried to understand how he had erred.

It cannot be said that the party committee did not fight for quality and effectiveness in officer tactical, gunnery, and special training.

It was not hard for the party committee secretary to remember the numerous meetings at which the personal example given by communist officers in the training and the need for raising the demands placed on their personal contribution to the collective's successes were discussed. Meetings were also specially devoted to the state of affairs in Capt 3d Rank A. Ryabchenko's subunit. The course and results of officer tactical and special training were discussed at one of them. It was stated that training was not clearly organized here, that lesson attendance was low, and that some officers were not very active. It was noted that the lessons were often postponed indefinitely, and that there were many deficiencies in the teacher training of some instructors. Party members Capt 3d Rank N. Cherey, BCh-2 commander Capt 3d Rank A. Ryabchenko, and main gun battalion commander Capt 3d Rank A. Klimchev were criticized for these and other shortcomings. The party committee adopted an expanded resolution. A long-term schedule for upgrading the technical and special knowledge of the officers was written up with its help. Thus we cannot accuse the party committee of being inattentive of combat training. But what changed after this meeting? Almost nothing at all. The party committee members could have persuaded themselves of this many times. As an example a short time after this meeting they made a surprise inspection during specialty drills. No changes had been made for the better. As in previous times, battalion commanders capts 3d rank Klimchev and Siluanov idled in their cabins, simply wasting training time. Many other officers sat around with nothing to do as well.

These facts were recorded, but what was done to improve things? All of the effort was limited to more talk about the low organization of specialty training. The party committee even "forgot" to see what sort of action was being taken in response to the critical remarks stated during that party committee meeting, and to correct those that were guilty of the deficiencies; no one thought about checking on compliance with the long-term schedule. Perhaps this all happened because the party committee, which intervened in officer technical training in this fashion, engaged for practical purposes in something out of its line, nullifying its political influence--the thing the party organ was mainly responsible for. The party committee developed a desire to act through administrative sanctions. This alone was enough to lead to failure.

The examples are also typical from the standpoint of the work "style" of the party committee. Judge for yourselves. In the period of accountability, it held 44 meetings and adopted as many resolutions, but in comparison with previous years the state of affairs in what is most important--tactical, gunnery, and special training--did not improve; it even deteriorated. Why was the effectiveness of the party committee's work so low?

We believe that the cause lay mainly in the low demands placed upon the communists on a day-to-day basis, and the lack of consistency in nurturing their personal responsibility for assigned work. The cause lay in the fact that for practical purposes the party committee could do nothing to counter the atmosphere of indifference and conceit that had evolved in a number of communists in response to previous successes.

Take as an example the same BCh-2. The party committee could not have been ignorant of the poor state of occupational training at least because two members of the party committee are assigned directly to this subunit. Nor was it a secret that the party organization of the BCh-2 was not distinguished by aggressive work, and that it often condoned simplifications in combat training and formalism in the organization of competitions on missions and standards. But the party committee never arrived at the logical conclusions.

True, the secretary of the party organization, a passive and unprincipled person, was voted out of office by special election on the insistence of the division's communists. But the matter never went further than that. After the new secretary was elected--warrant officer V. Bondarenko--the party organization of BCh-2 did not begin to work more aggressively, and it failed to do far from everything in its power to unify the collective even more. It is obviously not enough to replace one secretary by another; he must also be taught to work. But the party committee just could not find the time to train its active party members.

Borrowing, sometimes incompetently, the techniques of a commander's work, the party committee began writing up all sorts of schedules, forgetting to some extent the need for conducting concrete indoctrination work with the communists. And its appeals for strictness were usually of a general, so to speak disinterested nature; its appeals were simply declared, without being refracted through the prism of daily practical activities. For example, many of the best specialists, including communists, failed to satisfy their socialist pledges. But for practical purposes the party committee made no one answerable for the shortcomings. The party committee started off the new training year, as an example, by neglecting to note the low quality with which the cruiser completed two of its cruise missions, and the carelessness and sluggishness of the persons responsible for this work. The party committee's condescension in appraising the facts, and its position of noninterference generated indifference and irresponsibility in certain comrades for the state of affairs in their assigned work; its approach reduced the fervor of the people, such that it could not mobilize them to engage in creative enquiry, and selfless labor.

We would think that following the party election meeting, Capt 3d Rank Mil'nik, who was reelected party committee secretary, extracted the necessary lessons from the criticism of his comrades. We were persuaded of this in a recent visit to the cruiser. The seamen adopted high pledges in the competition. The party committee was keeping its hand on the pulse of the competition. The organization of special training improved as well. But it is a little too soon to make any sort of satisfying conclusions from these facts. Success becomes stable only after an atmosphere of high responsibility, each for one's own area, is established in the collective, after the people begin to work creatively, with full effort and capability, in all areas. Such an atmosphere is not created in one sweep, by implementing just one measure. What we need here is consistency, purposefulness, and persistence, things that the party committee and its secretary had formerly lacked.

Escort Ship Weathers Storm

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Capt 1st Rank M. Remizov, Twice-Awarded Red Banner Baltic Fleet--The escort ship commanded by Capt-Lt S. Akimov was caught in a violent storm. The hull and the ship's mechanisms and systems were damaged by the blows of the powerful waves. Under the guidance of the commander and his assistant, Capt-Lt A. Bgan, the seamen competently and steadfastly fought the savage elements. Seamen A. Korotkikh, V. Sharapov, G. Yevstaf'yev, and D. Degtyarev spent many days on watch in the extremely difficult conditions, controlling the ship by hand. Engr-Capt Lt S. Bobov, commander of the electrical and engineering division, and boatswain Warrant Officer V. Starchenko demonstrated high skill at their posts in their struggle against the storm.

The ship returned to its home base on its own steam. Navy Deputy Commander in Chief Engr-Adm V. Novikov, who was aboard the ship during the storm, noted that the crew had acted in the best traditions of naval practice.

Missile Ship Combat Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 80 p 1

[Text] Lt V. Samoylov, Twice-Awarded Red Banner Baltic Fleet--The large missile ship "Prozorlivyy" is undergoing intense combat training on the Atlantic. The naval seamen are striving for an honorable welcome to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

During one day of its cruise the "Prozorlivyy" conducted a firefighting exercise on a complex tactical background. The personnel had to work in the face of a simulated enemy's use of a mass destruction weapon.

Engr-Sr Lt P. Stroy, the commander of the electrical and engineering division, organized reconnaissance of the simulated site of the fire without delay. Engr-Sr Lt Yu. Bystrov competently managed the actions of personnel in the emergency crew. The simulated fire was put out significantly faster than required by the standard.

Submarine Damage Control Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 80 p 1

[Text] Sr Lt I. Anfert'yev--The penetrating ringing of the alarm rended the silence. Alarming reports began to flow in to the central command post after the command to inspect the compartments was given:

"The cable line on the left side is burning!"

"Thick smoke!"

"The hydraulic pipeline is ruptured!"

So began a routine exercise of submarine survival. According to the scenario the "enemy" had made a surprise attack on the submarine as it was standing at its base, resulting in serious damage. Now the mission of the seamen was to restore its battleworthiness and prepare it for combat and cruising in the shortest time possible.

The fight to keep a ship alive is a battle of its own. The enemy here is the fire and water, and the battlefield is the decks and the compartments. Events evolve just as swiftly as in combat with a real enemy. Here as well a commander organizing the fight for the ship's survival must be able to orient himself confidently in the constantly more complex situation, and to quickly make competent, unstereotypic decisions.

The first problem that the submarine commander had to resolve in the very beginning of the exercise was who to send to reconnoiter the damage in the "struck" compartment. Ordinarily he would send the subordinates of Warrant Officer V. Lapin. But the situation was now evolving in such a way that removing the soldiers from their action stations would delay the boat's preparation for combat and cruising.

He had to find another solution. A compartment occupied by personnel under the charge of Warrant Officer V. Tatarnikov happened to be in the compartment next to the one that was "struck". But it was impossible at the moment for these seamen to reconnoiter the situation. Were they to raise the handle of the rack-and-pinion and open the bulkhead door, poisonous gases formed as a result of the fire in the "struck" compartment would immediately spread throughout the boat.

The situation was estimated in precious seconds. A brief consultation was held with the commander of the electrical and engineering division, Engr-Capt 2d Rank V. Yatkin, and a decision was made. The possibility that poisonous gases would penetrate through was anticipated by a complex of well-conceived measures: The "struck" compartment was first ventilated, and the pressure inside it was reduced. The personnel donned personal protective resources.

Warrant Officer V. Tatarnikov and PO 2d Class A. Markelov, wearing pressure suits and armed with fire extinguishers and self-powered lighting fixtures, went in to examine the simulated damage and the simulated fires. In just a few minutes soldiers of the emergency crew headed by Capt 3d Rank S. Litvinyuk followed them into the compartment to fight the fire and the water. The seamen operated in coordinated fashion, and they plugged the "holes," put out the "fires," and corrected the malfunctions of the technical resources faster than required. The sharpness of Litvinyuk's commands was worthy of note. He competently distributed the men and equipment and managed the damage control operations in the compartment.

Numerous training sessions with a new electrified trainer built by the boat's experts had their effect. This trainer affords a possibility for playing out all emergency situations, even the most complex, and to thoroughly evaluate the correctness of commands, and the quality and effectiveness of the management of the damage control operations. Each submarine officer sat down at the console of this training device dozens of times in preparation for the important exercise. Interesting competitions were set up and managed by staff officers O. Klatayevskiy, G. Krinitskiy, and others.

Training rallies recently held in the department were of great benefit in honing the skills of the officers in damage control organization. During these rallies each commander, senior assistant, and subunit commander was able to test out his strengths in his role as the watch engineer-mechanic, in his role as compartment training officer, and in his role as emergency crew commander.

I soon came to understand that it is difficult to get by without various sorts of trainers and simulators in specialist training, ones which would help the seamen to quickly assimilate the principles of operation of certain instruments and devices. I also realized something else: One person cannot do all of this alone. I began to study the seamen more attentively, and to select assistants for myself. And I found many such persons with a curious, restless nature, capable of creativity. Chief petty officers L. Grafchikov, V. Bespalov, B. Zamorin, and Yu. Bravyy dove head first into the work.

The clear military order, the atmosphere of friendship and mutual assistance, and the possibility for doing something interesting inspired me. For days on end I drew diagrams and selected the best design of the training aids. Then together with my assistants I assembled the devices. In just a single year we developed and introduced dozens of efficiency proposals aimed at improving the training process.

But that which satisfied us yesterday already seems imperfect today. Thus we decided to reoutfit our training office, which at that time was recognized to be the best in the fleet. We thought about creating a training complex that would satisfy life's requirements more fully.

It was a lot of hard work. Neither I nor my assistants knew any rest. But we achieved our goal. Navy Commander in Chief Admiral of the Soviet Navy S. G. Gorshkov, on visiting the training complex, gave it a high assessment and called it the best in the navy.

This success raised my spirits aloft, and it was at that time that I made my final decision: "I'll stay in the navy!" The command satisfied my request.

As the years passed, the scope of my explorations broadened considerably. Electrified stands, trainers, simulators--these, of course, are good. But experience persuaded me that not every soldier could become an outstanding signalman. This specialty requires certain basic gifts and the appropriate character traits in the individual. How are we to select from among all of the young people entering the navy, those most suited to the signalman's specialty? The search for the answer to this question absorbed my attention entirely.

I had to read a considerable amount of special literature, and many psychology textbooks. And so I developed tables, tests, and exercises, and I created an instrument with which to determine memory characteristics and reaction swiftness. The "Signal"--this is the name we gave to the new device--earned a first degree diploma at the All-Army Review of Technical Training Resources, and it was recommended for industrial production. Somewhat later I created the unified "Signal", one making it possible to solve even other problems of making young specialists ready for work in the fastest time.

Today I am an instructor at the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov. But I still keep my hand in invention work; I manage an unofficial scientific research laboratory. Optimizing the training process on the basis of automation is the will of the times. We are now preparing four complex instruments for the Exhibition of the Achievements of the USSR National Economy, to be ready by the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth. These instruments are to be used to teach naval occupations to students in the most effective way, permitting them to use each minute of training time with maximum payoff. And I am well aware of the sort of difficulties the students encounter: The school in which I now serve is the one in which I had completed correspondence courses.

I work together with enthusiastic, creative engineers--captains 1st rank G. Voinov and M. Kondratenko, warrant officers R. Garayev and Ye. Lukoshkin, Cadet S. Tsitlionok, and others. They are distinguished by enviable stubborness, initiative, and the desire to see things through to the end. Following the law of naval comradeship, we always come to one another's aid.

Several years have passed since my decision to stay with the navy. I have found my calling here. I have become a senior officer and I earned the RSFSR Distinguished Efficiency Expert title. For all of this I am indebted to the navy, which has become a true school of life, a school of learning for me.

Time will pass. Senior lieutenants Sergey and Vyacheslav Podporinov, lieutenants A. Andrusenko and A. Misyur, and other young officers who decided as I did, after completing my first term of service, to remain in the armed forces as a career, will consolidate their position in the combat formation, and confirm their calling. And, without a doubt, they also will thank the navy very much.

Map-Making Facility Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jan 80 p 4

[Text] Sr Lt (Res) V. Yeliseyev--"Dear editor!

"I am a submarine navigator. Our boat must often go to sea on combat training missions. And with every new cruise a new map appears on my desk. As a rule the quality of these maps is high. Plotting courses on these maps, I always gratefully think about the people who made these maps. Could KRASNAYA ZVEZDA tell us about where sea charts are made, and who makes them?"

Sr Lt N. Patin

Satisfying the reader's request, we published a report on the Naval Central Map-Making Office below.

The huge bright building, almost half a kilometer long, stands on a quiet street, far away from the noise of sea waves and the whine of ocean winds. But one can sense the breathing of the ocean in almost every room, and the excitement of distant naval expeditions is visually evident--such is the unique aspect of the institution housed here. It is truly as if all of the oceans are right next door.

A large collective of map-makers labors within the walls of the building. The TsKP--the Naval Central Map-Making Office--is our country's only enterprise producing sea charts, navigational directions, beacon descriptions, radio-technical navigation resources, and other navigation aids insuring sailing safety.

The duty officer led me to the office of the TsKP chief. An officer stood up from his desk and presented himself:

"Capt 1st Rank Faleyev...."

One of the walls of his office is covered by racks of books dominated by marine handbooks published in Russian and in English, atlases, navigational directions, military regulations, instructions, manuals, and recommendations.

Half of the second wall is occupied by a unique map of the world ocean, drawn up by the light-shadow isobath method. This map makes it possible to envision the topography of the bottom of the seas and oceans, as if from aboard a craft flying above the water. The most important merit of this map is that the accuracy of the geographic coordinates never changes as one uses the map over a long period of time.

It is with the history of this unique map's creation that Viktor Ivanovich Faleyev began his story. The making of the map required the use of more than 2,500 Soviet and foreign sources. The work went on for four years. The most experienced specialists took part in it. Thus the map's editor was Zoya Pavlovna Maslichenko, who had a record of a quarter century of service. Relief map artist Nikolay Konstantinovich Lepkovskiy has been working at the TsKP for thirty years.

The creators of the world's only relief map of the world ocean exhibited it in Geneva at the UN Third International Conference on the Law of the Sea. Representatives from many countries, specialists versed in the use of sea charts, took part in the conference proceedings. Their high evaluations were unanimous.

"Another fundamental labor of the marine cartographers," Capt 1st Rank Faleyev continued his story, "is the unique 'Atlas of the Oceans', at the moment the only one of its size in the world. Two volumes of this publication have already been printed. One of them gives answers to many oceanographic, geographic, ecological, hydrometeorological, and historical questions about the Pacific Ocean. The second volume is devoted to the Atlantic Ocean."

Chief editor Vadim Sergeyevich Makarov joined the discussion on the "Atlas of the Oceans":

"The atlas was compiled on the basis of numerous measurements made by naval hydrographic vessels and the USSR Academy of Sciences scientific research fleet. We also made use of foreign maps, catalogs, and descriptions. In addition to our map-makers, specialists from 23 of our country's scientific research institutes took part in the atlas's creation."

"For whom is the 'Atlas of the Oceans' intended?"

"The atlas is intended mainly for naval officers, for captains and navigators of the fishing and transport fleets, and for scientific workers," explained Capt 1st Rank Faleyev. "Navy Commander in Chief Admiral of the Soviet Navy S. G. Gorshkov is the editor in chief of the 'Atlas of the Oceans'. The world recognition received by the two published volumes of the 'Atlas of the Oceans' is evidence of the high level of Soviet oceanology and oceanography."

"What do you mean, Viktor Ivanovich, when you say recognition?"

"On 22 February of last year the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium held a meeting under the chairmanship of Academician A. P. Aleksandrov, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The 'Atlas of the Oceans' produced enthusiastic responses during the meeting. We are also aware of positive responses from foreign specialists. As an example the English and Japanese have applied for the right to publish the 'Atlas of the Oceans', and they have proposed purchasing all of the copies from us. The International Geographical Organization declared that the atlas's content is faultless, and that the printing is fabulous."

I leafed through the pages of the enormous volumes. It was truly impossible to not take pleasure in the completeness in the information contained therein. As an example the first volume contained a map needed by naval school historians and teachers: "The Most Important Russian Expeditions Prior to the Mid-19th Century." The following page was a map of Russian expeditions into the north Pacific, showing the routes taken by the great Russian pioneers, navigators, and explorers S. Dezhnev, A. Poyarkov, O. Kotsebu, and G. Nevel'skoy.

Navigators sailing the Pacific will doubtlessly find the "Sunami" map helpful; it contains data on this menacing phenomenon from 1737 to the present. A separate map of the Kuril-Kamchatka coastline shows a curve marking the distance from which it would take 15 minutes for sunami waves to reach the coast. A knowledge of this distance would make it possible to implement the appropriate protective measures.

Maps in the "Atmospheric Circulation" section, which give wind speeds and directions for every month of the year, are a good aid to navigators.

Cyclone and anticyclone maps, earthquake and volcano maps, and maps of the tides and of other hydrometeorological phenomena make the "Atlas of the Oceans" a true encyclopedia of the World Ocean.

Among other projects of the marine map-makers, the world's first attempt at creating a detailed map of the Mediterranean Sea through the joint efforts of scholars from several countries is interesting. Specialists of the Soviet Union, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the FRG are participating in the work on this map. It will be published in our country.

"We have been talking about unique publications," Capt 1st Rank Faleyev noted. "But naturally our main day-to-day work involves the production of the ordinary sea charts that are used by literally all of our navigators."

The TsKP is one of the oldest enterprises of the domestic navy. Its age induces respect--it is over 200. Of course, there has been several generations of cartographers in such a long period of time. But their traditions are handed down, and they live within the collective. One such tradition is that of naming the places upon the world map after prominent compatriots. The library of reference literature possessed by the TsKP was used as the basis for publication of the books "Handbook on the History of Geographic Names on the USSR Coast" and "Russian Names on World Maps". The list of geographic objects appearing on the world maps in literally just the last few years includes the Voyeykov Shelf Glacier, Somov Sea (named in honor of the Soviet Antarctic explorer M. Somov), and others.

Capt 1st Rank V. I. Faleyev's diploma from the naval academy states: "Top-Grade Hydrographer-Navigator". The officer served with hydrographic expeditions in the North and in the Far East, and he himself collected the valuable data represented on today's sea charts as oceanic depths, bathymetric lines, and the outlines of islands, bays, and gulfs. Capt 1st Rank Faleyev has served 16 years in the Central Map-Making Office, during eight of which he has been its chief and, concurrently, the editor in chief of the "Atlas of the Oceans".

The work of the sea chart creators is truly valorous. The highest assessment given to this labor, they feel, is the gratefulness expressed by ship commanders, vessel captains, navigators, and all who make use of the aids prepared by the Navy Central Map-Making Office.

Seamen Physical Preparedness

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Adm V. Chernavin, Commander, Red Banner Northern Fleet--Whenever our fleet summarizes the results of a long cruise or a training battle, in addition to the combat skills displayed and the tactical proficiency of the cruise, the senior chiefs mandatorily evaluate the personnel's physical fitness. Such is a unique feature of naval labor: It has always demanded high physical preparedness from the seamen. The intense nature of combat at sea and the hard judgment of the elements impose a heavy load upon the personnel, one which only strong, courageous people can endure. It would be sufficient to point out that during a storm, practically every ship find itself carrying people suffering severe seasickness (especially among the young seamen). However, it would be difficult to recall a case where bad weather kept our ships from performing their complex missions.

The large antisubmarine ship "Admiral Yumashev" was caught in such a severe storm during a cruise that it became extremely difficult to service and operate the equipment. The wind speed reached 40 meters per second. Capt 3d Rank A. Stefanov and his subordinates knew no rest for several days. They devoted all of their effort to fighting the raging elements. And the "Admiral Yumashev" had just barely returned to home port before it was once again sent out to sea for an inspection of its missile launching capabilities, which mean so much to our navy. The crew, which had not been given an opportunity to rest, completed its new mission with excellent grades, displaying high combat proficiency, stability, and good physical endurance.

The electronics, automation, and telemechanics with which modern ships are outfitted do of course significantly facilitate the labor of the naval seamen. But replacement of physical work by mental tension does not reduce the load: It only modifies it. Moreover as combat equipment and weapons grow more complex and as the tactics of their use develop, the action this load has upon the body grows, rather than decreasing. Here are a few examples.

Consider an atomic submarine traveling beneath the ice in Arctic latitudes, seeking a break in the ice so that it could surface. The crew must sometimes spend many hours on meticulous, important work associated with a certain amount of risk. All, beginning with the commander and ending with the common seamen, experience high nervous tension that causes fatigue to set in faster. A good reserve of strength is required for successful surfacing.

But what about during combat at sea? Sometimes, for example, it takes so long for surface ships to hunt for a submarine that both the commander and the crew begin to feel deeply tired of the monotonous, scrupulous work that requires so much attention and offers so little to freedom of movement. But no matter how long the hunting takes, the personnel must maintain their alertness, swift reactions, and clear thinking. All of this would be needed in the battle that would subsequently take place when the "enemy" is discovered.

The experience of many training battles has shown that tiredness sometimes dulls the acuity of technical thinking, the freshness with which events are perceived, and the reactions of even the experienced commanders. Only a physically prepared crew would be able to mobilize its efforts at the decisive moment.

Indicative in this respect is the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The famous submariner Hero of the Soviet Union Rear Admiral I. Kolyshkin described one of the combat cruises of the submarine S-56, commanded by Capt 3d Rank G. Shchedrik, as follows in his memoirs:

"The submarine had it unusually hard. First it was caught in a storm of hurricane force.... After the elements died down, the boat's position was discovered by an escort vessel and a destroyer near enemy shore. The latter pursued the S-56 for more than 26 hours, dropping more than 30 depth charges. Just think about these figures! That was more than a day of continuous work and colossal nervous tension for each crewmember, and especially for the commander! Such a day ages a person as much as a whole year of easy life. One unwittingly asks: What is the limit of the load that a person can endure?"

This question still faces us today. In the ship-man system, the latter is the most important element. The concept of "fatigue" is also used in engineering, but naturally the fatigue experienced by people operating equipment is what troubles us the most. As an example the modern atomic submarine is intended to remain at sea for significant periods of time. The limit of its practical independence, however, which is below the technical possibilities of the craft, is fixed by the crew's capability for remaining aboard at a high degree of combat readiness for a prolonged period of time without special rest. And this in many ways is predetermined by the endurance and the physical preparedness of the seamen. This is why we cannot improve the combat readiness of the crews today without increasing our attention to the physical fitness of the personnel.

It is thus no accident that a unique gymnasium containing various equipment is foreseen aboard modern atomic submarines, in which every square centimeter of space is precious, and that physical exercises for seamen are a mandatory element of their daily routine while at sea. An entire complex of mass sports functions is planned for long cruises. Physical training specialists, physicians, and the craft commander invariably maintain strict control over the physical condition of the personnel. The crew constantly undergoes research that is subsequently utilized to arrive at practical recommendations. Thus it was established through scientific observations made by special methods that the resistance the bodies of physically developed seamen offer to the effects of unfavorable factors aboard a submarine is twice higher than the resistance offered by the untrained body.

Nevertheless there is still much that is unexplored. Practice often rejects the forms and methods of maintaining a high working tone that are believed to be traditional and effective. I experienced this fact myself. The submarine I was commanding was on a cruise. We conducted physical exercises regularly, but their intensity seemed unsatisfactory to me. At first I decided to increase only my load. I found it a pleasure to work out on the parallel bars and with weights, and I felt alert; then suddenly I began to notice signs of weakness and sluggishness. I had overloaded myself. Rather than doing myself good, I did myself harm.

Since that time I have been convinced that strenuous exercises must be strictly dosed depending on the cruising time and on the way the person feels, and that they must not take on the features of competitive sports. Sports functions must be conducted during a cruise under the mandatory and strict control of the ship surgeon.

The landing deck of the ASW cruiser "Kiyev" can pass for a stadium beneath the open sky! Even during a long cruise, given proper organization of active rest, the crew can naturally be made to feel that it is ashore. But it is an entirely different matter in a crowded submarine with its artificial atmosphere, preventing active movement, where the main goal of physical exercises is to keep the submariner's body in optimum working tone for the given concrete conditions. Practice has shown that special physical exercises would best be supplemented by competitions having the main goal of relieving nervous, psychological, and emotional tension.

The effectiveness of this can be ascertained from the experience of the outstanding atomic submarine "Leninets". Physical training at sea is organized well aboard the craft. The championship games, which are held aboard in two stages, have been tested in practice, and they are being employed successfully at sea. The time for organizing these competitions is selected wisely. In the initial period they are coordinated with the highly complex phenomenon of adjusting to life at sea, and toward the end of the cruise the nature of these competitions is adjusted to this time of greatest tiredness. Naturally the personnel of the "Leninets" are distinguished by high combat proficiency and firm physical fitness. There are many good sportsmen aboard the boat, beginning with the commander, who is a master of rifle sports. Many officers play volleyball in formation and fleet leagues, and participate in marine all-around competitions and in other forms of sports.

Research on the specific ways to maintain combat readiness during long cruises is now being conducted on a scientific basis. Implementation of the latest instructions, methods, and recommendations by the crews helps them to increase their cruising time without causing the fatigue of the seamen to grow. However, it is important in this case to maintain a highly responsible attitude toward the problems of organizing physical training for the personnel during a cruise, and to persistently implement these recommendations. These are primarily the concerns of the craft commanders.

Unfortunately we still encounter cases in which the commanders themselves fail to serve as a positive example in this serious matter. Each year some of them must be transferred to shore duty until such time that they could work in command positions as they should. A person's age might still permit him to sail, and the officer may have a great desire to command a ship, but his reserve of strength and his health are lacking. This almost always happens simply due to negligence of one's physical training, due to the reluctance to understand that watching one's health and constantly training the body is an official responsibility of the commander. The complexity of this situation is also a product of the fact that we cannot always expect such officers to show concern for the physical fitness of the crew.

At the same time we do have many veterans who have served aboard submarine and surface ships for more than two decades, individuals who have spent many long years at responsible posts and who are nevertheless still perfectly healthy, untiring, and still capable of working hard at sea. The energy and alertness which they have managed to preserve are a highly important complement to their proficiency and experience.

Northern Fleet veteran officer G. Nikitin has been credited with many long cruises, from which the officer and his subordinates have always returned with high results in their missions. The experience of this officer deserves broad dissemination. He uses modern methods in his work with the personnel, considering everything and using everything to raise their combat readiness. To him, the physical preparedness of the seamen is not something secondary, something that could be evaded and dropped in the laps of specialists; instead, it is an integral part of training ashore and at sea. There is no need to belabor the point that the officer himself is very demanding of himself: He has held the crew skiing championship for several years. It is no surprise that this ship has held on to the cup for the best mass sports work in the fleet for two years, or that the personnel invariably received outstanding scores in physical fitness inspections.

This attitude toward seaman physical training must be nurtured in all commanders, and this factor must be considered when summarizing socialist competition results.

USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov emphasized many times that moral and psychological stability and high physical endurance are now as important to Soviet soldiers as weapons, as is the menacing military equipment itself. These words are full of practical meaning to naval seamen. Under otherwise equal conditions, he who is better prepared for combat, both morally and physically, and he who steadfastly endures all trials, maintains a deep faith in victory, and fully recognizes his patriotic and international duty to the motherland will win in combat.

Minesweeper Training Deficiencies

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Capt 1st Rank (Res) Ye. Korovin--Honesty and truthfulness live within the person unpretentiously. They need not be put on show. For that matter, why should anyone ever want to put them on show? Are they really such rare jewels in the motherlode of our life that we must take delight in each of their manifestations?

Whatever the truth is, judging from the letter written to the editor by Sr Lt D. Kim the latter was fully justified in praising himself for his truthfulness. He was the only person aboard ship who would not keep silent about the ignoble acts of some of his fellow servicemen during an exercise. This was all the more unexpected because his own personal behavior was also peppered by ignoble acts.

But more about Kim himself later. First let us look at his letter, since truth is truth, no matter who utters it.

The events evolved as follows. At the eve of the exercise, which was to be attended by the admiral, the base minesweeper practiced deploying its sweep. The crew had practiced this earlier with varying success, though it was felt that the personnel had practiced this operation enough. This time, however, the sweep got tangled up as if on purpose. It turned out that the cable was damaged in a number of places, and that the sweep might tear the next time it was deployed.

The question as to whether to deploy the sweep or not tormented battalion commander Capt 3d Rank I. Semenov from the very first minutes of the exercise. Three minesweepers were to travel ahead of the flagship and the ships following it. "What about having only two of the ships deploy their sweeps?" Semenov thought. "And have the third not deploy it, and just simulate deploying it?" Had he reported the true state of affairs to the unit commander, he may have avoided this distressing thought. But something like this is easier said than done. To report the problem would mean to stumble in front of the admiral.

"We will not take the risk!" Semenov decided.

That which happened aboard the ship after this decision not to deploy the sweep in no way recalled an exercise--it sooner recalled childsplay: Two cables were dropped from the stern, one attached to a 35-pound weightlifters weight, and the other to a balance weight, and so "sweeping operations" began.

Let me make it immediately clear that this incident with the make-believe sweep is an exception to our unit and to the navy in general. Thus it is all the more important to see how things turned out subsequently. The following notes appeared in the watch log: "Initiated preparations for sweep deployment. Sweeping crew briefed. Deployment initiated. Deployment complete...."

The hardest thing for minesweeper commander Sr Lt V. Soskin and department commander Lt M. Turlanov to do was to explain what the note "Sweeping crew briefed" in the watch log meant. This briefing was conducted without looking the seamen in the eye. It was embarrassing. And although some people later tried to explain that the weights had to be attached to the cables in place of the sweeping equipment in order to create an atmosphere of tension in the training, the strong, dexterous seamen, who had demonstrated their high skills at sea many times, were unable to sense the "tension" even in the wildest imaginings.

It was no less difficult to subsequently "brief" those who, in the event of an inspection, had to confirm that the sweep had in fact been deployed, and that the note in the watch log was true. Once again the eyes had to be turned aside. Moreover they even took the trouble of thinking out what their story would be, if ever they were summoned to explain the situation.

On learning of the letter to the editor, the unit commander did in fact demand an explanation from certain persons. Showing them to me, the chief of the political section contritely shook his head: The fanciful, fradulent documents looked bad.

"The sweep was deployed in response to a signal from the flagship," wrote the minesweeper commander.

"According to the log, the sweeper otter was deployed...." This is an excerpt from the detachment commander's explanation.

Everyone wrote what they were told--that is, they lied. Then they explained this lie with the desire to "show the ship's best side."

"Show." "Make it look good." These words, which we often hear in common usage, are not essentially reprehensible. To the people who know the value of true success, they mean a natural desire to demonstrate proficiency attained through hard work. To a whitewasher, meanwhile, these words mean something entirely different. To him, making something look good means showing that which is better and hiding that which is worse.

I wanted to think that this incident with the sweep was an exception. Nevertheless the battalion political worker and I did attend some of the lessons. First the political lessons, and then the specialty lessons.

Lt Turlanov conducted the political lesson we attended, which was on the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Improving Law Enforcement and Intensifying the Fight Against Crime." As with all lesson leaders, he tried to tie in the material being studied with the practical tasks of the soldiers, and to induce lively exchange of opinions. The officer explained and commented upon a number of the decree's requirements rather persuasively. It was only in one case, when the discussion turned to the need for decisively fighting eyewash, that he for some reason continued on without comment, limiting himself to reading the appropriate citations.

But the specialty lessons evoked much greater disappointment. Before attending them we acquainted ourselves with the combat training log. It was filled with good grades for the training course tasks. There were even good grades for training organization. But here is how the training organization really was: No one checked the preparations for the lessons. Not a single officer ever attended any of the lessons aboard ship (the commander was on duty with the battalion, and his assistant had been given a one-day pass). A fourth of the personnel had been excused by staff order for housekeeping details under a warrant officer's supervision.

PO 2d Class A. Gutsulyak conducted the lesson on the topic "The Schedule and Order of Sweeping Armament Inspections" at the stern next to the equipment entrusted to him. But his equipment did not bear the traces of strict and meticulous inspections, and this immediately placed the petty officer in a difficult position. He had to proceed backwards--he had to show not how things should be, but rather how things should not be.

"Now we inspect the way the sweep armament is secured," the petty officer said. "This rust must be removed...."

"Now we inspect the sweep cable drum. We remove foreign objects (sundry lengths of cable, a wrench, and a rag are dropped to the deck). The cable is not wound correctly on the corner elements...."

The petty officer's tone is confident and pedantic, as if the responsibility for all of this lay upon someone other than himself.

"Once a week," the petty officer continued, "we inspect the instrument (he pulls the instrument out of its box). We inspect it. We start it up."

But at this point the petty officer got into trouble--the instrument would not work. He turned it around in his hands, he tried to explain why it would not work and, being unable to find an explanation, put the instrument back in its place.

Watching this lesson, the battalion deputy commander for political affairs, a new man here, could not conceal his disenchantment. Perhaps he was thinking the same thing I was thinking: "Why such negligence? Let us assume that training organization was good aboard the ship during the training period, and that the grades had not been inflated. But then what happened? How were the grades maintained, who checked them, and when?"

And so the eyewash was discovered. Someone will be punished, and as they say in the navy, they will pull in the slack (at the time of the letter's confirmation steps were already being taken to do this). They will also doubtlessly consider the moral damage done to indoctrination of the soldiers. Naturally they will begin to publicize honesty and truthfulness. But how? That is the most important question. If they do this in the way Lt Turlanov did in the political lessons held after this incident (where he read the appropriate citations and proceeded on, evading the cases of dishonesty aboard the ship in silence), there could be little benefit. After all, there is no such thing as abstract honesty, honesty that does not depend upon the acts and deeds of people. Real honesty does not sit with its arms folded. It labors on! And the more effective is its labor, the stronger is the foundation upon which it rests--ideological conviction and faithfulness to duty. Can we possibly imagine honesty not accompanied by soldierly skill and high professionalism? After all, eyewash is usually the tool of those who, because of their negligence and indifference to the work, are unable to show their real successes.

It is from these positions, I would think, that the battalion command should attack eyewash and cover-ups.

Such is one of the lessons of the "childsplay" described here.

There are other lessons as well.

A week following this exercise and its unfortunate, to the base minesweeper, outcome (unfortunate only to it, since the exercise as a whole was successful), the unit held an officers court of honor. The proceedings were against Sr Lt Kim--the author of the letter to the editor. Of course, he was ordered to appear not because he blew the horn on the eyewash. He had many of his own sins, ones which were so striking and frequent that one would have to commend the remarkable patience of his supervisors. Nevertheless the following question arose: Why did Kim reveal the deceit, while his fellow servicemen who had good performance reports, who were personally disciplined, and who never did deceitful things remain silent on learning of the eyewash? I posed this question to the political worker and commander of the minesweeper, and to the staff officer. They either shrugged their shoulders, or they said: "What does Kim have to lose? He just wanted to annoy his superiors, and so he wrote the letter."

Let us assume that the author of the letter did not have any other motives (this is probably the case). But what sort of "annoyance" can there be in the truth, and what might one "lose" due to truthfulness? Naturally my interlocutors could have cited examples in which those who reveal shortcomings are persecuted for their criticism and falsely accused of trying to blacken the good name of the ship, unit, and so on. But does this in any way detract from the other examples--and the ones that dominate--in which persons guilty of eyewash and individuals suppressing criticism are strictly punished, being compelled to pay for their arbitrariness, sometimes with their position.

When it organizes combat and political training for the new training year, the unit command will probably consider all of these lessons. This is all the more important because a cover-up was attempted in this unit at threshhold of the last year. The guilty person was strictly punished at that time, and he was dismissed from his post. But strictness alone cannot rid us of such cases. Profound, all-encompassing conclusions must be made, the workstyle, control, and inspection of work done must be improved, and the training and indoctrination must be bettered. And honesty, frankness, and self-criticism must be supported in every possible way, and brought up as the example. Had all of this been done to the full extent, perhaps the unit might have avoided the bitterness of reliving the past, and Sr Lt D. Kim, whose bid for sympathy had entirely different designs, might not have been able to use the truth for his own ends.

Staff Officer's Duties Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jan 80 p 1

[Text] Capt-Lt (Res) N. Andreyev--Without a doubt the division commander is one of the hardest working officers of a submarine. But the work and the troubles of a ship engineer and the degree of his responsibility rise many times over as soon as a specialist with "hammers" on his shoulderboards becomes a staff officer.

The ship specialist is responsible for equipment and for the people in a division of one ship. A staff officer's job description, meanwhile, also includes the following item: "safe navigation of all ships in the unit." But then, ships differ in the "capriciousness" of their engines and in their age. The results, meanwhile, must be the same--safe navigation both on and beneath the water, both near home and on distant meridians.

It is easier to become a master of military affairs by being a ship officer. It is somewhat easier than earning this lofty title while serving at the staff level. To become a master while serving as a staff officer requires effort at the maximum of one's capabilities, and it says a great deal about the officer.

Engr-Capt 2d Rank V. Stefanovskiy became a master the hard way, while serving as a staff officer. Moreover everything important in his life was done the hard way. The temperature in the compartment in which Engr-Lt Stefanovskiy had to work was at the endurable maximum. And the icy waters of the Atlantic that engulfed the aft superstructure also approached the limits in terms of its danger to life. It was at such a time that Engr-Capt Lt Stefanovskiy had to check out an instrument that had failed during an ocean storm.

Consider one day in the life of a staff officer at home port. Immediately after the morning flag-raising ceremony he goes to one of the submarines for an operational control inspection of the technical resources and weapons. Then he travels to the training office to conduct lessons for petty officers in their specialty; from the training office he goes to the base workshop to see how preventive repairs are progressing. Then on to the dockside--a young commander was beginning to unload equipment.

It would be very difficult to do a time-and-motion study on the day of an officer ashore. There is perhaps less bustling at sea, but the sea does offer its own problems. Sometimes of tremendous proportions! Once during a long cruise Engr-Capt 2d Rank V. Stefanovskiy was called by a submarine for advice. The specialist's practiced eye immediately recognized that were steps not to be taken, one of the machine units could break down. And so Stefanovskiy tried a bold, brilliant experiment. The experiment was successful, and the machine unit continued to work until the end of the independent voyage.

He has been credited by dozens of efficiency proposals. He has already selected a topic for his dissertation. And in his free moments--they come so rarely!--he plays piano or tackles the parallel bars (this staff officer is a pentathelon master of sports, and he has represented the USSR Armed Forces in championships many times).

Stefanovskiy's athletic figure catches the eye from afar. One can see him pacing along the quay wall beside the ramps raised up against the hulls of the submarines. The mechanisms are being checked by hand in the compartments. The piercing screams and deep roar of foghorns and sirens spread over the harbor as the latter are tested. And it seems as if the submarines are sounding a greeting to the staff officer.

Missile Subunit Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 80 p 1

[Text] Sr Lt D. Yartsev--The final inspection of the technical subunit commanded by Maj A. Gudko ended with a grade of "good." In and of itself, this is a rather high grade. But it could not bring satisfaction to the coastal missilemen.

The fact was that this same subunit had earned an excellent grade a year ago in the naval championships. Not very long at all after that, that same Warrant Officer A. Prazdnichnov who demonstrated outstanding skills during the competitions could achieve only a grade of "satisfactory" in the final inspection. Masters of military affairs warrant officers I. Shustov, N. Kuchma, and others acted below their capabilities. Unfortunately the coordination of the crews dropped as well.

These and other shortcomings noted by the commission were discussed at a critique of the final inspection, held at the end of the past training year. It would be natural to presume that in the new training year, the subunit will not delay in its attempt to catch up in the work of improving the quality of combat skills and the effectiveness of the training process.

The specialists with the top qualifications have an especially great role in the technical subunits discussed above. The bulk of the masters of military affairs and specialists 1st class here are warrant officers. On the whole, their training does not elicit reproaches. On the contrary--the commanders are not stingv in their kind words about the first assistants to the officers. But what does "on the whole" mean? What sort of concrete problems must every warrant officer solve in the current training year?

It is most difficult of all to find the answers to these questions in the pledges that have been adopted. At least because warrant officers V. Buloychik, A. Dorozhkin, and some others have not adopted any. And this is no accident. As before, competition among the warrant officers suffers serious shortcomings in the present training year. While the subunit commander deals objectively with competition among first-term soldiers, the same cannot be said in relation to the warrant officers. Their weekly results are not summarized, and points are not awarded in the principal subdivisions of the competition.

As a consequence individual commanders, Lt V. Kostyuk for example, do not have a clear idea of the present proficiency of given specialists. The ideas he does have are based on very old information, information that is updated irregularly. This in turn sometimes leads to discrepancies in the content of warrant officer qualifications and performance reports. Take as an example Warrant Officer A. Prazdnichnov. The subunit commander describes him as a competent specialist. However, he soon had to be transferred to a new position because the warrant officer could barely handle his previous duties.

During the inspection the representatives of the higher staff turned their attention to the fact that the technical subunit was not devoting enough attention to interchangeability, to the mastery of second and associated specialties. And yet instructive experience had been accumulated in this respect in the neighboring subunit in which Sr Lt V. Pyatenko serves. What is keeping Maj A. Gudko from capitalizing on this experience? The officer makes the excuse that the specialties in his subunit are more complex. True, greater effort would be required to master a second technical specialty. But life affords us sufficient examples demonstrating that this task is fully realistic. All that is necessary is to make organizational work and indoctrination more concrete, and to rely on competition more actively.

The list of shortcomings in competition organization may be lengthened by the following example. In better times the subunit initiated a fight to see that each routine training mission would be completed at a higher level of quality than that of a previous mission. But time passes, and there is still nothing to show for this initiative. Unannounced inspections of the action stations are becoming rarer and rarer. In the present training year, for example, no direct mention has ever been made of the fading initiative either at operational meetings or at party and Komsomol conferences.

The subunit commander and active party members also could not find the energy to capitalize adequately on the positive experience accumulated in the unit, for example by Sr Lt G. Prokhorchev, commander of an outstanding launcher battery. He works with relish, and competently, to improve the training methods, and he devotes a great deal of attention to maintaining rivalry and to lengthening the life of the weapons and technical resources. In the other subunit, meanwhile, the training sessions are monotonous, and their effectiveness leaves something to be desired.

On one hand the missilemen are resolved to consolidate successes attained in the past and to rid themselves of the saddening shortcomings. But on the other hand, were we to look more closely, we would find that this resolve is only on paper, and that combat training, and competition especially, has been left to fend for itself. Will this not mean that all of the remarks addressed to the missilemen will be repeated in subsequent inspections? Will they not simply be multiplied?

It is not too late to think about this. The time has come to efficiently generalize the existing positive experience, to think about it deeply, and to "put it to work" with maximum benefits to the collective. The subunit's communists can do a lot to help out here. For the moment, unfortunately, the achievements of the best soldiers are not being publicized aggressively enough.

Personnel Indoctrination Measures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Capt 1st Rank V. Samarkin, Navy Political Directorate Senior Instructor, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences--The discussion at the conference turned to the poor state of affairs in the subunit commanded by Capt-Lt V. Korovnichenko. The frequency of gross violations of military discipline had increased here. Moreover even those upon whom the commander had rested his hopes, those whom he felt to be his supporters, had begun committing violations. There was no need to look far and wide for the causes of the low discipline. They were, so to speak, right on the surface: unsatisfactory individual work, and the officer's poor knowledge of his subordinates.

This was clear to all except Korovnichenko himself.

"But I know the people extremely well," he declared, and he went on to state the names of his soldiers and enumerate their statistics. The captain-lieutenant had in fact learned them well, but he also immediately revealed that except for this general information, he essentially knew nothing else about his subordinates--neither the character traits of the soldiers, nor their inclinations, their habits, and their interests.

Korovnichenko was struck quite deeply by questions posed to him by one of the officers:

"You complained that there are many so-called 'difficult' seamen among your subordinates. But what have you done to understand why they are the way they are? For example, have you ever written letters to their parents, or tried to find out what sort of people these seamen were before joining the navy? Where had they worked?"

What could Korovnichenko possibly reply? He had never written anywhere, and he had never even thought about writing. He did not follow any sort of system in his analysis of subordinates, or even in any of his individual work.

And yet such a system is a necessity to an indoctrinator. This is well understood in the subunit commanded by Lt Col V. Tikhonin. Every morning huge bundles of letters are deposited on the desk of the commander and his deputy for political affairs, Maj I. Tarabanov. And invariably an airmail envelope, or colorful stationery, or color postcards would peek out from among the bundles of official correspondence. The father of young Seaman N. Mirzogitov asked the commander to relay his instructions to his son: "In my time I performed my military duty honorably. Let my son follow the same road!" Seaman N. Grechshikin's mother shared her anxiety: "My son never did develop a strong character before joining the service; be stricter with him...." On learning that their emissary, Seaman V. Suvorov, did not begin serving in the best way possible, the Komsomol members of one of the plants wrote: "He is not a bad person, and he will produce. But he needs to be pushed a little, he needs to be given something interesting to do...."

Tikhonin and Tarabanov do not make a secret of this correspondence. Every soldier knows that the commander and political worker receive letters from their families and friends, and they regularly write back as well.

Young seamen develop quickly in a friendly, unified collective. Military service becomes for them a true school of life, a school of education from their very first days. What we find here is firm military order, traditionally high quality in performance of training missions, and a truly healthy moral atmosphere. The roots of the collective's successes lie in the ability the officers have for reaching every person in training and in indoctrination, and deeply understanding the subordinates.

It stands to reason that the correspondence with the relatives and friends of the soldiers was not the only source of such knowledge. After all, the most important thing that in the end characterizes a soldier is his attitude toward his work, toward fulfillment of the requirements of the oath and regulations. The commander, the political worker, and other officers always find the time for personal communication with the seamen, they attentively note the way each of them displays himself in drills, training sessions, exercises, social life, and mutual relationships with comrades, they account for the opinion the party and Komsomol organizations have of a given individual, and the opinion of the entire collective, they compare the different points of view, and they analyze them. But correspondence plays far from the last role in individual work.

Discussing the importance of regular, thoughtful correspondence between the commander and the seamen's relatives and friends, we must lay special emphasis on the tactfulness required in this effort, and its pedagogical and psychological nuances. I know of one officer who receives a great deal of mail and showed great care in the way he stores all the letters, but he never seems to find the time to devote to the people, to their pressing needs and demands.

A commander should maintain correspondence not to fill squares but to insure an integrated approach to indoctrination. This is not an idle statement. After all, an integrated approach to indoctrination presupposes deep, thorough analysis of the subordinate's personality, and penetration into his inner world. An integrated approach also permits us to comply with the principle of continuity in indoctrination. That is, beginning work with a new seamen not from scratch, as some people do, but with a consideration of what had already been done for him by his family, his school, and the Komsomol. Moreover a commander's correspondence is more than a supplementary source of information required for indoctrination. In competent hands it is itself a rather strong resource of indoctrination.

The USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations foresee, as an incentive, communicating exemplary fulfillment of official duties by a serviceman to his place of residence or to his previous place of employment. Wherever the writing of such letters of thanks is not treated formally, such letters serve as a good stimulus of diligent work by the soldiers.

And imagine how many new forms of capitalizing on letters from the relatives and friends of seamen have been brought to life by ideological indoctrination and socialist competition! Some ships, for example, maintain a display titled "Faithful to a Father's Words." Photographs of the best soldiers are posted on these displays next to photographs of their fathers. Also contained in these displays are excerpts from words of guidance addressed by veterans to their sons. It is a great honor for every seaman to end up on such a display. Some collectives have developed the practice of reading the parting words of fathers and mothers to their children, encouraging them to serve honorably and in an exemplary manner, before the entire formation.

Before ships set out to sea on long cruises, many commanders and political workers do not forget to create a reserve of so-called talking letters--tape recordings of the soldiers' relatives and friends. These letters are kept secret until the proper time. And when seamen suddenly hear familiar voices and warm words about their motherland and about love and faithfulness in the most difficult times of a cruise, their strength and alertness are multiplied.

It stands to reason that far from all letters should be utilized in this fashion. Correspondence is a delicate matter, requiring maximum sensitivity and tactfulness from the officer. The relatives of his subordinates, who view the officer as the closest mentor of their son, grandson, or brother, may confide something personal, intimate in him. In such a case even the slightest reference to such information would be impermissible--it could wound the spirit of the individual.

Unfortunately not all commanders and political workers are sensitive and tactful enough. Sometimes it even happens that the contacts a commander maintains with parents transform into weapons of intimidation. "If you do bad work, I'll tell your parents," says one officer to his subordinates, failing to understand that he is appealing to the wrong side of the soldier's spirit, and that this technique is prohibited.

Some officers who do not know how to conduct meticulous individual work with subordinates, or are reluctant to do so, do carry out their threats. Their can be no doubt that such a "technique" will never produce any sort of positive effect in indoctrination of a wayward soldier.

The art of an indoctrinator is often compared with the art of a jeweler. His every word, his every deed must be as sure as the movements of a craftsman cutting a precious stone.

Fathers, mothers, and friends send letters from all corners of our country to those who are wearing the military uniforms today, who have joined the ranks of the fatherland's defenders aboard the ships and in the units. Commanders and supervisors send letters in reply. The addresses on the envelope are different, and so are the postmarks, but they all carry one mark that is the same--the mark of a caring, interested attitude toward the soldiers, the mark of untiring concern for seeing that service in the army and navy would truly become a school of life, a school of education for them.

Petty Officer's Administrative Problem

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 80 p 4

> [Text] Dear editor! Last year I was given a short leave to go home. While I was at home the ship was rebased to a new place; following the instructions in a telegram to me from the ship commander, at the end of my leave I went to that place as well. I soon found out that I was not on the crew list and that I could not receive my clothing allowance and pay. I submitted a request up the chain of command to reinstate my allowances, and to give me my back-pay for the past months; my request was rejected by Officer V. Dubovchuk, the ship commander's chief assistant, without any sort of explanation. It was not until the ship commander arrived at the end of October that my petition was sent to my former place of service. The clothing allowance papers were sent to the ship in November. But my pay records and orders transferring me to the new unit have still not arrived. I respectfully ask for your help in cutting this red tape.
>
> PO 2d Class A. Ruzhnikov

Capt 2d Rank A. Zlydnev--First of all let me note what in my opinion is a detail of no small importance. Prior to redeployment the ship crew was raised to full strength. Ruzhnikov should have returned to his previous place of service after his leave. However, Officer V. Dubovchuk, the ship commander's chief assistant who was acting in the latter's behalf, was ignorant of this, and he arbitrarily summoned the petty officer to the ship. Dubovchuk decided to do so because Ruzhnikov was a disciplined soldier and an outstanding specialist. Before the ship left for its new base the officer declared for all to hear: "Ruzhnikov will continue serving with us no matter what. I'll send him a telegram telling him to come to the new base, and someone else can iron out all of the details. I have no interest in the paperwork."

This declaration is all the more thoughtless in that this paperwork is the basis for the transfer of any serviceman from one unit to another. Dubovchuk must have been aware of this. But, as we can see, he was not interested in the fate of his subordinate.

And so the red tape began. It was not until the ship commander arrived that things began to move. The appropriate requests were submitted to the remote garrison at which the ship had been based formerly. The reaction to them was efficient, but it was not complete. In particular, while Officer G. Apryshkin, the officer responsible for personnel transfers, did send the petty officer's food and clothing allowance papers and his record of service card, he did not make sure that Ruzhnikov's pay records and transfer orders were sent. In his interview with the correspondent, Gennadiy Fedorovich admitted his carelessness, though he did note that had Officer V. Dubovchuk not been so arbitrary, none of the red tape would have come about. Whatever the case, the petty officer suffered undeserved insults. And alas, neither the ship, nor the new unit, nor the unit's political worker to whom Ruzhnikov appealed were able to solve what was in general a very simple problem.

This is a rare case, but it is evidence of an unconscientious attitude of some officers to their responsibilities. After the correspondent intervened, it did not take long at all to send the required documents.

PO 2nd Class A. Ruzhnikov had originally intended to remain in the navy as a warrant officer. Now, however, after encountering such red tape, he has changed his mind. The appropriate chiefs need to think a little about this.

Submarine Cruise Activities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26,27,29 Jan 80

[26 Jan 80 p 2]

> [Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA permanent correspondent for the Red Banner Northern Fleet Capt 3d Rank S. Bystrov took part in an Arctic cruise aboard an atomic submarine. His commentary on this cruise is published below.

Flag Over the Ice Hummocks

"Lucky again!" the rear admiral exclaimed as he turned away from the periscope.

Imagine how much everyone aboard the submarine wanted to peek at this moment through the ocular at the never-ending pack ice, the huge hummocks, and the patch of open water, covered by young ice, which we found with such difficulty from the ocean depths and in which we managed to surface. The atomic submarine completed one of the most complex maneuvers of submarine navigation--surfacing in an open patch of water. Each time it did so, everyone aboard burned with the desire to look into the periscope.

The sensation one feels when the spirit is engulfed by a feeling of pride for the boat in which you have traveled to these poorly explored latitudes, and for your country, which created the remarkable equipment, is astounding, and there is nothing to compare it with. Amid this limitless glacial silence, in this kingdom of snow, sun, and cold, the little periscope is the sole manmade creation for hundreds of miles around. All else is of the elements, of nature. It seems as if you have found yourself in the center of an innermost mystery--and in fact this is so. The Arctic is still mysterious to man in many ways, the secrets it holds are still dependably locked in by ice, and the price paid for human boldness is still sometimes the loss of life.

After returning from the cruise I developed a yearning to speak with those who had been here before, in the subglacial oceanic depths, to the first whose impressions were one of a kind, whose footsteps we followed into this Arctic unknown.

Here is what Hero of the Soviet Union Rear Admiral L. Zhil'tsov, commander of the atomic submarine "Leninskiy Komsomol", had to say:

> "Our submarine confirmed the hypothesis that there is another underwater mountain range in the cruising area. Where we thought we would find depths of thousands of meters, the sonar equipment began recording an entirely different pattern--a steep ascent. We had to be extremely careful, but at the same time we were pleased by the awareness that we were discovering something new for the map of the ocean. One of the summits of the discovered range now bears the name of our atomic submarine."

The rear admiral relinquished his place at the periscope to the submarine commander, Officer Anikin. The latter squinted in anticipation of the blinding brightness of the expanses above the ice.

I recall my first meeting with the commander--an hour before setting out to sea.

The official send-off had not started yet, departing sailors in lightweight dark blue uniforms were still intermingled on the quay with visitors in conventional uniforms. A short submariner with a round face and strong sinewy hands peered intently at the shore. Something there gave him concern, or it made him anxious.

"A little anxious perhaps?" the first deputy chief of the fleet political directorate, Rear Admiral V. Polivanov, approached the submariner.

The officer turned around, his excited eyes still expressed anxiety, he said something in response to the rear admiral, and as he turned the words "Sub Commander" became visible above the left pocket of his jacket.

The commander of a modern atomic submarine, so the scientists have felt, must have facility with several thousands of operations in order to successfully control the boat and the crew while cruising and when engaged in combat. It is not easy to find a specialist that would equal an atomic submarine commander in his scope of occupational knowledge. But in this hour just before departing, there was one particular concern, among the numerous concerns of a commander, that troubled Anikin the most. Perhaps he was thinking that someone may have forgotten to stow everything aboard for the cruise, or that this was going to be his first trip beneath the ice, or perhaps that someone who was to see him off had not shown up yet. The truth, however, was that the commander was simply taking a long look at the land which he was abandoning. Because to a Soviet commander his native Soviet land, its security, and its protection are always the main concern.

I do not know what Officer Anikin saw when he first peered through the periscope. Ice, sky, or snow? But he probably once again recalled his native land, which he abandoned for this cruise, and which becomes even more visible in the mind's eye from this place.

Not only the sonar operators but also everyone in the compartment heard the young ice giving way with a gentle crackling sound as the submarine surfaced. We were now fully on the surface.

Swathing himself in an insulated jacket, fur cap, and boots, the commander climbed the ladder to the conning tower hatch.

The fresh nipping air wafted into the compartment with its habitual atmosphere. Water still remaining on the top of the hatch splashed onto the deck, and fragments of ice dropped down the ladder with a ringing sound. The commander gasped as he took his unexpected oceanic shower. He climbed out to the bridge, looked around, and immediately slid back down, sopping wet. His cap was frozen to his face, and his eyes were dancing as he stomped his boots.

"We are standing like at home, except that there isn't anything to tie the mooring lines to!"

Laughing happily, the men in the central post helped the commander to change. And the air made one delirious, Arctic air, the air of victory. Smokers nervously passed cigarettes out to each other--an innocent excuse for going up top, though what they really wanted to do was see where they were.

Here is what Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral (Res) A. Petelin had to say:

> "We saw a large crack. This pleased us. We turned, got beneath it, and began surfacing. But the crack was long and very narrow. We could get only the conning tower above the surface. We could see

> through the periscope that the bow and stern were still beneath the ice. It was, of course, a pity that the first ice surfacing in the fleet's history was incomplete. Moreover the crack was growing narrower, and we could not linger on the surface. Nevertheless the commander and I did give everyone present in the central post a chance to look at the Arctic at the 85th Latitude."

It became a firm tradition beginning with the first surfacings in ice to let each seaman see the Arctic with his own eyes. After all, for most people this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.

At the time of the first and second surfacings few went to the upper deck, and all the more so onto the ice. The seamen had to basicly satisfy themselves with viewing the Arctic through portholes around the sides of the conning tower.

This time our submarine surfaced amidst some of the thickest ice. We were surrounded by huge hummocks, snowdrifts, and dense young ice. But it was here that we decided to hold a meeting. The ice was thick, it was not moving much at all, and there was no wind. An "ice cube" was perched on the bow of the boat. The commander of the electrical and engineering division, Officer Rozin, shuffled his cap concernedly on seeing it through the periscope: This was quite a great deal of additional "ballast" for the bow ballast tank! Then a command which had never been heard before aboard this boat was broadcast to the compartments:

"First and second combat shifts are to convene on the ice for a meeting!"

Wearing a life jacket, the boatswain was the first to jump out on the ice and tighten the safety line. The seamen at first remained huddled by the submarine, but the spirit of exploration finally won them over, and soon there were dark figures everywhere; in no time a perfect spot for a soccer game was found, a ball was drug out from somewhere, and so the "Olympiad-80" was begun.

"A study in ice," said the rear admiral as he surveyed the marvelous colors created by the sun and snow. "Just like a painting by Rockwell Kent."

Wearing a cap and an insulated jacket, and being of short stature, the rear admiral lost himself in the crowd of seamen here on the ice, yielding to the universally shared joy. This ice surfacing was the first of his life.

I recall him wearing a jacket bearing a gold star during a meeting just before the cruise. Seamen turned curious eyes toward it from all directions. An award belonging to a troop commander always embodies the labor of the common soldiers. The gold stars of today's Northern

Fleet sailors are especially precious to the naval seamen--some of their labor is represented in these gold stars as well.

The meeting was opened by Rear Admiral Valeriy Timofeyevich Polivanov, the first deputy chief of the fleet political directorate. He climbed up a hummock, and it was from here that other speakers gave their addresses. No one had prepared for this earlier, but everyone wanted to share his intense experiences with his comrades. There was one seaman who stretched out his hand in a plea for recognition several times. No one noticed him. He was extremely shy, but each time he made his way closer to the hummock. And finally he was able to speak. A rumble of amazement could be heard through the crew, since it was the first time this seaman had ever gathered the courage for public speaking. "A good lad, that submariner," I warmly thought after he said his simple but touching words, simply and straight from the heart.

Flares were launched on high, disintegrating into colorful bits of fire; camera shutters clicked, slogans and flags fluttered on the hummocks, the submarine stood a dark background behind the men, everyone was frozen to the bone but oblivious of the fact, each speaker was followed by another, and no end to the meeting was in sight. But suddenly everything quieted down. The rear admiral took the floor. He straightened his cap and said a few words about the glory of Soviet seamen, about perpetuating the best traditions of today's domestic fleet, and about the fact that the strength of admirals has always lain in outstanding seamen.

"Let's toss the admiral!" the duty officer's voice, amplified by a megaphone, resounded from the craft. The seamen heard many unusual commands during this cruise. But their unexpectedness never embarrassed them. The admiral was tossed into the air with cries of "Hurrah!". This does not happen very often--we must, after all, have respect for rank.

Then the entire crew gathered together for photographs. Those with color film were lucky. They will have a good memento of that unusual portrait in ice: the turquoise sky with its pink and greenish glow, the deep dark blue of the shadows, the sparks from the sun, and the unending furrows of hummocks turned by the ocean's plow. The amateur black-and-white photography could also capture that which was most important and most precious: the faces of the people, who together are given the name--crew. The ordinary faces of the seamen, each of which is marked by remarkable qualities: great love for the motherland, high occupational proficiency, and the ability to contribute all effort to completing an assigned mission, no matter how difficult it may be.

[27 Jan 80 p 2]

[Text] Searching for Open Water

The submarine surfaced in the ice a few times more, which by itself was rather risky and complex. But the main and hardest part of the cruise was behind us. The watch settled down to a routine, and things in the central post were calm. Capt 2d Rank Gabriyelov set up a dark room aboard our boat, developed the films, and printed photographs. Their quality was for the moment not much better than the first daqguereotypes, but the value of even these photographs was tremendous aboard the submarine. Officer Chuprin, the deputy commander for political affairs, set up descriptive art exhibitions entitled "Our Native Land" and "Domestic Painting." Now a pictorial newspaper is posted in this place. The crowd about it is always impenetrable. That which the crew had experienced was now documented history.

There was a collective photographic portrait of the crew, and snapshots of groups of sailors and individual people. Imagine how many interesting stories there are behind these photographs! Next to the photographs was a short description of the development of our atomic fleet, which has its significance today, a definite role to play in the future, and a close tie with the past.

Were Rear Admiral L. Zhil'tsov to see these photographs, he would probably have exclaimed: "Mikhail, my nephew!", having recognized the tall officer in the photograph to be his Mishka, whom he guided into a navy life.

Officer Mikhail Zhil'tsov, the commander of the navigation division, relinquished his place in a cabin right next to the ward-room to me as a guest. He told me a little bit of his story. We talked about the difficulties of sailing in high latitudes. His uncle was the first to experience such sailing in the domestic atomic submarine fleet. When Lev Mikhaylovich Zhil'tsov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, his nephew had just turned ten.

Once in Leningrad Mikhail, who was studying at that time in the higher naval school, was visited by L. Zhil'tsov. Mikhail traveled to his hotel. He opened the door and lost his self-control. There were three people sitting at the table, and all three had gold stars--L. Zhil'tsov himself, A. Petelin and R. Timofeyev.

"Well, the future of the fleet," Zhil'tsov joyously greeted his nephew, "sit down, and tell us what the young people are doing. Can we rely on them?"

The heroes looked at the young cadet with interest. It seemed to him that there was nothing for him to talk about. Should he tell them about his practical experience or his apprenticeship, or should he mention that the commander and navigator had recently permitted him to serve his watch independently? But all of this seemed so unimportant in comparison with their deeds. Nonetheless, the eyes of his seniors were very attentive. A fleet cannot exist without continuity in the generations. Here lies the strength of its traditions, and the guarantee of firm progressive development. And concern for finding good replacements always agitates anyone who truly feels himself to be a seaman.

Rear Admiral Zhil'tsov would have seen another very familiar face among our crew--his former electrician. Twenty-two year old Mukhin was a senior seaman, a specialist 2d class at that time. The gyroscopes and the ice fathometer aboard the "Leninskiy Komsomol" were under his charge. Warrant Officer Mukhin also serviced the ice fathometer during this cruise. The only difference was that now he was a master of military affairs, he had confirmed his top grade 14 times, and he had been awarded combat medals 3 times.

Eyes in the central post were glued for hours to Mukhin's ice fathometer when the submarine sought open patches of water. This was a time when the strongest combat shift took the watch, when the commander of the electrical and engineering division, Officer Rozin, himself took his position beside the on-duty engineer-mechanic.

His face in our pictorial newspaper would probably have been recognized by Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral N. Usenko, former deputy commander for political affairs aboard an atomic submarine that participated in a 'round-the-world underwater cruise by Soviet atomic submarines in 1966. On leaving the craft for a new position Nikoliy Vital'yevich turned his affairs over to Officer Rozin, who was then secretary of the boat's party organization. Inspired by the example of the political worker, the engineer-mechanic thought about transferring to political work. Since that time he has continued to maintain a special interest in party-political work. And today he is assistant secretary of the craft's party bureau.

"Division Commander, is the submarine nestled comfortably in your arms?" the rear admiral asked Rozin with a smile, though with a strict tone.

"Yes sir!" the latter replied.

"And who is caring for the watch engineering-mechanic? You?"

"I have everything under control, Comrade Rear Admiral!"

"Then let's get on with it, but slowly."

I described the rear admiral as follows in my notebook: "Short, well-built, and dexterous. His hair is cut short, and completely gray, but thick, on the whole even making him look younger. His eyes are dark brown, and they look as if he has no pupils at all, though when speaking close up to him you can make them out. His face is often dimpled by a smile, which carries an air of a father's playfulness. He speaks eloquently, clearly, and interestingly. His conversation is peppered by jokes."

Here is an excerpt from the commander's portrait: "...his speech is fast, but it is extremely diverse and to the point, always laced with sharp wit."

The search for an open patch of water began. The seamen loved this time best of all.

Much has been written about surfacing in ice. This is no longer felt to be unusual today.

What was unique about our cruise was that there was nothing exceptional about it, that it was routine. Except for its organic equipment, the boat carried no special additional equipment to make its sailing easier.

The submarine managed to surface without causing even the slightest damage to itself.

I looked at my watch--how time flies! There is a small portrait of V. I. Lenin in the central post. Il'ich is standing in a cap, and his gaze is hard and attentive. When a submariner catches those eyes staring at him, he begins to feel easier. He begins to see beyond the petty details of the day and beyond the monotony and hardship, suddenly becoming aware of the grandeur of it all. Consider, furthermore, that nothing gives a person strength more than the awareness that his labor is necessary and valuable.

From its bottom, the surface of the Arctic Ocean seems to be covered by a cloudy sky through the periscope. Sometimes a light green strip flashes by--this is a large crack in the ice, and then a light greenish opening suddenly begins to appear in the "clouds". From below, from the central compartment, in which someone is looking through the unraised periscope, we hear the report: "The open patch is beginning." The ice fathometer indicates the same thing, and the navigator notes the position of the open patch on his chart--we may have to surface suddenly at some point. But usually the open patches are very small.

Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral A. Sorokin:

> "We discovered one iceberg, rose to periscope depth, and photographed it. We determined its height, which according to the periscope grid was 35 meters; consequently more than 180 meters of the iceberg were under water."

This is why we must seek a large open patch. And when one is finally discovered, the rear admiral or the commander descends to the periscope. The time of cautious maneuvering begins.

I can remember now that throughout the entire cruise, there was never a single conflict or heated discussion aboard ship. It was pleasant to know that one was sailing with such a friendly, well-wishing collective, one knowing how to keep its spirits up with humor and with witty jokes, even in the most difficult moments.

My cabinmate was a 27-year old captain-lieutenant who had just been appointed craft deputy commander. First of all his post was one of the most troublesome, and second he tried to prove himself in every way, sparing no effort. He never got any rest, he slept fitfully, and one could only envy the optimism and enthusiasm of this officer.

He gave me as a memento a copy of a menu which he had prepared for the week together with the ship's surgeon. I also wrote down a few of his aphorisms, which the deputy dropped unceasingly, no matter where he was.

"Now that's what I call a healthy relationship--being able to laugh at someone who is sick," he said as we were joking about an officer who managed to contract angina while under water. Or: "Playing chess, I really get the feeling that we can do quite well without the kings. They cause nothing but trouble." To the navigator: "Misha, your attempt at plotting the course is like the song about the sailor Zheleznyak, who wanted to go to Odessa but ended up in Kherson."

We were on our way back when the ocean began raging above us. Up top, onrushing waves slapped against the conning tower hatch unceasingly. One can imagine what the commander and the officer of the watch were going through up there, on the bridge! I climbed up for a smoke just when the captain-lieutenant's watch was ending.

Turning away from the oncoming wind, the commander smoked, hiding his cigarrette in his fist. His assistant watched forward. Dressed in a hooded jacket and rubberized trousers, secured to the superstructure by a safety line, wet, and encrusted by ice, for him there was no ducking away from the water flying over the conning tower.

On seeing me, the officer tried to smile but his frozen face would not obey. He wanted to say something, but the wind would not let him open his mouth. Twenty minutes later, pulling off the wet clothing in his cabin, he joked as if there was nothing unusual, and he invited us to inspect the boat with him.

His face is not among the photographs. When all were getting their pictures taken the deputy was busy with new problems that had arisen at the time the submarine surfaced. But I remember him well nonetheless, as is true of many remarkable people in this crew, the pride of the fleet.

Here is what submarine commander Hero of the Soviet Union Capt 1st Rank (Res) I. Gulyayev had to say about such people:

> "The crew and I had to perform many difficult missions. We usually had to work in complex conditions, and we spent the bulk of our time at sea. The submariners labored selflessly, understanding how important it was to quickly assimilate the new equipment and weapons.

> But the working conditions were very severe at
> that time, and it was very difficult to place
> personal affairs in order, especially family
> affairs. However, no one complained. We were
> doing something very necessary to the motherland,
> and we felt fortunate in doing so."

I now close my eyes, and I can see the dim red light of the central post. I can see the commander's concerned face pale in this light, the attentive faces of the officers and seamen, and the voice of the rear admiral, who spent hour after hour at the periscope. Water below the keel, ice above, and not a soul for hundreds of miles around. The boat was searching for open water. An unknown poet wrote a song which group commander Officer Sizov, a handsome light-haired lad, sang to the pleasure of all:

While a Verdi melody plays sadly on,
The compasses stand useless,
And hungry polar bears wander
Somewhere over the navigator's head.
The hummocks melt from view
As we bid farewell to the sky--
The submarine
Disappears beneath the ice.
The submarine--
A lightning bolt beneath the sea, steel-gray eyes peering
From beneath a black sailor's cap.

[29 Jan 80 p 2]

[Text] Neptune's Post Office

History has shown how commanders have on occasion experienced the revelation that man is really the principal element of combat. This fact has been confirmed as an immutable truth in this century of scientific-technical revolution. And no matter how much the imagination is struck by the supercomplexity and technical perfection of a modern atomic submarine, it would never even start up without the hands of seamen, petty officers, warrant officers, and officers, it would never depart from its moorings, and it would generally be unable to do anything.

A modern nuclear submarine is an amazing thing, but the modern submariner, who has power over a nuclear reactor, is also something that is amazing--a miracle of the century, a person who has managed to experience moral and psychological loads that all of the people of his native village would never know, a person who can still laugh to exhaustion at the film "Now Wait!" even though he has seen it 10 times. Generally speaking, all of these are signs of high human maturity: professional erudition, moral stability, and sincerity of spirit.

The hardest days of the cruise had barely passed when the party bureau found itself examining four applications from submariners asking to be accepted into the party. Officer Sizov, and warrant officers Antipov, Kosenko, and Morgunov. They wrote: "I would like to join Lenin's party. I will try to make an honorable contribution to the work of our craft...." "If the motherland should need my life, I will sacrifice it without a second thought...." Each one of them wrote sincerely, each had already revealed himself in his work, and the collective had long developed a good opinion of each of them. The group under Officer Sizov's charge initiated the socialist competition of the cruise, and warrant officer Antipov was one of the first aboard to become a master of military affairs. All proved themselves to be outstanding specialists. Nevertheless the bureau members scrutinized the applicants meticulously, one might even say to excess. Not because they had personal grievances against these comrades. A third of the boat's crew are communists. The party organization is large. But that just meant that the bureau carried greater responsibility. Every communist in the crew was relatively visible to all. And only those persons who are truly worthy can honorably endure such scrutiny.

Each day a news broadcast starting with reports from the places of local events was relayed aboard the boat. This form of reporting was the invention of the deputy commander for political affairs. Officer Chuprin constantly kept a portable tape recorder with him. Once at the time when one shift was relieving the other, duty engineer-mechanic Pustovalov dared to be late. The entire conversation, the explanations, and the commentary were recorded, and then broadcast during lunch. Now this was an effective way to air out wrongdoings--here they were, for everyone to see and hear. People became wary of the tape recorder, but of course they did recognize its usefulness without reservations. On hearing the recording of a torpedo attack, the submarine commander sternly remarked to officers of the ship combat crew:

"There is a little too much chatter, comrades. Especially on my part."

Objectivity makes for healthier attitudes. And it is upon their "health" that a ship's successes depend. Friendly criticism was also held in high honor aboard the first boats to earn glory for the Soviet submarine fleet.

Here is an excerpt from the diary of Hero of the Soviet Union Vice Admiral A. Mikhaylovskiy, former commander of an atomic submarine which had completed a circumpolar cruise:

> "Amateur poets performed almost every evening during the cruise. The verses were satirical for the most part. Jabs were thrown at all, irrespective of person, position, and rank. Deputy Commander for Political Affairs Varganov was often the one to read them. 'Now hear this! It's "story" time again!' could often be heard in the compartment over the

> intercom. But the political officer himself remained invulnerable for a long time. Apparently no one had enough courage to take a 'jab' at my deputy commander. But at the very end of the cruise he was finally made the target of a 'story' as well. No one was insulted, and the funny and sharp criticism helped us out very much."

One listens to a radio broadcast--biting, funny, provocative, with songs, verses, and stories about comrades--and one recalls Tvardovskiy's words: "There are no people more remarkable than you."

Warrant Officer Benzik was a diligent, efficient, responsive officer; he was always working, and whenever he did have free time he spent it with the political worker, drawing or writing something in the day room. It was evident from everything that life aboard a submarine gave him great satisfaction.

Benzik returned to the boat following a lengthy time elsewhere. After completing his first term of service he went back home, got a job, and married. But one day he sat down and wrote a letter to Rozin, commander of the electrical and engineering division, telling him that life without submarines was impossible for him.

"You know," Benzik said, "I have been dreaming about the submarine all of these years. And the dreams are so real that when I wake up at night, it takes a little time for me to remember where I am--at home or with the crew."

Officer Rozin did everything to get one of the best electricians back into the fleet. One day Benzik dropped by his atomic submarine for a visit, but he ended up rejoining the crew.

Imagine the world for which he so longed: a narrow corridor a few paces long, with electric control panels for walls. It is here that the warrant officer now spends the greater part of his service. And this is what he likes. And not he alone. A plaque bearing the following inscription is attached to one of the panels: "This station was first serviced by Bel'tsov." That was Benzik's teacher. Benzik gleaned everything he could from his teacher, beginning with his love for the boat, and then he went on further. He became a specialist 1st class, and three times he earned a leave for distinguishing himself at sea. His station was recognized to be the best in the unit when the submarine competed for the outstanding title.

During the cruise Benzik wrote several poems for the wall newspaper. True, they did not have literary polish, but they are highly valued aboard ship. His inspiration is precious to all who have learned to love the world of this strong hull.

"One must come to love iron," submariners say, referring to their equipment endearingly, but relating to it with the greatest respect. It is no accident that one of the main criterion by which people are assessed in the crew is their attitude toward the boat. It is not something readily noticeable in ordinary life. But when one goes out to sea and knows that only the crew can guarantee the safety of the boat, one gains a special understanding of the role played by masters and the best specialists, and the price of the selflessness of the seamen.

Here is an excerpt from an interview with Hero of the Soviet Union Engr-Capt 1st Rank R. Timofeyev, former commander of the electrical and engineering division of the "Leninskiy Komsomol":

> "After I earned my gold star I brought my subordinates together and said: Four of the five rays on this medal are yours. Yes, it was the proficiency, selflessness, and courage of the personnel that permitted us to complete our cruise successfully. All officers proved themselves to be substantial specialists in their areas, experimenters, and virtuoso operators. The seamen displayed good theoretical and practical training."

Our submarine also carried a higher reserve of dependability in that the crew had borne the outstanding title for many years, and in that many specialists, for example warrant officers Antipov, Raskatov, and Svintozel'skiy, are the best in the unit. In the last days before the cruise some officers and warrant officers, especially of the electrical and engineering division, would not go home until all of the equipment was checked out completely once again. Warrant Officer Pischal'nikov, who had just joined the crew, was among them. He immediately adopted the customs of the crew which also says something about the strength of the collective.

One can guess whether it is night or day aboard ship only by looking at the clock or knowing which shift is on duty, or by whether or not potatoes were being peeled at the particular time. This was always done at night, and in addition to those assigned to help the cook, anyone who had nothing to do participated. What seemed like dull work transformed into something fun aboard ship. First it permitted a rare opportunity for the submariners to get together, and second, even peeling potatoes is a pleasant distraction from the monotony of life under water; furthermore this was simply a good chance to talk, joke, and listen to interesting stories. Sometimes when he had nothing to do, even Rear Admiral Timofeyevich Polivanov sat himself down by the potato bin. The first time this happened the seamen were embarrassed. But later they got used to it. It is a small world aboard a submarine. Admirals, officers, and seamen do everything together. Yes, aboard a submarine the success of one is the success of all, the mistake of one is the mistake of all, and the joy of one is the joy of all.

When our atomic submarine finally climbed from the depths and the calculated point of surfacing coincided with the actual point (for airmen this would be equivalent to landing precisely on an unmarked landing strip after many hours of blind flight), the hero was the navigator, but everyone viewed this to be a shared success. When an exhausted snow-bunting (a polar sparrow) landed on the shoulder of the captain-lieutenant on duty on the bridge at the time of surfacing, and he brought it into the compartment, the joy was shared by the entire crew.

The seamen were touched by the trustfulness of the tiny cautious being that was not afraid of the most menacing of all war machines known to the history of mankind--an atomic submarine. What is really important is not the destructive potential of this craft but its spirit. And the spirit of the craft is the spirit of the crew, the spirit of the Soviet seamen, who would never hurt a single living being without cause, and for whom peace is the meaning of life, and not a ruse. Learn how to handle your weapon, seamen, and let your hands and nerves be strong, but keep your head clear and your heart pure. Such is the way the motherland wills the Soviet submariner to serve, entrusting him with a weapon of unprecedented power.

Once a seal, an animal known for its curiousity, swam to the surface in a patch of open water. Snorting, it stared at us for a moment, but then immediately dropped from sight out of caution. Several attempts at coming closer to the steel monster persuaded the animal that neither the atomic submarine nor the people who had hopped ashore on the ice were of any danger to it. The trust of animals is not only a pleasure to man but also a test of his nobility.

Yes, the sea and the ocean are now more than just the object of study, exploitation, and protection for man. They are also a place for thinking. Much appears clearer from out here. Clearer and more distinct is our love for all that we left behind on shore, that gives the seamen strength and inspires high purpose. Nothing is more annoying to a crew than sitting around on shore, but at sea, like it or not, one counts the days until it is time to go home. Everyone does this in his own way. Some collect the chocolates that are given out with evening tea on each day of the cruise. The more of them there are, the less is left of the cruise. Then they go home with the chocolates for their sons or daughters. The children also soon begin to understand that the more chocolates they receive, the harder it had been for their fathers at sea.

Once on surfacing we decided to send something via Neptune's post office: Everyone had at sometime wanted to follow the age-old marine tradition of sending, by floating "courier", messages about the most important events of marine cruises. And the message itself must have a sense of history--it must be brief and meaningful.

The honor of corking the bottle containing the message for the future fell upon me. We read the note to future generations one last time.

I sealed the "letter", and the boatswain went up top and "dropped it in the mailbox"--threw it into open water away from the submarine.

Most likely our letter will become encased in ice, and it will wander with the latter about the Arctic. And our greatest wish is that it would fall into the hands of one of our compatriots surfacing in an open patch of water a few decades from now.

So much for the romance of the sea--for the moment everyone was concerned with the reports to be made to the command, and with the evaluation the latter would give to our many days of labor beneath the planet's icy carapace.

The cook baked two pies just before we returned. They were birthday presents. To Seaman Bogomolov it seemed like ages, holding the pies in his hands until the celebrants would come to the central post for their congratulations. Bogomolov's hands turned numb, but he was embarrassed to say anything.

"Put those pies down," the commander noticed the seaman's discomfort, "birthdays are supposed to be happy, and there you are tormenting yourself."

Anikin smiled at the embarrassed seaman.

"An excellent sailor," he whispered in my ear.

At this time I was making an entry in my diary: "Fifteen people celebrated their birthdays during the cruise. But we have all been reborn as subglacial mariners. The boat's party organization grew by four persons." Later, I learned that many were also to receive more decorations.

Naval Air Reconnaissance Mission

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Maj Yu. Yampol'skiy, Squadron Deputy Commander, Military Pilot 2d Class, Red Banner Northern Fleet--This time the flying assignment was not distinguished by anything new. It was an ordinary training mission: Find a group of "enemy" ships in some region of the ocean. Almost at the farthest edge of the map. Well, that was not so bad, since the squadron had flown to remote oceanic latitudes before. Nevertheless the aerial scouts prepared for the forthcoming flight as always, meticulously and thoughtfully. The airmen coordinated upon the actions they were to take in the event of a sudden change in the situation, and they worked out several contingency maneuvers that would permit them to reach their objective unnoticed and unexpectedly. They also rehearsed their integrated use of the reconnaissance equipment.

The crew took off at the appointed time. The expanses of the open sea were unfolding before them when the "ground" summoned the commander. Following that radio exchange Military Pilot 1st Class Maj Yu. Mikhalev pressed the intercom button:

"Navigator, we've been ordered to check for targets in area...."

Everyone aboard the aircraft accepted the new input calmly and matter-of-factly, inasmuch as the possibility of a sudden change in mission had been foreseen during ground preparations.

The new area was a slight angle away from the course they were flying. And at the most advantageous moment the second navigator turned on the radar for a short time. Being an experienced scout, it was enough. He soon reported:

"Commander, there is a target in the indicated area at 30°. Range...."

"Crew, we're going down to check out the target. Navigator, keep me posted on its range," Major Mikhalev ordered sharply. "Radio operator!"

"Yes sir."

"Prepare a radio message on the target for immediate transmission. Navigator, give him the latitude and longitude...."

Such foresight is very important to the crew of a reconnaissance airplane. In a modern fluid battle, typified by an acute lack of time, the role of surprise in reaching a target and of the swiftness with which intelligence is dispatched grows many times over. Literally every second is precious. And everything must be foreseen, so that time would not be wasted.

I recall the following incident during my first year of service as an aircraft commander. Our crew, which was given an air reconnaissance assignment, began its preparations. However, the pilots and navigators worked according to their own plan while the gunner-radio operator worked separately, in the communications classroom. How well did the crew function in the air? We discovered the target quickly in the search area. But then the lack of coordination made itself known. The crew had to waste extra words on the radio operator to explain what had to be transmitted to the command post, and how.

After we landed the commander admonished us for our slowness. And the radio operator bitterly admitted that he could have acted much more quickly, had everything been agreed upon earlier. Everyone learned their lesson.

Major Mikhalev's crew is well coordinated. On board, a few syllables were enough for everyone to know what was going on. And Yuriy Aleksandravich demands that such coordination be present in all of the crews of the squadron under his command during this training year. When necessary, however, even while in the air Mikhalev does not fail to capitalize on an opportunity to discuss forthcoming actions with his crew beforehand, so that changes in the situation could be accounted for. And so it was this time, when he turned to the navigator: "How will we maneuver to the target area?"

The decision was made with a consideration for target illumination. During their first pass, when they were flying away from the sun, they took a long-range photograph. After turning around for the return pass, which was now flown into the sun, they photographed the "enemy" ship in plan view. Both photographs turned out to be clear and contrasting. And the entire maneuver took up a minimum of their time. By excluding extra passes, the aircraft crew saved on fuel. Having extra fuel is never a burden: Who knows what might happen during a mission?

While one crewmember was taking the photographs the rest were not sitting around idly. The commander told everyone before reaching the target: "Look to the left, and classify the target." The second navigator raised his seat to the upper observation bubble, where he could get a better view. Meanwhile the radio operator prepared the message. And as soon as the navigator determined the nature of the target and its movement, the radio message was immediately sent. Its reception was soon confirmed by the command post.

Then the aircraft performed an antiaircraft maneuver. And once again the airplane returned to its assigned course to its main search area. Mikhalev recalled the warning from the duty weatherman: The weather was going to be complex in the area. And in fact, soon the sky darkened, visibility worsened, and flight became very turbulent.

The aerial warriors meticulously surveyed the search area. Flying the last of numerous runs, the navigator reported: "Everything's clean, commander. There's nothing to indicate that the target is anywhere near."

But Maj Mikhalev did not feel the search to be hopeless. Ordering his copilot to guide the airplane to the zone in which, according to the navigator, signals from the ground radio beacon could be heard for a better fix, he carefully analyzed the situation and thought about the route the "enemy" ship might most likely take in its attempt to steam through unnoticed. And he concluded that the search must be concluded in one of the neighboring areas.

The crew checked the figures: There was still more than enough fuel. The navigators noted the new coordinates on the amp, plotted the course and, as soon as the airplane reached a particular line, they turned on the necessary apparatus and tuned out the interference.

"I see the target, Commander!"

The rest depended on the tested proficiency of the scouts. Objective monitoring resources later confirmed the high precision of the crew's radio messages and the authenticity of their information. Acting in highly limited visibility far away from shore, the aerial warriors displayed foresight and sensible initiative, and the ability to orient themselves in a complex situation.

The foresight of an aerial scout, reinforced by high moral-combat qualities, by piloting and navigational proficiency, and by a deep knowledge of the avaiation equipment and the tactics of its combat application, is a sound guarantee of success in complex missions. And we try to make sure that the aerial warriors would be alert and resourceful, and that they would be capable of orienting themselves precisely when searching for targets from different altitudes, in all sorts of weather, which changes so quickly in the Far North. The method of playing out various situations that may evolve during air reconnaissance has recommended itself well in our regiment. We have guidelines for modeling such situations in the training classrooms. The crews think about such situations deeply, and they work with inputs reflecting possible changes in the aerial and tactical situation. This promotes development of creative thinking in the airmen, and it helps them prepare themselves for inventive and decisive actions in the target search areas.

This training year our competition for high quality air reconnaissance preflight preparation is better organized. We employ the following method to raise the spirit of rivalry. When two crews must be launched for one particular assignment, we have three make the preparations, with the condition that the flight would be performed by the ones making the best preparations. As an example when Capt S. Naumov's crew lost its opportunity to fly because it lost such a competition by being insufficiently knowledgeable about the area of operations, many learned a lesson--they began to study more carefully.

Well-delivered lectures, experience exchanges, and talks given by the best pilots and navigators on particular topics are a great support to air reconnaissance preparations. Incidentally Maj Yu. Mikhalev himself began learning the complex art of air reconnaissance under the guidance of Lt Col L. Popov, a former pilot and an experienced officer, while flying as part of his crew as aircraft deputy commander.

During their training, the military airmen persistently studied the tactics and methods of air reconnaissance, and they actively capitalized upon the best experience, competing for high grades in their combat missions.

Training of Young Officers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Capt 3d Rank V. Shirokov, Red Banner Northern Fleet--Lieutenants V. Perfir'yev and V. Gur'yanov felt rather confident aboard ship after leaving school. But soon it was their turn to be certified for independent control of their subunits--and here they suffered serious failures. It turned out that the practical and theoretical training level of the young officers was lowered than required. Besides the fact that the delay in certification was unpleasant to the officers themselves, they had also let their collectives down, earning "penalty points" for them in the competition. Unfortunately this situation has often repeated itself aboard one ship or another. And in the end, the officers were late in working themselves into the crew, and unfortunate interruptions had to be suffered in training and competition.

Staff officers M. Korotkov and P. Kotelyanskiy studied the problem of hastening the development of young officers for a long time. They meticulously analyzed the training afforded to novices aboard different ships undergoing certification, they compared the results, and they revealed the laws. The staff officers concluded that far from all lieutenants undergo training in a strict, meticulously organized system, one which affords an integrated approach to training and indoctrination, and maximum utilization of the mobilizing force of socialist competition.

As long as a distinct, sensible procedure for training young officers does not exist, they are often overloaded with secondary duties, and the help given them is often not very good. Moreover the rivalry factor is often understated in this very important phase of an officer's development.

But how are we to improve and accelerate the training of young officers preparing themselves for certification? Naturally the training would be most effective when it follows a strict order and when it is strictly monitored, when lieutenants are able to assimilate the concrete experience of the most competent and experienced specialists. And this is done best of all on a unit-wide scale.

The command supported the initiative of the staff officers, and practice demonstrated the value of this proposal.

Now the training afforded to young officers preparing for independent control of their subunits is clearly organized, and it is rigidly regulated by a plan that is mandatory to all crews. School graduates are relieved of additional duties and watches for a certain length of time, and they are enrolled in a training group, in which they acquire the skills of competently operating the combat equipment and weapons under the guidance of highly qualified specialists, such as division commanders and flagship specialists.

A training program has been set up at unit headquarters for each specialty. Methods to be followed in lessons given in base training offices have also been furnished to group leaders. Much attention is devoted in this case to transmitting the experience of the unit's best specialists to the novices directly.

A socialist competition for high-quality lesson preparations is organized among the officers. Moreover, competition within the group is always keen and lively. Enjoying equal conditions and having equal opportunities, each tries to display himself to the maximum in the lessons and training sessions, which as a rule proceed in an atmosphere of active rivalry.

The students are aided by modern training offices and various trainers, mock-ups, and diagrams. The lieutenants themselves help to improve them, and they try to leave something of themselves for those who follow after them. Nor do the officers abandon the training offices forever after being certified for independent subunit control. Incidentally, the time allocated for certification is now quite ample.

The utility of the new specialist training method has gone beyond the needs of preparing young officers for their work. It is now being applied to the training of seamen and petty officers undergoing certification as well. Moreover the possibility of providing integrated training to the seamen on a crew-wide scale is now being studied as well. The first trials have shown that after the personnel undergo classroom training in accordance with the specially developed methods, the crews perform more successfully as a rule in their general training missions. And direct competition in the combat missions and concrete exchange of experience play a major role here.

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LETTERS FROM READERS: EDITORIAL COMMENTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 80 p 2

[Editorial commentary: "The Mail of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] In December the editorial staff received 14,153 letters from readers--articles, correspondence, notes, as well as questions, requests, suggestions and remarks. Of these, 470 were published in the newspaper. We received 416 comments on articles in the paper. In 1979 the editorial staff received 123,086 letters in all. Of these, we published 5,842.

The December mail reflected important events which took place in the last month of the year. Reports of our readers and newspaper correspondents on meetings of party actives taking place in the army have been published and continue to be published. These meetings are for the discussion of the tasks of the party organization in light of the decisions of the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the speech made by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the Plenum.

Capt Yu. Popov from the Turkestan Military District reports on the agitation and propaganda work that has developed in the units [chastyakh]. This work is associated with the resulution of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin."

"Communists Lt Col S. Volkov and Maj V. Tereshchenko," he writes, "conducted political information sessions and discussions in the subunits [podrazdeleniyakh]. Headquarters officers and the District's political administration took an active part in this work."

Preparations for the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the union republics and to local Soviets are being actively conducted among the troops.

"At our military post," writes Capt E. Khalabadzhakh of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, "there have appeared colorful calendars, stands and placards informing us of the date of the elections. Canvassing has visibly begun in the barracks, and the campaign station has started work. Lt Col V. Klimov, Lt Col Ya. Vanags, Maj V. Kochetov and Sr Lt S. Chernetskiy have appeared before the troops with lectures and discussions. Party and Komsomol activists are devoting particular attention to the troops, who will take part in the elections first."

Capt V. Shvyrev of the Red Banner Kiev Military District writes about the attention given to the army youth, about how the young soldiers take their places in battle formation and enter into socialist competition. Under complex conditions the rocket-troop warriors had found the high-flying, high-speed target. After the combat operation Capt V. Yevpak collected all the young fighting men, and the worldly-wise operators were divided according to their experience, by how they had executed the difficult combat training mission. Such an exchange of experience is an important condition in fulfilling their obligation in competition: to confirm the rank of outstanding subunit during the school year.

Maj A. Petrov reports that the first days of the school year have already been marked by considerable success in the Leningrad Military District Order of Lenin helicopter squadron. The crews of Capt V. Faraonov and Capt V. Nenënov have perfectly executed their missions in landing troops and destroying the "enemy's" ground targets.

In all arms and services of the USSR's Armed Forces active combat training is going on and socialist competition acquires greater and greater scope--this is the main theme of the editorial mail.

In December the editorial staff received 461 replies to letters submitted for consideration. Commanders and managers of local Soviet and party organs, as well as managers of State and social organizations reported on the results of the examination and the measures that were taken.

Among the responses that arrived at our publications were dozens of letters from readers who decided to take part in operation "dolg" ["Duty"]. We also received their advice, wishes and suggestions for what they would like to see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA be in 1980.

The new 1980 year has begun. From you, dear readers, we expect new letters about life and training in the USSR Armed Forces, about competition for a worthy reception for the 110th Anniversary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin, about the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory, and about everything that fills the everyday lives of the defenders of the socialist Motherland.

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BOOKS ON MILITARY AFFAIRS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 80 p 2

[Article: "Published by Voyenizdat"]

[Text] Yepishev, A. A. "Ideologicheskaya rabota v Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Silakh" [Ideological Affairs in the Soviet Armed Forces]. Second edition, with supplements. 1979, 334 pages, price 70 kopecks.

In the book are examined pressing questions on the ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces, the Marxist-Leninist training of the military cadres, the heroic-patriotic education of youth in light of the decrees of the 25th CPSU Congress and the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Educational Affairs."

"Za vysokuyu effektivnost' propagandy i agitatsii. Iz opyta agitatsionno-propagandicheskoy raboty v voyskakh i na flote" [For the High Effectiveness of Propaganda and Agitation. From Experience of Agitation and Propaganda Work in the Army and Navy]. Edited by N. I. Smorigo. 1979, 127 pages, price 15 kopecks.

The materials in the collection tell of the organization, methods and practice of agitation and propaganda activities in units [chastyakh] and on board ships, in light of the decrees of the party's 25th Congress and of the subsequent resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee.

The collection is intended for commanders, political workers, propagandists and agitators, as well as for the active party and Komsomol members of subunits [podrazdeleniy] of the army and navy.

Belyayev, I. P. "Den' sed'moy, kak den' pervyy. Dokumental'naya povest'" [The Seventh Day is as the First. A Documentary Narrative]. 1979, 352 pages, price 70 kopecks.

This book from the famous publicist and internationalist, I. P. Belyayev, is dedicated to the events of June, 1967 in the Near East.

In the narrative, the real state of affairs in the Near East is revealed. Zionism is exposed as the most dangerous enemy of the peoples' peace and progress.

Chistyakov, N. F. "Po zakonu i sovesti. (Voyennyye Memuary)" [By Law and Conscience. (Military Memoirs)]. 1979, 256 pages, price 1 ruble 10 kopecks.

During the hard times of the Great Patriotic War the author worked in agencies of the military procurator's office. For a number of years he was administrative chief (department chief) of the USSR Committee on State Security and participated personally in the investigation of dangerous crimes against the State. The book tells about this. Interesting, little known and unknown details are cited.

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ENGINEER COMBAT SUPPORT: IMPORTANCE STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 80 p 1

[Article: "Engineer Combat Support"]

[Text] The comprehensive support of combat operations has always been a most important condition for victory. Profound changes in the nature of combat, brought about by the appearance of nuclear rocket arms, the increase in the might of conventional strike weapons and an increase in the mobility of units [chastey] and subunits [podrazdeleniy] have given new substance to the basic types of combat support and raise even higher their roles and significance. This is reflected with all obviousness in engineer support of combat operations.

Reliable engineer combat support is achieved through the concerted efforts of all arms and services. The most complicated missions, demanding particular knowledge and special methods, are carried out by engineer subunits. Numerous missions, associated with the laying of cross-country tracks, overcoming small rivers, streams, canals and other natural obstacles, making gaps in the enemy's obstacles, equipping occupied areas and positions and camouflaging them, must be solved by the mechanized riflemen, tankers and artillerymen independently. Skill in carrying out engineering measures in all types of combat, under any weather or climatic conditions, day and night--this is an inherent element of their field training.

Modern combat makes ever-growing demands on the engineering training of the combined-arms commander--the main organizer of all types of combat support. The commander organizes the engineering reconnaissance, analyzes its data, determines the nature and extent of the necessary measures and executes control in carrying them out. Knowledge and skills of the officers in the area of military engineering affairs must be persistently improved in classes in the commander-training system, in field classes with the personnel and in tactical and special tactical exercises. The commanders of company and battalion sections merit special attention. With an increase in the spatial dimensions and pace of combat and the number of missions to be carried out by subunits that are detached from the main forces, the commanders must more and more frequently organize engineer support for operations without the help of specialists.

Among the troops there are few units and subunits whose personnel are distinguished by a high level of engineering training. During an exercise recently, conducted under complex semi-desert conditions, the soldiers of the regiment in which Maj Radvilovich is chief of the engineering service masterfully employed the engineering equipment. Mechanized riflemen equipped the subunit bases and control points competently and in reduced time, they cleverly camouflaged them and skillfully made gaps in the obstacles built by the "enemy."

Each unit has extensive opportunities for improving its engineer combat support skills. It is important only that they not be limited by exercises in special fields and that the military engineering training is not separated from tactics. It is important that the tactical and tactical construction exercises be totally saturated with elements of military engineering training and that the engineering missions during exercises be carried out without simplification or slackening.

Unfortunately, the engineering training is being pushed into the background in a number of subunits. Other commanders maintain the profoundly mistaken opinion that engineering affairs are the domain of specialists, that they are someone else's concern. This is reflected in the actions of their subordinates and gives rise to a simplified approach to important questions of combat support. Frequently the support of positions is only designated--passages through the minefields are prepared beforehand, as a rule, and not under the "enemy's" fire. Already in the first days of winter training the old "disease" has appeared here and there: a substitution for practical on-site work, that is, fulfilling the standards through a reiteration of theoretical propositions. As a result, personnel do not receive the necessary skills, and the fighting men develop an incorrect understanding about the nature of modern combat. This cannot be tolerated. Commanders and headquarters workers and, first and foremost, chiefs of the engineering service must strengthen control over the quality of exercises and their material support.

It is necessary to see that during the execution of any combat training mission the questions of engineer support are given the same attention that they require in actual combat. During training under conditions that approach those of combat, it is necessary to actively employ mine sweepers. Other hanging and built-in pieces of equipment, assemblies for underwater navigation, bridge-laying equipment, tracked bridges and the means for light mechanization. The subunits in all arms and services must persistently study self-entrenchment, the layout of concealment for personnel and equipment, camouflage and the use of local defense facilities. This makes it possible not only to retain combat capability under conditions in which the enemy employs modern strike weapons, including nuclear arms, but also increases the potentials of one's own means of battle. It is important to see that each fighting man thoroughly understands the significance that engineering measures hold for the outcome of the battle, that he conscientiously and responsibly carries out the mission he has received and that he exhibits resourcefulness and initiative. During engineering operations it is also necessary to master the methods of constructing dummy defense centers, dummy fire positions and dummy starting positions, using front-line experience in this area.

Commanders, headquarters and political organs must not lose sight of the problem of improving the combat training of the engineering troops' subunits--combat-engineering, fixed-emplacement, road construction, pontoon, bridge construction, river-crossing and landing and others. It is necessary to train them under complex tactical conditions, using all means possible to conduct joint exercises with subunits of other arms of services, and conduct operations in their interests.

It is difficult to imagine carrying out complex and labor-intensive engineer combat support missions without competition between subunits and individual soldiers. It is necessary to utilize his motivating force in all exercises and training and to objectively propagandize the experience of the front-rank people and their methods of operation. They are acting correctly in those units where the engineering training standards are included in crew and gun-squad competition programs, and where competitive reviews are conducted on the upkeep of engineering equipment.

Party and Komsomol organizations must use their own inherent methods in order to fight for an exemplary treatment of engineer support problems during exercises and training. They must struggle resolutely with the underestimation of this type of combat support, while fostering among the personnel a conscientious attitude toward the execution of their military duty.

To tirelessly improve field training during the course of winter instruction and to teach soldiers to more successfully carry out a combination of missions in combat support operations means raising the combat capability of the units and subunits to an even higher level.

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BASIC MILITARY TRAINING: PROCEDURES AND RESULTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen A. Popov, Chief of Administration of Territorial Military Training of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Through Combined Efforts--Basic Military Training"]

[Text] The Communist Party and the Soviet government are conducting a consistent battle for peace and for the relaxation of international tensions. World reaction, however, does not give up its hopes of destroying socialism through military means. Thus, the CPSU and its Lenin Central Committee display a constant concern for strengthening the military might of the Armed Forces and the country's defense capabilities. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Educational Affairs" demands, in particular, an intensification of the military-patriotic education of young people and of the training of youth for military service.

Experience shows that an important place in the solution of this problem is occupied by the basic military training which is being conducted in schools, technical schools, professional technical colleges and at the training stations of enterprises and kolkhozes.

In accordance with the existing situation, the responsibility for the organization of basic military training and for the quality of military service training that young people receive is borne by the directors of educational institutions and by military instructors. It still must be noted that high results in this work are achieved where the basic military training and military-patriotic education of the students have become a vital concern of the pedagogical collective, the party and Komsomol organizations and the DOSAAF Committee.

In this respect, Moscow secondary school No 38, the State Professional-Technical School No 5 of the Yakut ASSR, the Riga electromechanical technical school and many other educational institutions may serve as an example. In these schools, close inter-disciplinary ties have been established between basic military training, literature, social science, history and geography. Great attention is given to the physical tempering of the future fighting men. During extracurricular time they conduct thematic evening sessions and trips to places commemorating the revolutionary, combat and working glory of the Soviet people. The young men and women take an active part in the All-Union Komsomol Military-Sport Game "Orlënok."

All of this promotes the education of youth in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, contributes to the readiness to come out in defense of the Great October Conquests and gives birth to a lively interest in the study of miliatry affairs. In addition, it seems that it is no accident that the overwhelming majority of graduates of these educational institutions have nothing but good and excellent marks in basic military training and strong physical tempering.

The consolidation of efforts plays a paramount role in the solution of organizational and methodological questions associated with basic military training. No less significant is the common concern for the improvement and development of material training bases.

One may with satisfaction state that the material training base at the majority of schools and other secondary educational institutions at present already meets fully the demands made upon it. And, perhaps, in this regard, the case of the Ukraine is best of all. In Chernigov oblast, for example, more than 80 percent of the schools have shooting ranges. Much is being done in this curriculum in Dnepropetrovshchina. Complexes for basic military training and for the future soldiers' physical training have been built in the majority of schools in Ivano-Frankovskaya oblast.

However, the problems of the further development of the material training base have still not been solved everywhere. In Chitinskaya oblast, for example, more than 70 percent of the schools and educational institutions up to now do not have shooting ranges. The situation with ranges in Tashkent oblast is even worse. Why? There are, of course, objective difficulties. Nevertheless, the main reason for the lag, in my opinion, is concealed in something else: in the passivity of the respective officials, and in the expectation that someone else would come and do it.

Military commissariats do not always pointedly put the question of rendering aid in the construction of the material training base before the local party and Soviet agencies, although they, as a rule, gladly respond to such requests and meet them head-on. They require only complete and objective information about the state of affairs, as well as valid, concrete proposals. Alas, often there are no such proposals.

Here and there and, in particular, in certain regions of Novosibirsk, Volynskaya, Moscow and Tashkent oblasts and in separate rayons of Moscow, classes in basic military training have been transferred to industrial training combines. Toward what end has this been done? In order to achieve better material support. It would seem that the advantages are readily apparent: due to the fact that there are only a few schools, it is simpler to equip a single military training area and concentrate a greater amount of equipment in it.

Such an experiment has gone on for a number of years in the Menskiy rayon of Chernigov oblast. However, B. Kiyeni, manager of the regional people's education department, and military commander Lt Col P. Slesarenko soon became convinced that there is another side to the coin. The level of the recruits' preparation for military service not only did not rise, it even dropped somewhat.

Analysis has shown that the reasons for this consist of the following. In the first place, the directors of the schools, who bear the responsibility for the organization and execution of basic military training classes, loosened their control over the classes. They would say that they were not running the classes, someone else was. In the second place, attendance had dropped. Not all students were able to get to the industrial training combine on time. And, finally, a gap had started to show between the basic military training and the military-patriotic instruction which all the teaching collectives had to conduct.

It seems that this is the conclusion that arises: basic military training can and must be conducted in each school. Each school must have its own material training base. Such a training program has been created in the Orël school No 17 through the efforts of the director, V. Matveyeva and the military instructor, reserve Maj Ye. Ignatov, and in the Tallin State Professional Technical University No 10 through the efforts of the director, A. Sosnitskiy, and the military instructor, reserve Lt Col V. Lepeshkin.

Can it be possible that the results obtained in Menskiy rayon and in Chernigov oblast are accidental? A thorough check of a number of schools in the Moscow Baumanskiy rayon, in the city of Tatarsk in Novosibirsk oblast and in Snezhnoye in Donetsk oblast, where basic military training is also carried out in industrial training combines, has shown that the picture is approximately the same there, too.

Unfortunately, within certain department, even up to the USSR Ministry of Education, there are those who support the continuation of this "experiment." At the same time, as far as I knowk it has not occurred to any of them to create single physics, chemistry and social science training areas for several schools. Are these not the same sort of subjects as basic military training?

Speaking of the deficiencies which exist in the organization of basic military training in the schools, professional, technical colleges and technical schools, one may not avoid questions of the military instructors' methodic skills. Some of them up to this time have been conducting the practical lessons poorly, especially the lessons in weapons, tactics and parade drill training. Not everyone is able to properly interest the trainee and see that the young men and women actively work in groups and participate in mass defense measures.

Gaps in the military instructors' methodic training are most often explained by the fact that many of them do not have special teacher's training. Nevertheless, this inadequacy, as experience shows, will also be eliminated when desired.

What is required for this? First of all, single-minded work is required from the military registration and enlistment office which, along with the people's and the professional-technical education agencies, has been called upon to thoughtfully plan and to carry out at the proper time methodical training assemblies with the military instructors. They are not to be conducted formally and are not meant to be just "checked off," but rather they are to be of some real benefit.

Toward this goal it is necessary to achieve a further strengthening of business ties with military units and military training institutions, the officers of which can suggest much to the military instructors. They must learn methodically how to correctly conduct classes with their pupils not in the classroom, but on location and at the shooting range.

Finally, there is still one more tried and true method: constant contact between the basic military training instructors and the entire teaching body of the school, the technical school and the professional-technical college. No one is about to deny that the instruction of military affairs has its own specific aspects. However, the overall principles of instruction remain the same. This means that the military instructor must persistently and interestedly adopt the experience of senior, more qualified instructors.

Much has been done in recent years for the further improvement of the military-patriotic education of young people and for the preparation of youth for service in the army and the navy. We must not, however, be content with what has been achieved. We must self-critically evaluate the work being carried out and the results that have been achieved, and take effective measures to eliminate the existing defects. The questions of improving and expanding the material training base and intensifying the military instructors' methodical training and the students' physical tempering demand paramount attention. Just as before, the necessary attention must be devoted to working with those soldiers who have a poor command of the Russian language.

The training of worthy reinforcements for the Armed Forces is a task of State importance. We are faced with solving this task through the common efforts of the people's educational and professional-technical training agencies, and the military registration and enlistment offices and DOSAAF organizations. We are faced with solving it, constantly remembering that the defense of the socialist Fatherland is the sacred duty of each citizen of the USSR.

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DOSAAF: DRIVER TRAINING CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA non-staff correspondent A. Zhakupov in the column "Letter with Commentary": "Laid-up Zaporozhets Automobiles"]

[Text] Dear editorial staff! This year the State has allotted me, free of charge, a Zaporozhets automobile with hand controls because I am an invalid from the Great Patriotic War. However, as of yet I have been unable to get it, since I do not have a driver's license. Since March I have tried repeatedly to complete the amateur driver's courses. In our oblast of Alma-Ata, the only institution at present that prepares these courses is the Lenin Regional Committee of DOSAAF. The sport and technical club subordinate to it has three training Zaporozhets automobiles with hand controls. Here is the problem: these automobiles have been standing motionless for months. Lessons in the practical driving course have not been conducted for four months. We ask the instructors: when will the automobiles be repaired? They only make helpless gestures. Workers at DOSAAF send us to make inquiries at social maintenance agencies. They, in turn, send us back in the other direction. We are going in circles senselessly. K. Skobichev, invalid of the Great Patriotic War.

The editorial staff directed this letter to the chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee of the Kazakh SSR. A reply was soon received, signed by the Deputy Chairman Comrade V. Vlasov. It was reported in the letter that "The presence of deficiencies in the invalid driver's training program has been pointed out to the Alma-Ata oblast committee of DOSAAF, and it has been suggested that measures be taken to restore the automobiles that are in disrepair."

Since then much time has passed. One would have thought that measures on this critical signal had been taken. Recently, however, this veteran once again called the correspondents station at KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and reported that lessons on theory had begun, but the training automobiles were still laid-up as they had been previously.

At first I went to the sport and technical club of the Lenin Regional Committee of DOSAAF and met with its chairman, Comrade I. Voropayev.

"We are interested," he said, "in repairing the equipment more rapidly, but we are hindered from doing this by a lack of spare parts."

Our conversation with Colonel K. Kozhaspayev, chairman of the Alma-Ata oblast Committee of DOSAAF, also came down to the problem of spare parts.

Of course, the automobiles cannot be repaired without spare parts. One must have them. For this, however, it is necessary to have, at the minimum, economic foresight and efficiency. It is time for DOSAAF instructors to turn from their mutual squabbling, complaining and excuses to a practical solution of the problem. The affair should finally be organized so that the training automobiles are provided with spare parts by a centralized procedure. This can be done, for example, in the same way that it is done for automobile transportation for the private use of invalids.

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BOOK REVIEW: GENERAL MAL'TSEV'S MEMOIRS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 80 p 2

[Review by Col Gen K. Grushevoy, member of the Military Soviet, Chief of the Order of Lenin Political Administration of the Moscow Military District, of the book "V gody ispytaniy" [In the Years of Ordeals] by Gen E. Mal'tsev, Voyenizdat, 1979, 320 pages]

[Text] Each book of military memoirs you take into your hands with nervousness: What will the author say that is new, which facet of military events will he most thoroughly reveal? I think that the book of General of the Army E. Mal'tsev "V gody ispytaniy" [In the Years of Ordeals], published by Voyenizdat, justifies the reader's hopes in this respect. The author of the book spent the entire war as a political worker, and has dedicated his memoirs to party-political affairs at the front. The book was particularly near and dear to me. Fortunes at the front brought me together with the author of this book during the trying days of the Ukrainian retreat of the spring and summer of 1942, near Rostov, on the Kuban'. Later we took part in the advance operations in the northern Caucasas, on the Taman' Peninsula, when the so-called "bluc line" created by the enemy was broken. I remember E. Mal'tsev as a division commissar, a chief of the political section and a member of the army's military Soviet. The party put him in crucial districts, and everywhere, be it in the 12th, 47th, 56th or 21st Armies, he carried out his duties befittingly.

The author went down his combat path along with such illustrious party workers and generals as L. I. Brezhnev, R. Ya. Malinovskiy and L. A. Govorov. He writes simply and truthfully, showing the most vivid features of their characters.

When telling of his meetings with L. I. Brezhnev, the author emphasizes his profound knowledge of affairs, his spiritual generousity and human kindness.

"I never saw," he writes "the chief of the 18th Army's political section bored, depressed or desperate, even in the most difficult and the most, it seemed, hopeless moments of life at the front. I was always struck by the scale, breadth and clarity of Leonid Il'ich's judgements on the problems of party and political affairs at the front, and on the role of advanced ideas in the formation of the soldiers' and commanders' moral strength.

The figure of V. Begma, member of the 12th Army's military Soviet, who always strove to be in the heaviest sectors of combat where success was decided, is well revealed in the book.

Being an army political worker, E. Mal'tsev naturally devotes primary attention in his book to the activity of the party's political apparatus and to those people who armed the fighting men ideologically, strengthened within them a great feeling of love for the Motherland, instilled faith in their forces and inspired them to heroic deeds. He thoroughly reveals the forms and methods of party-political and political-educational work in defense and on the march, and shows convincingly the foundations of its effectiveness. Under combat conditions, notes E. Mal'tsev, one must correctly determine the optimal correlation between word and deed under the constant dominance of deed over word. Readiness for a heroic deed does not come by itself, the author points out. It is fostered and formed within people.

Here is a characteristic example from the area of education. They had to overcome a fear of tanks that existed among soldiers in a certain unit [chasti]. With this goal in mind they conducted special exercises. Tanks crossed over the entrenchments in which the soldiers concealed themselves. However, one of the soldiers flatly refused to lie on the bottom of the trench. The regimental commander, a bold and strong-willed man, shouted and threatened. Nothing helped. The division commander, Maj Gen S. Kuznetsov, acted entirely differently. He came up to the soldier and asked calmly, "What is the matter, boy, is it frightening to lie in the trench under the tank?" The soldier agreed. The general himself then jumped into the trench and lay down on the bottom together with the soldier. When the tank had gone over them, Kuznetsov said to the soldier, "See that wasn't so terrible, was it?"

The author shows with particular clarity the significance of the communist's personal example under combat conditions. When the political worker first rushes in to meet the shower of lead, he is led first and foremost by a feeling of duty before the Motherland and before the party. The soldiers, knowing this, rise up as one and follow the communist. This is not only a matter of the political worker's bravery. The soldiers see in him a representative of our party. They believe in the party and know that where the party is, there is victory and success. The author confirms this thought through numerous examples of the courage and fearlessness of communists in combat.

The success of party political work, notes the author, depends to a great degree upon the political worker's personal qualities. The author places first and foremost ideological conviction, courage and spiritual generosity. He shows the role of the political worker's mental outlook, his ability to see in the thick of events the main element on whose timely and correct solution success depends. In the book, the necessity of long-range planning of party political work is convincingly brought to light. In this respect, the author's notebook with outlines of questions for the monthly plan is interesting. Here everything is taken into consideration--from the renewal of the political-worker apparatus to concrete measures for eliminating the soldiers' fear of tanks.

A large part of the book is set aside for the work in summarizing and inculcating combat experience, and for the skills needed to promptly spot and support the sprouts of new initiative acts on the part of soldiers and commanders and to advance the slogan of the day. This skill appeared, for example, at the onset of the massive sniper movement which was opportunely supported by the army's political section and in the work of the entrenchment agitators, whose activities were planned and well-organized.

The author warmly recalls the soldiers and commanders with whom he had had occasion to meet at the front. In the examples of their illustrious lives he reveals the moral-combat aspects of Soviet fighting men and shows their inextinguishable faith in victory. The reader will find out much that is new about Maj Tsezaro Kunikov who, having led the landing party, seized the beach-head that later became the legendary Malaya Zemlya.

A great impression is left, for example, by the booklet dedicated to the landing-party soldier, written by Ts. Kunikov. Interesting also are the images of the clever and calculating commissar N. Sedykh and bold battalion commander Sr Lt K. Ostapenko, who managed to use all means possible in order to achieve victory in battle. Sr Sgt I. Yakubin, the courageous combat engineer who many times secured success in battle through his daring and resourcefulness, is also recalled. It is precisely these people, educated by the Communist Party, who forged our victory over the hated enemy--German fascism.

It seems that General of the Army E. Mal'tsev's book of memoirs will be read with interest by the commanders and political workers in our army. It will play its role in the formation of patriotic consciousness among youth and in preparing youth for the selfless defense of the socialist Motherland.

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ENGINEER OFFICERS: TASKS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by professor Engr-Lt Gen V. Filippov: "Facets of the Profession"]

> [Text] In his speech at the November (1979) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev formulated a number of questions, the solution of which is directed at accelerating scientific-technical progress, efficiently employing material resources, revealing initiative and creativeness, further increasing the effectiveness and the quality of our work and strengthening each individual's personal responsibility for matters that have been entrusted.
>
> All of this is in keeping with the tasks which our Armed Forces carry out in further increasing combat preparedness and the efficiency of military operations and in strengthening organization and discipline. Which role in the solution to these problems belongs to the combat engineer? How is this specialist to be viewed in the epoch of scientific-technical revolution? The Chief of the Military Aviation Engineering Academy imeni N. Ye.Zhukovskiy, Engr-Lt Gen V. Filippov, raises these questions in the article published below.

Modern arms and combat equipment are extremely varied, multifunctional and complex. People from the most varied specialties, possessing the broadest knowledge and highest level of technical culture, capable of mastering new types of armament in the shortest period of time and psychologically prepared for both collective and individual action, are needed fo the efficient utilization and insured reliable opeation of these arms and for constantly maintaining them at a high level of combat preparedness.

Speaking out at a Kremlin reception in honor of the graduates of the military institutes of higher education, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, "The modern army has become an army of complex machines and precision devices. Scientific-technical progress has brought about a genuine revolution in military affairs. The appearance of nuclear rocket arms and other recent equipment has entailed fundamental changes in strategy and tactics, in the organization and equipping of troops, and in the methods of training and educating personnel.

Under these new conditions, the requirements for military-technical and, one may safely say, scientific training of officer personnel are increased immeasurably. In order to skillfully utilize the military hardware and teach this skill to others, one must know well the bases of its operation and have broad knowledge in various scientific fields. It is necessary that this scientific-technical knowledge be continuously supplemented."

The formula, as we see, is all-encompassing and concrete. It is true for officers of all branches of the Armed Forces. Its position is manifested most vividly in military aviation, where the level of technical outfitting, the complexity of many flights and the transient nature of combat situations demand the highest technical competence from all personnel.

How successfully this equipment is mastered, how fully its combat potentials are utilized, how well prepared it is for flight, how well the preventative maintenance and repair work has been carried out depends, in many respects, upon the military aviation engineers. I would consider their labor as a special type of activity akin to scientific, organizational and instructional activities, not always connected to a concrete work place but very concrete in relation to the sphere of problems to be solved. Therefore, let us become more closely acquainted with today's military engineer.

There are two ways in which the engineer may be depicted. One is the usual, traditional way, in which a man is drawn with a slide-rule, a work-book for his notes, and sometimes with tools in his hands. This is the image of a man between "the table and the lathe" or between the"aircraft parking apron" and the "testing laboratory."

The other type, no less traditional at present, is the engineer against a background of endless diagrams, selector panels, surrounded by various graphs and punchcards. This is an image of an engineer of another plan.

However, at all times we value in the engineer-exploiter (and we are speaking precisely about him) the fact that alongside the manager-organizer there is present in him a practical working teacher with his experience in servicing and repairing the equipment, combined with theoretical analysis and an understanding of the scientific organization of labor, the significance of network schedules and mathematical models. On the whole, he also has the ability to work with people, consider their opinions, and, through argument, defend his own point of view in debate.

The sign of the times lies in something else. In equipping aviation, one finds intricate air-combat complexes. In this equipment are included sensitive automatic guidance systems and flight navigation (PNK) and navigational sighting (PRNK) complexes with on-board computers that make it possible to carry out a flight according to a previously computed program in the automatic or semiautomatic mode and, in such a manner, free the pilot from the function of controlling many pieces of technical equipment so that he may concentrate his attention on carrying out the tactical plan during the execution of the combat mission. There are also special radio-electronic devices that insure the efficient execution of piloting and search-and-destroy missions, etc.

Although it was only 10 or 15 years ago, let us say, that an airborne armamant engineer was able to successfully content himself with knowledge of his own specialty alone, today, in order to be on a level with modern practical requirements, he is obliged to have a sufficiently thorough mastery of radio electronics, computer equipment, etc., as well. In their turn, the radio electronics engineers must also have a good understanding of guided missle armaments and aiming devices, which earlier had been an occuptational subject of other specialists.

The demand for such integration is determined, of course, not only nor very much by the engineer's functioning as the person responsible for the engineering and technical training of all the personnel. The integration is necessary primarily for properly organizing the preparation of airborne equipment for flights, for maintaining the equipment in a state of combat readiness and for the high effectiveness of its application in combat.

The expansion of the engineering influence on the combat-training and combat operations of aviation units [chastey] is also manifested at present through the direct participation of engineers in operational estimates and in the development of crew instructions for the effective application of combat equipment and for the selection of the best type of munitions for a reliable strike on a given target. Specialists of the aviation engineering service participate directly in combat flight management, since the control and introduction of flight programs into the blocks of the PNK and PRNK-type automatic devices are under their direction. In addition, the accuracy of the aircraft's target engagement and the extent of the strike damage from a rocket or bomb attack depends, in many respects, on how this work is carried out.

The lone man's time has passed. Today it is possible for only a collective of specialists or a group of individuals possessing experience and knowledge to solve this serious technical problem. It may also be solved by an institution that has as its basis the very same experience and thorough knowledge. Within this group of individuals the engineer-manager occupies a leading position.

Today the military engineer must work on a level with the requirements of the scientific-technical revolution. He must be ready to solve essentially new military-technical problems, and solve them on the modern level of the demands, not following the inertia of habit. He must skillfully rely on those important and useful things that he acquired in his years of study at the academy and reestablish his "theoretical knowledge," which is the foundation for understanding and proving that which is new.

His degree of "adaptation" to the profession is also important. Why, besides his military and technical knowledge, he must also be armed with knowledge of the social-psychological plan; he must be a teacher and a methodologist, a socialogist and a researcher. In a word, he must have "interprofessional" skills apart from his professional knowledge and skills.

There is still more. The realization of the military-technical training of the personnel in units and on board ships lies primarily on the shoulders of the military engineers who are, in technical respects, the best-trained officer corps of the Armed Forces. The scientific-technical revolution has made the engineer's profession the most massive for the officer, and a high level of engineering-technical training has been made necessary not only for technical specialists, but also for the command staff. An overwhelming portion of the army's commanding officers' cadres and those of the navy has for many years received an engineering education in the military institutions of higher education. The high military-technical training of the troops is one of the important components of their combat preparedness.

We must speak of one more quality that is extremely necessary for the modern engineer. This is the constant sense of that which is new. The military engineer is the bearer of scientific-technical progress. He must always strive in every possible way to expand the creative initiative of his subordinates. He must then direct this initiative toward the search for methods of increasing the combat preparedness of aviation equipment, toward shortening flight-preparation times and toward the improvement of methods for servicing and repairing the equipment. He is the organizer and manager of socialist competition between technical specialists.

In recent years, more and more attention has been devoted to the engineer's training as manager and educator in the military training institutions as well. The training programs include legal education and lectures on instruction and management, as well as lectures on military-economic, operational-tactical and many other problems in the military engineer's activities.

Those people are thoroughly mistaken, who consider that the knowledge received at an institution of higher education is sufficient for an entire lifetime. At present, military-technical information is being renewed so quickly that only constant independent work keeps the engineer from lagging behind life and from wasting the basis of his professional training. Once, in a regiment, I met an engineer who was reading a fat volume on the theory of games. When I asked him what had drawn him, an operator, to this problem, he answered with disarming simplicity: "It interests me. It will come in handy at work." This is the motive to which the future belongs. However, it is already today, not tomorrow, that the engineer must understand and know how to use in his work the fundamentals of scientific management, programming, etc.

Each generation of engineers is obliged to participate in the process of renewing military arms and equipment. Here it is very important that not only each engineer master the new equipment in as short a time as possible, but that their subordinates, too, be trained at the same level of combat skill as the masters.

Thus, it is as if two specialists were combined in today's combat engineer. One is the usual combat engineer-operator, the other we may call the researcher, the experimenter, the "propagandist and champion of novelty." This "second" one is also responsible for everything the "first" one does. However, there is one more aspect I would like especially to talk about. "An officer, no matter what post has been entrusted to him," underscores the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshall of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "is not only a military manager and specialist, but also a champion of party politics in the army and navy. It is also very important that the officer's demands on his subordinates be reinforced by his personal example in the faultless execution of his service obligations and by his creative, initiative approach to matters."

Such an active, vital position based on deep party loyalty has been bequeathed to us by the great Lenin.

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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1504

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MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITES

Company Level Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 80 p 1

> [Text] Lt Col V. Moroz--The training battle conducted by the motorized rifle company commanded by Guards Sr Lt A. Shaytanov was observed by the commander in chief of the ground troops--USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Army Gen I. Pavlovskiy. The originality of the plan and the closeness of the situation to one of real combat made the tactical exercise dynamic and interesting. A creative approach to organizing artillery preparation, attack support, and artillery escort of the offensive in depth against the simulated enemy defenses imparted a special hue to it. Army Gen I. Pavlovskiy declared his gratefulness to the Guards soldiers for the great field skills they displayed, and for their proficient use of the equipment and weapons.

The thunder of a gun volley emanated from a glade blanketed by puffs of morning mist. I recalled what Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Shaytanov said before the battle: "Artillery will play the first chord." It was no accident that the company commander used a musical term: He liked to compare the interaction of subunits of different branches of troops on the battlefield with an orchestra, where the conductor is the combined-arms commander.

At this time the battalion commanded by Guards Major M. Glushchenkov was providing fire support to the company's advance and deployment in combat formation, and it prepared the attack. The smoke puffs of the shell bursts mixed with the mist on the forward edge of the "enemy" defenses. The wind wafted the biting odor of TNT toward us.

Once again I recalled my interview with Aleksandr Shaytanov. He graduated in 1965 from the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR. This was his third year as company commander. He had led it into the attack more than once during this time. The young officer had a unique attitude toward tactics. "The deeper I get into them," he said, "the more clearly I recognize that combat is mainly a duel of armor and fire--tanks, armored personnel carriers, and modern antitank resources." And in fact, there is reason in these thoughts. So it was now, with numerous antitank resources--mobile, long-range, and viable--in the "enemy" strongpoints. It is impossible to destroy such an antitank fire system without interaction with subunits of other branches of troops.

The fire support helicoptors flew swiftly forward to the right and left of the advancing company, hugging the ground. It was especially difficult for the chopper crews today: Visibility was at a minimum. However, majors V. Vorob'yev and A. Karpov and Captain V. Semenov led the groups precisely on course. Helicoptor pilots have their own tactics. Some of the groups stay outside the "enemy's" zone of fire, climb swiftly, and shoot out long tongues of flame. In a few seconds the sounds of explosions recalling a drum roll could be heard from deep within the defenses: The unguided missile strike was on target. Meanwhile a pair of helicoptors "sneaks up" from the opposite side. Guided missiles rush toward distant targets like ruby fireflies.

The "enemy" is showered by powerful fire from different directions, and his actions are constrained back to a significant depth. The saber "stabs" from the sky, the artillery fire from concealed gun positions, and the direct sighting fire of the attacking tanks and armored personnel carriers, taken all together, using the language of tactics, make up an integrated fire strike at the stimulated enemy.

The company attacks, though in no hurry to commit its APC's. The spearhead of the attack is led by tanks. The armored personnel carriers are a hundred or so meters behind them. All armament is utilized effectively in such a combat formation, and at the same time the vehicles are sure to be a safe distance away from the bursts of our own artillery shells. An attack in an armored combat formation is an attack on wheels. The merits of such an attack are obvious. The main one is the high rate of advance, which deprives the "enemy" of the possibility of closing the breach in the defenses, advancing reserves to the threatened sector, creating new minefields, and calling out aviation and combat helicoptors. Attacking in an armored combat formation means making fuller use of the speed and maneuvering qualities of the vehicles, and the rapid-fire characteristics of their armament. But if such an attack is to become reality, we must have dependable artillery support, effective support from the air, and interaction coordinated down to the smallest details.

Gunner Guards Major N. Yarashenko spoke well about this: "Had today's battle been a real one rather than an exercise, we would not have had to work out any last-minute details concerning our coordination. There is nothing fake about it. Our fire is dense. And in addition to courage, we and the personnel of the attacking company had to display high psychological maturity."

The situation on the battlefield changes, and the interaction among the subunits acquires new characteristics. The fire plan is altered, and a different type of ammunition is employed. Beyond the forward edge of the "enemy" defenses the armored personnel carriers catch up to the tanks and begin advancing in a single line with them, dependably protected by artillery fire. The voice of Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Shaytanov could be heard over the loudspeaker. His commands are short and to the point, and the reports of his subordinates are just as brief; for the most part, however, communication is by signals understandable to the personnel of all of the interacting subunits.

Need I mention that all of this is founded upon a tremendous amount of labor contributed to joint tactical drills, and to the modeling of all situations that could be foreseen. Both the company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Shaytanov and the tank crews led by Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Bogachevskiy and the personnel of the artillery subunits ended the past training year with high results. They are also working purposefully on every topic of the new training year.

The present exercise is an important test. The situation changes dramatically once again: The "enemy" has managed to place his reserves into action. The combat formation of the advancing company is altered instantaneously. Detachments hurrying forward together with the vehicles deploy into a line. Coordinated reports from automatic rifles weave themselves harmoniously into the music of the battle. After all, the men must know how to shoot without the protection of an APC--the attack on foot has not as yet become obsolete.

The scale of the company tactical exercise is modest. The front of advance and the depth of the combat objectives is small. But if such an exercise is organized thoughtfully and creatively, it displays all of the characteristics of modern combat--its combined-arms nature, the decisiveness of goals, and great fluidity. It affords a broad avenue for a commander's resourcefulness. The tactics of tomorrow are born today. And every company can make its contribution to tomorrow's tactics.

Need for Defensive Training Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Col V. Yefremov, Staff Officer, Red Banner Turkestan Military District--According to the intelligence, the "enemy" was expected to reach the line occupied by the regiment's subunits at dawn. Thus the motorized riflemen had to make their defensive preparations at night.

In the previous phases of the exercise the battalion commanded by Captain S. Matyushin was especially active in the offensive. At the critical moment the battalion commander decided to commit a reserve company to combat in order to repel a counterattack by superior "enemy" forces. It was not that simple to do on the desert terrain. But Captain Matyushin completed his mission: He ordered the company commander to perform a deep maneuver under the cover of sand dunes. While the other subunits were repelling the counterattack with all fire resources from an advantageous line, the company made its way to the "enemy's" flank and attacked him by surprise. The outcome of the battle was predetermined.

So it was in the offensive. Now, according to the orders, the motorized riflemen were themselves to repel an offensive conducted by superior "enemy" forces, inflict significant losses upon him, hold onto the occupied positions, and set the stage for a new decisive offensive.

The "enemy" attacked at dawn. He concentrated his main efforts on the boundary between the defensive areas of two battalions. Between them jutted a wedge of terrain flat as a tabletop--a takyr skirting the edge of the dunes. This made it possible for the attackers to use their tanks aggressively. Although captains G. Tarnovyan and S. Matyushin foresaw this contingency and organized their fire plan in such a way that the attacking subunits would fall into a fire trap, the "enemy" was nevertheless able to wedge himself into the defenses. The situation demanded decisive actions from the commanders of the defending subunits.

Captain Matyushin decided to counterattack the wedge of "enemy" forces with two platoons. But the counterattack was not successful: The officer did not commit enough forces for this. Moreover coordination with his neighbor was not organized clearly enough. The battalion commander also made a number of other mistakes. In particular the terrain permitted effective use of tanks attached to the motorized riflemen as an ambush. But he did not capitalize upon this possibility.

In the end the "enemy" forces that had wedged themselves into the defenses were annihilated by the resources of the senior chief. But the impression made by the battalion, which had distinguished itself in previous training battles, was not as good any more.

Why was the battalion commander, who operated so successfully when repelling the counterattack during the offensive, unable to counterattack from defensive positions just as successfully? Naturally anything can happen in combat: As the saying goes, no two situations are ever the same. Even so, in my opinion the battalion could have acted more successfully in this case, if only.... If only more thought had been given in the training to work on problems associated with organizing and conducting a defensive battle. Just talk with the officers--they all are quite ready to talk about actions while on the march, in an offensive, and in an encounter engagement. But switch the conversation to defense, and all you hear is that this form of combat is simpler, and that it is a form of combat that is forced upon you by the enemy.

True, as the Great Patriotic War demonstrated, the troops never went over to defense willingly. But this does not at all mean that it is easier to organize defense. On the contrary, as our war experience and combat regulations teach us, the work of a commander organizing defensive positions is distinguished by a number of unique features requiring him to have deep knowledge and practical skills. Where can he possibly acquire all of this, if not in exercises, in conditions close to those of real combat?

My duties are such that I often receive reports on actions taken by commanders and by chiefs of arms and services. The usual pattern one sees is that the quality of these reports is higher when an offensive is involved. Analysis of actions taken in defense, meanwhile, reveals that they usually boil down to evaluating the engineering preparations made of the terrain, camouflage, and the fire plan. Without a doubt these are important issues. But it is no less important to evaluate a commander's ability, for example, to control the actions of subunits in defensive combat, and to make them utilize tactics that would foil the "enemy's" plan. All of this is on occasion shuffled aside. Nor are these problems always discussed when the results of drills and tactical exercises are summarized.

Let us consider the actions of a commander in defense. In the mountains, he tries to insure the stability of his defenses by creating company and separate platoon strongpoints with the objective of holding commanding hills, passes, and other important pieces of terrain; this is done by increasing the number of observation posts and by arranging the fire resources in tiers. In the city, a commander organizes his defenses in such a way that he could force a fight for each separate building even if he is completely encircled. In a word, whenever he organizes his defenses a commander considers the local conditions and the nature of the enemy's actions.

Naturally there are unique features in the organization of defensive combat in the desert as well. Exercise experience shows, however, that this is far from always considered. Often the topics in personnel defensive training are covered on the same terrain. As a consequence the subunits make use of trenches and strongpoints built several years ago. As a result neither the commanders nor the subordinates acquire the habits they need for defensive combat, and they become accustomed to stereotypic situations and simplifications.

In one exercise a battery commanded by Captain S. Karasev had to operate in unfamiliar terrain. And so, what happened? The subunit failed its first task--making engineering preparations around the gun positions. It turned out that the battery commander posed the mission to the subordinates without considering the unique features of desert terrain.

There is one more detail in this incident upon which I would like to turn the reader's attention. When the personnel began making the engineering preparations around the positions, it was suddenly realized that the battery did not have enough shovels. This fact speaks for itself. It was revealed later that although the battery did practice defensive tactics, it limited itself to just laying out the sites of the weapon pits. Need we belabor the point that such an attitude is impermissible? Every commander must make sure that when he teaches his subordinates what to do in defense, he must teach them what they would need in a real war.

This is precisely the attitude taken toward the training given to personnel in defensive combat by, for example, the motorized rifle regiment in which Major S. Snegur is the chief of staff. I recall the following incident. According to an intelligence report the "enemy" in a certain tactical exercise was preparing for a strike against one of the battalions with a tactical airborne assault party. The regimental and the battalion staffs had foreseen this contingency earlier, when organizing coordination. Fire against aerial targets by antiaircraft gunners and other fire weapons was organized beforehand, and dummy strongpoints, supposedly manned by motorized rifle and attached tank companies, were created. The battalion commander set up tank ambushes in the most probable sectors of action.

The subsequent events confirmed the effectiveness of the implemented measures. The "enemy" airborne assault party was misled by the dummy positions while approaching the defense area. Helicopters of the covering group collided with dense fire from antiaircraft gunners and motorized riflemen. On landing, the airborne assault party was immediately subjected to concentrated fire foreseen earlier by the commander. And when the "enemy" began moving toward its pre-arranged lines, tanks and armored personnel carriers opened fire at him. Tank and motorized rifle platoons ambushed the assault party in the flanks and rear.

I could cite many examples of this sort from our training practice. They persuade us once again that the road to success in troop combat training lies through a struggle against simplification and stereotypy in daily training. To teach subordinates how to act competenly in all forms of modern combat, including in defense, means to make one more step forward toward new summits of combat proficiency.

Political Officer Versatility Praised

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 80 p 3

[Text] Col A. Aleynikov, Inspector, Organizational-Party Work Department, Political Directorate, Southern Group of Forces--The motorized rifle battalion was making preparations for the offensive. At this moment the battalion commander was "incapacitated". Major M. Gaynutdinov, the deputy commander for political affairs, was ordered to take the battalion commander's place. The scenario input did not catch the political worker unawares. He quickly estimated the situation, made the right decisions and competently managed the subunit.

What helped Major Gaynutdinov to take charge of the situation without losing self-control? To put it briefly--good tactical proficiency.

The political officer must have many qualities; his chief weapons are personal example, passionate party words, and the ability to raise the human spirit, to incite a person to selfless labor. But in the hierarchy of knowledge and skills he needs, tactical training is not in last place. It insures effectiveness and purposefulness in his work with soldiers in all phases of training.

I acquainted myself with the plan prepared by Major Gaynutdinov for party-political work to be conducted during the exercise. The plan was broad and concrete, and the measures it proposed were in tune with the objectives of each phase of the exercise. The plan could easily be supplemented by new items if the changing situation required. Here is one example. A difficult obstacle was discovered in the direction of the battalion's attack. Consequently the political officer had to spend some extra time with the drivers, especially the young ones, and organize a talk by an experienced specialist. Thus another notation appeared on the plan, and the necessary measures followed.

These and other supplements to the initial plan were evidence of the fact that Major Gaynutdinov is able to orient himself well in a tactical situation, and that he can efficiently respond to an unexpected situation.

Diverse are the means for improving a political worker's military knowledge and habits. The main one is lessons in the commander training system. Political workers in Major Gaynutdinov's regiment study combat regulations, participate in short field tactical exercises and gunnery practices, and drive combat vehicles together with the rest of the officers. Moreover the demands imposed on them are the highest, with no allowances made. The problems of party-political work are also examined in a close association with tactical problems and the personnel's assimilation of the weapons and combat equipment in the rallies and lessons conducted by the political workers themselves. All of this has a favorable effect on the activities of the political workers, it helps them to act professionally, with a maximum consideration of the situation, and it permits them to understand the unique features of the objectives of tactical drills and exercises better, to penetrate more deeply into the commander's concept and plan, and consequently to have a more-objective influence upon the personnel.

The regimental deputy commander for political affairs is an example of good military training, and of organizing political work in organic unity with the tasks of combat training. His exactingness, his meticulous work with the subunit deputy commanders for political affairs have also had an effect on Major Gaynutdinov's actions.

The most unexpected situations may arise in combat. This is where a political worker must display exceptional flexibility, efficiency, and the ability to intensify party-political influence wherever success is being forged. Indicative in this aspect is the following experience of Major Gaynutdinov.

The motorized riflemen were to participate in a gunnery exercise. The fire conditions were complex. Some of the young soldiers doubted the possibility that the fire mission could be completed with a high grade. It was at this time that Nail' Khasanovich took one of the soldier's weapons and walked up to the fire line. His shots were accurate. The motorized riflemen went on to complete the exercise successfully.

I would like to add the following to all of the above. Great credit belongs to the formation political department for the fact that the political workers of the regiment under discussion here have had good military training. Officers at the formation level visit the units and subunits, and they show a constant interest in these problems. I recall a certain conversation held at the end of the exercise with A. Burlakov, an officer from the political department.

"There is nothing unusual about the fact that Major Gaynutdinov was able to command the battalion successfully," he said. "He who incites people to outstanding actions in combat must himself act in an outstanding manner, he must show that he can do the same. That is our rule."

Let me add that this is a good rule.

Battalion Level Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Col R. Dukov--The training battle had already progressed deep into the "enemy" defenses. The motorized riflemen advanced in unison, and swiftly. The outcome of the duel seemed preordained. And suddenly the attack bogged down: The motorized riflemen encountered dense fire from the defenders.

This was a surprise to battalion commander Captain P. Yudin. He thought that the "enemy" had been dependably suppressed by artillery fire. Instead, he was forced to call up fire once again against the strongpoints of the defenders on their second line. But even this did not lead to success: The density of fire from the defenders did not decrease. There was much food for thought here. During fire support to the attack against the "enemy's" first position, the shells of the artillery battalion hit their targets precisely. But fire against the second position was not very effective. Why?

It was not very difficult to answer this question. It was sufficient to compare the working maps of the motorized rifle battalion commander and the artillery battalion commander to see that the gunners were firing at unoccupied terrain. This was simply because the second position of the defenders had been marked inaccurately on the artillery commander's map.

This incident, which I was able to witness in a certain exercise, says a great deal. Mainly about shortcomings in the work of some commanders organizing for combat. What mistake, in particular, did Captain Yudin make? He failed to check how well his subordinated officers and the commanders of attached and supporting subunits understood the order of actions against the "enemy" defenses. Their efforts were not coordinated with respect to the two lines. And yet, as we know, constant and efficient interaction among combined-arms subunits depends precisely on how well their combat efforts are coordinated among each other as well as with subunits of all arms and services, and with special troops and neighbors, in relation to the objectives, sectors, lines, and time. Without all this, it would be difficult to count on successful completion of a mission. Nonetheless, we still encounter cases in which some commanders try to ignore such an obvious truth. This is what happened with Captain Yudin.

Why does this sometimes happen? In many ways because, I believe, simplifications and stereotypy are still permitted here and there in tactical exercises and drills. Theoretically, for example, every commander knows that he is obligated to observe the course of combat, reconnoiter the enemy, pose missions opportunely to organic, attached, and supporting subunits, and competently utilize all organic and attached fire resources. In practical activities, however, the experience of many exercises shows that some commanders often forget all of this.

We know for example that the goal of an offensive is to totally defeat the opposing enemy and capture an important area or line. Nevertheless one often sees a commander who appears to forget all of this when posing his missions for an offensive in an exercise. He goes into detail only about actions on the forward edge of the "enemy" defenses. He discusses coordination of men and equipment in relation to subsequent objectives only in general terms. As a result coordination is felt to be lacking in many ways.

There can be only one solution to this problem: Subunit commanders must be taught to envision the entire depth of a battle. Nothing should be unclear concerning the actions of subordinated forces and resources both on the forward edge and deep in "enemy" defenses. Moreover the commander must know how to predict the possible outcome of a battle, and to structure his tactics with a consideration for this outcome. The commander must also take the initiative to seek the best means for completing a mission no matter what the situation, without waiting for orders, and he must be able to make bold decisions and implement them firmly. Need we mention that an officer does not develop such qualities spontaneously?

Fight until complete annihilation of the "enemy". This is also the objective of the commander of an artillery battalion attached to a motorized rifle battalion. In our case the gunners should have wiped out the "enemy" forces hindering the forward progress of the tank and motorized rifle subunits, and they should have transferred their fire to newly revealed targets, especially antitank targets, in response to signals from the battalion commander, or independently, thus insuring continuity of attack support. But they were unable to do this. They were hindered by what would seem to be a minor detail--the artillery battalion commander made a mistake in drawing up his working map. One can imagine what such a "minor detail" would have cost in a real battle.

Were we to think about it a little, we would not find it difficult to conclude that the battalion commander's formal attitude toward organizing coordination of the effort against the "enemy" defenses and the negligence shown by the artillery commander in drawing up his map have the same cause. Both problems became possible owing to simplifications and laxity in day-to-day training. Formalism in the training process inevitably makes an impression on the style of work done by officers organizing for a training battle. They cease to notice so-called minor deficiencies. The harm this can do to the effort may be demonstrated with the following example.

Pursuing the withdrawing "enemy", a motorized rifle battalion reinforced by a tank company attempted to cut off its route of retreat. But the "enemy" managed to break away from his pursuers; occupying a tactically advantangeous line, he went over to defense. An attempt to penetrate the defenses on the move was unsuccessful. Then battalion commander Major A. Sychev decided to maneuver part of his forces in to the "enemy" rear. The route he selected for his maneuver skirted the back slope of the hill occupied by the "enemy", which insured covert movement. Moreover the maneuver was to be performed at night. According to the battalion commander's plan the enveloping detachment--a motorized rifle company and a tank platoon--was to reach the "enemy" rear by dawn. The time for a joint attack from the rear and the front was arranged.

The detachment departed. Faking active operations in front of the defenses, the battalion commander distracted the "enemy's" attention to himself, thus insuring covertness of the maneuver. After the enveloping maneuver was completed and the time came to raise the company in front to the attack, the commander of the enveloping detachment signaled that he could not complete his mission. What happened?

It turned out that the battalion commander failed to adequately assess the terrain in the area of forthcoming actions before choosing the attack line for the enveloping detachment. On its way, the detachment met a steep slope. It was impossible to get around it without passing through the line of "enemy" fire: The only accessible road, which wound its way up the hill, was dependably covered by antitank and other fire resources. An attempt by the detachment to break through on this road ended in failure. Thus because the officer lacked the elementary habits of working with a map, the battalion was defeated in the training battle.

Yes, it would be difficult to count on success in modern combat if there are any sort of shortcomings in a commander's training. Moreover we cannot forget the consequences such shortcomings harbor. Need we discuss the heavy price we may have to pay for any "minor detail" unaccounted for? Figuratively speaking, the commander is obligated to be well prepared in relation to the entire depth of the requirements of modern combat. This is the position from which each officer must evaluate his own skills.

Firing Range Deficiencies Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 80 p 1

[Text] Maj F. Smirnov, Red Banner Volga Military District--The motorized rifle battalion commanded by Major G. Novosel'tsev began its exercise precisely on schedule. The firing range was one of the main training points for the motorized riflemen that day. Here, gunner-operators in the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Kosarev were taking their lessons.

The exercise proceeded at several training places. In particular the group of specialists commanded by Lieutenant N. Uvarov worked on the standards of dismantling and assembling a machinegun and loading an ammunition belt. The gunner-operators worked quickly. Although most of them were young soldiers, a certain amount of skill could already be sensed in their actions. But fast work was not always hand in hand with high work quality. The officer turned the attention of his subordinates to this problem.

As an example Private Kh. Ilyasov finished loading an ammunition belt with time to spare. But Lieutenant Uvarov was not one to make hasty judgments. He picked up the belt loaded by the soldier, and shook it. The bullets dropped out one after the other. No words needed to be said: It was clear that completing a particular operation quickly does not mean satisfying a standard with an excellent score. Excellent means with high quality. In this case quality was clearly lacking.

Lieutenant A. Baranov, who was teaching motorized riflemen to load ammunition into an armored personnel carrier, was just as demanding of his subordinates. The training proceeded at a high pace. The lieutenant attentively monitored the actions of the soldiers. Not one mistake went unnoticed.

At first glance Private R. Sharifullin was doing everything well. But Lieutenant Baranov ordered him to repeat his task: The soldier had been guilty of what might seem to be insignificant carelessness--he got the cord of the intercom caught when he slammed the hatch cover shut. But in real combat such a "minor detail" could mean loss of communication. The lieutenant tried to see that every soldier would understand this, and that none of them would permit any sort of deviation from the established requirements of the standards.

In a word, the lessons proceeded in organized fashion in the battalion. However, we must not ignore the fact that the possibilities afforded to the regiment by its training material base were not being utilized fully. Take as an example that same firing range. It is furnished with trainers, electrified stands, mock-ups, and other devices that can be used to make the training conditions close to those of real combat. But a good half of the equipment was unused. What was the matter?

Warrant Officer V. Fedorov was directly responsible for technical maintenance and correct operation of the firing range. But he can rarely be seen working there. The warrant officer is perpetually torn away from the training by his chief, who gives him jobs having nothing to do with maintaining the firing range ready for lessons.

But it would be incorrect to explain the shortcomings away by just this fact alone. We must look at the problem more broadly, on a regimental scale, so to speak. The fact is that there are problems which neither Warrant Officer V. Fedorov nor the subunit commanders could solve on their own. They are only within the competency of the regimental staff.

As it turned out, some trainers at the firing range stand unused due to faults in the electric system. Once I watched the motorized riflemen performing fire missions at the range. They did everything from stationary APC's because the devices intended to simulate their motion were not working. It turns out that the firing range's electric power system cannot carry enough voltage to operate these devices.

Is the regimental staff aware of this? Of course it is. Major Novosel'tsev and other officers considered this problem many times. But its solution is constantly being postponed. Moreover when the staff found out that there was a problem in supplying enough power to the firing range, it decided to prohibit the use of the largest power consumers.

It stands to reason that we cannot condone such a situation. It is high time for the regimental staff and for officials directly responsible for the training material base and for its improvement and proper maintenance to tackle the problem head-on. By eliminating the shortcomings in logistical support to the lessons and by making maximum use of the potentials afforded by a modern training base to train the personnel, we could upgrade the quality and effectiveness of our military labor even more.

Divison Level Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Lt Gen L. Kuznetsov, First Troop Deputy Commander, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District--A group of officers from the combat training directorate and I worked with the Nth Motorized Rifle Division in the first days of the winter training period. We analyzed the training plans, attended the rifle and tank training sessions, and familiarized ourselves with the way commander training was organized. Certain shortcomings were revealed. The overall impression from the inspection remained favorable nonetheless. The formation had started the new training year in organized fashion.

"The fact that the division joined the movement for best formation had a positive effect on the state of affairs," said the chief of the political directorate. The pledges adopted by motorized riflemen of the Samaro-Ul'yanovsk Iron Division were studied by all of the subunits. Their initiative was given avid support."

A month later we once again visited this division. We were interested in how the movement for best formation was developing and which particular regiment had achieved the best results in December and why. We found that the staff did not have such information available.

It became clear that the division made far from full use of the mobilizing role of the movement for best formation, and that the movement had not as yet been given concrete form closely associated with the tasks of the day, week, and month. The results of individual test exercises on the basic subjects provide rich material for analyzing the appropriate conclusions. When the results of such exercises are not compared, it is difficult to say that visuality and, consequently, effectiveness have been achieved in the competition. Unfortunately the plan for test exercises in this division was not being fulfilled, and the staff was not displaying firmness and successiveness in this area, and various "objective" circumstances were being used as an excuse. As a result the achievements of the regiments in the first months of training were not evaluated, and no one knew who was ahead and who was behind.

It is no accident that I place so much emphasis on competition among the regiments. Without such competition, it would be impossible to maintain the movement for best formation. What specifically is the essence of this movement? Its objective is to make each unit fight for the top, to make each unit highly and equally proficient, to keep all of the elements of the divisional organism from falling behind, and to thoughtfully and purposefully introduce the best experience. To promptly note the achievements of each military collective, to demonstrate the sources of success or the causes of failure, to create an emotional atmosphere in military rivalry, and to catch the attention of the people--without all of these goals, the movement for best formation ceases to influence day-to-day affairs and the morale of the people, and inspire them to achieve maximum results in military labor.

The movement for best formation, this competition among the regiments, is a relatively new thing. But we can already say that it has a positive influence upon the state of affairs. Commanders, staffs, and political workers are taking a more active direct part in organizing competition, they summarize the results more frequently and thoroughly, they generalize the best experience more effectively, and they react more keenly to shortcomings.

All of our district's divisions are participating in the movement for best formation. Effective ties between the formations have grown stronger, and the experience of the best divisions of other districts is being studied more deeply. We are now regularly exchanging delegations among the divisions, we are acquainting each other with the way training and the training material base are organized, we plan officer occupational training together, and so on. All of this is producing tangible benefit. Nevertheless--as we can see from the example given above--the movement for best formation, the competition among the regiments, is not organized effectively, and the best experience is not being utilized throughout.

The district does have good examples to work with. Consider the Guards Motorized Rifle Taman' Division imeni M. I. Kalinin, which can be termed the initiator of the movement for best formation.

A meeting of representatives from the division's units and subunits, held before the start of the new training year, comes to mind. The achievements were evaluated, and the goals for the future were determined. The division commander, the chief of the political directorate, staff workers, service chiefs, subunit commanders, sergeants, and privates spoke to the personnel. The ways for completing the training plans and programs and satisfying the socialist pledges were thoroughly discussed.

The division has accumulated a rich amount of experience. Special attention is turned to competition among the regiments. The formation maintains a diary of the socialist competition. It takes the form of tables and graphs reflecting the results of every unit and subunit for the week. These indicators, when summarized, provide a visual picture of the competition's dynamics and show who is ahead and who is behind.

"It is not easy to maintain the diary," notes the political department chief, Guards Lieutenant Colonel O. Zolotarev. "The staff and political department must work especially hard. But the labor justifies itself. Everyone knows who is the best, where the weak points are, and who is lacking."

According to December's results, Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Kulagin's subordinates were the best in the division. The results achieved here in combat training missions and in work on the standards became a reference point for all.

Of course everyone who serves in a leading formation must shoot well, drive proficiently, demonstrate tactical maturity, and be an example of discipline and diligence. But this is not enough. The division must have its own Guards signature to all of its missions; it must add to the glorious traditions of the past with its own new ones, born in field exercises, and it must always be at the forward edge in the creative search for new combat training methods and new ways to utilize modern equipment and weapons.

We can say that soldiers of the Taman' division have made tangible advances in this area. Motorized rifleman Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Shaytanov, tankman Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Bachevskiy, and gunner Guards Major M. Glushenkov are among those officers who have distinguished themselves over and over in exercises in terms of their original decisions and their use of new fire tactics unexpected by the "enemy".

The Taman' soldiers believe problems associated with improving the personal life of the soldiers, maintaining the camp in exemplary order, developing the field training material base, raising discipline, and improving the physical fitness of the personnel to be an inseparable part of the struggle for the best formation title. In other words they view the movement integrally, as affecting all aspects of the life of the division, as affecting each soldier.

Are all of the formations satisfying the high requirements imposed upon a leading division today? Unfortunately not. Some mistakes have been made in organizing the competition among the regiments. Sometimes we witness a desire to implement "all-embracing" large-scale measures. Rallies attended by the best soldiers and meetings attended by unit representatives with the objective of transmitting the best experience are not always prepared for meticulously. Sometimes the atmosphere of such meetings is so solemn that no one wishes to speak about the unsolved problems, or about things that are causing trouble and blocking the way to combat perfection.

The Taman' soldiers found it useful to acquaint themselves with the life and achievements of personnel in another division successfully fighting for the best formation title, one which had won the perpetual Red Banner of the Ground Forces Military Council--the Guards Motorized Rogachev Division imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet BSSR. A delegation headed by Guards Major S. Nazarov recently returned from the Belorussian SSR. Tables comparing the results of the two formations were posted in the club of one of the units. These tables showed that the Rogachev Guards were completing their technical training tasks more successfully, that they were driving their combat vehicles better, and that their results were distinguished by stability and confirmed by all inspections. Comparisons of this sort keep us from becoming self-satisfied with our achievements, and they open up additional reserves. And there is one main reserve in every formation: As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the November (1979) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, we must upgrade effectiveness and quality with doubled and tripled energy.

The fight for best formation can be effective only if the efforts of all are contributed--from the division commander to the common soldier. It would be unimaginable without meticulous indoctrination, and without attracting all soldiers to the competition.

The results of the first month of lessons show that an appearance of competitiveness is fabricated in some places to cover up the lack of aggressive work with people. We inspected two regiments in one of the divisions. The tasks were being completed successfully, and all topics had been covered completely, and with high quality, at the Guards Tank Shepetovskiy Regiment. In the neighboring tank regiment, meanwhile, the picture was different. Tank gunnery training was less effective, and the security service was not organized very effectively. Of course, exchange of experience between the regiments and capitalization upon the best ideas did help to eliminate the shortcomings. However, even though the units are next-door neighbors they live separately, and the division's staff and political department do nothing to strengthen contact between them. Is concrete, effective competition possible in such a situation? The commander of the less-successful regiment responded as follows to this question: "We are not trying to compete with them. We have enough troubles of our own." So it happens when the mobilizing role of competition is understated, and when its organization is viewed as an additional duty.

The division to which these units belong is fighting for the best formation title. At least that is what the pledges say. But visible changes have not yet occurred after such an important pledge was adopted. The experience of the best regiment is still being publicized weakly.

Such shortcomings must not be tolerated. All the more so because the best formation movement is not solidly entrenched in the life of the troops. I recently talked on this subject with the commander of the Guards Motorized Rifle Shavlinskiy Regiment, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Chayko. "Our service would lose a great deal of its vividness, and it would become much poorer were we to stop competing with our neighboring regiment," he shared his thoughts. "We are growing in this competition. It keeps us from relaxing, and from exaggerating our achievements. One day you finally take the lead, and the next you find yourself already behind your rivals."

Such an atmosphere must reign in every unit, in every division. Commanders, political organs, and staffs must not weaken their efforts at organizing and managing the socialist competition; they must decisively fight formalism and showing off, and they must give support to all that is new and good. To insure high effectiveness in the competition, in the movement for best formation, means to honor the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the final year of the 10th Five-Year Plan with greater combat readiness of the units and formations.

Officer Training Methods Questioned

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Major V. Shipitsin, Commander, Motorized Rifle Battalion--Our battalion ended the last training year with mediocre indicators, mainly due to shortcomings in the personal training of some officers. As an example Lieutenant A. Kraynov, commander of 6th Company, received a satisfactory score for fire training and an unsatisfactory score for driving. Platoon commanders lieutenants M. Shunayev, V. Porushchenko, and V. Sandratskiy lacked confidence in their shooting and driving. Hard though it may be to admit this, but some junior officers--graduates of military schools, and the Baku Higher Combined-Arms Command School in particular--failed to demonstrate a worthy example in one of the most important areas--technical knowledge. Although I had only accepted the battalion half a year ago, I do not wish to belittle my own responsibility for the poor show in the inspection. The mistakes in commander training organization are obvious. What are they?

It was thinking about this that compelled me to write. What sort of knowledge does a commander need to be able to make the maximum use of his equipment? There can be no doubt that a subunit commander must be able to shoot confidently from the organic armament,and to drive well. But there is some doubt concerning something else: Is this what the main attention should be focused upon in officer technical training?

The commander is not a gunner-operator, and he is not a driver-mechanic. He must have shooting and driving skills in order to teach his subordinates well. Nor of course, do we exclude the possibility that an officer may have to take a gunner's place or spell a tired mechanic on a long march. But this is not at all the most important thing to the commander. Controlling a vehicle and controlling a subunit, a battle, are two different things. In terms of both complexity and significance.

I often think about this when correcting deficiencies revealed in an inspection. We are working to see that Kraynov, Shunayev, and some other young officers will be able to confidently perform all exercises at the firing range and the tank driving range, and with time this will be so. This task requires a great deal of time and effort, and yet it applies to just the basics of a commander's technical training. The basics that are assimilated in schools, when the cadet's only obligation is to learn. Making up deficiencies in a lieutenant's training means an impermissible waste of time, time extremely needed for further movement forward, for assimilation of the equipment from a commander's position.

And precisely from a commander's position. It is at this point that technical training comes into inseparable unity with tactics. Imagine a modern motorized rifle battalion. It is a highly complex technical entity: dozens of combat vehicles, motor vehicles, and high-power, diverse armament. There are dozens of combat specialties involved. It is important of course for the battalion commander to know how to control all of the vehicles and armament, but it is by far more important for him to know the combat capabilities of the weapons of his, attached, and supporting subunits. I am referring not just to performance characteristics alone. He must know the strong and weak sides of everything in his possession, and he must know how to use the equipment in combat in the best way possible. This is possible when the commander has a knowledge of the enemy's capabilities, his equipment, and his weapons. In a word, knowing how to drive an APC is not enough for a commander; he is obligated to know its strengths, how to compensate for its shortcomings, how it would behave itself in a given situation, what its place is in the combat formation, and how it would best fight against the enemy's fire weapons. The same can be said for other types of equipment controlled by the combined-arms commander in combat.

A certain incident in a tactical exercise unwittingly comes to mind. Performing a maneuver, Lieutenant A. Kudinov led his platoon not along a ravine which would have insured covertness, but over a field, within sight of the "enemy". He believed that the APC's would not make it through the marshy depression. Computations showed, however, that this route would not have been an obstacle to the APC's. Ignorance of the real possibilities of the equipment led to tactical--the inspector validly emphasized the word tactical--error. We can cite many such examples. A commander's technical incompetence invariably reflects upon the organization of combat activities, and upon the maturity of decision making.

One often hears that the commander must serve as the example to subordinates in all tasks, and that he must always be in the lead. But is every commander capable of using a grenade thrower, controlling an antitank weapon, and driving a vehicle better than everyone else? Does he have the time for the training required for this? I am firmly convinced that subordinates must view their commander as a person with irreproachable skills of controlling a subunit, organizing coordination, and making the fullest and most effective use of all forces and resources. This is the area in which a commander must serve as a worthy example.

It might be said that one of these aspects is not in conflict with the other. But is this so? There are commanders who know the layout of an APC engine perfectly, which is to their credit, but they do not use these vehicles in the best fashion in training battles, and the lessons they conduct for driver-mechanics may even be poor. Whenever officers, sergeants, and organic gunner-operators undergo testing, I always analyze the latter separately--they are the most important. After driving tests, I separate out the scores I give to organic driver-mechanics--in this case they most fully reflect the subunit's skill level and combat readiness. But when the discussion turns to the use of equipment and armament on the battlefield, and to command and control, the proficiency of commanders takes the foreground. It appears entirely logical to me that subunits contain gunners that shoot better than the commander, and mechanics who achieve better results than he at driving. They learn to make maximum use of the vehicle and the concrete armament model, while the goal of the officer is to find the most sensible tactics and methods of using the equipment as a whole, to get the maximum payoff from the subunit's combat capabilities.

I may not be right, but it seems to me that the latter is not always considered when technical training is organized for officers. We study the material, we drive, and we shoot, sometimes forgetting about the commander's place as the organizer and leader of modern combat. Sometimes it happens that our main goal when tested together with subordinates is to receive higher points, to ornament the test certificate with a high officer's grade. But is this really an officer's grade in the strict sense of the term? I think that our technical training must be exploratory in nature. In it, we must become aware of the equipment's possibilities, and measure it up, if I may be permitted to use the expression, to combat.

I would like to lay special emphasis on officer class qualifications. An officer's class rating is a representation of his training in both engineering and tactics. It would seem that the importance of a class rating must be very high. This is not in fact so, however. Because apparently class ratings are not given significance in certification and in promotions. The qualification commissions do not always adhere to principles either. Because the book is sometimes bent, high class ratings are awarded to officers who are not truly proficient. Thus the percentage of specialists with high class ratings does not reflect the true state of affairs. Some comrades wait years on end before requalifying themselves, and this practice is not being given a principled assessment on the part of their chiefs and the party organization.

The organization of competition among officers also gives food for thought. What sort of competition should this be? In its course we learn who among us shoots and drives best, and who is behind, which by itself cannot raise objections. But is this enough? How do we account for the unique nature of the missions facing us, and insure, through competition, organic unity in our technical and tactical training?

Naturally the problems of officer technical training are closely related with assimilation of the equipment by the personnel. As we know, we get our specialists from training subunits. This complement is basically trained adequately. Nevertheless--and I do not hold this opinion alone--the technical aspect could be studied deeper and more substantially in the training subunits. I would like to know what the commanders of training subunits think in this regard.

Learning to get the maximum possible out of the equipment--that is, to strike the target with the first shot, round, and launch, and from maximum range, and to make the fullest use of the speed, maneuvering, and protective properties of the vehicles--is one of our most important tasks, and the most important prerequisite of victory in combat. What is the best way to complete it? What forms of planned commander training are the most expedient? What should the nature of the lessons be? It would be very useful to exchange opinions and experiences on the pages of this newspaper. Life itself places these and many other problems on the agenda.

> FROM THE EDITOR: Major V. Shipitsin's letter, while its content might raise debate here and there, raises interest in terms of the importance of the issues it touches upon.
>
> We invite commanders, political workers, engineers, technicians, staff and military training institution officers, and soldiers of all arms and services to take part in their discussion.

Regimental Level Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Lt Col A. Lemesev, Motorized Rifle Regiment Commander, Red Banner North Caucasus Military District--The short bursts of automatic fire and the dull moans of the grenade throwers sounded as if they were right next door--field firing was proceeding at the training center. The motorized rifle company commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Berezhkov formed itself up by the field Lenin room.

"Here are the results of the next phase of the exercise," said Senior Lieutenant Berezhkov.

I noticed that the soldiers, who were still just getting over a recent test, were agitated: What sort of grade would be awarded to their labor?

Possessing generalized data on the field firing exercises--the results were eloquently revealed by the "socialist competition display" mounted on a special stand--the company commander acquainted his subordinates with their results, naming the winners of the competition.

What was interesting about this? The officer devoted a great deal of attention to thoroughly analyzing the procedures and methods used by the best gunners. Using a few precise, pithy words, he painted a graphic picture of what it was that was responsible for the excellent results they achieved. Thus the critique was an effective form of generalizing and introducing the experience of the best soldiers.

As an example the platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant Ye. Yatsenko attained the best results. The company commander turned the attention of the motorized riflemen to the fact that their success stemmed in many ways from correct choice of the wind correction.

The action of the best sniper, Private A. Potapenko, who had earned the perpetual banner honoring Hero of the Soviet Union Senior Sergeant P. Likhachev, whose name is inscribed in the rolls of the unit in perpetuity, was instructive to many. This banner was instituted by the regimental Komsomol committee in honor of the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the the Great Patriotic War. Potapenko carefully selected his position for firing, and he concentrated attentively on the target situation.

The commanders of the neighboring companies held their exercise critiques just as concretely and instructively.

I must admit that this excellence did not come about right away in the motorized rifle battalion to which these companies belong. Some of the young officers "forgot" to hold thorough critiques after each exercise and after each of its phases. A few good words should be said in this regard about the battalion commander, Major N. Mazur.

What is typical of this officer? First of all there is his conviction that one of the most important aspects of managing a competition is efficient generalization and practical introduction of the experience of the best specialists.

The commander and staff of this battalion, and the party bureau perpetually have their hand on the pulse of the competition, and they persistently channel the efforts of the soldiers at completion of the socialist pledges. They regularly analyze the price of success and the methods of its attainment, and they efficiently determine how best to make practical use of the experience of the best soldiers.

Unfortunately this cannot be said about some other subunits in the regiment. On occasion we encounter commanders who are not aware of the concrete experience of their best specialists, and who do not delve into the actions and techniques they employ. Thus such commanders summarize exercise results formally, without deeply analyzing the positive factors and the shortcomings.

The way results were summarized in the tank company commanded by Captain A. Maksak comes to mind.

The tank crews were busy at the tank driving range all day. Trading places with each other, the crews drove their combat vehicles and performed other combat training tasks on the same routes. Nevertheless the results differed. In particular, the platoon commanded by Lieutenant G. Kolomiyets, a recent school graduate, performed the exercise poorly. And it was naturally to be expected that the company commander would subject the mistakes made by the tank crews to instructive analysis following the exercise.

But this did not happen. Captain A. Maksak simply rattled off the shortcomings of Lieutenant G. Kolomiyets's subordinates. Discussing the best soldiers, the officer limited himself to a single sentence: "Good lads, you completed your training mission successfully." But what was instructive about the experience of the best soldiers? What are the causes of the shortcomings? The tank crews never did get answers to questions such as these.

These facts became the object of a serious discussion of the results of combat and political training in the regiment for the first month of the training year, and they were on the agenda of an officer meeting. Many other examples in which commanders did not disseminate the best experience effectively were revealed. There was also mention of the influence staff and service officers have on combat training.

Life shows--we are convinced of this at every step--that effective generalization of the best experience is not one of the easier tasks. Sometimes it happens that the impact of utilizing some new technique is not especially high, and that the possibilities of its application begin to seem limited. This is when a staff officer or service specialist attending the exercise and its critique should turn the attention of the commanders and all of the soldiers to the as yet insignificant innovations, and to demonstrate their true value to the people.

But how often do we really see specialist officers at training sessions? Do they really participate in critiques? Not often, we must confess. They are still rare visitors to the training center, the tank driving range, and the gunnery range. An attempt to find out the reason for this produces responses such as: I'm too busy, I'm swamped with official duties.

Once I asked rocket artillery armament chief Major V. Nikandrov why he had forgotten the way to the gunnery range.

"I never have the time to go," he tried to justify himself, "and so my memory lapses."

I was thus forced to correct the service chief, and to include him among the officers responsible for monitoring the quality of exercises at the training center. Incidentally we now require staff officers and specialists of the regiment's different services to work with the subunits more often in the field, where a real possibility exists for revealing the best experience in its full volume.

Persistent attention to the best experience and a desire to keep no good initiative from being forgotten helps us to solve many difficult problems. As an example we were able to eradicate the sharp contrasts formerly existing in the training level of different subunits. Sometimes it happened that one company or battalion was successful in field firing owing, for example, to exemplary preparation of the weapons or utilization of the latest procedures for setting the sighting attachments. Subunits firing after such a company would suffer failure precisely because of underestimation of these factors. But things are different now. As a rule a subunit that has finished firing or driving APC's does not leave the training place until its representatives share the "secrets" of their successes or the causes of their failures with comrades following them.

The soldiers of the regiment, who were first in the district to support the initiators of the socialist competition in the ground forces, are persistently fighting for outstanding results each day, and for a reduction of the time required to make weapons and equipment combat ready. And I must frankly state that a more demanding, exacting approach to summarizing the competition results--one of the effective forms of introducing the best experience--is playing a major role in breathing more life into the competition.

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AVIATION UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Maintenance on Naval Aircraft

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Eng-Maj A. Gan'kin, chief of an excellent technical maintenance unit, Red Banner Northern Fleet: "The Superior's Shoulder"]

[Text] The periodic technical servicing unit for aircraft radio communication and navigation equipment headed by Engineer-Captain N. Tudvasev receives new men each year, who have only mastered the basics of the difficult aviation work. From the very beginning they are introduced to the traditions of this congenial and united collective and are helped to acquire a deep sense of the need for continuity of expertise, careful handling of the aviation equipment and a deep sense of responsibility for its preparation. For the youth, the master specialists are more than just highly skilled individuals: They are a kind of frame of reference in their military work, in their conduct and in their relationship to co-workers.

The newcomer can always lean on the superior's shoulder when things are difficult. Warrant Officer I. Zakharov, for example, who recently joined the unit, feels confident next to Captain of Technical Service Yu. Kozhushko. And the specialists are performing a very difficult job, one requiring great skill, after all, when they replace a relay in ASW radio scanning equipment. They have one gage between them, with twin outlets. It is like the two control wheels on a dual-control trainer designed for training new pilots. To extend the analogy, officer Kozhushko is like a veteran flight instructor, reacting to all of the trainee's actions with sensitivity, but also with tact.

The youth learn a great deal from this master of combat skills and party activist. Warrant Officers V. Sandakov and S. Tishchenko, skilled mechanics, settled into the formation as easily as did Zakharov. They rapidly reached a high level of training in the unit and also matured in the moral sense. They became first-class specialists there. They left the unit for promotions to senior technicians.

Warrant Officer V. Zaytsev, senior technician for radio communication and navigation equipment, willingly helps the young mechanics to master the specialty and skillfully indoctrinates them with practical examples from the combat training. A master of combat skills and a communist, he considers it his party duty to see to the development of the newcomers.

The periodic technical servicing unit is among the leaders month after month. Although their servicing work is evaluated only by specialists from the flight subunits--strict and never-compromising judges--this excellent team has the highest average rating, 4.8. It is in first place in the technical maintenance unit with respect to the number of suggestions for improving efficiency, submitted and adopted.

Engineer-Captain N. Tudvasev, unit chief, has contributed a great deal to the achievement of these successes. He enjoys great prestige in the collective. A member of the party bureau and a master of combat skills, he possesses great political and technical erudition. This communist has done a great deal to create a moral climate in the unit in which mutual support and assistance and genuine concern for the development of the new specialists has become the rule. It would appear that Nikolay Aleksandrovich spends too much time and energy on so-called production-unrelated concerns: He sees that the youth become active in the technical groups, encourages amateur radio activities during the off-duty hours and sets up group entertainment for the evenings. The unit fighting men always work together harmoniously, however, with a good mood and in a climate of good-natured rivalry.

The masters have good students. They have unanimously accepted a commitment to perform the periodic maintenance work on a high level. And judging from the results of competition for the winter combat training period, they will certainly keep their word. The unit specialists recently performed periodic maintenance work on the radio communication equipment of an ASW aircraft. The extensive job required great skill. Nonetheless, the results were excellent.

Base Support Battalion Shortcomings

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 80 p 1

[Article by Maj B. Karpov: "The Battalion Has Slipped--This Is What Results From Deficiencies in the Organization of the Training and Indoctrinational Process"]

[Text] A few years ago this airfield technical maintenance battalion was among the best subunits of its kind in the district. Unfortunately, only memories are left of the former achievements. Although on the whole the subunit coped with the tasks assigned it during the past training year, it was noted during the final testing that the number of flight shifts performed poorly had increased.

What had caused the deterioration? One of the causes was the inferior technical training of certain specialists. This is why there was a delay in the departure of the motor vehicles. Errors were made in the methods for conducting classes. Some of the officers and warrant officers had not devoted enough attention to indoctrinational work with their men. A report-and-election party meeting discussed ways of correcting the defects and regaining the battalion's former name.

Has there been any noticeable improvement in the training year with respect to the methods used to set up the classes for new drivers?

...The very day I visited the battalion the new drivers were not at the locations specified in the schedule. And at the time specified they were to have a class on traffic rules. A special training class was also omitted. Incidentally, Senior Lieutenant Yu. Medvedev, in charge of training for new drivers, was unable to tell me what subject was to be covered in the class or who was to conduct it.

Even at first glance, one could tell that the schedule had been carelessly prepared. The names of the intructors were not always given, for example. Nor did the schedule indicate whether or not the class had actually been held.

This is how Senior Lieutenant Medvedev conducted a class. Instead of an outline, the officer used a manual. From the manual and from memory, he dictated a list of the operations involved in the technical servicing of motor vehicles and the safety rules. He immediately gave the trainees an oral quiz. They raised their hands without hesitation and gave the right answers. The fighting men did possess a certain amount of knowledge, then. In such a case, this knowledge should be expanded, it would seem, and this or that topic should be clarified in great detail. Visual aids would undoubtedly have come in handy. There were none in the classroom, however.

Scheduled classes are frequently postponed or cut short in the battalion. I looked through one notebook, then a second and a third.... They contained brief notes on only four subjects. Clearly, too little. Some of the officers would explain this as an oversight in the records for classes which, they would say, are conducted every day. The facts indicate otherwise, however.

After all, I had had occasion to visit this subunit prior to this, at which time I was also struck by the deficiencies in the organization of the training for new drivers. They were supposed to have fire training,for example. Class did not take place, however, as Junior Sergeant V. Cherenkevich, a deputy platoon commander, explained, because the order came in to send the new men to the medical facility.

The following picture took shape in a conversation with the young soldiers. They spoke proudly of the fact that they would be serving in the aviation.

However, when I asked them whether they knew that they had been given the honor of providing flight support for a twice order-bearing air regiment with glorious combat traditions, not one of them could answer in the affirmative.

Perhaps the newcomers are now familiar with the traditions? No. Meetings have not been arranged either with the pilots or with the veteran aviation specialists. And it would be interesting for the youth to hear how today's heirs of the front line soldiers are mastering the modern equipment and adding to the traditions of the combat veterans.

I might mention in passing that this subunit, in which the new men are just beginning their service, also contains fighting men whose service and work are worthy of emulation. Many of the best drivers were helping with the harvest, for example. The men accomplished the assigned job and returned to their subunit with honor. The certificates awarded them for their shock labor are eloquent testimony to how well they worked. Clippings from local newspapers, which they brought back, also tell how the drivers excelled.

A few hours following their return, the "assemble" signal was given. And the fighting men set out on the trip and successfully performed the assigned task on those same vehicles which had covered thousands of kilometers over field roads. Many performed outstandingly, including Komsomol members, Privates Vladimir Dontsu and Ivan Pedurar'.

In short, life itself and the practical combat training provide extensive opportunity to conduct well-timed and thoroughly-planned indoctrinational work with the men. Unfortunately, these opportunities are not always used to advantage in the subunit.

I had a talk with Major V. Shevyrev, battalion chief of staff, in the presence of Captain A. Moroz, secretary of the party bureau, about deficiencies in the organization of the training and indoctrinational process. They claimed that this was due to objective factors and difficulties. We cannot deny that these do exist, of course. It is also apparent, however, that indulgences of any kind in the training are not beneficial and can, therefore, not be tolerated.

Maintenance Officer's Activities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Warrant Officer A. Palenyy, aircraft technician and specialist first-class: "Technician for a Supersonic Aircraft"]

[Text] Warrant Officer Nikolay Artemov and I walk together toward the combat aircraft. Where the taxiway turns off, he heads toward his aircraft, No. "42" and I turn toward my aircraft standing next to it. We begin the preflight preparation of the aircraft equipment at the same time. There is a rigid norm for the performance of each operation, and it must be performed faultlessly. Warrant Officer Artemov is well aware of this. He is an experienced specialist from whom one can learn.

Now he pauses near the engine intake and carefully inspects each compressor blade. On previous flights the aircraft landed on a field airstrip. Perhaps a small pebble has entered the air intake? The technician has carefully inspected the power unit, of course, during the preliminary preparation of the aircraft. Had there been the slightest dent anywhere, he would have noticed. He is still not satisfied, however, and makes a thorough inspection once again.

Warrant Officer Artemov performs his job conscientiously, with a sense of great responsibility. The son of a frontline soldier, he began working as a boy. After completing a 7-year school, he went to work in order to help his mother give his younger brother a start in life. He did not drop his studies, however, but went to school evenings. This was followed by regular service. In the technical maintenance unit of an air regiment, the soldier became a first-class specialist and became intimately linked with the military collective. He stayed on for extended-duty but still found time to study. He completed the Kiev Civil Aviation Engineering Institute by correspondence. His experience and knowledge help him cope with the duties of an officer-technician.

The air regiment's deputy commander for aviation engineer service once invited Artemov in for a talk. "We are thinking of appointing you aircraft technician," he said. "Can you handle it?" Nikolay had always envied the technicians somewhat, for they were entrusted with the job of readying the combat aircraft and giving the go-ahead for it to fly. He agreed to take the job. He made an effort to thoroughly learn the official requirements and regulations governing the preparation and servicing of the aviation equipment. He then underwent on-the-job training and acquired practical skills under the command of Senior Lieutenants of Technical Service Nikolay Tishchenko and Vladimir Boyko.

Then came the day he had dreamed about, the day he began working on his own. Artemov was assigned an aircraft bearing the number "42." He inspected it. He cleaned the cockpit, correcting deficiencies as he went. Senior Liuetenants of Technical Service B. Mesha, V. Boyko and N. Tishchenko and Warrant Officer V. Illarionov, the technicians on adjacent aircraft, began to help their comrade in every way. Nikolay listened to every word uttered by the veteran specialists and consistently adopted the best methods of servicing and preparing the equipment. He kept at it until the aircraft assigned to him was rated excellent. For 3 years now, his aircraft has been maintained in exemplary technical condition.

Once, during exercises, a group of aircraft landed at the airfield. One of the pilots expressed concern about the performance of a power unit. Artemov listened carefully to the pilot and asked him exactly when the trouble had developed and how it had appeared. He then asked: "And did you switch on the cone?" "I must have," the lieutenant hesitated. They looked into the cockpit. Everything was clear: The toggle switch to the system controlling the engine cone was off.

Warrant Officer Artemov is exacting in all things, large or small, pertaining to the job or to the service. Let us say that a tanker has stopped by his aircraft. Before permitting his aircraft to be refueled the technician checks the driver's fuel-analysis certificate. He also checks the pump and filter. He is equally careful in checking the work performed on the aircraft assigned him by the servicing group. Once, he noticed that an instrument light was not burning. "Why not?" he asked the mechanic who had just adjusted the lighting in the cockpit. "These are day flights," the latter answered. Everything will be fixed before the night flights begin. The warrant officer demanded that the mechanic finish the job right then.

...The flights began at the designated time. The supersonic, winged-vehicle bearing the number "42" also lifted off. Senior Lieutenant of Technical Service Yevgeniy Dubina, the aircraft technician, approached Warrant Officer Artemov: "Would you recommend me for party membership, Nikolay Kalistratovich?" Communist Artemov, his comrade in the service and a member of the party committee, reacted with joy. After all, he knew Yevgeniy Dubina well as a highly competent individual and one of good political caliber. A specialist with a great deal of experience, Dubina maintained the aircraft entrusted to him in excellent condition.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kondrat'yev, political worker, dropped in at the parking area. He talked with Artemov and asked him how things were going with preparations for the warrant officer's group political classes. Artemov told the political worker that the evening before he had discussed with Captain A. Akif'yev, group leader, what training aids should be readied for the seminar, and reported on an extra class he had conducted with the fighting men. The group has earned an excellent rating for 2 years in a row. And a great deal of the credit goes to Warrant Officer Artemov, the assistant group leader, for his conscientious performance of his duties.

It was just reported over the loudspeaker that aircraft No. "42" has just landed. The technician soon meets the aircraft at the parking site. "Any complaints about the performance of the aviation equipment?" he asks the pilot. "No complaints! Thanks for the excellent job of readying the aircraft," the latter answers. The warrant officer is happy to hear this good appraisal of his work.

Fighter-Bomber Squadron

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Starostin, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Commander of an Excellent Squadron"]

[Text] During an exercise pilots in the squadron commanded by Major A. Shipit'ko, flying supersonic fighter-bombers, bombed an "enemy" airfield.

The mission was successful. Aleksey Il'ich was truly happy following the landing when he heard words of praise from Captain V. Saklakov about Senior Lieutenant I. Krakosevich. At the squadron formation officer Shipit'ko also mentioned the young pilot as one of the outstanding members. Krakosevich went up to him afterwards and asked him nervously: "And what about the landing, Comrade Major? How was the landing?" The squadron commander smiled and silently raised a hand with the thumb extended.

It was all water under the bridge, but Senior Lieutenant Igor' Krakosevich had caused the commander a great many problems when he had begun learning to fly the new aircraft. He performed his first seven solo flights successfully, and then on the eighth.... He brought the aircraft to the leveling-out point but then forgot to watch the speed for a second or so. The aircraft "settled" and touched earth a few meters in front of the edge of the runway. The gross error rated as a precondition for a flight accident. After this incident, some instructors lost confidence in the ability of the young airman who had just begun learning to fly the new aircraft.

The squadron commander had faith in the pilot, however, and arranged for him to have extra training. He then flew with the the lieutenant on a dual-control trainer, in order to see for himself how well he had retained his piloting skills. No, the young pilot had not lost them. After his solo flight on the combat aircraft, however, the following notation was made next to Krakosevich's name in the flight operation officer's log: "Approached leveling-off point at great speed and above the glide path...."

Aleksey Il'ich summoned the pilot for a private talk and asked him: "What is the matter, are you afraid of the ground?"

"That same ill-fated landing keeps passing before my eyes," Krakosevich admitted. "I automatically increase speed...."

Major Shipit'ko instructed Captain Saklakov, flight commander, to thoroughly go over with Krakosevich the procedure for distributing one's attention during a landing. He himself also frequently worked with the pilot in the cockpit, explaining to him over and over what to do during each stage of a flight. The trainee gradually developed solid, correct habits and gained confidence.

Faith in a person.... It strengthens not only the individual in whom the faith has been demonstrated, for whom one goes to bat. It also has a good effect upon those around him, helping to maintain a climate of mutual understanding and respect for each other within the team. And this is what happened. One might ask what was special about Major Shipit'ko's methods. He taught the young officer how to fly well, just as a squadron commander is supposed. With his confidence in the pilot's strengths and abilities, however, he also developed him into an airborne fighter. Success had finally come to Igor' Krakosevich. It came to him just as it was once achieved by Senior Lieutenant Yuriy Makarov, a military pilot second-class. Aleksey Il'ich also worked with him a great deal on a one-to-one basis.

At first, Makarov performed the combat flights fairly well. All of a sudden, however, he began making sighting errors. The squadron commander checked his skills on a trainer. This is what he found out: The "mark" on the sight was not approaching the target blip before the young pilot would get in a hurry to turn the aircraft and would press the firing button prematurely. Shipit'ko explained his error to him and showed him how he should operate in this situation. He was tested again. The result was the same. What was the matter?

The real cause of the problem was not cleared up until Yuriy Makarov was called in for a frank discussion. It turned out that he did not feel confident on the bombing run but was embarrassed to say so at first. After this, Major Shipit'ko changed the methods he used for conducting the training sessions somewhat. He demonstrated and convinced the lieutenant that given the desire and the discipline he was perfectly capable of achieving consistent firing accuracy.

Communist Shipit'ko is always sensitive to the men, to their needs and requests. He can always tell what mood an individual is in. He appears tired and irritable.... Major Shipit'ko knows how to reassure such an individual and how to ask him tactfully why he is in a bad mood.

Major Shipit'ko once learned this sensitive approach to the men from his senior comrades. From Lieutenant Colonel V. Timchenko, former unit commander, from Lieutenant Colonel M. Lizun, political worker, and others. Now, Aleksey Il'ich himself provides new officers with good schooling. Take Captain G. Strepetov, party activist, and Senior Lieutenant Ye. Anan'yev, currently squadron political worker, for example. They learned a great deal from the commander's individual work with the fighting men and became good assistants to him. Some of Major A. Shipit'ko's students have already been promoted. They serve in other subunits.

Competing for a worthy commemoration of the 100th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, the airmen in the excellent squadron are persistently improving their combat skill. The results of the first month of the winter training period showed that the personnel had fulfilled the assigned tasks well. Two more pilots passed the first-class test. Senior Lieutenants Makarov and Krakosevich, by the way, have advanced considerably in their combat training. They are a match for the masters of combat employment as they go through their assignments in the air.

The military aviators are increasing their efforts in the combat training by the day. They are assisted by the atmosphere of seriousness and efficiency and sensitivity for the men which has become firmly established within the friendly, united collective.

Flight Controller Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Andryushkov, military pilot first-class: "A Night Interception"]

[Text] From the windows of the flight duty shack, the pilots had a good view of the runway piercing the horizon. It was growing dark. Something neither rain nor snow was falling against the window. Inside the shack, however, it was warm and cosy, and a soft light came from the colored television screen. There was a constant feeling of alertness in everything which went on, however.

"Combat duty is no ordinary job," Major I. Prediker, squadron commander and senior crew member, stated during the shift personnel briefing, "everything is determined in seconds. Always be prepared, comrades."

The subunit commanded by him is one of the best in the fighter regiment. All of the aircraft pilots and technicians are specialists first- or second-class. Their good training helps the airmen to stand combat watch successfully.

The latest mail, newspapers and magazines were brought to the shack. They had just been sorted out, however, when the command came: "Crews—to your aircraft!" The sound of running feet was heard on the concrete slabs. And near the missile-carriers the heavy "starters" rumbled, sending off puffs of smoke. The technician turned on the aircraft radar to warm up. The squadron commander reported to the command post that all was ready. The following order came back: "45--take off!"

Licking the concrete runway with the flame of its afterburner, the fighter seemed to push itself off and climb steeply, disappearing in the night sky. Major Prediker understood from the first commands sent by the aircraft controller that Lieutenant Aleksandr Brazhnikov, recently graduated from school, was on duty that day. He had only been certified for duty a few days. There was excitement in his voice and he hesitated after each word.

The pilot was far more confident in the air when he heard the familiar voice of a veteran specialist from ground. It has long since been the rule in the regiment for the interceptor pilots to prepare for flights together with the controllers at the command post, and both are good at catching all nuances of intonation in the commands and the replies to them. The veteran specialists can detect psychological stress without difficulty. It is not an easy matter to dispel this tension. Especially among the new pilots. One or two unrecorded flights or unsuccessful guidance performances--and there is a psychological fall. It is good when the pilot is in a condition to analyze his actions in an air battle correctly and self-critically and concludes that the failures are due primarily to inadequate preparation on the ground and to his own failure to understand the controller's plan. In such a case, the pilot goes to the command post without the slightest feeling of false shame and goes over with the controller this or that tactical procedure which was unsuccessful on the flight.

It is worse when the pilot blames and reproaches the specialist at the command post for everything and moves on to the next flight without having analyzed his own errors. He is not thinking about how to win the air battle, but about how to emerge from it and what to say to his commander by way of justification. New controllers at the command post make the very same errors in their self-appraisal. In both cases, individuals lose confidence in their own abilities, in the training of the other specialists and even in the capabilities of the equipment. It is easy to lose this confidence, and it is not soon regained.

Major Prediker is well aware of all this. At first, when he detected the note of uncertainty in the controller's voice, he was annoyed and began to doubt that the interception would be successful. He immediately remembered, however, that he only had to manifest his doubts and annoyance to the young controller and the latter would become completely inhibited. Furthermore, when should the microphone be turned over to a beginning specialist? Perhaps, when an inexperienced pilot is in the air? In this case, the young command post officer would have even less chance of success. The major confidently reported that the controller's command had been fulfilled, and the latter's voice immediately became firmer and more even:

"Forty-five, descend to safe altitude. Target at point of interception!"

Brazhnikov soon sounded completely confident. It was obviously that someone from among the older men on the ground was helping him.

And this was indeed the case. Captain Rogovtsev, officer in charge of the command post, began to correct his subordinate's performance with brief, precise commands. As though the young controller had roused himself, his constraint disappeared. "I literally began to see clearly at that point," he later acknowledged to his commander.

"Forty-five!" the lieutenant's commands were given aggressively, and his excitement was only revealed by their unnecessary loudness. "Turn 180 degrees! Keep a close watch! The target is taking evasive action and employing powerful jamming means."

"Roger," Prediker answered and brought the missile-carrier into a chandelle above the edge of the clouds. Almost immediately upon coming out of the maneuver the pilot noticed a blurred mark among the lights created by the interference.

"I see the target. I am attacking!"

"Forty-five," the interceptor pilot heard the regimental commander's voice in the earphones.

"Don't attack. Return to the 'point.'"

This meant that the mission had been completed: The control target had not passed through undetected. The squadron commander experienced a feeling of satisfaction. It was not just because of his own success, however: He was happy that the new controller had had a good training drill. He could now be confident that there would be one more well-prepared combat control officer in the regiment.

Air Crew Physical Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by Lt Col (Res) V. Ol'shevskiy and Maj V. Suslov, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "The Pilot's Sports Rating and Class Rank"]

[Text] In the air subunits in our district, one frequently encounters officers who are not only first-class specialists but are also highly rated sportsmen. Lieutenant Colonels V. Grishin, Ye. Konovalov and V. Komkov, for example, have first-class ratings in three different sports. These officers do not forget the need to improve their physical condition. Each of them always finds time to participate in the morning calisthenics and at the end of the day to play soccer, volleyball or handball, to devote their free hours to training sessions in a sports group.

The excellent physical condition developed in the physical training classes and the training sessions in the groups and participation in competitions contribute a great deal to success in the combat training. This is demonstrated by the fact that all three expertly perform the most difficult flight missions.

Physical conditioning and popular sports have become solidly established as part of the airmen's difficult training days. It is assumed that all the airmen are well aware of the importance of physical exercise. Strange as it appears, however, certain officers are still heard to say that they don't care about sports, that they are not planning to break any records, after all.

Certain airmen in the squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Potokov feel that their tight flight schedule prevents them from engaging in sports. It turns out, however, that the airmen of this squadron are no more overloaded with flight preparations and missions than those in the other subunits. Why, then, are sports in this subunit so openly left to develop on their own? The collective has had no men who would see that the VSK [Military-Sports Group] norms are met, that sections are organized and competitions held. Unfortunately, the squadron command and the party organization have not become involved. And it is certainly not surprising that during one of the flight critiques the commander pointed out to the senior men that the personnel of this subunit lack physical conditioning, that the pilots tire rapidly and respond lethargically to commands and hypothetical situations. Naturally, this has to affect their progress in improving their class rating.

The airmen use the term "flight longevity." It is only certain and solid when based upon good physical conditioning. And we must not forget this fact. The sports rating and the VSK badge are not a goal in themselves but represent a constant striving for the pinnacles of combat skill and certain flight longevity.

The district airmen have acquired an ample body of experience in mass sports work. The physical training classes, training sessions in the groups and competitions are skillfully organized and precisely planned in the outstanding air unit in which officer Yu. Timchenko serves. The unit has no airmen who do not participate in sports. In the wintertime, for example, they all take part in ski, ice skating and hockey tournaments. Each year at the military facility, the personnel themselves flood a rink, which is gladly used by both the servicemen and members of their families, especially the children. Ski trips have become traditional on days off in the unit. And not one of the airmen would ever say that since they are not striving for any records, it is not absolutely necessary for them to engage in sports.

Constant attention is given to the improvement of physical conditioning in the subunit in which Captain P. Fal'k serves. The commander and the party organization always provide the sports committee with practical assistance in its work. It is not surprising that every airman there has either a second- or first-class sports rank. All of this is favorably reflected in the class ratings of the airmen. During recent missions performed in adverse weather conditions, for example, the airmen demonstrated good professional skill, excellent physical conditioning and stamina.

The idea that physical conditioning and sports are indispensable aids in the service is not a new one. It is essential, however, that this be universally understood, that we all adopt the progressive experience accumulated in organizing physical education classes and sports. The VSK badges and sports rankings worn on the chest of the airmen alongside the specialist's class rating insignia demonstrate that the airman is prepared to perform the most difficult missions in the sky and help to master the modern equipment.

Flight Commander Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 80 p 1

[Editorial: "The Flight Commander"]

[Excerpts] The modern air force flight (a detachment in the long-range and military transport air forces) of combat aircraft and helicopters is a flight subunit with great striking force, good mobility and maneuverability. It is capable of performing the most diverse missions both as part of squadrons and independently, interacting with subunits of ground forces and naval ships. It is perfectly apparent that the flight should be headed by a tactically competent commander, a highly rated pilot, a determined and strong-willed air fighter.

A flight is a military team within which officers and warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers, fighting men of many different combat specialties, serve. In the long-range air force, for example, such a team consists of pilots and navigators, operators and aerial gunners, aircraft engineers and technicians, mechanics and other junior air force specialists. It is most frequently a family with members of many different ethnic groups, people who also differ in age. The flight commander is faced with the serious task of uniting these people into a single whole, of motivating each to strive to improve the subunit's combat readiness, to insure a high level of vigilance and flight safety, to maintain firm military discipline and organization.

The majority of flight commanders are politically mature officers, experienced organizers of socialist competition and skillful indoctrinators of the men, officers armed with advanced methods and the fundamentals of military pedagogics and psychology.

Not all of the flight commanders have sufficient experience in training and indoctrinating the personnel, however. Each year these positions are assumed by many young officers, full of energy, highly knowledgeable and with good flying skills. Not all of them possess the solid practical skills required by commanders and instructors, however. They are sometimes not demanding enough and are unable to rely upon the party and Komsomol organizations in the indoctrinational work, to channel their efforts into the accomplishment of the main combat training tasks. These growing difficulties, which are to some degree only natural, are perfectly surmountable if the flight methods work is well organized in the regiment, if party concern is demonstrated in developing the young officers into good commanders.

It is not enough to consider flight training alone for selecting candidates for flight commanders. No matter how good this training is, it is not enough today. Greater tasks are involved in the training and military indoctrination, and this demands political maturity, good ideological conditioning, good party and moral qualities and skills in organizational and methods work on the part of command personnel.

The young officer's first steps as a commander are not easy ones. And it is very important that he receive support. It is not acceptable either to leave him on his own or to surround him with petty patronage. One sometimes sees senior comrades fill in almost completely for the flight commander, training the airmen under his command in the air. In the process he loses confidence in himself and loses authority as the instructor. The most certain guarantee of professional growth lies not in substituting for the officer but in doing everything possible to help the young commander rapidly to acquire methodological skills.

The practical training methods work has convincingly demonstrated the fact that training methods assemblies on the field force, air force district and fleet scale, the extensive exchange of know-how among flight commanders, commander-training flights and demonstration exercises help the personnel to improve as commanders. Commanders, political organs and party organizations must work in a goal-oriented manner in order to develop the party qualities required by a leader in flight commanders. These include efficiency, principle and great demandingness of themselves and of the men under them. The experience acquired by outstanding subunits, those which have become real centers of political and indoctrinational work, should be used to teach the new commander the right methods to use in organizing and conducting various activities within the flight, the art of taking an individual approach to the personnel and the ability to create a wholesome microclimate within the team and a mood of competition during the combat training.

Officers in command of flights and detachments make up the largest group of command personnel in the air force. They are the ones who are directly involved in the training and indoctrination of the personnel. Concern for their development and for the constant perfection of their skills as commanders is concern for the all-round training of defenders of the homeland's air borders.

Crew Retraining Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jan 80 p 1

[Article by Col V. Zhuravlev, Red Banner Far East Military District: "Training on New Equipment"]

[Text] Posted in a prominent place at the air regiment headquarters is the socialist competition board. Listed on it in vivid letters are the names of those in the lead. They include Captain V. Medvedev, aircraft commander, and Senior Lieutenant S. Kirillov, navigator. It is clear from the brief description exactly what scores gave this crew victory over their rival in the competition. Take the average score for the individual types of combat training, for example. It is close to a five for piloting technique. The bombing scores are all good or excellent. The ratings in the other training disciplines are also high.

Another excellent crew, this one commanded by Captain N. Terent'yev, military pilot first-class (with Senior Lieutenant V. Lanin as navigator) is in competition with Medvedev's crew. This training year Terent'yev and Lanin have not yet managed to overtake their rivals in the competition. They also have extremely good scores in the combat training, however. They were assisted in the achievement of these ratings by the solid friendship which exists between the members of the two crews, by the organization of mutual assistance and a continuous exchange of advanced know-how. The latter is specially important in view of the fact that both crews are retraining on new equipment.

Both pilots previously flew fighters. They are now learning to fly a bomber. It is not just the aircraft system itself which is fundamentally new for them: Most of the elements in the piloting techniques and combat employment are also different. Captain Medvedev recently performed a control flight in good weather at night. He coped excellently with the exercise. Terent'yev has fallen somewhat behind in his training level: He is still not scheduled for a night control flight.

Captain Medvedev told his comrade in detail about the difficulties he had encountered during all phases of the flight--from takeoff to landing.

The exchange of information as a method of disseminating the experience acquired has become an immutable rule for all the competition participants. The following is an example of this.

Captain Terent'yev's crew flew a combat employment mission on the first shift. His rivals were to perform the same exercise during the second shift. The pilots and navigators of both crews met at the end of the first shift. Captain Terent'yev and Senior Lieutenant Lanin, who had already "tested" the range, told Medvedev and Kirillov about the target setup and the peculiarities of operating the sight on the bombing run. They considered the forthcoming mission and together selected the best plan for destroying the target.

When the results of the bombing were received from the range, they were plotted on a diagram of the target setup. The slightest errors in the navigators' computations were immediately evident. Lanin did everything to see that his rival would not repeat his errors at the range.

Serious concern is demonstrated for the summarization and dissemination of advanced know-how not only in this flight but throughout the regiment as well. A methods council thoroughly analyzes all of the best practical know-how accumulated and makes it available to all. Officers A. Chernyavskiy, V. Koshkin, B. Zabelin and others, the best trained and the most methodologically competent pilots and navigators, constantly publicize advanced know-how.

...Flights are under way. Over the loudspeaker system at the airfield, party activists are telling how the bomber crews commanded by Captains V. Medvedev and N. Terent'yev have performed their assignments. They have accepted a commitment to master the basic types of combat employment for their bombers in honor of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. And, judging from the results, this commitment is being successfully fulfilled.

Air Regiment Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Katayev, Red Banner Far East Military District: "When They Took a Concrete Approach to the Job"]

[Text] In our air regiment, socialist competition has become a reliable tool for stimulating the personnel in their work. The struggle to achieve first place among the fighting men and the subunits is a fairly intense one. Now, that is. Around a year ago, however, the members of our party committee came upon some things which forced them to stop and think. It was revealed that some comrades have a poor understanding of the experience acquired by adjacent subunits in organizing the training and indoctrinational process and socialist competition. Naturally, we were justified in criticizing certain of the communists in charge. After thinking about it, however, we concluded that the party committee itself had not performed very well.

We analyzed our manner of accomplishing the job and understood that we had frequently acted incorrectly. One of the party committee members would visit a subunit, for example, spot a number of salient deficiencies, point them out and believe that his main task was completed. New things in the given subunit, however, things which might help the others, did not always receive attention for some reason and were poorly publicized.

In short, we were forced to make some major changes in our performance. I will admit that this was not an easy matter. After all, grains of know-how are not scattered over the surface. They must be revealed and their public importance and their usefulness to the others evaluated. A high level of competence is needed. The task was therefore assigned to the communists, experts in one specialty or another. The party committee then summarized the know-how gleaned and employed all available means and methods of publicizing it and of making the fighting men want to repeat the innovations. This goal was served by arranging talks by the men possessing the new know-how, by scheduling talks by party committee members in the subunits themselves and by publicizing the most efficient work techniques and methods in the wall press and in local radio broadcasts. Competition picked up markedly and became effective after this.

Now, the party committee regularly (at least once a quarter) brings up at its meetings questions pertaining to the summarization and publicizing of experience accumulated in the best subunits. The procedures used in servicing the aviation equipment in the group headed by Senior Lieutenant of Technical Service R. Rogachev were recently summarized at the initiative of the party committee, for example. Some new things were revealed in the way the group's personnel were distributed among the work positions and in the organization of operation-by-operation control, which insure that the operations are performed well and that the equipment functions more reliably. This group's experience was soon made available to the specialists in the other subunits.

And the party committee is already making preparations for the next task. One of the members has unhurriedly and thoroughly studied the methods employed in the training of flight personnel in the squadron commanded by Major G. Shevchenko, a first-class pilot, a skillful organizer of the training process and a good methods expert. The party committee member heard many interesting things from Captain Yu. Korsunya, squadron commander and secretary of the party organization, and saw many others for himself. It was clear what he should recommend for application in the other subunits. Among other things, the party committee plans to summarize and disseminate the squadron's experience in organizing socialist competition.

The painstaking work of selecting everything new and valuable in the combat training and indoctrination continues throughout the regiment--at the airfield, in the technical maintenance unit's workshops, and in the classrooms. This work is being successfully conducted by officers A. Telyatnik, V. Osadchiy, N. Kuz'min, G. Shevchenko and many other unit communists.

All this means that the party committee will constantly be informed of new things emerging from the creative work of the commanders, of all the personnel. And it will consequently be possible for the party committee to continue publicizing advanced know-how objectively, and it will strive persistently to see that this know-how is extensively applied.

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TANK UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Tank Regiment Economy Measures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Major S. Bobak, deputy commander of a tank regiment for the rear of the Red Banner Baltic Military District: "The Contribution of Each is Apparent"]

[Text] A year ago the personnel of our tank regiment took the lead in the all-army competition for economy and thrift. Today we can proudly report that we have met our commitments. Due to the prudent utilization of fuel, electric power, water, as well as a thrifty attitude toward property and equipment, the savings of state resources amounted to tens of thousands of rubles.

What made up so impressive a sum? Of course, there were the contributions of each serviceman which were stated in their individual savings cards. As a rule, these contributions exceed the goals set by the tank personnel about a year ago. In order to achieve such a situation, the commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations of the regiment had to work very hard, imparting to all personnel a feeling of personal responsibility for the judicious and effective application and utilization of everything which the fatherland gives us for normal training, service, and everyday living.

Moreover, we tried to reinforce educational work with organizational work. It is important not only to arouse within an individual a yearning to economize in the big and the little things, but also to help him realize this noble desire.

First of all we set up a strict accounting for the work of each serviceman--we established individual savings cards, regularly conducted competition reviews, and helped the laggers to imitate the methods of the pacesetters. For example, the experience of the driver Private V. Grusdev, who saved more than 400 liters of gasoline, was noted and disseminated in the regiment in a timely fashion. Our community did not overlook a different kind of case when the negligence of Privates A. Alekseyev and M. Arutyunyan in maintaining motor vehicles came to light. I remember what a sharp and specifically business-like discussion we then had at the technical conference of drivers.

In the combat vehicle motor pool the tankers re-equipped the lubrication points and a showcase appeared by each of them, depicting the sequence of the various operations and the norms for expending materials. The chief of the fuel and lubrication materials service Captain V. Drobinin began to oversee more strictly the departure of vehicles from the motor pool: is it possible to use one vehicle where they plan to use several? Is it not more advantageous to use in such a case a circular delivery system, and to utilize trailers? We have very well set up the recovery of wasted oil and lubricating materials.

The concern of the servicemen for their own property has yielded great savings. The immaculate order at the warehouse run by Warrant Officer (praporshchik) L. Trikhan'kov, the skillful conduct of company administration and services, the timely and qualitative repair of property performed by PFC N. Nasirov--all of this has prolonged the service period of many articles of clothing.

In the regiment they persistently teach the conduct of economy to company and platoon commanders, and subunit master sergeants. At one conference, for example, the officers discussed the work methods of Captain A. Zagudayev and Senior Lieutenant G. Popov.

The tankers uncompromisingly regard each case of loss and damage of property. For example, one day Privates G. Shishlo and T. Saidov tried to give a more "fashionable" cut to their clothing and boots. The servicemen discussed this case at Komsomol meetings and at a gathering of subunit master sergeants it caused an analysis of the effectiveness of our educational work with the people.

The regimental commander, his deputies, and the party organization are paying great attention to the economic training of specialists of the rear, all officers, and subunit master sergeants. Higher staff officers are coming to the regiment to conduct many exercises. We consider the various showcases, posters, leaflets, and bulletins on the foremost methods for conducting unit administration and services to be a valuable help in economic self-education. After studying one document, our specialists determined that the coal-burning technology used in the boiler room was obsolete. The Soviet Army member V. Prosvirin used an innovation which led to a substantial savings of fuel. We have altered the sequence for the utilization and maintenance of a number of electrical mechanisms and instruments. As a result, they require less power and last longer.

Much has been done in the regiment to increase the profitability of the kitchen operation. The regimental greenhouse, where cucumbers, onions, and other vegetables are grown, adds greatly to the serviceman's meals.

Nevertheless the success of the work which has been done is determined not only in rubles, tons, and machine hours. The battle for savings and thrift promotes the education of the personnel in such qualities as zealousness, initiative, and persistence. They can go, after completion of their service obligation, into the national economy with these qualities. This arouses special satisfaction in us, their educators.

Field Maintenance Capabilities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 80 p 1

/Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Snurnitsyn, senior armored service officer of the Red Banner Baltic Military District: "The Tanks are Returning to Service"/

/Text/ The vehicles of the repair and refitting battalion, after performing a long march, stopped at the edge of a forest just to the side of the place where tank subunits, participating in a tactical exercise, were active. Immediately, without delay, the repair personnel went to the equipment of the "damaged" vehicle assembly point--tents were set up, electric cables laid, and portable racks installed. A device is tested in the vehicle bodies which are similar to their equipment in mobile shops and laboratories. The subordinates of Captain A. Pachkay, who are socialist competition pacemakers, work especially efficiently. Also not far away are the repair personnel who are competing with them from the subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Pronyakin.

The repairers well understand that they are indispensable in modern war. When the subunits of the opposing sides are heavily saturated with tanks and anti-tank devices, much equipment will go out of commission. The replacement of losses will depend on how effectively and skillfully the repair personnel work during combat actions.

Engines began to rumble after a lapse of only several minutes. The turning lathes and other machines came to life. The various types of repair equipment were being tested. The repairers had just completed adjusting the equipment when the first "damaged" tank was delivered to them on a trailer. Captain A. Pachkay, Senior Lieutenants A. Pronyakin and A. Meshkov, Warrant Officer(praporshchik) A. Mattern, Junior Sergeant (on re-enlistment) V. Kudayev carefully examine it.

It turned out that it was necessary to replace the engine on the first tank delivered to the repairers. Soldiers of the squad commanded by Senior Sergeant Yu. Chmykhaylov carry out this work. The mutual assistance and mutual understanding, and competitiveness help the repairers to work quickly, without error. They cut the time norm for replacing an engine in half.

The bettering of the norm has special meaning for the repair personnel. The quicker they repair the tank, the faster the subunits waging the battle receive it. It is not unreasonable to refer to the subunits restoring the equipment right on the field of battle during wartime as the front industrial shop.

Each subunit repairman knows, for example, about the exploits performed by the repairers around Staraya Russa. Here dozens of tanks went under the ice during the crossing of a frozen river under artillery bombardment.

The technician V. Tarasenko requested ropes to fasten to the tanks. For work under water he adjusted a gas mask, by lengthening its tube with a hose several meters long. The brave technician submerged ten times in the sharp frost. Thanks to his courage, the tanks were pulled out to the shore and soon after repaired. On this very same day the tankers of the 11th army of the Northwestern front used these vehicles to successfully annihilate the fascists.

The present-day servicemen are learning the soldier's keenness, the ability to act decisively in any situation, from the front-line soldiers. This is how it also was in this exercise. The complex situation and the abundance of exercise settings required quick and decisive actions, bravery, selflessness. All of the repairers, all of the subunits, acted exactly in this way, just as did their commander Lieutenant Colonel N. Prudkiy--the son of a political instructor who had died around Moscow. Intensive, coordinated work took place everywhere. The damaged vehicles quickly returned to life thanks to the skillful actions of the repairers. Filling everything around with a terrible din, they left for where the battle thundered.

Tank Battalion Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 80 p 1

/Article by Major S. Ivanovskiy of the Red Banner Ural Military District: "In an Advanced Battalion"/

/Text/ The tank training area and the neighboring moving-target tank gunnery range became a single entity at this exercise. The tankers of the training battalion commanded by A. Demin met, by using a multiple approach here, the norms and tasks for driving vehicles, and for the tactical, weapons, technical, and other types of combat training.

The battalion commander directed the driving. The platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Semenov is carrying out the task. At the sector of the tank training area where a strong point of the "enemy" has been fitted out, crews are overcoming mixed minefields, other obstacles, and are directing fire on targets painted in light colors hardly discernible against a background of snow.

I have had occasion more than once to be in the battalion for the tank-driving. The "enemy" had earlier been denoted by several targets and a large part of the vehicle's route passed over a well-worn permanent rut. Everything was then subordinated to the driver, the tactical and weapons training elements played a minor subordinate role. Now they carried out simultaneous exercises on driving and on firing, and met a number of norms. The tankers worked at seven training points.

The battalion commander related that not everything turned out at first. In executing the firing mission, the crews did not keep to the established intervals and distances and were careless in carrying out the commands for a change of formation from the approach march formation to the battle formation and vice versa. There were errors in determining the nature of the targets because the young tankers were not able to maintain their attention and simultaneously execute several tasks--which is precisely how one must act in battle.

The picture changed after much training. The exercises at the tank training area, fitted out as an "enemy" strong point, were of special interest to the students. Here the tankers became aware, to a great extent, of the capabilities of the combat equipment, and acquired skills in using it in a situation approximating combat.

While one of the platoons executes a combat training mission at the tank training area, another trains at the moving-target tank gunnery range. The company commander Captain V. Ivashchenko directs the training.

The crews took up their places. The readiness-for-battle report rings out. There is a new command and the vehicles rush to the attack. The young tankers confidently direct fire on cannon and machine-gun targets.

The tanks are at the cease-fire line. Earlier they returned from this line with their gun barrels turned to the back. Now, on the way back, the crews carry out fire tasks.

Captain V. Ivashchenko explained that the students receive a lot of training during such firing. Motor capacities are used more efficiently. At the same time, of course, there is constant concern to observe safety measures.

At other training sites, norms are being met for technical and field engineering training. The students hang a mine-clearing attachment to the tank, and are taught the ways of self-recovery of the vehicle with the help of a tree trunk and rope. Effort and a spirit of competition reign everywhere.

This complex exercise turned out to be interesting. Not one minute was lost.

The chief of staff of the district, Lieutenant General Ye. Kuznetsov, after observing the activities of the tankers, noted the high quality of the exercise. Multi-theme training, he said, permits an increase in the capacity of the training hour, and speeds up the formation within the future young commanders of skills important for battle. Naturally, it requires great effort from the director. It is necessary to think out the multi-theme process to the last detail and to achieve thorough logistical support to the exercise.

Let us add--the training battalion commanded by Major Aleksandr Demin is the best in the unit. The battalion commander has been awarded the order "For Service to the Fatherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR", third class.

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CSO: 1801

MOTOR VEHICLES: ACCIDENT PREVENTION STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Prevent Vehicular Accidents"]

[Text] The number of motor vehicles in our country has more than doubled in the last 10 years. The increase in traffic speed and intensity has required special attention to traffic safety. The Soviet Government has devoted a series cf decrees adopted in recent years to solving this important state problem.

Each day a large number of motor vehicles belonging to military units join the general stream of traffic. Vital military activites in troop combat training are inconceivable without broad use of motor vehicles. It is a constant concern of commanders, political agencies, staff, and party and Komsomol organizations to insure precise, accident-free operations of motor vehicles.

Where a comprehensive approach is taken, combining high standards and tight controls with well thought-out and diversified forms of training and indoctrination, the challenge of insuring accident-free operation of wheeled and track vehicles is being met. In the Carpathian M. D., for example, the number of vehicular accidents is dropping year after year. The Military Council and district headquarters keep a constant watch on questions of traffic safety there. The requirements cf documents that regulate procedures for the use of vehicles and organization of driver training are consistently followed in the units. They work hard to improve facilities for servicing and timely repair of motor vehicles.

Unfortunately, work to prevent traffic accidents has not yet been organized so well in many places. In the Transbaikal M. D., for example, it is done in "flurries," and possible causes of vehicular accidents are not studied thoroughly and carefully enough. Many things are overlooked in monitoring the use of transport at certain military construction organizations.

Many officials take part in the campaign to insure accident-free operation of vehicles. The commander is expected to unite their efforts. His attention should be focused on questions of improving the technical training of personnel, above all of officers. During command training they should work hard to improve their ability to organize movements and control columns. It is important to study guideline documents carefully, in particular the Manual of Vehicular Service.

Staffs have a large part to play in insuring accident-free vehicle operation. Their job is to work for rational planning of the use of vehicles and exemplary organization of work at motor pools and to maintain strict checks on specialized driver training. The regulations impose personal responsibility on the deputy commander for technical affairs, the chief of the vehicle service, and subunit technicians for the condition of the vehicles, correct use of them from a technical standpoint, and taking steps to prevent accidents, breakdowns, and other mishaps.

The main thing in work to prevent vehicular accidents is skillful training and indoctrination of personnel, instilling the fighting men with good moral-combat qualities and a sense of responsibility for compliance with the regulations, instructions, manuals, and traffic laws. Unfortunately, classes for drivers in their specialization are by no means always conducted regularly or well. Some subunits show no interest in organizing appropriate physical facilities for training. In the early stages of their service, driver training is sometimes organized in a formalistic manner.

The experience of leading units shows that well-planned driver training to prevent accidents is exceptionally important. Specialized driver training must be given at least one day a week, with comprehensive driving exercises at the vehicle grounds once each month. The work and combat training of this large group of military specialists should be permeated by competition. Drivers must be involved in the struggle for the title of best specialist in the unit and subunit, the campaign to extend the vehicle's running time between overhauls, and the drive to conserve materiel. There should be contests based on norms, competitive inspections for best vehicle maintenance and servicing, and sponsorship of newcomers by experienced drivers.

Exemplary organization of internal affairs at motor pools and maintaining strict regulation order there help prevent vehicular accidents. Vigilant, responsible performance of duties by the motor pool detail, effective work by the technical checkpoint responsible for keeping poorly maintained and malfunctioning vehicles off the road, and clear, graphic instructions for drivers and vehicle commanders befor the trip are important elements in the chain of actions to insure traffic safety.

The agencies of the military vehicle inspectorate have an important part to play here. Checks on military transport traffic must be more effective. Military vehicle inspection posts should be set up in the field when necessary and exacting, high-principled inspectors should be given all possible support and encouragement for conscientious performance of their duties.

Strict controls and high standards are effective when combined with purposeful party political work. It must be remembered that, because of the specific features of their work, some drivers cannot attend all indoctrination activities and are sometimes away from the influence of the collective for long times. Under such conditions, the importance of individual work with the men is even greater. Political workers and party and Komsomol organizations must look carefully into the questions of maintaining and operating vehicles, insure that communists and Komsomol members set a good personal example in using the vehicles, and create an attitude of censure in the subunits toward cases of "hot rodding" and any violation of traffic discipline. It is lack of discipline, seen in things such as speeding, improper maneuvers, and allowing unauthorized people to drive, that causes 80 percent of the accidents, according to statistics. Every unit should hold technical conferences for drivers, meetings with employees of the state and military motor vehicle inspectorates, and lectures and reports on causes of vehicular accidents, ways to prevent them, and characteristics features of operating vehicles in different weather conditions.

Winter combat training is at its peak. Each day many different vehicles come out of the unit motor pools. To complete every trip in exemplary fashion and eliminate accidents from the life of the subunit will create the setting for a further rise in the combat readiness of the subunits and serve as an important contribution to fulfilling the obligations assumed in honor of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

11,176
CSO: 1801

CRITICISM: OFFICERS FALSIFY TRAVEL VOUCHERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Jan 80 p 4

[Satirical article by Col A. Drovosekov and Col Intend Serv R. Sinev: "Newton's Third Law"]

[Text] Intelligent and sometimes brilliant ideas occasionally come very simply. All that is necessary is for the right object to fall on one's head at the right moment, which is convincingly shown by the classical example of Newton. An apple from a branch fell on him, and at that precise second he discovered the law of universal gravity.

Exactly what fell on the head of Petr Aleksandrovich Sosunovskiy we do not know. However, that is not so important. What is important is that he too had a flash of insight. Certainly his idea was not so powerful, and it did not lead him to a great discovery. Objectively speaking, it would be some exaggeration to call it an efficiency proposal.

In his official position Petr Aleksandrovich worked directly with military travel documents. Each of these documents consists of the original and a copy. A sheet of carbon paper must always be placed then, and from the copy one can always find out who went where, when, and for what purpose. The idea that dawned upon Sosunovskiy was that, with a slight change in procedures, it would be possible to write one thing on the original and something completely different on the copy.

That is what Petr Aleksandrovich did. And we must give him credit. He worked with great imagination, inventiveness, and subtlety — it was a crackerjack job.

But there is an old saying, that clever people trip over simple things. Without any electronic systems the inspector figured out all his manipulations and estimated that in two years Sosunovskiy used 35 military request blanks for trips for his personal affairs. He could have used more if he had wanted to, because neither Maj Yu. Kudlayev, his senior officer, nor Capt A. Shishinev, the deputy chief for political affairs, showed the slightest trace of that valuable quality called party principle.

Sosunovskiy has already gotten what he deserved. He was demoted from major to captain and moved to a different position, one rank lower. The story could stop here, of course, but it would be incomplete if we did not mention Igor' Mikhaylovich Lobanov. He does not know Sosunovskiy and he works far from him. But, what do you know! — he also had a flash of insight. And it was on the same plane, that the copy of a travel voucher need not be used to reflect what is written in the original.

When circumstances contrived to bring blank travel vouchers into Igor's Mikhaylovich's hands, he took exactly as many as he needed. In his own hand he filled out copies of them in proper form and even paid the cashier 10 rubles 40 kopecks for deviation from a route. Moreover, upon his return from leave Lobanov attached railroad and airline tickets to the copies, showing that he had traveled from Moscow to Blagoveshchensk. In short, everything was up to date and appeared perfectly legal.

This was judging by copies. But the original looked quite different. For a start Igor's Mikhaylovich traveled to Simferopol' at state expense. After returning from there to Moscow he set off for a voyage to the east, to Blagoveshchensk. He took a voucher from from his "personal reserve" and presented it at the ticket office, which accordingly gave him a ticket to Blagoveshchensk. But the train left without him; he needed the ticket only for the report. Igor' Mikhaylovich drove to the airport and presented another voucher that indicated that he, his wife, and daughter were traveling to a new place of service. For the return trip Lobanov presented an exactly similar voucher to the cashier at the airport in Blagoveshchensk. In other words, he relied in fact, not in words, on Aeroflot advertising, which calls on customers to travel by plane and promises speed, reliability, and comfort.

"I don't know how to cheat. If I had done something like that even once before, do you think I would have made a mistake?" Igor' Mikhaylovich says modestly.

We do not say that Lobanov ever used illegal procedures before. But he did not make a mistake in filling out the documents. There is simply one fine point which the uninitiated do not know, and it got him.

The disciplinary punishment, a warning on possible unfitness for service, was announced immediately after the auditing results were known. He repaid the loss of 616 rubles 40 kopecks that he had caused to the state. One would expect that the party bureau should have said a word in the matter. But it maintained humble silence, making its first sound only after it became known that Lobanov could be written up in the newspaper. In our opinion, this deserved the attention of the political branch.

Now, we think, is the time to ask why Sosunovskiy and Lobanov took up the path of flagrant abuse of official position.

The community is sometimes reproached in such cases. Why wern't they watching, people ask. Why did they fail to indoctrinate, caution, and explain?

However, it seems to us that the community is not relevant here. It could not know what Sosunovskiy and Lobanov were doing in darkest secrecy.

Their moral makeup proved weak, without any reserve of strength. They forgot such powerful concepts as the honor and dignity of an officer. Greed won out over decency.

The cases of officers Sosunovskiy and Lobanov are exceptional. However, cases of illegal use of travel documents are not, unfortunately, unique. There are cases where an officer to whom these documents have been entrusted will, from the generosity of his nature, or, to be more exact, his irresponsibility, entrust them and the stamp specially designed for military travel documents to a person who does not have the proper authority or elementary honesty. In another case a comrade may not want to bother with copying over vouchers, so he puts the stamp on blank forms and ask practically anyone to fill them out, as a favor. Somehow it seems not to occur to him that the blank can be filled out in different ways.

Military travel documents are really the same as money. An appropriate procedure for storing and keeping track of them has naturally been established. The problem is that these procedures are not always observed. There have been many cases when military travel voucher books were kept on desks and shelves which were never locked because there were no locks and records were in a helter-skelter way.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above is clear: a state-interest attitude must be taken toward state assets. This means that there should be no possible loophole for dishonest persons.

The stories we have told of forged copies of military travel vouchers did not happen yesterday, The circulation of these vouchers from the moment they are turned into the cashier until they return through the proper channels takes months, and more time is required for auditing. So if deception is practiced today, we will not find out about it tomorrow. But there is no doubt that it will be discovered. In this connection we feel it is worth mentioning that Newton also discovered what is called his third law: there is always an equal and opposite action.

We see this opposite action not only in the inescapable punishment for unseemly deeds. It should be embodied above all in effective controls and censure of violation of our ethical norms.

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COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES: DISTRICT COMMANDER'S VIEWPOINT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen O. Kulishev, commander of troops of the Red Banner Transcaucasian M. D.: "On a Party Foundation"]

[Text] When we talk about one-man responsibility in the army, we invariably turn to Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, who gave us profound theoretical substantiation for this principle. In military affairs, he pointed out, more than anywhere else there must be rigorous unity of action among large numbers of people, subordination of the will of thousands to the will of one person.

One-man command in our army has a party foundation. This means that in all his activities the commander is affirming party policy and observing Leninist principles of leadership. One-man command and party loyalty are two words closely linked by combat experience and practical army life. Where this link is broken the commander's authority inevitably diminishes and gaps occur in personnel training and indoctrination.

Lt Col V. Solov'yev came to us after graduation from an academy and was appointed to the important position of regimental commander. Everything seemed to be in his favor, the knowledge and volitional qualities mentioned in his record and the enthusiasm of youth.

Things did not start improving in the unit, however. What is more, towards the end of his first year of command trouble in the organization of combat training became plainly apparent. The formation commander excused this because Solov'yev lacked practical experience. A little more time passed, and the regiment fell considerably behind the other units for many indexes. Lt Col Solov'yev was removed from his position.

What happened to this officer who appeared quite promising?

The answer to this question is not simple, because it is a question of a regimental commander. This is the point in an officer's career where his ability to think on a broad scale is checked. It is a test of his self-sufficiency, and during it his maturity as a commander should come out in full. Some of the qualities needed by a leader of this rank are high personal professional training, precision and organization, a system in work that selects the primary direction of efforts of the regiment's personnel with respect to concrete circumstances, and uncompromisingly high standards. But there is one more quality without which there can be no true commander. This is profound party loyalty, which finds expression in a desire, to use the words of V. I. Lenin, "to act at all times in the way that communism in reality demands."

It was precisely party-mindedness that Lieutenant Colonel Solov'yev lacked in his work. He forgot that the commander's decision must be supported not only by the force of order and by physical force, but also by all the means of indoctrination and ideological work.

It is not true that no one ever explained this to Lieutenant Solov'yev. But it appears that they were not there when needed, that they overlooked a certain period of his activity as a battalion commander and chief of a political branch. After that it was too late. I feel some sadness at recalling this. He could no longer change his workstyle. On occasion he made thoughtless decisions, was rude with subordinates under the guise of being demanding, ignored the party organization because he understood one-man responsibility to mean personal responsibility, and viewed his personal participation in indoctrination as an unnecessary "burden." Here is just one instance. The subject of personnel indoctrination came up once, and Solov'yev said, "That is the job of my deputy for political affairs."

Needless to say, there is no justification for such an attitude.

The commander is a perso who has mastered all forms of influencing personnel. The Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces say that the commander "bears full responsibility...for the combat and political training, indoctrination, military discipline, and political-moral condition of personnel." We should look closely at the words "full responsibility." They mean that the commander must show constant concern for the effectiveness of political work and influence it directly through the regimental political apparatus and the collective of communists.

I have had many occasions to meet Lt Col V. Shalashkevich, commander of an outstanding tank regiment. When he received the regiment, it was in bad shape. The first thing he did was to assemble the communists. This was not a meeting with statements for the record and the mandatory protocol. It was a real party meeting, like those at the front, under the slogan "Communist, forward!" He said that the first problem was the condition of the equipment and physical facilities for training, and that this was where efforts would have to be focused. The tank training grounds and motor pool became the principal work place of party and Komsomol activists for a certain time. The results of competition between crews and subunits were totaled there. It was there that the daily radio newspaper was heard, and the name of the broadcast was a fitting one: "News from the forward edge." The problem was solved very quickly.

Communist Shalashkevich, unlike Solov'yev, did not wait until he was invited to attend a session of the party committee or party meeting. He himself proposed an agenda, drawing the attention of the party committee to the most pressing issues. Despite the scarcity of time, he found opportunities to talk with party activists at the tank training ground, motor pool, classroom, or club. I observed his work style during exercises. As I remember, his deputy for political affairs was not present. But the mechanism of party influence on personnel operated smoothly and Maj I. Krivoshey, secretary of the party committee, took over organizational duties. In the short breaks between training battles propagandists would give talks and operational news sheets were distributed among the soldiers reporting on those who surpassed norms and fired outstandingly. Soldiers who had distinguished themselves were awarded letters of commendation signed by the regimental commander right on the spot. The companies competed for the right to receive the victory banner for results of the exercise. In short, the commander was directly involved in putting all means of moral and psychological influence on personnel into operation. I think that this was a graphic expression of the unity of training and indoctrination, where the one is organically combined with the other.

Indoctrination is not just a process of ideological influence on the individual. The commander must not forget that a person who has joined the military is receiving indoctrination almost everywhere: in overcoming the hardships of the service and the strict army way , in the manner that soldiers conduct their private lives, and in the collective nature of activities. It is important that this influence be strictly in accord with regulations, and that difficulties do not give rise to lack of organization and inattention to the men. Like any leader, the commander cannot disregard the educational consequences of his every practical step. This was pointed out once again by the Central Committee of our party in the decree "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work."

Of course, the commander must be a spiritually rich person to recognize the full depth of his responsibility for the political meaning of administrative action, to bear in mind at all times the educational role of the entire way that military life is organized. The commander sets the tone for organization, precision of action, and regulation mutual relations. There is no question that he must be an active propagandist and able to talk sincerely with the men. Subordinates watch him and imitate him. They learn from him. Figuratively speaking, all personnel are in the "magnetic field" of the commander's personality.

Lieutenant Colonel Solov'yev commanded his regiment for more than two years. Five groups of recruits went through his hands. What did they take away inside them when they returned to the reserve; what did they learn from him? Probably they will not be writing letters to him or asking for his advice. On the other hand, the subordinates of Lt Col Vasiliy Ivanovich Shalashkevich will remember him for a long time, as war veterans do today when they recall, decades later, their beloved commanders. What happened late one evening at the training center will hardly be forgotten by the tank soldiers! The next morning they were going to ride in vehicles equipped with minesweepers through a real mine field. And this evening, just before such a serious psychological test, the regimental commander came to visit. He did not talk with them for a long time, but he made his mark. The soldiers felt that the commander, even though burdened down with other concerns, would remember them. The commander's character also determines the workstyle of his subordinates, makes them want to improve their military skills, and defines mutual relations in the collective and its moral atmosphere. Therefore he has no right to stop his own development and advance in military and political knowledge; he should follow party principle at all times in all things.

Here is another aspect of the problem that must be considered. One-man command does not preclude advice, but neither does it signify that the commander can share his personal responsibility for order in the unit and the results of combat training with anyone else.

At the Military Council we recently heard a report from a fairly respectable comrade. The question was the condition of military equipment, and he reported conscientiously that nine party meetings had been held on the question, and at them a total of more than 50 communists had spoken.

But in that case, why were regulation requirements being violated in the maintenance and operation of the equipment? And perhaps nine meetings on one subject is too many? This means that the party organization was working without effect. Of course, the party committee and the deputy commander for political affairs as organizers of party work are at fault. But where and how did the commander guide the communists?

It seems to me that in this case, instead of true party loyalty which fuses words into labor enthusiasm, we have a play at party loyalty. The number of meetings, use of the word "we" instead of "I" by the commander, and showy "democratic practices" do not in fact characterize his ability to influence the work of the collective through the party organization. Often they conceal a desire to evade personal responsibility. Modesty is fine, but why does the commander camouflage his own helplessness with words such as, "We did not make it." or "We did not fulfill." The phrase "did not fulfill socialist obligations" sometimes conceals failure to fulfill combat training plans and regulation requirements which are the norm of army life. The order and state of affairs in a unit are ultimately determined by the will and strong hand of the commander relying on the collective wisdom and experience of his party comrade

The one-man commander has a lofty and important position, and he is held responsible in many areas. An absolute majority of our commanders are ideologically, professionally trained, and competent in political work. They affirm the lofty principles of party loyalty in all their activities. Therefore they are successfully accomplishing the tasks of combat and political training and troop indoctrination, which is shown by the results of the first months of winter training.

Improving the workstyle of commanders and methods of controlling units and formations has always been and remains a focus of attention for the Military Council, headquarters, and political directorate of the district. We are doing everything we can to see that the heightened party demands of leadership personnel, which were stated with special force at the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, are realized in practice. At that Plenum Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "It is the duty of all party and economic leaders to improve their style and methods of work in the spirit of party principles. The Central Committee of the party demands this of them." The true party loyalty of a leader is also manifested by measuring his own actions against the standard of the Leninist workstyle.

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CRITICISM: UNIFORM VIOLATION DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 80 p 2

[Letter to the editors by Col (Res) A. Pazinenko, Kiev: "Wear the Uniform with Honor"]

[Text] Many of us, army and navy veterans who have been discharged into the reserve or into retirement, have the right to wear the military uniform. When we meet a man in uniform on the street we feel pride in the way it is worn and the way the man carries himself. It makes us wish we were back in the military again! However, sometimes some thing quite different occurs.

I happened to meet a former comrade-in-arms, a retired officer who fought in the war and received many orders and medals. We have known each other for a long time, and have been friendly for many years. His awards were glistening on his dress tunic. But when my glance slipped down, I saw he was wearing civilian trousers.

"Where are you going?" I asked.

"To the school where I am a military advisor."

"Dressed like that?"

"You know, for the kids my medals are more important than everything else."

What can I say! The comrade is plainly confused! If you have been given the right to wear the military uniform, wear it with pride. Do not bring disgrace upon it.

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CRICICISM: UNJUSTIFIED COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Yurkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "More Precious than All Talents — Party Life Traced from Letter

[Text] Maj V. Medvedev served in one of the units of the Siberian M. D. until recently. According to his letters to the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, he was a good specialist who worked hard to keep the combat equipment in exemplary condition and did not conceal the "secrets" of his skills from others. However, from a certain time, the work which had begun so well ceased giving him pleasure. Here is why. Medvedev writes that he could not tolerate the slightest deviation from regulations and norms of party life. He could not be silenced, for example, when he saw that a service vehicle was being used improperly or that the secretary of the party organization "does not work hard himself and is not demanding of others." But his appeals were the voice of one crying out in the wilderness; no one answered and no one supported him. Moreover, he began to be persecuted for his criticism. In short, he writes, he suffered in the cause of justice.

There was no way to refuse responding to this alarming letter. So here I am in the unit. Many of the facts reported by Major Medvedev were true, as they say. Indeed, a few collective "nature outings" were organized in the unit in violation of regulations. The letter reports that deputy commander Maj N. Lazarov misused his official position. No one denies this either, nor is everything perfect in the work of the party organization.

But here is what I find disturbing. From conversations with people here I have learned that the description which the author of the letter gave of himself is, to put it mildly, not exactly objective. Many episodes from his life are interpreted quite one-sidedly. One cannot help doubting whether it was in fact a sincere desire to eliminate shortcomings that inspired Major Medvedev to take up the pen.

After graduation from military school Medvedev served in one of the groups of forces. He worked with great zeal. Senior comrades noticed the young officer's professional competence and gave him deserved praise. He was encouraged and held up as an example numerous times for results achieved in combat training. But at this time the change in Medvedev's behavior could already be noticed. He liked to be seen. Gradually his desire to perform his duty conscientiously turned into a desire simply to serve in a way that would be "noticed." Before the performance of every complex assignment he would secure promises from the senior officer that his efforts would be properly rewarded.

Then he arrived in one of the units of the Siberian M. D. A need arose soon to set up a technical maintenance and repair point for communications equipment. This important work sector was assigned to Medvedev. He followed his old rule. Understanding the difficulty of the situation and without a trace of embarrassment he began bargaining with his immediate superior. The talk came down to the following: "What will I get for this?" He went to work after receiving an assurance that his diligence "would be considered." For the sake of fairness we should mention that Vasiliy Martynovich worked hard. Looking at the energetic officer from outside, it was difficult to imagine that his enthusiasm was fired by one thing alone, receiving the promised award.

The technical maintenance and repair point was set up in record time. An order was soon written transferring Medvedev to a higher position. He continued to follow his proven method. Now he literally bombarded M. Zatsepilin, a reserve lieutenant colonel, with requests to but in a word for him with the senior officer, to help him get promoted. Communist Zatsepilin saw the negative traits in his subordinate's character, but he took a tolerant attitude, thinking that Medvedev was young and aggressive, but would become more sensible with time. He blithely certified him for promotion. Thus Medvedev found himself in the collective which he described in such dismal terms in his letter to the editors.

As I was told, Vasiliy Martynovich established himself in his new position by following the well-used scenario. He began furious activity from his very first days. He "dug up" furniture for unit needs somewhere, got some scarce equipment, and personally drove a vehicle to take his fellow soldiers on an outing in the woods (incidentally, these were the very same trips he mentioned in his letter.) The men liked this outgoing, diligent officer. It seemed to them that he was completely subordinating his own intersts to the common cause.

It seemed that way. After receiving the insignia of a major Vasiliy Martynovich became noticeably less enthusiastic in work, and his interest in the concerns of the collective also diminished. The point was that the position Vasiliy Martynovich occupied did not promise any new promotion, and this thought upset him. His former outgoing, respectful attitude toward the men disappeared. It is true that he "thawed out" noticeably on one occasion, when there was a possibility of getting the position of deputy unit commander. After "testing the water" he became really alarmed because there were rivals. He considered Maj P. Traul'ko, secretary of the party organization, to be the most likely. The desire to achieve his goal at any price seemed to distort his vision. This is how the letter appeared, which contains many fabricated accusations against Major Traul'ko. Medvedev's plan was simple, to compromise him. Medvedev might possibly have gotten his way this time too, but he simply poured out complaints about Traul'ko concerning unseemly life away from the job, scandal, and wild parties at his house.

Vasiliy Martynovich understood that he had nothing to lose, and he came out, as they say, in his true colors. At a session of the party commission where his personal case was reviewed he was defiant. For behavior unworthy of the title of member of the CPSU he was given a severe party reprimand. That is, of course, a proper result. The only regret is that those communists who helped Mevedev along in his self-seeking careerism, and thereby also helped him to his downfall, were not brought in.

To be frank, I also feel sorry for Vasiliy Martynovich, an intelligent and capable specialist. Does he understand that selfish attitudes and excessive "practicality" deprived him of the true happiness that comes from work you love? I would like to think that he is aware of his mistakes and is changing his views of the service.

The difference between true service and serving oneself is clear to everyone. Our service feeds on sincere love of the chosen occupation, understanding of duty, and ability to subordinate personal interests to the interests of the work. These are the primary criteria by which we form our idea of a person's integrity and moral worth. In this connection I recal Sr Lt Aleksandr Buravnev. I will admit that whenever I have a chance I try to stop by the radar company he commands. The organization of work, healthy moral atmosphere, and inner self-control and precision of the men there is pleasing. The close, smooth-working collective successfully handles its difficult assignments and consistently wins first place in competition. A great deal of credit for this goes to communist Senior Lieutenant Buravnev. The men have caught his love of machinery and strict military order; his energy and optimism are contagious. From him they learned self-control and the ability to go on in the face of difficulty.

Aleksandr Buravnev arrived at his remote radar post, far in the mountains, several years ago. A difficult situation existed at that time there. The previous commander had made many mistakes in indoctrination of subordinates. Then this position was offered to Senior Lieutenant Buravnev. It meant leaving his customary, well organized life and having to move to the inhospitable high mountain region where humid fog hangs for days and the silent snow stretches many kilometers in every direction. But his love of the service and devotion to his chosen profession were stronger than any personal consideration. His answer was simple: "I am a military man, and that means I will do as ordered."

I recently met Buravnev again. He has things humming as before. He is respected in the subunit and praised by senior officers.

"Our company is outstanding," the officer readily told me. "We live harmoniously here. And what a fighting attitude the men have! They are ready to carry out any order of the Motherland. This makes me happy too." A good, open smile appeared on Aleksandr's face.

It has long been said that moral purity is more precious than any talent. The difficult life of a soldier confirms this once again. If a man does not spare himself at work and carries out his professional duty honestly, if his party conscience stays alert and no personal advantages guide his behavior, he will always win the respect of the collective. And the work of such a man will always be rewarded on its merit. But he who chooses the other way can hardly expect the respect of his comrades or success in the service.

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CSO: 1801

BOOK ON POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 80 p 2

[Review by Col Ye. Bondarenko, docent and candidate of historican sciences, of the book "Ideynaya Zakalka Voyennkh Kadrov" (Ideological Conditioning of Military Cadres), Voyenizdat, 1979, 128 pages]

[Text] A new collection of articles entitled "Ideynaya Zaklka Voyennykh Kadrov" has been received by military libraries and book stores. The book talks about the problems and work experience of commanders, political agencies, and party organizations with ideological-theoretical conditioning of officer cadres in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, subsequent Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the decrees of the Central Committee.

Our party attaches great importance to questions of improving ideological indoctrination of military cadres, viewing this as a crucial element in building communism and securing its armed defense. The essence of ideological indoctrination of military cadres has been and remains profound and creative assimilation of Marxist-Leninist theory, the most progressive revolutionary doctrine.

The anthology begins with Adm A. Sorokin's article "Timely Issues of Ideological-Theoretical Conditioning of Officers," in which the author speaks of the increased activism of political agencies and party organizations after the 25th CPSU Congress in their work to improve Marxist-Leninist officer training, political training for warrant officers [praporshchiki, michmany], and the party education network in the army and navy. In their work they focus the attention of military cadres on thorough understanding of current events, learning everything new that is developed in the experience of building communism, and subordinating all their activities to a single goal, securing the defense of our Motherland against any aggression by imperialist circles no matter where it may originate.

The article gives important figures that describe the level of ideological-theoretical indoctrination of military cadres. The author observes that more than 90 percent of army and navy officers today are communist and Komsomol members and more than half of them have higher military and specialized military education. In the Navy all deck officers have higher education and every other one has an engineering education. Thousands of political workers with higher education have come to the units and ships from the military political schools in the last decade. The article covers the basic questions of ideological indoctrination of military cadres and contains broad generalization, conclusions, and practical recommendations for improving ideological work in the army and navy.

The points made by Adm A. Sorokin are given concrete form in the articles of other authors from the various services of the Armed Forces. This gives the anthology many levels, although it also has a single goal.

The article by Maj Gen N. Smorigo tells about the comprehensive approach to organizing all officer indoctrination. The comprehensive approach, he emphasizes, is the way to achieve maximum efficiency in ideological-political, moral, labor, and military indoctrination.

Maj Gen D. Volkogonov devotes his article to pressing problems of the ideological struggle in the current phase. The sections of the article on the 25th CPSU Congress' statements concerning the characteristics of the ideological struggle under contemporary conditions, anticommunism as the principle ideological and political weapon of imperialism, the struggle of ideas in the military field, and teaching Soviet fighting men implacable hostility to bourgeois ideology are very important for information and indoctrination. Implacable hostility to the enemies of socialism is always, the author correctly observes, based on a person's clear, precise class viewpoints and it shows itself in his everyday practical affairs, ability to defend a point of view that is correct in principle, and ability to correctly evaluate political events, people's actions, and intentions.

Major generals V. Lukin and S. Panzhinskiy and other authors discuss experience accumulated among the troops when officers are studying Marxist-Leninist theory. A significant place in the anthology is given to revealing ways to improve Marxist-Leninist training, which is the primary form of assimilation of revolutionary theory by officers. In organizing this training commanders and political agencies call special attention to identification and assimilation by the officers of the principles and conclusions contained in the reports and speeches of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and his advice and recommendations expressed in the books "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [Resurrection], and "Tselina" [Virgin Land]. This is very important for the practical activity of the officers, improving their workstyle, and raising the quality and effectiveness of training and indoctrination.

The authors in the anthology show convincingly that the chief method of learning Marxist-Leninist theory is self-education, which means careful, planned work by each officer, general, and admiral to raise his political level. This is a complex and multifaceted process overall, but its foundation is independent work on primary sources. Long years of experience show that this must be carefully planned.

One of the articles in the anthology is devoted to telling about a comparatively new, but already well respected form of work, the political information session for officers. The chief purpose of such sessions is to provide a regular and flexible format for informing officers of the most important party and government decisions and the achievements of the Soviet people in economic, social, and cultural building, and explaining the principal problems of domestic and foreign life, timely issues of party and military development, and the upcoming missions of combat and political training.

The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" says that every communist, no matter where he may work, must act as a propagandist and spokesman for the ideas of the Leninist party and dedicate all his knowledge and spiritual strength to this exceptionally important work. The articles in the anthology tell in detail about the organization of lecture propaganda among the troops, the work of agitation and propaganda collectives and groups, and the effectiveness of political speeches by officers to classes. The conclusion that agitation and propaganda work brings good results only when it is closely tied to the life of the units and subunits and backed up by the personal example and reputation of the officers, their professional training and lofty party qualities combined with profound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, cannot be disputed.

Thus, the anthology raises a broad range of imporant problems. Each article presents instructive experience which commanders, political workers, party organizations, and propagandists will undoubtedly use to further the improvement of ideological indoctrination of officers.

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CSO: 1801

SOCIALIST OBLIGATIONS OF MILITARY BUILDERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 80 p 1

[Announcement: "Appeal by Military Builders of the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet to All Persons Employed at Army and Navy Construction Sites, Enterprises, Planning, and Housing Operations Organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense"]

> [Text] This appeal was discussed and adopted at a meeting of production leaders and winners of 1979 socialist competition from construction organizations of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet.

Dear Comrades!

The decisions of the November 1979 Plenum of the Party Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The 110th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin" have been received with enormous enthusiasm in our country and in its Armed Forces. They have called forth a new upsurge of political and labor activism among Soviet people and fighting men of the army and navy in the struggle to successfully carry out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the plans and socialist obligations of 1980 and of the five-year plan as a whole.

The military construction workers of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, along with all the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, are preparing for a worthy celebration of the Lenin anniversary and the 35th anniversary of our Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Last year the construction workers of the fleet fulfilled their socialist obligations. The plan for volume of construction and installation work was fulfilled by 102.9 percent; the figure for launching fixed capital in use was 100.6 percent and for housing space it was 101.4 percent.

In the homestretch of the five-year plan we must adopt even higher goals.

After discussing the results of the past year and thoroughly analyzing our potential and reserves, we, the military construction workers of the fleet, adopt the following socialist obligations for 1980:

1. Concentrate primary efforts on unconditional fulfillment and overfulfillment of the assignments of the year and of the 10th Five-Year Plan as a whole. Complete plans for construction and installation work and production and sale of output by industrial enterprises by 25 December 1980, and complete the assignments of the five-year plan by 15 November 1980. Fulfill the assignment for the year for introduction of fixed capital by 101.2 percent. Put one residential building with 70 apartments into use ahead of schedule, by the 63rd anniversary of October.

2. Work persistently to improve the quality of construction, installation, and parts and construction elements produced. Continue the struggle to turn projects over at the first submission, and expand and improve the quality control system. Launch more than 90 percent of the housing and domestic-cultural projects in operation in 1980 with evaluations of "outstanding" and "good." Broaden competition for the right to work on self-checking and for the title "Outstanding Quality Worker."

3. Overfulfill the established assignment for raising labor productivity by seven percent and the assignment for reducing the prime cost of construction and installation by 0.2 percent. Minimize losses of working time. Insure fulfillment of output norms by military construction workers at a level of at least 105.5 percent during the year. Reduce inputs of manual labor per million rubles of construction and installation work as compared to the figures established in the plan: by one percent for concrete and loading-unloading jobs, by 1.2 percent for painting work, and by 0.8 percent for earthmoving jobs. Apply the job-rate with bonus system of payment to 76 percent of piece-rate workers. Have at least two brigades working under the N. Zlobin method at each project supervisor's office. Expand the patriotic movement "Work without anyone falling behind" and socialist competition under the principle of the "worker relay" with conclusion of mutual contracts among all participants in construction.

Use the potential of construction machinery with maximum efficiency. Fulfill the year's plan for motor vehicle shipping by 5 December and shipping by maritime transport by 20 December 1980.

4. Continue work to introduce automated control system elements to improve the system of management of construction work. Introduce programs in 1980 to plan delivery of articles in complete sets and programs for record-keeping and movement of physical assets.

Use material-technical resources more efficiently and campaign every day for economy and thrift. Exceed assignments for savings of cement and lumber by five percent, metal by three percent, and fuel and lubricants by four percent. Achieve an economic impact of at least 1 million rubles rubles from the introduction of efficiency proposals in construction.

5. Raise the professional skill level of military builders, workers and employees, to a higher level. See that every other military construction worker raises his qualifications one level in the second year of service. Expand the sponsorship movement.

6. Insure a continued rise in the sophistication of production and improvement of working conditions. Strictly observe safety precautions and create an atmosphere in the work place that precludes industrial accidents. Work more aggressively to introduce the method of Hero of Socialist Labor A. Basov, to work in a highly productive manner without accidents and injuries. Increase the number of brigades working by this method to 10 percent. Steadily improve material-domestic facilities and the provision of sophisticated leisure time activities for military construction workers and Soviet Army workers and employees.

7. Make fuller use of the mobilizing and indoctrinational role of socialist competition and Leninist methods of organizing it, directing the efforts of the competitors to achieving good final results and improving quality indexes. Teach and develop ideological conviction, high political consciousness, and a communist attitude toward labor in personnel by every means. Struggle hard for the right to receive the challenge Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and Komsomol Central Committee.

8. Work hard to meet the demands imposed on military construction workers by the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, and AUCCTU entitled "Further Strengthening Labor Discipline and Reducing Worker Mobility in the National Economy." Carry the honor and dignity of the military construction worker proudly, strictly observe the requirements of the military oath and regulations and the norms of communist morality, strengthen friendship and military cooperation, mutual help, and solidarity in collectives, and increase military and political knowledge.

During 1980 hold communist voluntary work Saturdays in honor of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 63rd anniversary of Great October.

The principal guide dates for competition and totaling the results of fulfillment of obligations will be the day of the Lenin anniversary, Costruction Worker Day, and the 63rd Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

We appeal to all military construction workers, to warrant officers [praporshchiki], officers, engineering-technical personnel, and workers and employees of construction, planning, industrial, and housing operations organizations and enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense to raise the banner of all-Army socialist competition ever higher and in this year of the Lenin anniversary and preparation for the 26th

CPSU Congress, to engage in shock labor, to work in a Leninist manner.

We challenge the military construction workers of the Red Banner Northern Fleet to competition.

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FOOD: CATTLE RAISING EXPERIMENT DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col L. Golovnev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Unit Livestock Complex — The Story of an Economic Experiment"]

[Text] Shapely spruces and ungainly pines surround the training building, barracks, and soldiers mess and line the roads of the military camp. The slogans and posters calling for development of the unit farm are especially striking in this setting. You must agree this is an unusual combination in a combat military unit.

"This slogan is no accident," Maj A. Grebennikov explained. "We have taken up a new form of operating the unit farm. We have set up an experimental livestock complex which allowed us to triple our production of agricultural output. This was a great help in improving the men's diet. But to do this, of course, took some effort."

I must admit that it was the first time I had heard of such a livestock complex. The rear officers of the unit confirmed that at the present time there is indeed just one such farm, and so it is called experimental. The idea of setting it up emerged a year ago from a suggestion by Lt Gen M. Manakin, deputy commander of troops of the Moscow M. D. in charge of rear services for the district. It is true that some were skeptical and feared that it might draw personnel away from classes and that there would be additional difficulties with materials and finances.

But the initiators of the experiment reasoned otherwise. There is a training field nearby, which means, they said, hay. And there is so much leftover food from the soldiers mess! The neighboring military sovkhoz, they argued, will be able to help somehow.

They began building the complex with their own personnel. Then Gen Arm V. Govorov, district commander of troops, visited. He was told about the project, looked over the construction site, and decided to give aid. Now all the facilities have been put into operation.

It was not simple to get to the complex. We had to go through a veterinary-sanitary check and put on robes treated in special chambers.

"We will begin the inspection at the cowbarn," WO [Praporshchik] G. Bogdanov, chief of the complex, suggested and pointed to one of three sturdy brick structures.

The first thing we were aware of upon entering the cowbarn was tight streams of hot air driven by powerful heaters. It was as if they cut away the odor of cold pines we carried with us, and we were enveloped in an atmosphere redolent of fresh milk.

"The shop was figured for 28 cows and 50 calves," the warrant officer explained. "We planned machine milking and mechanized waste removal. The automatic milkers are in operation. All the equipment is controlled by one person."

It was the same in the hogshead and in the poultry barn. Automatic units, machines and "smart" devices were everywhere. We observed a band conveyor picking up feed and carrying it to a crusher, and then to a mechanized, self-propelled feed distributor. And this entire process was controlled by one person, the operator WO (Res) P. Degtyarev.

At the poultry barn we met Comrade N. Perelomov, who was adjusting the reflectors of the chick heating lamps. We learned that he graduated from the Leningrad Veterinary Institute and has a good knowledge of the processes of poultry growth and sanitary care of them. Perelomov assured us that the unit will receive 150,000 eggs this first year, and it will be able to supply a number of units with eggs.

After inspecting the complex I asked Warrant Officer Bogdanov how he assesses the switch from a conventional garden farm to the livestock complex and whether he felt the full responsibility that it put on his shoulders.

"It is difficult even to compare what we had and what we now have anymore," he said. "After all, the unit used to receive 12-14 tons of meat and the farm took twice as many workers. Now the hog unit alone feeds out 300 head, which makes it possible to turn over more than 25 tons of meat a year. But just five people work in the complex. Each of us requested assignment here, and we are proving that the commander was correct to trust us."

So the first military livestock complex is in operation, producing output. Gen Arm S. K. Kurkotkin, deputy USSR minister of defense and chief of rear services of the USSR Armed Forces, recently visited it.

He praised the practices of the artillery soldiers highly. I believe that this experience deserves dissemination.

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MOSCOW MD COMMANDER ON WEARING OF UNIFORM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by Gen Arm V. Govorov, commander of troops of the Order of Lenin Moscow M. D.: "With Honor and Pride"]

[Text] I am sure many readers will recall Tat'yana Grishina's short letter published in the last edition of the "Azimuth" column. The girl wrote that her friend Konstantin M., a military school cadet, was embarrassed to go to the theater in his uniform and preferred wearing civilian clothes. In his words, civilian clothes made him feel somehow "more free."

This behavior attracted the attention of many KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers. Here are some excerpts from letters which the editors showed me.

"In the 1920's," writes A. Yaknitskiy, a retired lieutenant colonel from Frunze, "the greatcoats we had were nowhere near as good as those the cadets today wear. But I remember how proud we were of them! I am already 78 years old, but even now, in retirement, I wear my military uniform. How could it be otherwise? I take pride in it. It is part of my honor as an officer and my love for our Motherland and its armed forces."

Reserve officer V. Olifirovich of Bryanskaya Oblast, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, speaks directly to the cadet in his letter: "How can you be embarrassed at a uniform like ours? It is respected almost everywhere in the world today. Glory and honor to it!"

These words by the veterans cannot fail to move those who have passed their entire life in uniform, who have carried the lofty title of Soviet fighting man through peacetime and the trials of war.

Many letter writers ask how the cadet's words about feeling somehow "freer" in civilian clothes can be understood. They wonder what he means by "free." Perhaps this refers to looser behavior that would not be appropriate for a military man. Then, no matter how much we may regret it, we have to ask about his moral makeup, what he is like inside, not about wearing the uniform.

This is the standpoint from which future officers Sh. Gashilov and V. Luk'yanov evaluate the cadet's actions. They write that none of their comrades at school would try to change clothes while on leave. On the contrary, they are all proud of their uniforms. "Its austerity and unique handsomeness," the authors of the letter reason, "are a symbol of the unity of a serviceman's external appearance and behavior." One cannot disagree with them.

N. Sorokin, A. Orobinskiy, and O. Zimin, cadets at the Leningrad Higher Military Engineering School of Communications imeni Lensoveta, write on the same subject: "Konstantin M.'s behavior shows his lack of respect for the uniform and for the work to which he has decided to dedicate his life. Yet in the future he will have to teach subordinates and instill them with a love for order, military bearing, and precision."

It is notable that virtually every letter responding to Tat'yana Grishina's letter condemns Konstantin M.'s behavior. Some are more severe, while some have reservations. But let me repeat that it is correct to censure the cadet's behavior. A man in a Soviet military uniform is an embodiment of honor, courage, and nobility to all our people.

This idea is very well expressed, I think, in the following lines of poetry:

"If it were suddenly necessary
For all people to choose their clothing and apparel
On the basis of taste and calling,
I would ask for a soldier's greatcoat
So that as I walked the spring streets,
Passing through the noise and bustle of day in it,
The people would look at me
With fraternal love and respect."

Indeed, I was once given such a choice. Going back to those days in my mind, I remember that when I put on the uniform I thought immediately that now I would have to take a more serious attitude toward myself, my behavior and words. And soon I learned from my own experience that in our country a man in military uniform is looked on with just that, respect and love. And I think that you too, my young friends, have already felt this.

It is not impossible that someone has called on you or your comrades for help at a difficult moment. If you yourself have not experienced this, you will recall the terse newspaper lines telling of fighting men who were the first to rescue the inhabitants during floods, fires, and other natural disasters.

As for the harsh war years, you understand very well that there is good reason for the hundreds of cities that have erected monuments to the man in the Soviet military uniform, the liberator who gave his all to the fight against the enemy and frequently died to save children, women, and old people. This too is mentioned in the letters to the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

I was deeply moved, in particular, by these lines from the letter of M. Yaklovleva, who lives in Khmel'nitskaya Oblast: "During the Great Patriotic War and after it ended, whenever I saw someone in uniform I always tried to look him in the face, to see if it was the soldier who came running to me and my little brother during a terrible bombing attack, forced us to the ground, and covered us with his body. I never did find him, but eternal flames now burn in many cities in our country to honor such people."

It is common knowledge that the military uniform looks especially good when worn in exact compliance with regulation requirements and appropriate orders. But unfortunately, this is still not always the case. Certain letters mention that cadets are seen on the streets of the cities in shortened greatcoats and "bell bottom" trousers with their caps set back on their heads at a rakish angle.

V. Maksimova, an officer's wife from Leningrad, mentions this. "What is this," she says indignantly, "an attempt to be stylish? I think this is absolutely out of place for a serviceman, especially a cadet." I think that there can be no doubt about it. It is not only out of place, it is absolutely intolerable. The uniform is a uniform. It is comfortable and attractive without any self-styled innovations.

I could add that even during the war soldiers at the front took care of their uniforms and preserved them. They sewed up holes in blouses and greatcoats and found free time to replace collars. Everyone wanted to look smart and proper.

As I looked through the letters from readers, my attention was caught by the fact suggest that we not be too quick to draw conclusions about cadet Konstantin M.'s behavior; they think that it is the result of thoughtlessness. This is said by Capt N. Sakharchuk of Tambov, S. Khristichenko, and S. Chirskiy, cadets at a Suvorov school in Minsk, and others.

What can we say to them? I am not in favor of evaluating a person's moral qualities and makeup by a single isolated incident. It is entirely possible that what happened was mere childishness and bravado. But at the same time I cannot entirely agree with these authors, no matter how much I might want to. And here is why.

Let us look at the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces. They contain an article which says that during non-working time generals, admirals, officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki, michmany], and extended-service sergeants and petty officers are authorized to wear civilian clothes only outside the unit area. Are cadets mentioned here? As we see, they are not. This means that Konstantin M. did not simply commit a thoughtless act, he violated military discipline. His behavior must be evaluated first of all from this standpoint.

You, my young friends, have chosen a glorious and heroic occupation, defending the Motherland. You are all going to become officers. This is a great honor and a great responsibility.

A difficult, interesting, and attractive job awaits each of you. And the Soviet military uniform will always an inseparable part of it for you. This uniform was worn by the best sons of the socialist Fatherland during their most difficult moments, and it is worn today by those who guard the peaceful labor of our people. Wear the uniform with pride, honor, and dignity.

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USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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POLITICAL TRAINING: AT THE COMPANY LEVEL

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen V. Samoylenko, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Urals military district: "Company Communists"]

[Exerpt] Company communists. It is truly difficult to overestimate their role in the life of the military collectives. They have considerable opportunities for influencing the fighters, and through them, the state of affairs in a (podrazdeleniye) subunit. We would add: specific and daily influence. For they are always together with the people - in the field and in the classroom, standing watch and on regular duty, they have the opportunity to observe the action of every person under the most diverse conditions, make a reliable judgement of the motives for his actions and study the specific features of his character. All of this makes it possible for them to have a deep individual impact on service men and substantially assist the commander in training and educating personnel.

The truth of these words is confirmed by life itself. Suffice it to say that in the past training year, in the companies and batteries of our district, the results of combat and political training were much better in those having party organizations or party groups than in the same subunits which do not have party organizations.

In our district, party organization and party groups have been created in more than 90 percent of the companies and subunits equivalent to them. The past reports and selections have once again confirmed that as a rule, these are combat ready collectives of communists which have a marked influence on all aspects of military life.

Every day work more efficiently and with higher quality - this is the military slogan put forward by the 25th Party Congress, and which rings out with new force at the November (1979) Plenum of the CPSU CC. Each party member should think about the military activity of his own organization and about his personal active participant in its work. This is all the more true since besides the "on the whole" happy indicators, we also have indicators of a different kind. For example, the tank company which is commanded by Senior Lieutenant M. Khovzun, has already several times now taken on the obligation of becoming a company rated as excellent. The obligation has been assumed but not carried out, close but nonetheless "not pulled off". Why? It can be said quite definitely that the commander underestimates the significance of educational work, moral incentives, while the party nucleus of the company is likewise doing inadequate work for its part in this regard.

There are also those subunits which over several years have satisfied themselves with a mediocre position, but really lag behind everyone.

This is why the political directorate of the district assigns special significance to the fact that the feeling of responsibility of the members and candidates of the party is to be raised, and their creative forces activated. And it is nonetheless important to painstakingly teach the communists of this unit the methods and forms of party influence on the fighters. It is no secret that some of them (and they are young people, primarily with a short party service record) frequently equate administrative activity with party activity, and reduce the latter to solely participating in the party meetings.

We are making an effort to objectively train the local active membership in the units in the practice of party work and the organization of intraparty life. The secretaries of the company party organizations are participating in topical seminars, in which the procedure for party work in various areas is being studied. For example, how to assure that a subunit will be an authentic center for the education of soldiers and noncoms. Or, let us say, it is being considered in detail how the members and candidates of the party can assist the commander in rallying the military collective. The same specific approach is being taken when hearing out the party communists at the meetings of the party committee, party office and in generalizing the experience of the better company party organizations and party groups. In a word, the attention paid to them by the political organs and political workers of the units and subunits, as well as the primary party organizations has increased markedly.

It stands to reason that the battalion party office occupies a special place in the training and education of party communists. It has the capability of objectively supervising the activity of company party organizations.

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MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE: ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Cap 1st rank A. Pozdnyakov: "The house on Universitetskiy Prospect; reporting from the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense"]

> [Text] Moscow, Universitetskiy Prospect, No. 14. Here, the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense is housed in a modern glass and concrete building. Created by a resolution of the CPSU CC in 1966, it has made a substantial contribution to historical science, especially in developing questions of Marxist Leninist methodology in military history, in researching the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union from 1941-1945, and the Second World War as a whole.
>
> The institute is widely known in our nation and abroad through its own fundamental works. And what is the collective of the institute busy with now, in the course of preparing for the 35th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, and with what will the military historians arrive on this renowned date?

There is a bust of V.I. Lenin among the greenery of living plants in the spacious vestibule, and the words of Il'ich are on the wall: "A modern army cannot be built without science." It is as if they underscore the fact that the work of the scientists of the institute, who have devoted their life to studying such a complex phenomenon as war, is inseparably tied to the business of reliably defending the socialist state, and serves for the development of the theory and practice of constructing the Soviet armed forces.

"In the activity of our collective," says the chief of the institute and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Lieutenant General

P. Zhilin, "Studies of the military science and military history heritage of the classical scholars of Marxism Leninism, the generalization of the historical experience of the Soviet people in protecting the socialist fatherland and the preparation of works on military science and studying the military history of foreign countries occupy one of the foremost positions."

For the 35th anniversary of the great victory, the collective of the institute is preparing a series of scientific works. The following monographs are in production in the publishing houses: "V.I. Lenin and Military Science", "CPSU Leadership of the Armed Forces is the Fundamental Basis for Building the Soviet Military", "The Armed Forces of the USSR and Military Engineering Progress", "A History of Soviet Military Strategy", as well as the following historical and theoretical studies: "Political Organs of the USSR Armed Forces" and "Party Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy". The development of a manuscript on frontal offensive operations has been completed, and works are being prepared on the strategic reserves in the Great Patriotic War, assault crossings of water obstacles (based on the experience of the 65th army), the books "The Karelian Front in the Great Patriotic War", "The Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army, 1918-1945", "Ideological Work in the USSR Armed Forces" and a number of others.

Preparation for scientific conferences is underway which are devoted to the military theory activity of V.I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory.

"Our institute is coordinating military history research on a nationwide scale," continues Lieutenant General P. Zhilin, "We view its mission as one of eliminating parallelism and duplication in the study of military history problems, and concentrating the attention of researchers on the development of that which is of real importance. For this purpose, we maintain ties with 300 scientific institutions and organizations. The scientific council on coordination, at one of its sessions in 1979, treated the recommended suject material for research, doctoral and candidate dissertations for the years 1980-1990. There are more than 160 topics in it."

The participation of the institute in the practical military education of workers is expanding. Scientific associates have consulted on the 20-series documentary film "The Great Patriotic" and are assisting in the preparation of the television programs "I Serve the Soviet Union!" and "A Heroic Deed". About 250 lectures were given in units and formations, in enterprises and in institutions in 1979. A series of popular science brochures on the leadership role of the CPSU in achieving the great victory, the most important events of the Great Patriotic War, the art of the Soviet military and the liberating mission of the USSR armed forces in the Second World War has been published.

One of the important trends in the activity of the institute is fighting against bourgeois falsifiers, who are trying to deny the decisive role of the Soviet people and its armed forces in achieving the victory over fascism in the Second World War. Besides the special works on this problem area, the scientists of the institute are presenting lectures and reports at international congresses and symposia, in which they expose all kinds of versions which distort the prewar foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and the course and outcome of the Second World War.

The institute has established and is reinforcing scientific ties with military history institutions in cooperating socialist nations and with international military history organizations. In the past year, 70 historians from 1? nations visited the institute. More than 20 scientific associates of the institutes traveled abroad to participate in international conferences.

The works of the institute, published both in our country and abroad are in glass cases in the office of Lieutenant General P. Zhilin. Among them are several works on the activity of V.I. Lenin in the field of military theory and history, a number of works on the history of the Great Patriotic War, the book "War, History, Ideology", 10 volumes of "The History of the Second World War, 1939-1945" and the 7 volumes of the "Soviet Military Ecyclopedia".

We talked about these and other scientific works. Our conversation was interrupted several times by the telephone ringing. It was like an illustration of the account of the chief of the institutes on the affairs and the concerns of the collective and its many sided connections. For example, they reported from the "Nauka" publishing house that the manuscript "A Brief History of the Second World War 1939-1945" which had arrived there will be printed in the requisite amount for the upcoming discussion of it in Budapest. This one volume popular science work is being written by the Institute of Military History and the Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences in conjunction with scholars from socialist countries. It is planned for high volume publication in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Rumania and in Cuba.

We had hardly finished the conversation on the new work, when the telephone rang from Bucharest. This time, the conversation was about the scientific reports at the 15th International Congress of Historical Sciences, which will take place this summer in the capitol of the Rumanian Socialist Republic.

Then a folder was brought in with the letters which had arrived that day. The mail was diverse. There were several letters from participants in the Great Patriotic War : memoirs, recollections of events, requests and queries. Colonel Ninko Kosashki, chief of the Bulgarian Military History

Institute, writes from Sofia. He is asking for an opinion of the author's abstract of the candidate dissertation of Major Ignat Krivorov on the subject "The Cooperation Between the Bulgarian People's Army and the Soviet Army in the Fatherland War in Bulgaria in 1944-1945".

And the usual everyday work goes on in the apartments and editorial offices offices of the institute, including that on the 11th volume of the "History of the Second World War, 1939-1945", a work being written by the institute in conjunction with the Institute of Marxism Leninism of the CPSU CC, and the Institutes of History of the USSR and General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The editor-in-chief of the work on the history of the Second World War, candidate of the historical sciences, Major General N. Glazunov relates: "The efforts of many scientific associates are now concentrated on the completion of this fundamental work. As you see, the second proof of the 11th volume is being revised in accordance with the commentaries of the main editorial commission, which includes great scholars and military figures. The manuscript of the 12th volume, its first variant is on the table to the right. . .

The "History of the Second World War, 1939-1945", 330,000 copies of which are being published in our country, is being translated and published in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Considerable interest in this scientific work is being manifest in the U.S., France, England and in other nations.

Work on the "Soviet Military Encyclopedia" being published by the institute is likewise being completed. I found its editor-in-chief, doctor of military sciences, professor and Lieutenant General M. Kir'yan at work on its last and eighth volume. Some 505 pages of the future book, it can be said, have already been edited, but still ahead are many large and pressing concerns related to its publication. There are about 11,000 concepts and terms in the encyclopedia. This is a systematized summary of knowledge of military history and the state of the art in military affairs.

The department of domestic military history. There are two works in front of doctor of the historical sciences, Colonel Yu. Perechnev, chief of the department. "On the Volkhov Front", which the department has prepared for publication. And the manuscript of the book by retired Colonel A. Dorokhov, "The Winged Defenders of Sevastopol". It arrived at the institute from the "Tavriya" publishing house for review.

"Reviewing is one of the most labor intensive areas of our work," says Yu. Perechnev. "Some 1,100 author's sheets [units of 40,000 ens], this is how many manuscripts, books and doctoral and candidate dissertations were reviewed by the institute in 1979 alone."

In the hands of the chief of the department of foreign military history, candidate of the historical sciences, Colonel A. Antosyak is a manuscript of the book "Courage and Brotherhood" - a joint work of Soviet and Cuban historians, which recounts the friendship between the peoples and fighters of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

"Right now," relates A. Antosyak, "There is another book of the same kind in production at Voyenizdat Publishers under the name 'Age-Old Friendship, Fighting Brotherhood'. We have prepared it in conjunction with Bulgarian Military Historians."

In another room, I saw the proofs of a book with the title "From Stalingrad to Berlin". This book, written by two-time Hero of the Soviet Union and Marshall of the Soviet Union, V.I. Chuykov, will soon be published, and it is as yet being read and touched up in the institute.

At work here is a highly skilled collective of researchers who love their work. Among them are more than 100 participants of the Great Patriotic War, and about 70 percent of the staff members have college degrees. They are making a worthy contribution to the education of workers, servicemen of the army and navy in the spirit of trueness to Leninist ideals, the revolutionary, fighting and labor traditions of the party and the people, as well as in the spirit of constant readiness for a heroic defense of the motherland.

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POLITICAL OFFICERS: RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMANDERS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEDA in Russian 18 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Berezhnoy: "Party Life: the Communist in the Collective: Contact"]

[Text] The train had already started to move. Colonel Ye. Galasyuk glanced out the window. The last thing he saw was a part of the area near the station and two officers: the commanding officer and his deputy for political affairs.

Yevsey Nikitovich waved a hand at them. They did not reply, occupied at that moment with some friendly conversation of their own. The commander opened the car door, inviting his deputy along. This small detail occasioned joy in the heart of the Colonel.

"The ice, it seems, has started to melt," he thought with satisfaction. And this meant that his stay in the unit did not pass without a trace, something which could also be reported to the political directorate.

The train picked up speed. Yevsey Nikitovich looked out the window and thought about these people with whom he had served, and believed that now everything would go well for them. And he remembered his own story, when for him, at the time when he was chief of the political section of the regiment, relationships with the new commander were also difficult and complicated. . .

. . . Lieutenant Colonel N. Ivanitskiy (he is now serving at a new station) right from the first did not appeal to him with his coldness and his somehow emphasized officiousness. During those few days when Ivanitskiy was taking over the regiment, he also did not take time, and perhaps, didn't consider it necessary, to meet with the chief of the political section. This offended Yevsey Nikitovich. He attempted to find some kind of justification for this behavior of the commander, and comforted himself with the fact that the commander didn't have time right now for long conversations and needed to quickly get into the affairs of the regiment. And right then he caught himself engaging in self-deception, in that his conclusions were not very convincing. Yevsey Nikitovich had served for several years in the regiment, knew the people well, and of course, his assistance would stand the commander in good stead. But the commander literally did not take note of him.

For several days Lieutenant Colonel Ivanitskiy worked in the subunits. Yevsey Nikitovich jealously waited for the result. He most of all wanted to find out how the new commander assessed the state of affairs at the "points". But it was not in the rules for the chief of the political section to ask this of subordinates, and he did not want to call Ivanitskiy. The sense of insult stired him up so that he went out and didn't even say anything about this.

"Well then, let it be that way," decided Yevsey Nikitovich. "I have my own area of work, and there are my own ways of influencing the execution of the missions. . ."

On the day the commander returned, Yevsey Nikitovich was as at a party meeting, and when he appeared at headquarters, he found out that Lieutenant Colonel Ivanitskiy had arrived in a bad mood and had already signed a punishment order for one of the division commanders, an officer of principle and a hard-working one.

"Well there is the first sign," summed up Yevsey Nikitovich. "Things are getting tough. Should I seek advice from the chief of the political section of the soyedineniye [unit]? And what should I say? And is this really the best way of eliminating conflict? I must do something on my own. Only don't get hot headed. What am I really unsatisfied with?" he reasoned later. "The commander has not shared his immediate plans with me, and did not offer to travel together to the divisions. And why should he do this? And if I honestly admit what I was thinking about myself when I met him? Well, they say, he arrived ready for anything, critical of what he had to do, and we had invested so much work to get the regiment excellent ratings. . . if this did not escape his attention, then this could also irritate him."

Just this simple idea then forced Yevsey Nikitovich to go to the regiment commander. Lieutenant Colonel Ivanitskiy certainly anticipated his arrival, because he met him guardedly. But Yevsey Nikitovich gave no sign that he knew about the given order.

"Nikolay Afanas'yevich, I was at a party meeting at the division today," he began directly from the threshold. "The communists put forward sensible suggestions as regards the execution of the comprehensive training exercises for the combat teams. I came to report to you."

"You are always welcome," replied the regiment commander, his face brightening somewhat and standing up to meet him.

This, in essence their first conversation, continued for a long time. Yevsey Nikitovich discussed the party meeting in detail, and asked the commander to share his impressions about the trip among the subunits, and then gave his own opinion of the officers of the regiment. He devoted a tiny bit more attention to the individual qualities of the division commander, who received the punishment. The sincerity fo the tone of the political worker, and the sincere desire to help the commander of the regiment understand people did not go unanswered. Lieutenant Colonel Ivanitskiy frankly admitted that as regards Major Kozlov, he had jumped to conclusions. He called the chief of staff and ordered the annulment of the order. By the way, it subsequently became the rule for the regiment commander to obligatorily consult with the chief of the political section in such situations.

So on Sunday a competition for the best team was planned in the regiment. The commander supported the initiative. Preparations were made for this event with enthusiasm. Everything went well, but on the eve of the competitions, Yevsey Nikitovich accidentally found out that on Sunday, the commander was planning to go somewhere on personal business. The notion then flashed through his mind: let him go. But then thinking it over, he acted differently. He went to the commander at home, and convinced him of the need to be present, if only for the opening. For the participation of the commander in such activities not only imparts importance to them, but is perceived by the personnel as something considerably more than a sign of respect in them and interest in their affairs, and increases the authority of the commander. In a word, Ivanitskiy then spent the entire day at the stadium, and afterward more than once mentioned this Sunday and thanked the chief of the political section for the fact that he insisted and "dragged" him out into the fresh air.

Their relationship was always mutually useful. After about a half a year, Yevsey Nikitovich noticed that Lieutenant Colonel Ivanitskiy was almost never in the first division. This subunit was always numbered among the average in the regiment, and as the previous commander thought, its leaders weren't up to anymore. He did not approve of the position of Lieutenant Colonel Ivanitskiy, who could not but see the deficiencies existing there, but he refrained from expressing his opinion. True, as before, he himself frequently visited there. Soon, however, the opportunity to speak about this with the regiment commander presented itself.

"What are you busy with, Yevsey Nikitovich, if it is no secret?", asked Ivanitskiy once, looking in on him in his office.

"I am putting some plans together," replied Galasyuk. "We want to work with a group of officers in the first division."

"Really, and if I'm against it?" responded the regiment commander. "I don't think it is as yet necessary to go there even more, for a group."

"I do not understand. Do you really not see that things are going poorly in the division?"

"Accordingly, you plan as before to watch over the commander?" Ivanitskiy said with a clear allusion to the frequent trips of the chief of the political section to the division. "This is not the work procedure here."

"And what do you propose? Sitting with your hands folded and waiting for trouble?"

"No. It seems to me you are making a mistake in the evaluation of the leaders of the division. With respect to the level of theoretical and methodological training, we have the strongest commander in this subunit. But he, just as his deputy for political affairs, waits for instructions for any reason and is afraid to be independent. You have accustomed them to this."

"This is something new," smiled Yevsey Nikitovich.

"Don't take offense," said Lieutenant Colonel Ivanitskiy in a conciliatory manner. "Of course you can go. But look at them from this viewpoint and you will be convinced that I am right. The demands on them need to be increased and you should watch over them less."

That evening they parted, each with his own opinion. But the following morning, Yevsey Nikitovich told the commander that he would not be traveling to the division. Subsequent events confirmed the correctness of this decision. By the end of the year, things improved in the subunit, and the regiment made yet another step forward in combat improvement . . .

Colonel Galasyuk recalled much more. He thought about how important mutual understanding is in relationships between communists-leaders. And once again he thought about his own command in the unit. He now believed that for the commander and the deputy for political affairs, everything would go well. And they will travel the stern roads of service for more than just one year, supporting each other.

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MILITARY JOURNALS: CONTENTS EVALUATED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEDA in Russian 18 Jan 80 p 2

[Article: "Review of Military Journals. In the Interests of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] In our age, the age of scientific and engineering progress, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of technical knowledge. It is especially necessary for army and navy personnel. ". . . a person who has completely mastered the equipment," remarked comrade L.I. Brezhnev, "Remains the major, decisive force in war." The press, including military journals, occupy a conspicuous place in the mobilization of servicemen for the mastery of military equipment and weaponry. The press is actively engaged in propagandizing the positive experience in training and educating personnel, experience in the study and mastery of combat equipment and weapons by the servicemen. Materials are regularly printed in the journals VOYENNYY VESTNIK and ZNAMENOSETS which revealed the experience of combat skill experts, the achievements of inventers and efficiency experts, and which tell about the refinement and utilization of the training materials base.

For example, a selection devoted to the training of military drivers attracts attention in the 10th issure of VOYENNYY VESTNIK. Articles by doctor of the military sciences, professor and Colonel N. Malyugin and candidate of the military sciences, lecturer Major General of the Artillery (reserves), N. Korf are published in it, in which useful advice is contained as regards preparing skilled specialists, the drivers of combat vehicles, in short periods of time.

The reader will also find a great deal interesting and instructional for himself in the article of the commander of a leading battalion, Major P. Chuyko, "For the Excellent Driving of Military Vehicles" (No 7). In it, he tells of the training of tank drivers for operations under unfavorable conditions atnight.

The journal devotes much other material - critiques of exercises, correspondence and articles on the better specialists, etc. - to popularizing advanced methods of training troops in the skillful mastery of weaponry and equipment.

The journal ZNAMENOSETS devotes a great deal of attention to personnel training procedures. Over the course of a number of months, a detailed conversation has taken place in its pages on the topic: "Procedure is the Art of Training". Many readers have participated in it.

A continuation of the conversation started previously was the publication of materials on the making of young specialists, under a new rubric: "We Train the Young Replacement". In them, the experience of the better instructors, leaders of exercises, combat skill experts and first class specialists is shared.

It is generally recognized that a remarkable accelerating agent in the technical training of troops is socialist competition, to which the journals VOYENNYY VESTNIK and ZNAMENOSETS likewise give considerable space. It is shown in the published materials how competition assists the troops in mastering combat equipment and weaponry, operate them competently, maintain them in perfect shape, increase their proficiency rating and acquire related specialties.

The journal ZNAMENOSETS regularly talks about the guns of the Great Patriotic War, and provides photographs and descriptions of celebrated combat equipment. A photo quiz on the best knowledge of domestic guns and combat equipment has run successfully on its pages. All of this undoubtedly makes the troops proud of our equipment and guns, and calls for even better knowledge of them so as to successfully use them in battle.

Both journals are conducting a constant search for improving technical propaganda. And they have made definite achievements in this area. But far from everything has been done. Many possibilities and reserves have as yet not been utilized. For example, take such a question as the creation of high technical standards among the troops. It is well known that today it is important to have deep knowledge of radio electronics, computer engineering, physics and other engineering disciplines. The journals would be able to provide no small amount of assistance to the troops in supplementing this knowledge, by publishing popular science and specialized articles of famous scientists on the achievements of science and engineering. However, they do this rarely.

Modern equipment, materiel and weapons, in order to be in constant readiness, need regular checking, precise alignment and adjustment. Here the strictest operational and maintenance discipline is especially needed. Instilling this quality in the troops is a most important problem. The journals could do a great deal more to solve it than they have done.

Questions of strengthening discipline, as required by the resolutions of the November (1979) Plenum of the CPSU CC, should appear on the pages of the journals with particular sharpness and be constantly in their field of view.

The journals devote little attention to instilling in servicemen feelings of responsibility for the skillful mastery of weapons and equipment, maintain them in constant combat readiness, as well as the moral and psychological tempering of the personnel. In a number of materials, the notion that contemporary weapons are collective weapons is correctly underscored. But in essence, it is not further developed. The problems of psychological compatibility of people, ways of strengthening collectives, creating a business-like mood in them as well as a healthy moral atmosphere such as is needed in modern battle, are not reflected to the requisite extent.

Materials are rarely printed on the work of military engineering circles, schools of advanced experience, universities of technical knowledge and lecture halls. And really, the propagandizing of their experience is likewise called upon to promote the broadening of military engineering knowledge of the troops.

At times, the journals are defficient in courage and decisiveness in combating negative phenomena, which are encountered every once in a while in the course of study, military applications, the operation and maintenance of equipment and weaponry. It is necessary to take a more uncompromising approach to the facts of unskilles operation of equipment and come out more actively against obsolete methods of mastering it.

Far from all of the materials of the journals are of high literary quality. Several of them suffer from cheerless descriptiveness and technological dryness, as well as a lack of deep analysis and are reminiscent of instructions and manuals. There are articles which are, in principle, written about everything a little at a time.

Great and responsible tasks confront the personnel of the army and navy in the new training year. Assiting the troops in dealing with them successively is a matter of honor for the military press. For this, it is necessary to make better propaganda of advanced experience, including experience related to the mastery of combat equipment and weapons, and making more insistence and goal directed use of the entire arsenal of journalistic means and forms for this, as well as the creative capabilities of the editorial staffs.

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MOTOR VEHICLE SCHOOL: COURSE IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Eng, V. Pavlov, superintendent of the Ryazan' Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering Academy: "Closely Tied to Practice; Educational Experience"]

[Text] Every year a new detachment of motor vehcile officers is sent to the troops from the walls of our academy. After a little while we begin to receive opinions on how yesterday's students are doing in service: they train and educate subordinates, as well as provide for the operation, repair, maintenance and combat service of motor vehicle equipment.

In these opinions is not only evidence of how the graduates are serving, but also an assessment of the work of all of those who trained and educated them. Being an objective and the most widespread form of "feedback" to the academy from the ranks, they provide rich food for thought, and allow for the timely introduction of requisite corrections in the training and educational process.

The overwhelming majority of opinions on the graduates which we have received over the last years are happy ones. It was decided, shall we say, to find out how the communists and Senior Lieutenants V. Cherkasov and D. Komolov, Lieutenant Yu. Kochurov, I. Chestnykh and many others were doing in service. The commanders spoke of each one warmly and sincerely, and rated their self-sacrificing military labor highly. For example, Lieutenant Yu. Kochurov, served for two years as the chief of motor vehicle services of a division and was advanced to the duty of company commander for repair of motor vehicle and tractor equipment.

Unfortunately, although rarely, letters do come in containing negative comments on individual graduates. The officers S. Kobozev, A. Drachev, V. Kalinin and A. Sharapov have not shown their best side with the troops. Poor professional training was noted for some, and for others, a low level of personal discipline, and a lack of knowhow in organizing socialist competition in the subunits. Each fact like this is an alarm signal, which is evidence of failure in our work.

All of the comments, both positive and negative, are carefully analyzed by the academy command, and the officers of the political and teaching section. Then they are transmitted for study to the departments and faculties. Some questions related to the making of young specialists are discussed at party, komsomol and general meetings of the personnel, and sessions of the academy council. For example, the academy council in considering the problem of improving the ideological tempering of students in light of the requirements of the decree by the CPSU CC: "On Further Improving Ideological, Political and Educational Work", considerable attention was devoted to analyzing the comments.

As a rule, the study of them was broken down according to sections. Comments were considered with respect to the Marxist Leninst training of the graduates, their ideological tempering and participation in political and educational work. The quality of the special military training of young officers, and their having organizational and procedural skills is analyzed. This makes it possible to reveal weak links in the activity of one department or another, make corrections in the planning of the educational and training process and improve its efficiency.

I shall cite an example. Noted in the characteristics of the troops of Lieutenant A. Ivashov and a few other 1977 graduates was an absence on their part of solid practical skill in working with equipment. All of the comments with the corresponding recommendations were transmitted to the department for motor vehicle and tracked vehicle operation, which is headed up by Colonel Yu. Vokrachko.

After a detailed study of them, the instructors planned specific measures to eliminate the indicated defficiencies. At one of the department meetings, a working group was created in which colonels G. Obenko, S. Makhnev, Ye. Zherdev, Lieutenant Colonel Engineer S. Shirokov and others were included. It was given the mission of generalizing the work experience of young officers with the troops on motor vehicle equipment and determing the optimum volume of knowledge in practical skills needed to be taught, taking into account their preparation as engineers and mechanics. This work was carried out during the troop training period of the students.

On the basis of the data obtained, new plan charts were compiled and structural logic flow charts for the study of certain disciplines were developed by instructors Colonel Engineer V. Miridonov and Lieutenant Colonel A. Seredoy. Colonel Engineers M. Kolchayev and S. Shirokov prepared a series of procedural educational aids on the performance of adjustment work, the utilization of fuel and lubricants, the elimination of typical defects in motor vehicles and the completion of technical documentation.

Requirements placed on the quality of the laboratory work performed by the students were likewise increased, and individual accounting of the independent execution of practical tasks by them in the technical servicing and adjustments of plants and instruments was instituted. All of this yielded positive results. In the comments, such deficiencies as poor practical skills of the graduates in the organization of servicing and operating motor vehicle equipment, the utilization of fuel and lubricants and a lack of knowledge in preparing planning and accounting-reporting documentation came to be cited significantly less frequently.

I have already said above that we were seriously disturbed by the lack in some of our pupils of solid practical skills in organizing socialist competition in platoons and companies, and in supervising the competition. In particular, such a reproach was directed towards S. Kobozev and other graduates. These kinds of shortcoming were also noted in the characteristics ascribed to a number of students with a period of training in line units.

When we studied this question in detail, it turned out that the majority of students did a good job with this publicity, comparability of the competition results and the possibility of repeating the advanced experience. But they did not have a sufficiently clear cut idea of how to apply these principles in practice and utilize them on a daily basis.

The commanders, political workers and instructors of the academy began to devote greater attention to the practical side of the problem. We will note that Lieutenant Colonel V. Zelenskiy and V. Shepelev strengthened supervision over the course of the competition between students, and began to strive to see that each student constantly measured what was achieved against the obligations and felt personally responsible for his successes and the successes of the platoon or company.

At the same time, we were concerned how each student also performed in the role of an organizer, supervisor of socialist competition in the exercises, carrying out the duties of subunit commanders. The future officers were trained to make practical provisions in the exercises for competitiveness, wide publicity, comprability of the results and popularization of the advanced experience of the best. Each of them was given the opportunity to sum up the totals for a particular exercise.

The comments from the troops caused us to pay more constant attention to how we are training future officers in working individually with servicemen, and the use of disciplinary rights. This question was discussed at party and komsomol meetings and at departmental sessions. The communists proposed, along with increasing the quality of planned exercises, the use of different methods for work outside the class. At the initiative of the party organization, the departments of Marxism Leninism held a practical scientific conference with the students on "Your Subordinate, His Character, Inclinations and Shortcomings"; and a topical evening meeting on "The Right to Reward and Penalize". The series of instructional readings based on the works of V.I. Lenin, N.K. Krupskaya, M.I. Kalinin and A.S. Makarenko were of considerable use to the students. Experience in working individually with people and knowing how to select "keys" to the heart of a soldier were communicated in conversations with students by teachers, political workers and graduates of the academy. Senior students who had been through the training period shared their impressions of the first steps in the role of an educator of soldiers.

Much of what we did was prompted by comments concerning the service of our graduates among the troops. This feedback is quite useful, and we will improve the forms of it. For these purposes, we are also studying the experience of other military academies.

In conclusion, I would like to turn to unit commanders and political workers with a request: take a more responsible approach to comments, which are an important reference point in our work. They make it possible to more completely feel the pulse of the life of the troops, and this means prepare motor vehicle officer personnel more efficiently and with better quality.

8225
CSO:1801

CRITICISM: OFFICER HOUSING DEFICIENCIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Ret I. Moshkovskiy: "The Official Document Has Been Signed, the Building Stands Empty. Following Up a Letter"],

[Text] If you believe the business papers, then this five-story building has been officially accepted for a long time. Eye witnesses say that as early as September, the doors of all of its entrances were thrown open wide for the commission members. The commission walked around through the apartments, looked over the flights of stairs and the landings between floors, and its members committed their official signatures. As it should be, the latter comes under the official document, which means: accept the building for operation with a rating of "good", signed the chairman of the commission.

And so the builders turned over the building. The facility was brought in solidly above the percentage. And if the percentages were high, then a bonus is stipulated. The builders, it goes without saying, were satisfied.

Days went by, weeks went past, and the building was not occupied. We waited longer and are still waiting; we discussed its future residents, feeding the hope that such an important event for them would be made to coincide with the Great October Holiday. However, the holiday passed and the new arrivals for the building still did not appear. December came to replace November, but even in December, the keys to the apartments were not turned over to anyone. Then a group of officers and ensigns wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "We earnestly ask that you help us in resolving the question of the occupation of the building which was turned over for operation on the 28th of September, but which until now has still not been occupied. . ."

It was explained further on in the complaint why the building was not being occupied. The heating did not work, there was no gas and the washbasins and toilets had not been installed.

Immediately after the new year, I arrived at the garrison from which the complaint came in and I can certify: the lights in the new building didn't even come on either on the new year night, and probably, they will not come on their for two to three more weeks. The official document was signed in September, but in January, the building still stands empty.

Why then has the building been empty for four months. Before answering this question, it should be noted that it was erected by its builders at an envious pace. As they say, the building grew up before your eyes. But it grew up and froze. It froze because with the bringing in of the lines to it, primarily the heating mains, there was a breakdown.

According to the first variant, the length of the heating line which was to be installed by the military builders was 250 meters, according to the second variant, now about 600 meters, and according to the third, even more: 800 meters. The variants were discussed and the decision was re-reported through the chain of command, and the time was lost. It is quite natural that the work dragged on to an extraordinary degree and was only completed after the 20th of December. The exterior gas piping was finished and laid literally on New Year's Eve.

Thus, there was no heat, there was no gas and the commission headed up by chief of the operational quarters section, Major Engineer Yu. Ivanov, the building was accepted, and with a good rating at that. I was not a witness as to how the acceptance of the building went and what conversation took place between the members of the commission and the builders - area commander V. Kukushkin, and UNR [not further defined] chief, Colonel Engineering Services V. Yefimov. But based on what I saw with my own eyes in January, it is not difficult to say that the members of the state commission were not exacting. The long list of unfinished work, which has not yet been eliminated, is evidence of this.

The builders justified themselves with: is it worth it to pay attention to petty details? The residents, if you will, should settle in, lodge their claims and then we will do everything. And is it not better to eliminate the defects when the building is unoccupied? This is the first thing. Secondly, no matter what promises the builder made, the residents can hardly expect complete satisfaction of their requests. As things now stand in the kitchen of apartment No. 9, with the heating radiator having a bent and crumpled convection cover, that's how they will stand. No one now is about to replace this radiator. Not to mention redoing the slipshod welding of the pipe or cutting off the protruding ring.

There is a line in the socialist obligations of the UNR collective that the builders will not spare any effort in fight for high quality facilities. In looking at the results of their labor, you come to the conclusion that the fight for quality is being poorly handled.

The indifference of the chairman of the commission, Major Engineer Ivanov is surprising. The impression is gained that all of this does not bother him at all. I call the attention of comrade Ivanov to the rather solid hole in the garbage disposal duct.

"Trifles, we will not use the garbage duct," he replied and started to argue that the chambers and receiving valves themselves are of an unsuccessful design, not suited for operation.

But if they are really not suitable, then why was approval given for their installation? In a word, according to the conclusion of the chief of the quarters operations unit, the garbage duct was doomed to inactivity.

"We shall put boxes in the yard, and the residents will haul the trash there in buckets," he stated in a peremptory manner.

The major engineer likewise had a unique reaction to the remark that one of the floor plates of the stair landing had humps and potholes.

"After about 10 years they won't be there. The residents will polish the floor with their soles," joked the commission chairman.

In all honesty, this was the first time I had met such a quarters operations unit chief, who instead of protecting the interests of the residents, somehow undertook to protect the builders. It is true, somewhat later comrade Ivanov remarked, "Well I did sign the official document." And this is just why it is in vain to wave your fists. Yes there is a logic in this. But there is none in the fact that both the chairman and the members of the commission bought a coat without the sleeves - they accepted a modern residential building for service without the underground mains.

And there is yet something else you can't be quiet about. The officers and ensigns turned to the editorial staff with the complaint because need forced them to. Captain A. Vasilevich, for example, has already been living for three months in a hotel with his family. Ensign V. Merkulov was forced to send his wife and two children to her parents. Unfortunately, the supervisory comrades who were in the garrison painfully received the appearance of the complaint. Such a position can hardly be called correct.

However, we shall return to the building. It is thought that the senior commanders and the political organs will make a basic assessment of this entire story.

8225
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BOOK REVIEW: TOLUBKO'S BIOGRAPHY OF NEDELIN

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Marshall of the Artillery P. Kuleshov: "A Brilliant Example of Service to the Homeland"]

[Text] The "Molodaya Gvardiya" publishing house has published in its series, "The Life of Remarkable People", the book by General of the Army V. Tolubko, "Nedelin. The First Commander in Chief of the Strategic Forces".* It recounts the life and military career of the famous and talented battle commander, and reveals the most important period in the development of the Soviet armed forces, related to the creation and deployment of nuclear missiles with the troops.

I, personally well acquainted with Mitrofan Ivanovich Nedelin, would like to underscore the fact that the author has successfully revealed in a deep and multifaceted manner a fascinating portrait of this remarkable man, expressively communicates all of the passion and purposefulness of his feverish activity to strengthen the combat might of the Soviet armed forces and assure the safety of our socialist homeland. This was undoubtedly aided by the author's good knowledge of the front line and postwar activity of M. Nedelin and their joint work in the field of creating and expanding the Strategic Rocket Forces.

The life of M. Nedelin is traced in detail in the book. The gifted youth from a working family was distinguished from his early years by an insatiable thirst for knowledge. Having become an artillery commander, Nedelin works a great deal and with considerable intensity, earnestly engaged in self-education, he independently studies the theory and practice of artillery fire. Thus, the maturity of a commander comes to him.

Of undoubted interest are the pages telling of the participation of M. Nedelin in the struggle of the Spanish people against reaction and Fascism.

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* V. Tolubko. "Nedelin. Pervyy glavkom strategicheskikh", "Molodaya Gvardiya" publishers, 1979, 222 pp, price 1 ruble 20 kopecks.

The outstanding capabilities of M. Nedelin, as the author emphasizes, were revealed particularly brilliantly during the years of the Great Patriotic War. He accumulated experience with the combat units of artillery from battle to battle in fighting a strong enemy. He was distinguished by a broad tactical and operational field of view, the striving to avoid fixed patterns in operations, knowing how to find new ways and methods of combat use of artillery as well as how to rapidly introduce them into troop practice. In war, he traveled the path from commander of an antitank artillery brigade to artillery commander of a front.

The author cites many documents and the recollections of eye witnesses which reveal the outstanding capabilities of M. Nedelin as a great artillery battle commander, in the refinement of the state of the art achieved in managing large masses of artillery in all kinds of operations. The qualities he acquired on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War became the reliable foundation of further friutful work in the post-war period. He devoted a great deal of effort to generalizing the combat experience, its introduction into the practice of training artillery units and subunits.

The name of the commanding marshall of the artillery, M. Nedelin will always be linked to the creation of a new branch of the nation's armed forces: the strategic rocket forces. His deep military and technical knowledge, brilliant organizational capabilities and purposefulness in many respects assisted in the successful resolution of complicated organizational, scientific, engineering and special questions, which confronted the rocket forces.

The intensive activity of M. Nedelin to develop the organizational staff structure of the rocket forces, select and train personnel, capable of carrying out the important missions assinged by the communist party and the Soviet government, in the organization of tests, mastery and assignment to combat duty of a new weapon, the working out of questions of combat application and administration, and the creation of the requisite conditions for the life and activity of the troops is presented on a wide scale in the book. A great deal which is instructive is also told of the work style of the first commander in chief of the strategic forces, his ability to see, ascertain and solve the main problem, but without overlooking the details, on which the combat capability and readiness of the rocket forces depended.

It is no accident that it was specifically M. Nedelin whom the party and government entrusted with heading up the new branch of the armed forces, which became the basis for their combat might. It is convincingly shown in the book that M. Nedelin took an active part right from the first postwar years in the development and testing of nuclear rocket weapons, the creation of a scientific experimental base and the introduction of nuclear rocket weaponry in the troops.

The role of the distinguished political, governmental and military leaders of our nation in the creation and development of the Soviet nuclear rocket weapon, the new branch of the armed forces, is also portrayed in the book in a deep and multifaceted manner. The personal recollections of the author of the activity of comrades L.I. Brezhnev and D.F. Ustinov in the development of rocket equipment, creating the first rocket formations, their trips to design offices, to proving grounds to rocket units and formations, as well as recollections of meetings with rocket troops are also interesting.

The book by General of the Army by V. Tolubko about M. Nedelin will be read to advantage by all who are interested in the development of the Soviet armed forces. It is especially to be recommended for our young people, since the life of M. Nedelin is a brilliant, inspiring example of selfless service to the homeland.

8225
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GENERAL ALTUNIN REVIEWS CIVIL DEFENSE TASKS

LD171325 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 80 p 2 LD

[Article by Army General A. Altunin, chief of the USSR civil defense and USSR deputy defense minister, under "Civil Defense" rubric: "An Important Matter for All the People"]

[Text] By their selfless labor the Soviet people are implementing the economic and social program outlined by the 25th CPSU Congress. For the successful solution of constructive tasks peace is necessary. The CPSU and the Soviet Government steer an invariable Leninist foreign policy course--a course of peace, the relaxation of international tension and the curbing of the arms race.

However, the normalization of the international situation does not suit reactionary imperialist circles. The forces of aggression and militarism are not ceasing the material preparation of war and are spending ever new billions on military preparations and developing increasingly devastating types of weapons of mass destruction.

Our party and state consider all this and are doing everything for Soviet people to be able to live and work peacefully. "We have everything necessary to rebuff any military provocations," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in his speech to the voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy Okrug.

Equipped with modern weapons, the USSR armed forces, living the same thoughts and the same breath as the people, boundlessly devoted to the cause of the party and educated in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism, are reliable guards of the fatherland's security.

Civil defense is an important component of the country's defense capability. Involving all the people in its essence and content, it pursues the most humane and noble goals: In the event of war being unleashed by aggressive circles to safeguard the state's vital activity and the population's protection against modern means of attack, and to reduce losses to a minimum. The creation of a reliable civil defense is an objective necessity conditioned by the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and its accomplices and by the threat of war. As long as the enemies of peace continue the arms race and fuel military hysteria the party and entire people are obliged to devote due attention to civil defense and to improve it tirelessly.

Thanks to the concern of the party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers and to vigorous activity in this important sector by local party and soviet organs, the civil defense system's readiness to resolve the tasks set it is constantly strengthening. The improvement of civil defense is carried out in the mainstream of the implementation of the party's plans aimed at improving the efficiency and quality of all our work.

The course toward efficiency and quality means that any training measure in the civil defense system must be carefully prepared and comprehensively backed up. Emphasis is placed on the introduction of advanced methods and the most expedient forms of instruction. Exercises, especially comprehensive exercises at establishments, are held under conditions close to those which could take shape in wartime. In resolving tasks in a complex situation the trainees acquire essential skills and physical, moral and psychological tempering. As a result the reliability of civil defense of national economic establishments is increased. Special attention is naturally paid to training leading, command and chief staff, nonmilitarized formations and military civil defense subunits.

There are many labor collectives where civil defense tasks are resolved in a high-quality and purposeful manner. Last year, for instance, high indicators were achieved by Kiev's "Vulkan" plant, the Minsk No 2 state ballbearing plant, the V. I. Lenin electrical engineering plant in Riga, Kishinev's "Mezon" plant, the "Kirgizavtomash" automobile machine building plant, the "Bortniki" Sovkhoz, Kiyevskaya Oblast, and the "Voskresenskiy" Sovkhoz, Moskovskaya Oblast. There are civil defense competition leaders in every city and rayon.

Naturally, matters proceed best where the leaders of establishments, party committees and public organizations investigate the state of civil defense in depth and where the attention of the working people and entire population is focused on it. It may be noted with satisfaction that the work aimed at improving the reliability of an establishment's civil defense is reflected in the most positive way on the cohesiveness of the collective, on the consolidation of labor discipline in it and on the fulfillment of production plans.

The nonmilitarized formations and military civil defense subunits which have gained good practice at drill and exercises have shown themselves at their best in the struggle against the results of natural disasters. They have countered staunchly and courageously the natural disasters which raged in the Baltic republics, Belorussia, Saratov, Semipalatinsk and elsewhere. During their ordeals Soviet people displayed not only organization and the ability to perform rescue and urgent emergency restoration work successfully but also true selflessness and wonderful moral and political qualities.

Experience convinces us that the thorough preparation of establishment exercises makes it possible to improve markedly the quality of training of the personnel of nonmilitarized formations and military civil defense subunits and to use time more rationally.

In the past training year the comprehensive exercises at the Beskudnikovo construction materials combine (Moscow), the Mytishchi machine building plant, the Ilichevsk sea port and a number of other projects have been extremely instructive. The tense and dynamic situation created by the leaders of the exercises made it possible to rehearse in full measures to protect the population, organize production activity and carry out rescue and urgent emergency restoration work.

This year we must consolidate what has been achieved and achieve a further improvement in the efficiency of comprehensive exercises. The civil defense staffs' task is to conduct exercises at establishments where they have not previously been held and to pay attention to the sectors where shortcomings have been revealed.

[LD171327] In holding exercises it is important to make sensible use of every minute and to create conditions enabling leading personnel, nonmilitarized formations, workers, employees, kolkhoz members and the nonworking section of the population to gain the maximum skill. The nature and content of training missions must be in line with the specific tactical situation and have a clear goal--to improve the reliability of the facility's civil defense and insure its stable production activity in wartime. The training of nonmilitarized general-purpose formations and services deserves special attention. Their personnel must be equipped with the skills to operate in various centers of contamination and must resolve tasks together with other formations and military civil defense subunits equipped with mighty hardware.

The necessity of maintaining high civil defense readiness demands the tireless improvement of methods of protecting the country's population and national economy against all means of destruction, the creation of the requisite material base for this, the implementation of an appropriate package of organizational, engineering and technical measures, and also the further improvement of the training of all categories of people under instruction.

Leading personnel's responsibility for the quality of training activities is increasing. Leaders must have a profound knowledge of the demands of the main civil defense documents and means and methods of protection against modern weapons and must grasp advanced methods. The constant training of leading personnel is one of the main elements in improving the whole civil defense system.

This training takes various forms. It includes training on civil defense courses and the holding of meetings organized at short notice, group exercises and staff training sessions involving leading and command personnel. Leaders learn to plan and implement organizational, engineering and technical measures to protect people and safeguard facilities' production activity, to assess the prevailing situation correctly and to take valid decisions on organizing civil defense. At the same time they acquire the skills to train subordinates and master advanced methods. Civil defense staffs and services master methods of rapidly collecting and analyzing data on the situation and preparing the suggestions the leader needs for decisionmaking, draw up various administrative documents and learn to inform executants of them efficiently and to monitor their implementation. The supreme form of training for leading personnel is command and staff exercises rehearsing various questions of the facility's civil defense. These usually precede a comprehensive facility exercise.

The quality of specialized tactical studies and exercises within the civil defense system depends to a large extent on the leader's ability to exploit the mobilizing force of socialist competition. This training year the servicemen of the unit commanded by Lt Col L. Grokholskiy have been the initiators of competition among the personnel of civil defense subunits. Specific pledges have been adopted everywhere. The struggle to fulfill them, to surpass the set normatives and to rehearse every training question in exemplary fashion must permeate all studies.

By their nature civil defense tasks make high demands of people's political and moral and combat qualities. Civil defense chiefs at every level, staff personnel and party and Komsomol activists are called upon to implement persistently the demands of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Education Work" and to instill in people high political vigilance and constant readiness to defend the socialist homeland.

In propagandizing civil defense it is necessary to explain skillfully and clearly to the population the humanity of its aims and to educate people in the glorious traditions of older generations and examples of courage and heroism. The experience of organizing civil defense during the Great Patriotic War is of enduring value. The achievements of leading collectives and examples of combat collaboration between civil defense servicemen and nonmilitarized formations must be known to all. Civil defense days, weeks and months have proved their worth as a good way of propagandizing civil defense knowledge and leading experience. Where they are held regularly their role in Soviet people's military patriotic education is effective.

The course of efficiency and quality characteristic of all our society's life is also consistently pursued in the sphere of improving civil defense. The efforts of party, soviet and economic organs and the military command must merge in this important area. To mark the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War by solving civil defense tasks to still better standards is to make a fitting contribution to strengthening the motherland's defense capability and insuring the reliable defense of the people's creative labor and socialism's great gains.

CSO: 1801

MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS: DEVELOPMENT REVIEWED

Bonn TRUPPENPRAXIS in German No 2, 1980 pp 111-122

> [Text] The article deals primarily with rocket launcher divisions of the USSR, but it also deals with non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, inasfar as their equipment differs from that of Soviet armed forces.
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> Finally, the article contains a chapter about the launcher troups of the German Wehrmacht.
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> The author, assistant reviewer at army headquarters, last wrote the TRUPPENPRAXIS in No 8, 1979 about medals of the Soviet Union.

The First Battery

On 14 July, 1941, 3 weeks after Germany launched its attack in the East, the Red Army's only rocket launcher battery at that time, an experimental unit, fired its first round on the enemy. It hit the Orsha railroad junction of the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow line, which was filled with German troops and supplies of great importance to the Mitte army unit, which was advancing on Moscow. According to Soviet reports, the launch is said to have inflicted large casualties on the Germans and to have caused panic.

Soviet leadership ordered on the following day the mass production of the multiple rocket launchers called "Katyusha" which means "little Katharine," also called "Maria Ivanovna" by Soviet soldiers. The builder of the new weapon, Maj Gen Kostikov, an engineer, had been given the title "Hero of the Soviet Union" as early as August 1941. Immediately after it was first deployed, the German supreme commander is said to have ordered the capture of the "automatic multibarrel gun" which soon became known as "Stalin organ" in military jargon.

BM-13

The development of the first prototype of the multiple rocket launcher had been concluded as early as 1939. The weapon known as BM-13 (BM for boyevaya mashina, which means combat vehicle. The number roughly represents the

the caliber in cm) was able to launch 16 rockets within 8 to 10 seconds from a launching pad consisting of 8 dual T-tracks in one position. The rockets had a caliber of 132 mm, weighed 42.7 kg and carried 4.9 kg of explosives over a maximum distance of 8,500 m. Their maximum speed after burnout was 350 m/sec. A three-axled truck of the ZIS-6 type (Figure 1) served as carrier vehicle. The crew consisted of 7 men: commander, gunner, assistant gunner, driver and 3 loaders.

At the beginning of the war, the Red Army had all of eight launchers at its disposal. At the end of June 1941, the above-mentioned experimental unit was formed at the Aprilevka training field near Moscow. It was divided into one lead platoon, three firing platoons, one fire control platoon, one ammunition platoon and several supply units. The equipment of the battery consisted of five multiple rocket launchers BM-13, one 122 mm field howitzer as fire direction gun and 44 motor vehicles for supplies. The battery was deployed a few more times in the Smolenks area, got caught at the beginning of October 1941 in the Vyasma basin and, after an attempted breakout had failed, destroyed its rockets which were in danger of being captured.

BM-8

The first rocket launchers of the light BM-8 type were deployed almost simultaneously with the BM-13. The launcher, which at first was also mounted on the ZIS-6 truck, was able to fire 48 82 mm caliber rockets from its track arranged in two positions. (Figure 2). Their range was 5,000 m. Other BM-8 versions were designed for 36 rockets, and later, launchers of this type, along with launch tracks for 24 rockets, were mounted on T-40 and T-60 tanks as well as the STS tractor. After supplies from the United States arrived, Studebaker and Chevrolet trucks were also used for both types of launchers.

The Garde Grenade Launcher Forces in World War II

The Soviet leadership recognized quickly that the multiple rocket launchers are relatively easy to produce and extremely effective. It ordered, still in August 1941, the immediate forming of eight and later of an additional six rocket launcher regiments which were to be placed under the "Reserve of Top Command"--in order to form points of concentration. These and all later divisions were given the title garde, which did not even come into being until September 1941--a title given to other branches only after they had proven themselves in combat. With this, the great importance of the new weapons system was to be emphasized and the specially selected soldiers of the new units, now called "garde grenade launcher forces" (MGCh, meaning Gvardeyskiye Minomyetnyye Chasti) were called upon to give their utmost.

But the planned integration of the newly formed units in the "Reserve of Top Command" could not be realized. The critical combat situation called for the reorganization of some of the regiments into independent batallions so that the units in combat could receive immediate support in as many areas as possible.

At the beginning of 1942, the Red Army had more than five launcher regiments and 74 independent launcher batallions at its disposal. Each regiment consisted of three batallions, each batallion of three batteries with four launchers each. A little more than half of the divisions were equipped with the BM-13 launcher, the rest with the BM-8.

M-30

In addition to forming more BM-8 and BM-13 divisions, the formation of heavy rocket launcher divisions was begun in mid-1942. These were equipped with spin stabilized M-30 rockets, which could be launched with the help of a frame (RAMA M-30) (Figure 3). The rockets had a caliber of 300 mm and a weight of 72 kg. Their range was only 2,800 m. Their vulnerability, because of their short range, and the low mobility of the battery were compensated for by the fact that they could be deployed successfully against field fortifications and against armored vehicles, against which the lighter launchers had not been effective enough. The heavy batteries had 32 frames each at their disposal, with which 128 rockets could be launched.

Because of the forced increase in the rocket artillery, in November 1942 the Red Army's Garde Grenade Launcher Forces consisted of 20 light (BM-8), 17 medium (BM-13) and 85 heavy (M-30) independent rocket launcher batallions, as well as 19 light and 62 medium rocket launcher regiments, that is, a total of 365 batallions.

From the end of 1942 on, the combining of heavy batallions with rocket launcher brigades for the fronts (several armies and divisions), and the formation of rocket launcher divisions for the "Reserve of Top Command" was begun. The latter were at first divided into four BM-13 regiments and two M-30 brigades and were able to launch 3,840 rockets weighing a total of approximately 230 tons with one salvo.

From May 1943 on, the garde grenade launcher divisions were divided into three heavy brigades with four batallions to three batteries.

M-31

Simultaneously, the first 300 mm rockets of the M-31 type were delivered from the beginning of 1943 on. Their range was 4,300 m and considerably increased the possiblities for deployment of heavy launcher divisions.

The further increase and the growing significance of the rocket launcher units also necessitated on organizational revision. While in 1941 their deployment was still directly under the Highest Leadership, in 1942 the garde grenade launcher forces received their own commander and headquarters were formed for the administration and supply of the new troups which were considered to be a branch of the artillery.

In order to secure better fire coordination between the regular artillery and the rocket artillery, the latter were deprived of their independence in April 1943 and the launcher units were placed under artillery command. For the former commanders of the launchers, the position of a "Deputy Artillery Commander for Affairs of the Garde Grenade Launcher Forces" was created. The rank of commander was formally retained, but his staff was integrated in the Red Army's artillery (the last commander of the Garde Grenade Launcher Forces was Artillery Commander N. N. Voronov from August 1944 until the end of the war).

Further Improvements

Even after integration into the artillery, new units continued to be formed and their equipment continued to be improved. The M-13 UK and M-31 UK rockets, which were introduced in 1944, lessened strewing because of improved ballistic properties, and thus achieved greater accuracy of fire. And in April 1944, the heavy launcher units replaced the launch frames placed on the ground with BM-31 type mobile launchers, with which 12 rockets could be fired from a grate-like launch pad mounted on a truck (Figures 4 and 5). The heavy launcher divisions were combined with the regular artillery to form the "breakthrough artillery crops" and "breakthrough artillery divisions."

At the end of the war in 1945, the Red Army's garde grenade launcher forces had 7 divisions, 11 independent brigades, 114 independent regiments and 38 independent batallions, equipped with a total of 3,081 multiple rocket launchers. In addition to the T-34 battle bank, Katyushas became the best known and most dreaded Soviet weapon of World War II.

The Wehrmacht Rocket Troops

Soviet historians, on whose data the above article is essentially based, do not mention the fact that the German army had and deployed multiple rocket launchers even before the Red Army did. However, while the Soviet launcher had been conceived from the beginning as an artillery surface weapon, the German launchers were created more as a byproduct of a development with completely different goals in mind. Under the impression of the deployment of chemical warfare in World War II, the Imperial Army secretly began to prepare a unit which could deploy such war materials as well as fight its effects.

Building upon experimental regiments of the Imperial Army, the Wehrmacht in the fall of 1935 created a new branch which was kept top secret and whose actual mission was the deployment of and defense against chemical warfare. Publicly, however, only the deployment of smoke screens on the battlefield as well as the reconnaissance and decontamination of contaminated areas as their mission was emphasized.

For that reason, the new branch received the designation "smoke troops." Their branch color was established as Bordeaux-red.

At the beginning of the war in 1939, there existed three smoke units (batallions) and one smoke unit (training and operational). They were equipped with the 10 cm smoke canister launcher 35, which corresponded in construction and appearance to a mortar, and could fire smoke, chemical or explosive ammunition. With this equipment the units took part in the Polish and French campaigns. Since an adequate concentration of smoke or chemical materials could not be achieved with the smoke launcher 35, the experimental use of rockets which, in contrast to heavy artillery, had not been prohibited by the Versailles Treaty, was already begun in the Imperial Army. The Wehrmacht continued these experiments and later Maj Gen Dornberger developed the 15 cm Smoke Launcher 41 which was also called the "Do Launcher" after its creator. (Maj Gen Walter R. Dornberger was head of the army's Peenemuende Experimental Institute at the end of the war and developed there the V-2 rockets together with Wernher von Braun. After the war he worked for the Bell Aircraft Corp. in Buffalo, United States, and became its vice president for research). This towed launder with split trail could fire a salvo of six rockets within 10 seconds (See Figure 6). The rockets weighed 34.7 kg and had a range of 6,700 m. The maximum velocity at burnout reached 340 m/sec. In contrast to the Soviet rockets, the propellant was in the nose and the explosive charge in the tail of the rocket. On impact, the explosive therefore detonated above the ground and achieved a greater fragmentation and density result. (When the fire is concentrated, pressure differences in the impact area cause lung damage. This led to the legend of the "pressure air grenades," to which the Soviet Union is said to have reacted with a threat of a gas war. Such a threat can in fact not be substantiated in the war literature).

After the new launcher had proved itself within the training and experimental unit during the Polish campaign, it went into mass production. In the meantime, it was decided that none of the warring powers would dare to use chemical warfare. Furthermore, the 1939 Blitzkrieg had shown that "smoke" had hardly been used. Therefore, the development of rockets with explosives, which had been neglected until then, was pushed with more emphasis. After the demonstration of a battery of 15 cm launchers with explosives before the army commander in chief on 18 April 1940, the field applicability of the weapon as a multiple rocket launcher was determined and the formation of the first launcher regiments was ordered.

At the beginning of the Russian campaign on 22 June 1941, the German assault divisions were supported by four launcher regiments, the 51st, 52nd, 53rd and 54th, as well as a unit of the research and development regiment. The latter initiated the attack on 22 June 1941 at 0315 h with mixed salvoes of explosive and smoke rounds and thereby supported the Bug crossing in the Sokal area. Within 30 minutes, the unit's two deployed batteries fired 1600 rockets. The 51st regiment, later destroyed with the 53rd regiment in the Stalingrad "Cauldron," already proved itself at the end of June 1941 during the battles for Minsk, that means, also before the first use of the Soviet Katyusha.

The first Wehrmacht launcher regiments consisted of three batallions with three batteries each. The batteries had six launchers with a total of 36 barrels at their disposal. The regiment could therefore fire a salvo of 324 rockets, i.e. only 56 percent of the number of rockets that a Soviet BM-13 regiment could put on target with one salvo.

In addition to the 15 cm launchers,the heavy launchers 40 and 41, respectively, were also supplied to the divisions, which was probably the model for the Soviet racks for the M-30 rocket. From these launch frames built of wood (Model 40) or iron (Model 41), four 28 cm explosive or four 32 cm incendiary rockets, with a payload of 50 kg each, could be fired out of their packing cases (Figure 7). Their range was approximately 2,000 m. The weapon, which was known among the troops as "Stuka on Foot," were soon given to the engineer and infantry regiments because of their limited maneuverability. The smoke troops, which in the meantime have also been called "launcher troops," received instead the more developed 28/32 cm smoke launchers 41 (Figure 8) as equipment for the heavy launcher divisions. With them, six 28 cm explosive rockets or, after exchanging the tracks, six 32 cm incendiary rockets could be launched.

Furthermore, the 5-barrel 21 cm launcher 42, which could also launch 15 cm rockets with the use of tracks, was developed while the gun carriage of the 15 cm launcher 41 was retained. It reached a range of 7,850 m with the 21 cm ammunition.

Finally, the 10-barrel 15-cm armored launcher 42, for which the self-propelled mule served as carrier vehicle, was introduced as equipment for the so-called armored launch batteries. Besides that, in the last months of the war, crates of the 28 cm and 32 cm shells, in other words the "Stuka on foot," were also mounted on armored personnel carriers and were deployed as mobile rocket artillery.

The following model for the 28/32 cm smoke launcher 41 of the heavy launcher units, the 30 cm launcher 42 which looked very similar to it, was not delivered until shortly before the end of the war. It had a range of 4,500 m and could also fire 15 cm rockets and 21 cm rockets as unit launcher after installation of tracks.

The German launcher units were deployed during the war in many crucial points of the attack and the defense with great local success. They were held in high esteem by the infantry which they supported and they suffered many casualties. The new troops did not gain decisive significance, because the German leadership had no clear plans for their deployment and only moderately pursued further development. The independence of the new branch, i.e., its nonintegration into the artillery, appeared to have been the reason why its potential was only little exploited. In addition, Hitler was skeptical about the rocket as a method of deployment and emphatically pushed the development and construction of tanks and the conventional artillery, although the launcher units would have been especially suited for the defense against the Soviet mass attacks and the artillery supporting them.

So the launching units, scattered widely over the whole Eastern front, were often deployed as batteries. Often the units were "sacrificed" as a last resort in crises or--because of frequently missing ammunition supplies--were deployed as infantry and worn down. Not until mid-1942 were the armies given "smoke troop commanders" and later, launcher brigade headquarters were created in order to secure the uniform deployment of the units.

The number of the units deployed during the war cannot be ascertained because of the constant change between losses and reassemblies. According to the top command of the army, there were in early 1945, at least on paper, 15 launcher brigades with a total of 30 regiments in three batallions.

The brigade included four 15 cm units, a 21 cm unit and a 30 cm unit with a total of 108 launchers or 630 barrels.

One part of these brigades, the "People's Launcher Brigade" which had been formed in a hurry, was only partially motorized, others--the so-called position launcher brigades--did not have any kind of carrier vehicle for the launchers. In addition there were--as far as they had not been destroyed--13 armored launcher batteries as well as the six SS launcher divisions formed in 1943.

Soviet Postwar Developments Until 1964

After the end of World War II, the Western nations presumed that atomic weapons would be the most effective means against surface targets in the future. Therefore, they initially concentrated exclusively on the development of heavy artillery rockets as carriers of atomic warheads of various detonation properties.

Although the Soviet Union followed this trend, it nevertheless simultaneously maintained the equipment with multiple rocket launchers and continued the development of this conventional surface weapon.

BM-14

After the BM-13 and BM-31 models remained a few more years in the units on modern transport vehicles and with improved ammunition, in 1952 the replacement of the medium BM-13 launcher by the 16-shot successor model BM-14 mounted on the 2.5 t ZIL-151 truck (6 x 6) was begun (Figure 11). In 1959, a 17-shot version of this launcher was introduced chiefly for the deployment of airborne units, which used the lighter double-axle GAZ-63 truck as a transport vehicle. Both BM-14 models used for the first time barrels in place of the launching tracks for the guiding of the rockets during the launch. From 1964 on, the BM-14/17 was eventually replaced by a single-axle self-propelled launch removable by parachute, which is, as a rule, transported by the light half-ton GAZ-69 truck or by its successor, the UAZ-469. The launcher referred to as RPU-14 or BU-14 (reaktivanya ustanovka = rocket launch lafette. BU = boyevaya ustanovka = comat lafette) in the Soviet Army likewise uses launch barrels for the control of its 16 rockets during the launch (Figure 12). The spin-stabilized M-14 rocket, which is used by all the 140 mm launchers, has a weight of 39.6 kg and a range of 9,800 m.

BM-24

In 1953 the WK II launcher was replaced by the heavy BM-24 launcher which initially also used the ZIL-151 truck and from 1956 on the more modern ZIL-157 as carrier. It could shoot 12 rockets weighing 112 kg over a distance of 10,200 m from a grate-shaped launch paid.

A version of this type, the BM 24T, appeared from 1957 on. It used the AT-S artillery tractor as a transport vehicle and shot the same 240 mm rockets as the BM-24 on a truck from 12 barrels arranged in 2 positions. (AT-s = artilleriyskiy tyagach, sredniy = medium artillery tractor). (Figure 14)

BMD

The "BMD long-distance launchers" (D for "dal'noboynyy" = wide-range) eventually formed their own class of launchers, which could shoot a small number of rockets over large distances. As the first model of this class, the BMD-20 on the ZIL-151 truck, which could shoot four rockets weighing 194 kg each, over a distance of up to 20,000 m was introduced in 1954 (Figure 15). Its successor was the heaviest and most far-reaching Soviet launcher thus far, the BMD-28 on the YaAZ-214 truck, which shot 6 4.80 m long rockets weighing 455 kg each as far as 30,000 m from round, grate-like frames (Figure 16) (In the West, this rocket is often called BM-25).

Postwar Developments of Other Communist Nations Until 1964

The ground forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states accepted the Soviet launchers almost without exception. Only Czechoslovakia developed its own model, the RM-130. The launcher, which was introduced as early as 1951, has 32 short launch barrels for 130 mm rockets weighing only 24.2 kg with a range of only 8,200 m. The PRAGA V-3S truck serves as carrier for the launcher which is still used today by regiments in the Czech People's Army (CVA). Towards the end of the 1960, the antiquated launcher, switched over to the ZIL-151 and ZIL-157 trucks, was adopted also by the Romanian People's Army. The Austrian army also still has a few launchers of this type. As for the rest, only Poland developed its own mobile guided launcher for its airborne troops. It is similar to the Soviet RPU-14, uses the same ammunition, but has only 8 barrels. A mobile guided launcher for 32 128 mm rockets was also produced in Yugoslavia and introduced to the Yugoslav People's Army in 1963. It is called "Kacusa" and is still in use today.

The Soviet Multiple Rocket Launcher BM-21

There was a rapid succession in the development and introduction of various types of launchers in the Soviet Army. This ended in 1964 with the introduction of the 122 mm BM-21 launcher (number of type and caliber do no longer agree with this launcher).

The new model was conceived as a unit launcher and quickly replaced all models used previously by the Soviet Army because of its salvo range, fire sequence, range and weight. Only the guided RPU-14 continues to be used by the airborne units because of its specific suitability.

The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies also took over the BM-21, but with some modifications regarding the carrier and the number of barrels, which is dealt with below.

The following table shows data of presently used standard weapons systems of the rocket launcher divisions of the Warsaw Pact ground forces (See Figures 17 to 20)

Launcher

Number of barrels:	40 (4 x 10)
Length of barrel:	3 m
Barrel diameter:	122.4 mm
Gun angle of elevation:	0° to +50°
Angle of pintle traverse:	240°
Type of fire:	Serial, part-serial, single fire
Rate of fire:	2 shot/sec
Reloading time:	10 to 15 min
Crew:	1:4

Rockets	Short Type	Long Type
Length:	1910 mm	2870 mm
Weight:	45.8 kg	66 kg
Maximum range:	11,000 m	20,500m
Initial Thrust:	6,000 to 8,000 N	
Velocity at burnout:	690 m/sec	
Warheads:	Fragmentation-explosive type 21 OF and chemical warfare	
Fuse:	Impact fuse with or without delay action Spin- or surface stabilization	

Carrier Vehicle

Type:	4.5 t gl URAL 375 truck (6 x 6)
Weight (without launcher):	8,400 kg
Engine performance:	128.7 kW (175 PS)
Maximum speed:	75 km/h
Range:	405 km
Combat weight:	13,000 kg

BM-21 Variations in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact States and in the Third World

Among the BM-21 variations which have up to now become known, the Czechoslovak version stands out which, besides requiring a carrier vehicle of domestic production, shows a clear combat superiority.

The 10 t gl TATRA-813 Kolos truck serves as carrier vehicle to the weapons system which was introduced in Czechoslovakia under the designation of RM-70. (Figure 21). The increased carrier capacity, length, and the engine performance of this carrier vehicle permitted the installation of a hydraulic recharging device between the cab and the top-mounted rocket launcher. With it, a complete series of 40 rockets can be carried along, and the launcher can be automatically reloaded within 2 to 5 minutes. This shortening of the reloading time increases the tactical maneuverability of the launcher: It can either deliver two salvoes from the same firing position or can, without losing time, be deployed again from a different position.

Furthermore, the Czechoslovak cab was equipped with an armor covering. Because of the absence of such protection, the Soviet BM-21 must, in order to avoid damage to the cab, continually take up position perpendicular to the line of fire and, in case of a sudden change of target, change its direction of aim under certain circumstances. Finally, a sweeper can also be attached to the front of the TATRA-813, with which obstacles can be cleared away and protective covers can be removed.

The Czechoslovak RM-70 launcher, which has a battle weight of 23.3 t and a driving range of 1,100 km, was also introduced in place of the Soviet BM-21 to the National People's Army of the GDR. (Figure 22)

With other BM-21 variations, the number of barrels was merely reduced in order to make them suitable for weaker carrier vehicles mostly of domestic production or for more difficult terrain conditions. In this way, the Romanian strike forces utilize a version with 21 barrels (seven barrels in three positions) on the four t gl BUCEGI SR-114 truck, which is produced in the country. The Cuban intervention troops in Angola used a BM-21 launcher with 34 barrels: Only four barrels, instead of another 10, were placed on the lower three positions with 30 barrels. BM-21 variations with 30 barrels (10 barrels in three positions) were also observed in Egypt, and secretly at a parade in Pakistan.

Otherwise, the Soviet Union used the countries of the Third World mainly as recipient of its outmoded models: Egypt received BM-24's, among other things, for the Yom Kippur War of 1973; in Ogaden in 1977/1978, Somalian BM-14's and Ethiopian BMD-20's faced each other, and in Chad in 1976, even World War II launchers of the BM-13 type were still marketable.

The Czechoslovak RM-70 soon found an imitator outside of the Warsaw Pact; in 1973, Yugoslavia introduced as its own product a new multiple rocket launcher which shoots 32 rockets of the 128 mm calibre. The rockets weigh 64 kg and have a range of 18,000 m. The rocket launcher, which is mounted on a 12 t truck of the FAP-2220 BS type, has a recharging mechanism which appears to be quite similar to the CVA type. At any rate, Yugoslavia improved on its Czechoslovak model with a cover sheet for the launcher guiding system and recharging mechanism, which is folded at the rear end of the vehicle when the launcher is ready for deployment. (Figure 23)

Organization and Deployment of the Soviet Launcher Units

The standard unit of the rocket launcher troops of the Soviet ground forces and--modeled after them--the remaining Warsaw Pact armies, is the rocket launcher batallion. It is part of all armored and mechanized infantry divisions.

Beyond that, artillery divisions which are assigned to the fronts or, rather, to the "Reserve of the Top Command," still have a rocket launder brigade at their disposal, which includes four batallions.

The rocket launcher batallion has a strength of approximately 270 men, and is equipped with 18 BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, which can deliver a salvo of 720 rockets to the target. It is divided into three firing batteries, which consist of a lead platoon and two launcher platoons. (Figure 24)

The rocket launcher batallion of the division is not part of the division artillery regiment, but is placed immediately under the division artillery leader. It constitutes the conventional chief weapon of the division against surface targets and is usually deployed as a unit. Deployment of the entire battery can occur as an exception, especially in defense.

The rocket launcher batallion completes and strengthens the fire of the ordinary artillery, especially when high fire density is to be achieved quickly against predominantly open, scattered enemy targets.

In the Attach, where--according to Soviet combat principles--3 phases of artillery deployment are distinguished, it is used especially in order to

--open artillery preliminary fire suddenly and with great psychological effect and to increase its density at the end with a final salvo;

--hold down the remaining enemy artillery in its fire positions during the "artillery support of the assault" and to destroy advancing reserves and counterattack forces;

--hold down remaining forces during the "artillery cover deep within the enemy defense lines," to break up counterattacks and to secure open flanks.

The rocket launcher batallion is deployed in defense in order to

--destroy enemy assembly positions before the attack;

--hinder the approach of attacking units, and

--cut off the enemy advance by fire,

--support counterattacks.

In special situations, such as the defense against counterattacks in the attack platoon, or while engaging an advancing enemy in the defense line, the deployment of multiple rocket launchers in direct aim is also possible.

As a rule, the rocket launcher batallion is kept in readiness before deployment in an assembly area which is up to 40 km behind the front lines. From here, the area of the firing position of the batallion with main-, evasive- and alternate firing positions for the batteries, as well as the batallion observation point, are determined and measured. When advancing to the firing positions, the launchers are loaded and, if possible, they advance at night. If situation and terrain permit, they first move into assembly areas which are 2 to 3 km from the firing position before moving into the actual firing position, in order to protect against enemy reconnaissance and enemy fire. The firing position of the batteries, which, as a matter of principle, is changed after every salvo, is 125 to 250 m wide. The rows of launchers are 25 to 50 m apart. The entire firing area of the batallion is 1,250 to 2,500 m wide and 1,000 to 2,000 m deep, with its batteries 1,000 to 2,000 m apart.

When selecting the firing position areas, the distance to the planned target area must be taken into consideration here more than with the regular artillery. This is because of trajectory properities of rockets as well as the resulting strewing of salvoes, for which the following characteristics hold true:

The rocket trajectory has, contingent upon the propulsion during the initial stage, an extended ascending branch. Since there is neither any choice between different loads nor is firing in the upper angle group possible, its "ballistic flexibility," i.e., the adaptability to the terrain forms, is similarly limited like that of a cannon trajectory. Short-range firing is therefore often made impossible by protective coverings. Since the thrust during the propulsion phase is further subject to certain variations, its results in certain characteristics for the strewing of a salvo:

Range Dispersion on Horizontal Target of a Salvo

--is a multiple of the area of lateral disperson at short-range,

--decreases when the range increases and

--is lowest at maximum range

Lateral Range Disperson of a Salvo

--increases with increasing range and

--reaches its maximum value, surpassing the range disperson on horizontal target, at maximum range

Just barely under maximum range, lateral strewing equals horizontal strewing. This results in a target broaching close to maximum range, a square of plotted hits with optimal fire density.

When firing over a shorter range, a nearly equal blanketing of the target area can be achieved only by fanning out the battery salvo by setting different angles of deflection for the individual launchers. Therefore, firing positions are basically chosen in such a way that the most important target areas lie in the last third of the range. The possibility of using ammunition of differing range gives increased flexibility to the BM-21, which, however, requires time-consuming reloading when there are unexpected situation changes.

As a rule, the firing position of the rocket launcher batallion lies 5 to 10 km behind the front line of the attach, and 7 to 12 km behind the front line of defense when in a defensive position.

Symmary and Outlook

The Soviet Army has maintained its rocket launcher troops, which have proved themselves in World War II as an effective component of the conventional artillery, and has expanded them more than any other army of the world. It has continuously kept its equipment up to modern standards through the development of new types of launchers, and, with the BM-21 launchers, today has at its disposal an efficient weapons system which surpasses all provious types with its conbination of range, effectiveness and flexibility.

The number of the multiple rocket launchers carried in the rocket launcher batallions of the battle division, as well as in the rocket launcher brigades of the artillery division, amounts to around 4,000, and thus surpasses the number of launchers which were present at the end of World War II by about one-fourth, with approximately three times the fire power. In the future, it can be expected that the Soviet Army will follow the Czechoslovak example and will introduce a launcher equipped with a reloading mechanism.

Moreover, there are indications for the development of a new heavy multiple rocket launcher with a wide range, which is presumably supposed to launch large-calibre rockets filled with fragmentation mines.

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WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITARY AND PATRIOTIC EDUCATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 60-66

/Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Nikolay Nikolayevich Yefimov, Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov, and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Yuriy Ivanovich Deryugin, Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense/

/Text/ Military and patriotic education is an integral component of the ideological and political education of the Soviet people. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Educational Work" plainly requires the redoubling of attention toward this question.[1] "The affirmation in the consciousness of the workers, first of all the young generation, of the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, of pride in the Soviet Union, in our homeland, and of the willingness to rise to the defense of the achievements of socialism was and remains one of the most important tasks of the party," L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 25th CPSU Congress.[2]

The main goal of military and patriotic education in our country is the purposeful formation among the Soviet people of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, a thorough understanding of the essence and content of Lenin's theory of the defense of the socialist homeland and the cultivation among them of lofty moral, political and psychological qualities. At the same time it sets as a goal the mastery of the military and technical knowledge which is necessary for fulfilling a sacred duty--the defense of the socialist homeland.

The comprehensive examination of the system of military and patriotic education of various categories of workers presumes the gathering and analysis of the appropriate sociological information. For this purpose a study was conducted among young people of call-up age of the city of Moscow and the oblast, students of Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov, as well as in a number of military commissariats of the Baltic Military District. Moreover, servicemen of the initial period of serice in some units and combined units, which are stationed in various regions of our country, were surveyed.[3]

During the study the status and effectiveness of the military and patriotic education of young people of call-up age and their training for service in the Armed Forces were investigated. The analysis of documents, incorporated observation, the distribution of questionnaires and interviewing were used to gather the data.

The system of military and patriotic education, like any integral system, has a specific organizational structure, a subject and an object of control.

The leadership of the Communist Party is the highest form of the management of the process of military and patriotic education in socialist society. Relying on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the CPSU develops the theory of the educational process, determines its objectives and goals in conformity with the specific historical conditions, creates the conditions for the increase of the effectiveness of military and patriotic work and takes care of the broadening and improvement of its social, material and technical base.

Military and patriotic education is carried out by state and public organs (party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organs, military commissariats, DOSAAF, creative unions), commanders and political organs of the Armed Forces, the family, the school, higher educational institutions and the media. It is characteristic that along with the aggregate of public forms this system includes initial military training at the secondary school and the military training of students of higher educational institutions, lessons at the educational centers of enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and special courses at the military commissariats.

Thus, the system of military and patriotic education is distinguished by versatile, integrated organizational contacts and the close combination of state and public elements. The well-arranged centralized, comprehensive (day-to-day and long-range) planning of military and patriotic work and a high level of coordination of the efforts of all the organs and officials, who handle the process of military and patriotic education, are one of the most important conditions of the effective operation of this system.

At the same time our study showed that this condition is not always properly carried out in practical activity.

In particular, the problem of uniform criteria and indicators of the effectiveness of military and patriotic work remains unsolved. As the analysis shows, at present the set of these indicators is determined in different ways and often depends only on local conditions and possibilities and is not always closely interconnected with the main goals of the ideological and educational process. The lack of coordination of the various directions of education, sporadicness and spontaneity in the choice of the forms and methods of educational work are being observed. Inadequate attention is being devoted to the thematic diversity of the measures, their persuasiveness and emotional richness in conformity with the increased needs and requirements of young people.

There are a large number of different forms and methods of military and patriotic education, which are diverse in their content. Many of them have a great effectiveness of influence, others do not yield the desired result and, before having time to thrive, disappear then and there; finally, with a change in different social and sociopsychological conditions the great effectiveness of the forms and methods can decrease sharply. In this connection it is necessary to examine a number of questions which are of both methodological and practical importance.

From the methodological point of view the determination of a general approach, which would make it possible to properly select and use one form or another of military and political education and would ensure its conformity to certain conditions and to the general and specific traits of a specific social group, is of great importance.

When using a system of forms and methods of education, it is necessary to take into account the emotional, rational and practical features. Here the greatest effectiveness is achieved if the indicated components are inseparably connected, united and sequential.

Studies show that the inadequate consideration of this factor leads to a decrease of the effectiveness of many useful, and even necessary forms of educational work. At the same time the unity of the components being examined by us does not rule out the possibility that under certain conditions one of them may predominate over the others.

In practical activity forms of education are used, the implementation of which requires considerable time, others are used once. As a rule, the former are of a systems nature. Take as an example the universities of the future serviceman, military patriotic associations, various kinds of public clubs and sections. They have a permanent body of students, programs of training and education, which are designed for a long period. The further development of such systems forms is becoming an objective necessity.

The forms of education can have an individual and a mass direction. Studies show that in recent years mass forms of education have been finding especially active application. Frequently this happens to the detriment of individual educational work. The results of the study made by us attest to the need to step up the latter. According to the data of the survey of young draftees of the city of Moscow and the oblast, 40 percent of them believe that the improvement of individual work with young people, especially at the place of residence, is an indispensable condition for increasing the effectiveness of military and patriotic education.

The forms of patriotic education can be divided into active and passive.

The active forms afford the individual a greater opportunity not only to use certain information, but also to express his own opinion, to compare and contrast different views and assessments, to develop under the influence of a positive guiding principle a uniform approach to the solution of various questions. In a business-like discussion and debate of principle the individual convictions, the assessments of each young person and his views on certain facts of reality or others are polished, the collective as a whole is tempered, public opinion is formed.

For all the unmistakable merits of the passive forms and their enormous importance for military and patriotic work they have limited possibilities of "feedback." Unquestionably it is impossible to examine the active and passive forms in isolation of each other, they are united and yield the desired result only with their proper combination. However, on the basis of the known peculiarities of young people and such qualities of them as the aspiration for self-affirmation, resourcefulness and energeticness, particular attention should be devoted to the introduction of the active forms of military and patriotic education, which, as studies show, enjoy great popularity and are more effective. Their more extensive introduction in the practice of military and patriotic education was supported by 72.5 percent of the surveyed draftees at the military commissariats located on the territory of the Moscow, Belorussian and Baltic military districts.

At the same time the study attests to the inadequate attention toward these forms of education. A survey of soldiers of the initial period of service showed that before entering the Army only about 12 percent of the young people attended such measures as readers' conferences, Komsomol-youth debates and evenings on military and patriotic themes.

Information about the Armed Forces and military service plays an important role in military and patriotic education. As studies show, the main channels for receiving it are the contact of young people with parents, relatives and fellow workers, who have served in the Armed Forces, and talks with instructors of educational institutions and the administration of the enterprise (kolkhoz, sovkhoz).

Moreover, more than 40 percent of the draftees receive letters from the Army. This type of information is of great importance, since it reflects the opinions of the people who are directly involved in the very system of military organization. Here it should be borne in mind that along with adequate information, distorted information about military service, the army way of life and style of life, which are due to various causes of a subjective nature and the psychological qualities of the individual, is possible.

The publication on the pages of the press of letters of thanks of the command to the parents of servicemen with excellent results in military and political training and of reports from military units and the visit to them of young people of call-up age are of enormous importance for the formation of the correct ideas of young people about the Armed Forces.

Movies, radio and television are an important source of mass information about military service. About 50 percent of the surveyed draftees of the city of Moscow and the oblast stated this. Similar results were also obtained in other regions of the country. At the same time the survey of young people of call-up age of the city of Moscow and the oblast showed that 24.5 percent of the young people regularly watch the television program "I Serve the Soviet Union" and 26 percent watch "The Feat." In our opinion, the urgent need has arisen to study the conditions of the origin of and the means of forming the interests of television viewers in military and patriotic problems. On the whole the mass information on the modern Armed Forces of today needs further improvement both on the level of the tightening up of its coordination and in the expansion of the system of forms and methods of information. We are often still faced with the inadequate spiritual and physical training of some young people for army and naval service merely owing to the fact that they did not acquire in due time correct ideas about the modern army and did not get themselves mentally prepared to overcome the difficulties.

The study of the attitude of young people toward service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is one of the most important tasks facing sociological science in the area of the study of the problems of military and patriotic education.

As the results of the study attest, about 60 percent of the young people of call-up age felt drawn to military service and, moreover, experienced this desire back in the school years. Of those surveyed, 34.2 percent understand well the social importance of military service, although they do not have a particular interest in studying military affairs. Only 4.3 percent stated that the learning of a military specialty does not attract them at all.

The examination of the dynamics of the change in the opinion on this question among young draftees of different ages is of some practical interest. For the purposes of making such an analysis the entire group of draftees was divided into age groups. The obtained results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Attitude of Young Draftees of Different Ages to Service in the Armed Forced, Percent of Those Surveyed, N = 1,500

Answers of those surveyed	Age groups, years		
	18-19	20-21	over 21
I am joining the army with much interest, I aspired to this back in my school years	58.0	34.0	25.0
I personally do not have a particular interest in studying military affairs, although I understand the social significance, need and importance of military service	34.2	56.0	52.3
The study of military affairs does not attract me at all	4.3	8.0	12.7
Did not respond	3.5	2.0	10.0

The cited data show that the aspiration for and interest in military service, the understanding of its social significance, need and importance among young people of different ages are not the same. Whereas among young people 18-19 years old they are expressed more clearly (92 percent of those surveyed expressed a positive opinion on this question), in the age group over 21 the interest in service decreases slightly (only 13 percent of those surveyed stated that the study of military affairs does not attract them at all). The cause of this situation is, apparently, the high degree of development among this category of young people of life plans, which do not involve serving a fixed period. These qualitative changes should be taken into account in the practical activity of the military commissariats. In the system of military and patriotic education as a whole attention should be directed to the search for specific forms and methods of work among young people of older ages.

On the whole the attitude of young people toward military service is characterized by quite high indicators: 86.5 percent of the young people realize its social significance and need. Only 8 percent disapprove of the learning of military specialties. The studies made it possible to draw the conclusion that in military service itself young people see a wide range of opportunities for their own improvement as individuals (see Table 2).

Table 2

Expectations of Young Draftees From Forthcoming Service in the Armed Forces, Percent of Those Surveyed, N = 1,600

In being drafted into the Soviet Army, do you consider it possible for yourself	Answers of those surveyed		
	Certainly	More yes than no	More no
To increase the level of your political training	66.7	30.3	3.0
To study military equipment well	77.7	20.4	1.9
To broaden your cultural outlook	58.7	21.6	19.7
To temper yourself morally and psychologically	69.1	21.0	9.9
To acquire skills in community work	39.5	40.2	20.3
To acquire good organizing skills	61.2	23.5	15.3
To receive good physical training	90.0	8.6	1.4

On the whole it can be considered that the overwhelming majority of young people link with military service the solution of many questions of importance to themselves. This once again confirms the opinion, which has formed among our people, that the Soviet Army and Navy are a fine school of education of young people.

In a study, which was conducted by the Scientific Research Problem Laboratory of the Communist Education of Young People and the Council for Military and Patriotic Education of Moscow State University, a close link was established between the military training of students and their patriotic activity and value orientations. The students, who show greater progress in military subjects, have a higher level of patriotic activity. The high degree of correlation attests to the fact that the teaching of military disciplines not only provides students with military knowledge, but also is a most important factor of the formation of the personality of the student, his sociopolitical activeness and patriotic conviction.

Moreover, the results of the study showed that the level of patriotic activity and the corresponding value orientations among students, who served in the ranks of the Soviet Army before enrolling in a higher educational institution, is higher than among students, who had not served in the military. This should be taken into account in the organization of military and patriotic education. Students who have served in the Army and Navy should be recruited more extensively for participation in organizing work.

The attitude of young people toward military service is also expressed in their notions about the profession of a Soviet officer. As the results of the study attest, a young person who chooses this profession gives preference first of all to those values which express his personal idea and ideological convictions about fulfilling one's civic and military duty. This was indicated by 84.8 percent of those surveyed.

The analysis and generalization of the empirical material show that the social status of parents, as well as the factor of military service by the latter and their participation in World War II have a great influence on the choice by young people of the profession of an officer. According to the data of a questionnaire survey, the young people, the formation of whose occupational orientations takes place under the influence of parents who are employees (including servicemen), less readily give preference to the profession of an officer. About 60 percent of them responded negatively to the question in the questionnaire about the choice of the profession of an officer. Another thing is also characteristic: the parents or close relatives of 63 percent of those surveyed, who gave an affirmative answer, have comprehensive information about service, served themselved in peacetime or participated in World War II.

The still inadequate information of young people about the qualitative changes, which have occurred in the officers corps of the modern Armed Forces, is one of the factors having a negative influence on the type of vocational orientation, which we are examining. This was indicated by 36.8 percent of those surveyed.

Thus, in the system of military and patriotic education the diverse forms of the military vocational orientation of young people and the opportunities to acquaint them more extensively with the profession of an officer, especially with the qualitatively new characteristics of his labor, which arose under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution in military affairs, should be used more actively. In this respect the role of the youth military and patriotic schools, which are being set up at military schools, in military units, educational organizations of DOSAAF, at schools of civil aviation, naval bases and ports, is great.

The specific features of military service require that more serious attention be devoted to the psychological preparation of young draftees. The system of military and patriotic education under current conditions should be conducive to the shortening of the period of adaptation of young people to the conditions of military service and their rapid "inclusion" in the military collective. The sooner the young serviceman gets into the strictly regulated rhythm of army life, the more actively he will try to seize the heights of military skill. This also concerns the problems of tightening up military discipline.

Back in 1925 M. V. Frunze in a speech at the conference of the Russian Komsomol noted that the causes of the majority of disciplinary offenses in the army are explained first of all "by the abruptness of the transition from general civilian conditions to military life."[4]

The data of the conducted study attest that the notions of young draftees about potential difficulties are connected first of all with the observance of military discipline, with the need to obey (42.2 percent of those surveyed indicated this), with great physical stresses (20.8 percent), with the mastery of complex equipment (12.9 percent). Thus, there is a certain psychological anxiety of young people about the forthcoming difficulties and the specific conditions of army life. It is important to direct this anxiety in the necessary direction, by cultivating among draftees stable psychological aims at overcoming the difficulties and by instilling in young people such qualities as a sense of duty, the understanding of one's personal responsibility to society for the defense of the achievements of socialism, the willingness to obey an order, the requirements of military manuals and the oath.

The establishment of close contact between practical workers and researchers, who are engaged in studying the problem being examined by us, is the most important condition of the increase of the effectiveness of the entire system of military and patriotic education. In this connection attention should be directed to the fact that the question of the military and patriotic education and training of young people for service in the Armed Forces have still be inadequately studied.

The activity of sociologists, who are engaged in studying the problems of the influence of the family and the school on the process of military and patriotic education and the increase of its effectiveness at the secondary specialized and higher educational institutions of the country, requires considerable intensification.

The problem of organizing this work at the place of residence, especially with adolescents, whose education involves certain difficulties, merits a separate thorough study. In this respect it is especially important to devote attention to the study of the mechanism of the formation of informal groups and to elaborate pratical recommendations on the intensification of military and patriotic work in these surroundings.

The research work in the area of the moral, political and psychological preparation of young people for service in the Armed Forces, the formation of positive orientations and aims toward military service, the willingness of young people to bear its burdens and difficulties and the cultivation of great discipline and collectivism requires appreciable improvement and broadening.

It is also necessary to study more extensively the problems of elaborating military and patriotic themes in the cinema, on television and radio.

In scientific research activity more attention should be focused on the study of the conditions and the ways of increasing the effectiveness of the military and patriotic education of young people, the examination of the entire set of factors which influence the ideological educational process. In this connection the selection, placement and training of the organizers who perform this work are one of the important questions.

Under the conditions of the growing ideological confrontation of the two opposed social systems the intensification of scientific research activity in the area of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and the study of the role and place of the military and patriotic education of the rising generation in the solution of this important problem are of the greatest importance.

Military and patriotic education in its structure is distinguished by complexity and diversity. Its effectiveness to a considerable extent depends on the availability of the necessary sociological information on the trends, phenomena and processes taking place among young people. This places in the forefront the further development of sociological research and its coordination on a national scale. The problem of increasing the effectiveness of military and patriotic education can be solved only on a thorough scientific basis, with the extensive introduction of the practical recommendations which have been elaborated during the research.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "O dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 26 aprelya 1979 g." /On the Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Educational Work. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979/, Moscow, 1979, p 15.

2. "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" /Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress/, Moscow, 1976, p 75.

3. The total size of the sample was more than 2,000 people.

4. M. V. Frunze, "Speech at the Russian Komsomol Conference on 17 June 1925," "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" /Selected Works/, Vol 2, Moscow, 1957, p 386.

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MILITARY INSTITUTE: COMMANDANT ON 40TH ANNIVERSARY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Col-Gen M. Tankayev, chief of the Military Institute: "Increasing Traditions — on the 40th Anniversary of the Military Institute"]

[Text] The Military Institute occupies a prominent place among the higher educational institutions of the USSR Ministry of Defense. It prepares military translator-researchers, political workers, and military legal specialists. The institute was founded 40 years ago by a decision of the party and government. At that time it was called the Military Institute of Foreign Languages of the Red Army, and the entire first graduating class was sent to the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Alumni of the institute fought courageously in the active army and in partisan detachments, carrying out important assignments of the command in the enemy rear. Military legal specialists were also active participants in the Great Patriotic War; at that time they were educated by the Military Legal Academy of the Worker-Peasant Red Army. More than 5,000 graduates of these schools received orders and medals for exemplary performance of their duty to the Motherland.

In the first postwar years 26 Heroes of the Soviet Union studied at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages of the Red Army and the Military Legal Academy, and 90 percent of the students were veterans of the front. The teachers and graduates of the institute and the academy took an active part in the work of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international legal tribunals and the Extraordinary State Commission to Investigate and Establish the Misdeeds of the German Fascist Aggressors and their Accomplices and carried out other important assignments for the command. Today, revering and multiplying the combat traditions of their predecessors, graduates of the institute are making their own contribution to raising the combat readiness of our Armed Forces and strengthening legality and the legal order in the military. Incidentally, many of our graduates have received orders and medals for exemplary performance of service duty in peace time.

The military translator, military political, and military legal schools were combined within the Military Institute to improve the training of military cadres. In a short time the Military Institute has become a major multidisciplinary higher educational institution with excellently equipped auditoriums and dozens of specialized offices. It has an educational television system, radio broadcasting, a computing center, and an up-to-date crime detection complex. Among its resources are thousands of tape recordings in foreign languages, hundreds of educational motion pictures and video films, and about 500,000 books. The field training center has everything necessary for military training and the physical and psychological toughening of future officers.

The institute's greatest treasure is its faculty, which includes 129 doctors and candidates of sciences and 62 professors and docents. Among them are experienced teachers and moral leaders, masters of progressive teaching methods, such as Maj Gen Ye. Nozhin, colonels L. Nelyubin, I. Klenin, I. Mel'tsev, and A. Shiryayev, and colonels of the legal service Kh. Akhmetshin, A. Koblikov, N. Kuznetsov, and V. Shanin.

I would like to emphasize that the most basic thing in the entire system of training future military specialists is to instill them with communist conviction and dedication to communist ideals. The school arms its graduates with broad and varied knowledge and skills. It prepares them for battles on the ideological front and teaches them how to convey the strength of their own ideological conviction to the men, to respond properly to the slanderous assaults of the ideological enemy, and to struggle against vestiges of the past, to establish the high principles of communist morality and ethics.

The important and difficult problem of philosophical and methodological preparation of trainees is solved on the basis of a comprehensive approach, through the combined efforts of the entire collective of the institute, above all the departments of social sciences. Guided by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the decree of the CPSU Central Committee entitled "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," the collectives of these departments, led by doctors of sciences Col G. Khvatkov and Capt 1st Rank M. Ruban, both professors, are showing great concern for raising the ideological and theoretical level of lectures and seminars and for their influence in shaping the Marxist-Leninist worldview and scientific thought of the future officers.

We give a great deal of attention to the professional military orientation of the educational and indoctrination process. In addition to tactics and the fundamentals of operational art, weapons, and military equipment a good deal of time is given to studying combined arms regulations and drill and physical training. The cadets learn to fire the weapon accurately, master motor vehicles, and stand guard duty. Military training is not confined to the classrooms. During on-the-job training and in practical experience classes among the troops the cadets reinforce the knowledge they have gained and have an opportunity to improve their professional skills. A deep and thorough acquaintance with army life helps graduates find their place more quickly and enables them to begin filling their assigned positions confidently and rapidly. In large part this is facilitated by widespread socialist competition to achieve the best marks in training and by the communist attitude toward labor. Socialist competition is now aiming at a worthy celebration of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

Teaching work is successfully combined with scientific research and military science activities. The collective has published more than 400 monographs, major works, and textbooks and each year puts out a large number of training aids. The institute has become a center for the training of science teachers. In four decades these schools have given the country more than 50 doctors of sciences and 350 candidates of sciences. Many graduates of the military law school have received the title Honored Legal Specialist of the RSFSR.

The cadets are extensively involved in creative activities also. Members of 60 military science societies study circles participate regularly in All-Union competitions for student projects. In just the last five years more than 200 projects have received diplomas, certificates, and other awards in these contests.

Daily life at the Military Institute today is packed with hard work, as is true at all higher educational institutions in the country. Carrying out the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers entitled "Further Development of Higher Education and Raising the Quality of Specialist Training" and the demands of the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, our collective works hard to consistently intensify the educational process through universal introduction of scientific advances, higher education methodology, and troop experience.

The party and Komsomol organizations give the command a great deal of help in performing these missions. They work hard on communist, military, moral, and esthetic indoctrination of future specialists. Ideological-political indoctrination focuses attention on instilling the students with an active posture in life and class maturity, giving them the traits of a fighter and propagandist for the immortal ideas of Lenin.

The collective of the Military Institute is not planning to rest on its laurels. We will move ahead, strive for greater things in the important work of training ideologically tough, highly qualified military cadres.

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CSO:1801

AVIATION MAINTENANCE: TECHNICIAN PRAISED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Andryushkov, military pilot 1st class: "Thank You, Comrade Warrant Officer!"

[Text] As if shaking off the last remnants of sleep in the morning, my fighter plane shook resiliently at the connecting cracks of the slabs of the taxiway. I saw snowflakes falling from the outer wing panels, and stopped in front of the takeoff runway. This is the technical inspection point for a missile plane. From it the flight control officer gives the okay to take off. But this comes a little later, after the technician on duty comes up to the plane, inspects it, and raises his white flag.

Through the convexity of the canopy glass I could see a technician approaching the plane. By his distinctive walk, fast and at the same time unhurried, and by his slightly hunched forward figure I recognized WO [Praporshchik] Nikolay Ivanovich Vissarinov. Our eyes met and I waved my hand in greeting. The technician ducked underneath to inspect the undercarriage legs one more time. I was gradually overcome by a feeling of complete confidence in the plane and the upcoming flight. It was being inspected by sensitive, talented hands!

Glancing over the instruments I remembered how Warrant Officer Vissarionov once taught me, a young lieutenant, how to be the master in the cockpit. He was the technician of my first crew, and here today he was seeing me off again from the technical checkpoint. I could say the key checkpoint, but at an airfield they are all crucial. No post is unimportant to Nikolay Ivanovich. For 25 years now Warrant Officer Vissarionov's destiny has merged with the destiny of the airfield and of those people who are involved with flying to any degree.

I recall how, when I was young, I was surprised by the words of a pilot, flight commander Maj E. Manzhel: "It sometimes seems to me that I will never leave aviation until the planes stop flying." As a young lieutenant I did not understand then the profound love this man had for his work, the long years that had tied him to the airfield. Today I cannot imagine flying without such people as Eduard Mikhaylovich Manzhel and Nikolay Ivanovich Vissarinov.

Long before the pilots get into the cockpits the technicians, masters of work on the ground, arrive at the airfield. Among them is Warrant Officer Vissarionov. His plane is always closest to the takeoff runway. It ordinarily begins the flights. The plane is a fighter trainer. It looks like a little duckling against the background of the proud rank of supersonic missile planes. They look down at it, the long peaks of their pitot static tubes directed upward into the blue, not suspecting that their flights begin with their little brother.

Then when the pilots arrive, the aerial masters of the mighty silver missile planes, they go first to the little trainer, tap its snub nose fondly, exchange a few words with the technician, and only then move on to their own, supersonic planes. Some remain at the two-seater [training plane]. For them the way to supersonic flying is this trainer. At one time it was my beginning in the combat regiment also. Many years have passed since then, but those first flights in the trainer remain fresh in memory forever. On my first day at the military airfield then we were met at the two-seater by the aircraft technician, a short, solidly built man with a strong, healthy flush on his cheeks. We introduced ourselves, and began flying...without leaving the ground. The lieutenants learned how the wings meet the resilient air, how the controls obey in fresh streams of air, and what the instruments tell and do not tell about special flight situations. We soon understood that we were being examined: the technician would ask and we would answer.

It was the first examination where I did not experience the unpleasant feeling of being tested. I was interested. There was lively communication between the examiner and the examinee. We were being taught by questions, but taught in such a way that we wanted to fly as soon as possible! We learned the rule that when you do not know something, ask and it will be embarrassing for a minute! If you do not ask and fail to learn something necessary for flying, it will be embarrassing forever. We learned to ask questions when we were unsure and we would be taught the answers. Warrant Officer Vissarionov invariably follows this unwritten airfield rule. He is always ready to come to your aid, disregarding his own personal time. There is one thing he does not tolerate, dishonesty.

One time, I recall, a preflight training session was underway at his two-seater. The plane was lifted up on a stand and we were practicing emergency lowering of the undercarriage. Lt A. Fomin tried to lower it three times, but it would not go. The technician's face at this time was something to see. Could it be a malfunction!? The lieutenant's words burned like a slap in the face: "An airplane is not a wagon, comrade warrant officer! It must be prepared."

Vissarionov himself got into the cockpit and pulled one clamp and then another. The latches clicked and the legs emerged! He raised them, and again the latches clicked as the undercarriage came out. He repeated this about 10 straight times and the system worked perfectly. "Huh, it works!" Fomin smiled tensely and asked if someone had a manual. Then we understood that our comrade had not prepared himself for the drill. The technician got out of the cockpit and called Fomin off to the side. Only the squadron commander knew what they talked about, but on that same day Lieutenant Fomin was taken off the flying schedule. There was a long discussion at the squadron party meeting concerning the honesty of airmen. But here again Fomin tried to excuse himself. He had failed to learn his lesson from the principled attitude of his comrades and had not overcome the petty feelings of vanity. Before long he had to leave the Air Force.

But Warrant Officer Vissarionov's fighter trainer continued to serve both new pilots and experienced air aces without failing. Sometimes a top pilot would return from leave and not go right back to his missile plane. Instead he would approach the technician of the two-seater and say, "Hi, Nikolay Ivanovich! Do you suppose that I could make a couple of flights in the trainer tomorrow?" The technician would arrange it, and not just for a couple of flights, but for as many as necessary during the shift. The fighter trainer carried the insignia of an outstanding aircraft for eight years. After it was written off from combat work because of years of service, it and its "mark of quality" were raised on a pedestal in front of the air base.

Nikolay Ivanovich now has a new plane. It is just as good as the old one, and its technician has been recognized with new awards. He has received the title of master and been given many medals, including "For Distinction in Military Service" 2nd degree. Fame spoils some people, but the well-deserved fame of Warrant Officer Vissarionov has increased the respect of his fellow servicemen and given him even greater authority. He still devotes himself to his beloved work with great responsibility and exceptional inner discipline. He successfully combines military work at the airfield with public work. He has been an active member of the people's control group for several years. When someone is needed to defend the honor of the unit in sporting competition, there are few chess players in the garrison or even in the city who can approach the chess board opposite Vissarionov without trepidation.

Someone may wonder whether Warrant Officer Vissarionov has time left for his family and his home. I can assure that he does find time. After all, his moral makeup and psychological attitude begin with the family. In the summertime the Vissarionovs love to go on picnics in the pine forest, and when the first snow falls it is a rare day off that does not find Nikolay Ivanovich, his three sons, and sometimes also his wife, on skis. They ski well, and in a precisely checked direction.

The trail behind them is straight and smooth, like the line of his entire life. Whatever this man does, he does it according to conscience.

I saw Warrant Officer Vissarionov move unhurriedly away from my plane. He raised the white flag upward pointing toward the takeoff runway. I could take off with confidence. The ground technician had guaranteed that the plane would work properly. As I brought the fighter into the middle of the runway I said once more in my mind, "Thank you, comrade warrant officer."

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AIR DEFENSE: REALISM IN RADAR OPERATOR TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Arty V. Zenchenko: "What Kind of 'Enemy' Is Used in Exercises?"]

[Text] According to the report by Maj N. Zubrachev, chief of staff of the radar battalion and acting subunit commander, everything was ready for the tactical exercise. The only things remaining were to set the time for the beginning of the attack and determine the precise routes and tactics of the targets. Indeed, these details were reflected carefully in the scenario worked out beforehand. But it was apparent that Major Zubrachev was not entirely satisfied. He found again and again, suggesting something here and changing something there. The officers from unit headquarters who were visiting the battalion did not intervene in the major's actions. They had been given the job of checking the organization of combat training in the subunit and studying the techniques used to prepare for and conduct drills and tactical exercises. As a matter of fact, specialists of the battalion had been making mistakes recently in unit-wide drills.

The tactical exercise began. The radar troops became involved in intense combat work. At first glance everything was done to see that the crews worked at full efficiency, with initiative and creativity. However, the experienced eyes of the officer-methodologists also saw the oversights that were reducing the effectiveness of the exercise. A short time later, at the review, typical situations and the actions of Major Zubrachev and the other battalion officers were reproduced by graphs and charts. And then the typical errors in preparation of the tactical exercise became very clear.

The conception of the exercise did not take full account of the capabilities of enemy aerial weapons. For example, no provision was made for targets attacking at low and extremely low altitudes with simultaneous diversionary groups and powerful jamming actions. The situation was made more complicated chiefly by increasing the number of targets and the density of the attack. While working out the plan of the exercise Major Zubrachev did not realize that the flight characteristics of the simulated targets did not resemble actual ones and that their flight was not "tied" to the topography. As a result, the crews fought against a kind of abstract enemy and performed missions in situations which are extremely unlikely to occur in actual combat.

The unit commander and staff officers carefully analyzed the methodological mistakes that had been found and gave recommendations on improving the training process and where to focus special attention. It must be added that the battalion drew the proper conclusions and the quality of combat training there has risen noticeably.

Exercises have rightly been called the highest form of tactical training and combat training for the troops. During exercises the full range of missions is worked through in practice and various procedures and actions that insure success even under the most unfavorable conditions are refined and improved. It is obvious that they will be most beneficial if the advances of military science and results of thorough analysis of everyday personal combat training are used in the conception of each exercise and in conducting it; furthermore, the capabilities of the enemy's air weapons must be taken into account.

It is difficult, of course, to simulate all the features of actual battle in peacetime. There will always be conventionalities that to some extent diminish the feeling of real battle. Varied inputs, the use of smoke grenades and battle noise simulators, and tape recordings of shell blasts and the whistle of bullets make the situation much more complex, but they do not create the full psychological tension of actual battle. The soldier always understands that this is training, not real battle. But every commander has an opportunity to reduce the conventionality to a minimum and make the situation at drills and exercises resemble real battle.

The ability to make each training period and exercise maximally effective unquestionably depends in large part on the officer's experience and methodological training and on how creatively he approaches the organization of combat training for subordinates, how fully he considers the distinctive features of modern battle.

The radar company commanded by Sr Lt I. Doroshenko once did quite poorly at a tactical exercise. At the critical moment the crew could not take the psychological load and information on one of the important targets was sent to the missile command point much too late. As a result, the commander did not adopt a plan to destroy the target in time.

During the review of this situation it came out that when organizing combat training Senior Lieutenant Dorshenko underestimated the capabilities of the air enemy. His radar and radiotelegraph operators were drilled in conditions which did not demand maximum concentration of effort, will, and abilities.

After the exercise Doroshenko took steps to eliminate these problems. Subsequently, however, the radar operators broke down several times more in complex conditions. This reflected the fact that the company commander had not fully considered the characteristics of modern battle and was unable to mobilize the efforts and capabilities of personnel for comprehensive performance of combat training missions. Only thoughtful, purposeful work by the unit commander and staff with officers of the company finally brought positive results. The company officers began to look for reserves and use them more actively, to study and introduce progressive practices, and to make the tactical setting at training periods and drills closer to real battle conditions.

Everyone knows that mechanically using accumulated know-how, without considering specific conditions, is no guarantee of success. It is different when the commander is able to choose what is most valuable and effective in the experience for his particular conditions and apply it creatively in practical work. This ability is developed by thorough analysis of the training process and systematic collection and interpretation of information that characterizes the state of combat readiness of the subunit or unit. Therefore, the commander must also be a researcher, able to test a particular tactical procedure in practice, identify the "weak link," and determine an effective way to perform the combat training mission.

Once during exercises with participation by missile and radar troops several subunits received a number of poor marks. At first glance, however, combat training in them was well organized and most of the leading specialists, chiefly radar operators, had high class ratings. Staff officers from the unit had to do a good deal of investigation to find the true reason for this situation.

What did it prove to be? The air situation created at drills by simulation equipment failed to correspond to real conditions in many ways. It did not take account of the topography and actual flight profiles of aircraft and it did not provide an instructive tactical setting. The simulated low-flying target, for example, did not resemble an actual one at all, not in the configuration of the marker and not in the nature of the image on the radar screens.

The situation had to be corrected on an operational basis. Efficiency workers were called in. They took the job very seriously and made maximum use of statements made to them earlier by methodologists concerning training facilities. Corrections were also made in the method of using simulation equipment. All this made it possible to improve the skills of the personnel quite quickly.

Unfortunately, not all commanders take pains to see that the air enemy at exercises behaves just as he would in real battle. Sometimes the only thing the officer is worried about is whether his subordinates will get a high mark. He does not care so much how they do it. Such a commander will be tolerant of simplifications and indulgence.

The following was observed at a certain exercise. According to the input the enemy had used weapons of mass destruction. The crews showed what losses might take place among personnel and how much combat equipment would be knocked out. But what did it look like in fact? All the equipment remained in place, combat-ready and functioning smoothly. It is true that some of the specialists were declared "disabled," but they also stayed there, in the booths, and helped their comrades with advice. What is the value of a high mark obtained under such simplified conditions?

Needless to say, this case was severely criticized both at the exercise review and at a party meeting.

No, we cannot be pleased by success attained at an exercise against a weak enemy. Experience teaches that personnel skills and teamwork are better where simplification and indulgence have been excluded, where the "enemy" operates just as if it were actual battle. Each commander and staff should approach the organization of drills and exercise with this in mind.

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NAVAL UNITS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Missile Crew Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 80 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Shkurkin: "Before Commanding — 'Fire'"]

[Text] Sr Lt O. Filinov extended his hand for the hundredth time toward the overhead, toward the nickel-plated fan housing. Groping for the handle with fingers damp from exertion, he remembered that the fan vent had been wide open for quite some time. But the fan's even humming was bringing no relief. It was hot, not because of the high temperature but from the work.

The men of the excellent-rated missile battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Filinov had just successfully executed a mock firing. But the drill was continuing. They heard the ship's commanding officer, Capt 3d Rank V. Kornyushko, who was following the missile exercise on monitoring instruments, order over the intercom: "Commander of Combat Department 2, make the situation more complex!"

Sr Lt A. Chizhov, commander of the combat department, will get the job done. He is one of the most methodologically highly trained officers of the escort ship "Neukrotimyy." Chizhov possesses full mastery of the entire aggregate of techniques of making a training situation close to actual combat. With the aid of a special simulator, which makes it possible to simulate various naval combat situations, he reproduces on the screens manned by the operators various targets with complex parameters and now and again tests his men with unexpected scenario changes specifying various equipment malfunctions. But at the present time interference is causing the missile crews particular problems. A thick silvery cloud obscures the radarscope, making it difficult to track the tiny target return!

Nevertheless Sr Lt O. Filinov, Warrant Officer V. Zavadskiy and the other missile crew members were performing confidently, tracking the target without interruption. A contributing element was the wealth of experience amassed by the men during the ocean cruise from which the "Neukrotimyy" had recently returned. The men had efficiently utilized every mile of that cruise for training.

They had drilled with the assistance of the simulator, like today, and with general quarters, when various air targets appeared. Particularly valuable was the fact that all the combat training of the missile personnel was permeated with a spirit of competition. At the end of the cruise they would be performing a complex missile firing. And during the entire cruise there was vigorous rivalry between the batteries of Sr Lts O. Filinov and V. Arkhipov for the honor of performing it. Filinov's men ended up slightly ahead. They justified the lofty title of socialist competition leader -- they performed the missile firing with a mark of excellent, as if crowning the escort ship's cruise.

Here is an interesting detail. When the crew was honoring the winners, the cooks, following naval tradition, baked them a pie. On top of the pie they placed a star with the letter "P" in the middle -- like that painted on the flying bridge when a ship wins a prize for missile firing.

The hint was not difficult to get. The missile crew paid heed to it. They not only did not rest on their laurels but worked even harder in the campaign to improve the qualitative indices of training.

...A high-speed low-flying target appeared on the scopes. The men quickly locked on and commenced tracking, surpassing performance standards. Another simulated missile firing was successful!

The drill was completed, but training was not over. The missile crews do not limit themselves merely to the obvious results -- whether a "firing" was successful or unsuccessful, whether combat performance standards have or have not been met. Monitoring data are also taken into account at the critique and when figuring up competition results. The entire story of the attack is recorded in detail with electronic symbols, including the tiniest errors on the part of each operator. And officers Kornyushko, Chizhov, and Filinov exactingly analyze each of these errors, even those which do not affect the outcome of the mock engagement at all. How could they do otherwise? Only in this manner is truly excellent quality of combat training performance achieved.

..."Fire" is a short word. Only four letters. But in order that a ship's commanding officer can say it with confidence, guiding a missile to the target, much energy must be expended in training drills.

Aviation Maintenance Problems

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Kaz'min, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red-Banner Northern Fleet: "There Could Have Been No Offense"]

[Text] "Number 7 again? That aircraft has caused our maintenance people a lot of trouble," stated Engr-Lt Col A. Chayka, deputy chief aviation engineer of the Northern Fleet, glancing at his records. "Has there been faulty work in the past?" There has....

It was for good reason that I asked about faulty maintenance work on No 7. The editors had received a long letter filled with bitterness, resentment, and worried concern for the common cause. "The specialists had not had time," reported Engr-Maj Ye. Zarudnev, "to correct the defects discovered by one commission when instructions were received from our chief engineer, officer R. Nasyrov, acting chief of the aircraft maintenance enterprise, to present the aircraft for inspection. They inspected it and passed it on, contrary to regulations, to the next maintenance section. I informed Nasyrov several times that problems had not been corrected, but he ignored me. Not only that, at the first opportunity he got even with me for my persistence. This happened after I had raised objections to violations of maintenance procedures which they were trying to make me commit when replacing leaky fuel tanks on the aircraft...."

Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel Chayka had a brief comment about the author of the letter: "A worker. Persistent, even when he is wrong."

Yevgeniy Fedorovich had advanced up the difficult ladder from aircraft technician to senior engineer. The following fact was cited in his most recent efficiency report: out of eight aircraft turned over by Zarudnev during a specified period, seven were graded excellent — and only one was graded good. This is an excellent indicator of quality work. There are dozens of commendations, but he has also committed disciplinary infractions. For example, he has been tactless in dealing with fellow personnel. Yevgeniy Fedorovich has a quick temper, which is also noted in the efficiency report. The overall assessment, however, was positive: deserving of promotion to position of production chief. Some people were even saying that after one of the officers was discharged into the reserves, Zarudnev might even be appointed to a higher position -- enterprise chief engineer. But another officer was appointed to this position -- Engr-Maj R. Nasyrov. Although he is younger than Yevgeniy Fedorovich, he is also a highly-qualified specialist.

As it happened, soon after taking up his new duty assignment, Nasyrov had temporarily to perform the duties of enterprise chief. Rashit Raufovich resolutely set about this task. And circumstances required vigorous action: the quarterly maintenance and repair work plan was being completed. At the same time new types of repair and overhaul were being set up in the shops. Initially problems of coordination arose, chiefly due to deficiencies in supply.

Nasyrov was not to blame for this. He had been performing the duties of this job only for a few days, but he did everything he could to ensure smooth operations and tried to get the supply people moving. Nevertheless sometimes the enterprise would receive short-supply parts with a delay. Therefore at several stages of overhaul on No 7, certain installation jobs remained uncompleted.

Pendantically following the rule established at the enterprise, Rashit Raufovich of course had a right to prohibit the aircraft from being transferred from one section to the next until the deficiencies at each stage were fully corrected. But he proceeded differently. In order to avoid excessive down time, he took a chance: he ordered repair operations to be performed according to the schedule and to complete at a later time everything the specialists were unable to do immediately because of a lack of parts, while mostly monitoring and verifying correction of problems. This was without question dictated by the best interests of the matter and the demands of combat readiness. Nasyrov was counting on his experienced specialists and their assistance, including Engineer-Major Zarudnev.

But what was Yevgeniy Fedorovich's response? Unfortunately his jealousy was aroused by the fact that he had been bypassed on the promotional ladder. There is certainly nothing wrong with the fact that he, a capable specialist, good worker and party activist, was counting on a promotion. Who doesn't? One's behavior when one's hopes have not materialized, however, is another thing altogether.

Zarudnev was unable immediately to stifle his feelings of insult and injury. This was the reason why he took an incorrect position regarding settlement of a number of questions pertaining to repairing aircraft No 7. No parts? That is not our business; let the chief engineer take care of that department, since he is now in charge.

Or take the matter to which Zarudnev refers in his letter when he states that he was "pushed" into violating proper procedures in replacing fuel tanks. What actually happened? It was not at noon, as Zarudnev first claimed, but much earlier, at about 1000 hours, that specialists working under him spotted signs of kerosene leaks under the aircraft's wing. And he, an experienced engineer, of course realized immediately that in order to determine the cause it was necessary to unbutton the panels, for that is the only way to get to the fuel tanks. And the sooner the better: it is a laborious operation. But he initially "dickered" with the chief of the adjoining shop, attempting to push off on him responsibility for this job. He would not agree, and two hours were lost in the process. Finally, when Zarudnev was to head a team of specialists assigned to find and correct the causes of the leaking, Yevgeniy Fedorovich, unhappy with his job assignment, failed to display efficiency in organizing the work. His superior was right in upbraiding him for this. And what was the outcome? Instead of rising above petty resentment for the sake of the common cause, Yevgeniy Fedorovich took the attitude that he had more experience and know-how and had nothing to learn. He hotly defended this opinion, although, as it turned out, he was incorrect in his interpretation of a number of requirements of the procedural regulations.

No, it was by no means for revenge that Engineer-Major Nasyrov later reprimanded him, but rather for poor performance.

Unfortunately Yevgeniy Fedorovich did not understand this at first. There is a popular saying that resentment is a poor counselor. But judging from a number of facts, it was precisely resentment which impelled him to attempt to make his young boss pay for his strict demandingness. Here is what happened. Engineer-Major Nasyrov gave him permission over the telephone to permit the aircrew to take the aircraft up. It was a rash decision — regulations called for first signing an inspection form. In this instance Yevgeniy Fedorovich would have been entirely correct in displaying firm inflexibility and genuine high-principledness. But he released the aircraft, while retaining the unsigned inspection form in order later, when a favorable opportunity arose, to get his new boss into trouble.

And yet high-principledness presupposes observance of honesty and integrity not only before others but also when one is not in public scrutiny. Only an officer who is guided at all times and in all things by a sense of duty and honor is capable of immediately turning away from the temptation to compromise with his own conscience and a bitter feeling of envy toward a promoted colleague. Any heart can be pricked by the splinter of resentment. But he who approaches in a party manner his assessment of life situations and places the interests of the common cause above all else has an easier time removing this splinter.

Zarudnev's older comrades should have sensed his feelings and attitude and should have promptly explained to him the reason for the decision to promote to a higher position not him but another person. Later, when he brought his resentment to the political section, they should have shown greater sensitivity toward him. What did they do? He was received by deputy political section chief Lt Col Ye. Brazhnikov, who issued a recommendation that the enterprise party organization secretary look into the matter. But in the press of work the latter took his time getting around to it, and subsequently he totally forgot about Zarudnev's complaint.

As it turned out, this lack of attention aggravated the resentment. And this could have been avoided if the party members at the aircraft repair enterprise had rigorously followed the Lenin tradition: no tolerance toward deficiencies and mistakes, with the deepest respect toward one's fellow party member.

Use of Incentives, Punishments

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Capt-Lt V. Mel'nikov: "Check It With Regulations"]

[Text] The sonar personnel under the command of master proficiency rated Warrant Officer N. Grankov performed exceptionally well at a naval exercise in the Mediterranean. They succeeded in detecting an "aggressor" submarine under difficult hydrometeorological conditions and were able to classify the contact quickly and precisely, which ensured a successful attack on the target.

The commander of the Mediterranean Squadron, who was on another ship, immediately ordered preparation of certificates and award of valuable gifts to the men who had distinguished themselves. Later, in spite of the gale weather, the admiral flew over to the large ASW ship by helicopter and personally gave each sonar operator a certificate and gift and warmly congratulated them on their success.

The commendations announced by the admiral while the exercise was still in progress and his words of praise inspired the entire ship's company and evoked in the men an endeavor to act with even greater initiative and to stand watch even more vigilantly. That same night the sonar personnel once again did an excellent job.

Nobody is indifferent to a commendation, for this is not simply an evaluation of a person's military labor and skill. It is a moral incentive, which strengthens a person's faith in his own ability and encourages one to work to attain new achievements in combat and political training. A commendation evokes an influx of energy and the desire to carry out a task to the end, and not only in a case where one is thanked for one's work by a senior commander.

After a certain very intensive training drill, the tired men returned to the crew's quarters. Section commander PO 1st Class A. Sluchin noted that some of the young sailors were in low spirits. He then assembled his section, highly praised the men's hard work and commended the most outstanding man, S. Mamedov, for his skillful actions in response to the scenario dictated by the training drill leader. The men's mood began to change; they broke into smiles. A lively discussion began; it was as if all fatigue was gone and they were recharged with energy.

Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces state that every commander shall commend his men for intelligent initiative, zeal, praiseworthy accomplishments and distinguished performance of duties. But unfortunately not all commanders bear this in mind. Team leaders and commanders of sections, crews and posts forget this particularly frequently. And young officers who lack adequate experience in working with others sometimes underrate the indoctrinational effect of commendation. Some believe that their opportunities are limited. Others, although sometimes authorized to commend, do not always correctly apply their authority. And this diminishes the mobilizing role of commendation.

For example, PO 1st Class A. Tornenkov commended Seaman E. Lubikas for excellent performance on watch. The seaman deserved commendation. But in this instance the petty officer should not have commended his subordinate but should have cancelled a previously-levied punishment — an extra work detail. Unfortunately the subunit commander did not help this petty officer correct his error. There still occur instances where one of the most important principles of disciplinary practice is violated — commend only the deserving. Some commanders commend their subordinates as a group, without considering the personal contribution of each individual to the common cause. PO 2d Class V. Skobley commended Sn R. Ten and A.Kravchenko "for company," as they say. First these men violated equipment operating procedures, and then, together with other enlisted personnel, worked vigorously to correct the situation. The petty officer noticed these vigorous efforts but could not bring himself to discipline them properly for disregarding regulation-specified procedures.

The motivational effect of praise is also diminished in those cases where in every situation a commander utilizes one and the same form of commendation. We could cite many examples where even experienced officers have limited themselves to a formal commendation, without employing such effective forms as letters to the men's parents, award of testimonials, reward with extra liberty, etc. I observed such a situation in the combat department in which Sr Lt V. Kazachenko served as political worker. And yet intelligent utilization of moral incentives promotes creation of an atmosphere of friendship and mutual assistance, an innovative attitude toward military labor, intolerance toward unnecessary relaxation of demands, and increases activeness on the part of military personnel.

An example of this is the warship subunit in which Capt 3d Rank V. Nachalov serves as deputy commander for political affairs. In this subunit the commanding officer, the party and Komsomol organizations display constant concern to ensure that each and every officer, warrant officer, and petty officer with men under them have the ability to exercise in a methodologically correct manner their authority to reward and punish, seriously and with thought, approaching personnel labor incentives taking into consideration military education science and psychology. This produces pretty fair results and is one of the reasons why that subunit has remained for a long time a right-flanker in socialist competition in the unit.

The mobilizing force of reward is great. The commander, however, must also bear in mind the role of such an indoctrinational instrument as punishment. Strictness and intolerance toward the slightest violations of the demands of the oath and military regulations have always distinguished our finest commanders. But a serious mistake is being made by that officer, warrant officer, and petty officer who "chops off at the shoulder," who hastens to punish a subordinate fully without going into the circumstances behind an infraction and without taking into consideration the man's character and his previous conduct. Punishment in anger has no educational effect.

Sr Lt V. Pavlov was considered incorrigible. Within a short period of time his superior imposed six disciplinary punishments on him. This officer's next rank promotion was held back. The punishments, coming one after another, each more severe than the previous one, deprived the young officer of hope of correction.

But then a new commanding officer was assigned to the ship. He had several long talks with Senior Lieutenant Pavlov and determined that this young officer knew his occupational specialty quite well. Previously the subunit under his command had been excellent-rated and on several occasions had been the ship's top subunit based on training and competition results. The new commanding officer took all this into account and endeavored to help Pavlov come out of the psychological "blind alley," to examine his own behavior in a critical manner and to gain confidence in his own ability and in the possibility of exemplary service. When Pavlov did an excellent job on a mock combat problem, the commander reversed one of the punishments. Later a second punishment was removed from Pavlov for initiative displayed. This officer regained an active interest in military service; he became noticeably more disciplined and self-controlled.

Each disciplinary punishment as an indoctrination measure becomes effective when it is in conformity with the degree of culpability. And if punishment is announced, it should be executed without delay, and in exceptional cases not later than one month after punishment is specified. Unfortunately this rule is violated, which is fraught with serious consequences to morale.

The ship's commanding officer immediately sentenced Warrant Officer A. Pochtar' to 72 hours confinement in the brig for a violation of military discipline. Pochtar' himself, however, showed considerable indifference toward this punishment, and his colleagues' response was a grin. This was understandable, since the warrant officer had been sentenced on several occasions to punishment of 72 hours in the brig, but Pochtar' had not spent a single minute there: either the captain would forget to execute the punishment or the warrant officer's services would suddenly be badly needed on the ship. It is true that on one occasion he was even escorted as far as the brig, but then it was determined that he had the wrong "gear," and that his uniform was not in order. Therefore the severe punishment was not executed a single time. And contrary to regulations, nobody was made to bear responsibility for this. It is for this reason that such "severity" evokes an ironic smile from the men.

Experience indicates that procedure as laid down by regulations is more firmly adhered to in those units where a comprehensive approach to the entire business of indoctrinating personnel is employed and where, in particular, all officers, warrant officers and petty officers take part in disciplinary practice.

Commendation and punishment are reliable incentives for strengthening military discipline and an important means of indoctrinating personnel. It is the duty and obligation of commanders of all echelons to utilize them as fully and effectively as possible, fully in conformity with regulations and with the principles of military education science and psychology.

On the 'Kiev'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 80 p 1

[Article by Capt 2d Rank E. Kal'yanov, on board the cruiser "Kiev": "Search"]

[Text] A wind-pushed, sharp-peaked wave lashed the ship, causing the hull to shake ponderously and the deck to shudder underfoot. And this was the deck of a huge ship -- an ASW cruiser. Winter was in command even on the Mediterranean. The weather was greatly complicating the conditions of combat training, especially the mock submarine search being conducted by the ASW cruiser "Kiev" with a group of warships. The heavy swell was worsening the sea's hydrology, increasing a submarine's chances of remaining undetected.

Capt-Lt V. Kononenko, head of the navigation department, marked on the chart the area where the submarine was probably located and communicated appropriate data to the sonar operators. The sonarman-warrant officer was the first to stand sonar watch. The commander of Capt-Lt V. Chumakov's sonar operator group had his reasons for this. At that moment when the probability of submarine detection would be the greatest, section commander PO 1st Class V. Kozlov would take over. As specialists the warrant officer and petty officer are practically one another's equal. But Kozlov has an acuter sense of space, which helps him form a more precise picture of what is taking place under the surface when there is no helicopter assistance.

Captain-Lieutenant Chumakov always takes precisely into consideration the psychological element of every search operation and works innovatively with the operators, endeavoring to make maximum use of their individual qualities. On the eve of the exercise this officer sat over his figures for a long time, making rough calculations, proceeding from the developing situation, on the probability that a submarine would be located at various depths, submarine search modes, and detection range.... Now his theoretical calculations were being verified by practical actions.

The watch changed. Petty officer first class Kozlov took his place at the sonar console. There was no target as yet. This is the most difficult part of a sonar operator's job -- to listen for hours on end to the monotonous sound of the outgoing impulses and to see the electron scanning beam keep marking the same plot on the scope, while keeping from becoming distracted or even letting one's thoughts wander for even a moment.

Kozlov detected a target as the ship was setting a new course. The submarine was running deep, under a "discontinuity" layer. It seemed that luck was a factor in the detection. But the sonar operator was sure that Captain-Lieutenant Chumakov's preliminary calculations had played a part, just as Chumakov has faith in the petty officer's special abilities. Indeed, Kozlov had "acquired" the submarine at the maximum range of which the sonar was capable in the given instance. The submariners evidently had not been expecting this, but sensing that they had been detected, they employed one maneuver after another.... But all was in vain. The sonar operators maintained good contact with the target. In actual combat this would be sufficient in order for the other elements of the ship's ASW team to go into action, and the submarine would be destroyed.

But the exercise continued. The detachment commander had contact with the submarine passed over to a large ASW ship, while the cruiser "Kiev" headed for a new area to employ its "long arm" -- to search for another submarine with the aid of ASW helicopters. Chances were not too good, as bad weather was forecast.

Nevertheless it was decided on the spot to continue execution of the designated plan. The first pair of helicopters took to the air, followed by a second pair.... The helicopters lifted off the rolling deck, described a wide arc, and headed off on the designated course. The first two helicopters were piloted by Majs V. Semkin and V. Lyubar'. Both were veterans in over-water operations and had been on numerous extended cruises. Both are excellent indoctrinators of young pilots.

Shipboard specialists maintain continuous surveillance of the helicopters. One can state without exaggeration that hundreds of persons take part in supporting the flight operations of these aircraft. The navigation department computed a cruiser course and speed which provide maximum favorable conditions for helicopter takeoff and landing. Then the navigators continuously adjust the ship's course and speed to ensure that they are the most favorable for air operations. The cruiser's radar operators monitor the air situation and maintain surveillance on each helicopter in the air. The communication department specialists work most closely with the airmen. Air operations would be totally impossible without communications, just the same as if the engineering department did not provide the ship and hanger facilities with electricity and heat.

The hundreds of specialists on an ASW cruiser are closely interlinked. Performance of the simplest task demands of them a high degree of mutual understanding, mutual confidence, and precision operation of the highly-complex "crew-ship" system.

"What is fundamentally new about our cruiser," stated Capt 2d Rank A. Penkin, the ship's deputy commander for political affairs, "is not only its modern weapons and complex technical systems. It also lies in the fact that the ship carries many new specialist elements which were previously unknown in the navy. And modern ASW search is not merely a matter of developing skills but also mutual coordination and improvement in organization of shipboard life and a smoothly-running ship's company."

A report from Maj V. Lyubar' that buoys had been dropped was forwarded to the bridge.

"Return to the ship," ordered the flight operations officer. "Keep alert."

One of the buoys set out by the helicopters indicated contact. Another submarine had been detected. Neither the winter foul weather nor the heavy winds of the Mediterranean had proven to be a hindrance.

Importance of Combat Traditions

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Rear Admiral I. Petrov, Chief, Propaganda and Agitation Division, Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy: "Coordinates of Glory: Our Military Traditions"]

[Text] I recall the northern garrison where over the bay stands a monument to submariners. It is difficult to state today who was the first captain to take his crew to the memorial on the eve of an extended ocean cruise. But since that time, more than 10 years now, bidding farewell to the homeland by submariners begins with a ritual which has become a tradition.

Modest bunches of flowers in the summer and conifer "bouquets" in the winter are placed before the bas-relief figures of Heroes of the Soviet Union M. Gadzhiyev, I. Kolyshkin and others. At a rally the men speak from the heart their innermost feelings and swear to stand up with honor to the ocean's test, to carry out the orders of the homeland, and to be worthy successors to the fame of the men of the Northern Fleet.

There has never been a case of a word which has been given here diverging from deed. Nuclear-powered submarines which have steamed out of this bay have traveled to the North Pole, have crossed the Arctic under the ice, and have accomplished record cruises in distance and duration.

Of course it would be an oversimplification to state that this success is an outright result of the rally held at the submariner memorial. But it would be equally so to deny any link between them. Within each and every one of us there is a need for solemn, stern military rituals. Many of them possess enormous emotional effect.

Are we always able to utilize this great force for indoctrination of military personnel? Are we able with wisdom and solicitude to nurture those feelings aroused in a serviceman's heart during such rituals?

Let us look for the answers in life.

Regardless of the fleet in which a sailor serves, he is familiar with the term "coordinates of glory." These coordinates are placed on maps carried on every warship. As an illustration, a navigation officer in the Northern Fleet knows that a point with coordinates 69°34' North Latitude and 33°39' East Longitude is the location of the last battle fought by the escort ship "Tuman." On 10 August 1941 the "Tuman" was on patrol. In order to prevent the enemy from approaching our shores, the ship's commanding officer, Sr Lt L. Shestakov, entered unequal combat with three fascist destroyers. The "Tuman" continued firing until it went down.

Maps also show the point where Twice Hero of the Soviet Union fighter pilot Lt Col B. Safonov was killed, and the location where the icebreaker

"A. Sibiryakov," spotting the heavy cruiser "Admiral Scheer," reported by radio that this fascist raider had penetrated through to our Arctic sea lines of communication, and then engaged it in combat. There are also other coordinates of glory in the Arctic.

The navigation officer in the Baltic Fleet knows that a line joining Taran and Rozeve lights in the Bay of Danzig runs through those waters where the submarine S-13, under the command of Capt 3d Rank A. Marinesko, sent to the bottom the fascist passenger liner "Wilhelm Gustlow." Thousands of members of the SS and submariners went down with it.

The ships of the Black Sea honor the heroes of the destroyer leader "Khar'kov," the destroyers "Besposhchadnyy," "Frunze," and others.

When a ship reaches a distance of 5 cables from the location at which military honors are to be given, assembly is sounded. All personnel not on watch assemble on the main deck. The boatswain sounds his pipe. The Soviet naval ensign is lowered to half mast. This is the glory coordinates ritual procedure specified in Naval Regulations.

Correct procedures are being followed by those commanders and political workers who utilize solemn rituals for acquainting personnel more thoroughly with the history of the navy and its traditions, which date back to Hangö, Cesme, and Navarino. For example, when a surface ship was in the area where the Battle of Tsushima took place, the combined unit commander related to the men the boundless courage of the Russian sailors and called upon personnel to achieve further improvement in military proficiency. A wreath was lowered onto the water. Those present at the rally sang with great spirit and inspiration the songs "Dvoryag" and "In the Distant Tsushima Strait."

One can find in any fleet examples of successful utilization of examples of war heroism, skilled linking of rituals with the tasks of further increasing the combat readiness of ships and units, and indoctrination of naval personnel in a spirit of love of the socialist homeland, dedication to the cause of the Communist Party, and faithfulness to the demands of the oath and military duty. This work is being performed on an increasingly broader scale in connection with preparations to celebrate the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory.

On board a certain excellent-rated escort ship it has become a tradition to dedicate cruises to a Northern Fleet hero. The radio newspaper and agitators acquaint the men with the deeds of the hero and relate war stories. Following performance of combat training tasks, competition winners are announced in a solemn ceremony. These activities organically link combat traditions with daily military routine and provide our youth with lofty moral reference points.

Interesting rituals have been adopted in the unit to which the submarine "Ul'yanovskiy Komsomolets" belongs. Before putting to sea the crews hold a solemn ceremony at the Glory Monument. While at sea tape recordings are piped into the compartments, containing statements made by war veterans, including parents whose children are currently serving in the military.

There are many such activities, but unfortunately there are also weak spots in this area.

First of all, let us ask a simple question: does each and every officer, warrant officer, petty officer and enlisted man know the coordinates of glory at least in his fleet's theater? Can each man say what heroic deed they immortalize?

Unfortunately the answer is no. Why?

First and foremost it is evidently because certain commanders and political workers fail to adequately appreciate the importance of indoctrination in traditions and neglect rituals. Unfortunately not on every ship prior to putting to sea do they take a look at the map where the coordinates of glory are marked. At times a ship will cross one of these sacred locations, and nobody in the crew other than the navigation officer is aware of this.

It is sad to relate. No Soviet serviceman will pass by the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier without saluting the Eternal Flame. No servicemen will pass by without saluting the unit's colors or naval ensign. There is no eternal flame above the head of those who perished at sea while defending the homeland, and refusing to strike their colors. But they have earned the eternal admiration of succeeding generations and the eternal flame of our love. We shall not forget that for the fighting men of the sea this is not only a combat training ground but also a unique memorial.

One might also consider the following facts. During the Great Patriotic War many festive, bright, brisk and cheerful rituals were born and have been passed on to the present generation of Soviet servicemen. These include salutes in honor of great victories, send-offs on cruises, and official ceremonies honoring the victors in base.

Proper attention must be paid to this. It was impossible to fight the enemy when governed only by feelings of grief, dejection and fury. The Soviet citizen remained a human being in war, faced by mortal danger. One of the elements behind his gaining victory was the fact that within him, alongside hatred toward the enemy, there was love of the homeland, of his ship, regiment, and commander. The rituals of the war years embodied this spiritual unity of army and people, brothers in arms, comrades of forecastle, compartment, and foxhole.

It is quite natural that today official warship send-off and welcoming ceremonies are widely practiced in the navy. Trials against the elements, to which warships are subjected in the World Ocean, are at times akin to the trials of combat. The very distance and duration of blue-water cruises greatly exceed those of wartime cruises.

Unit and combined unit commanders remember to come down to the dock to see a crew off or to receive a ship captain's report of completion of the missions of an extended cruise, and to commend the men for their staunchness, fortitude and proficiency. This is their professional and moral duty, and it is in the final analysis tradition.

But unfortunately life also provides examples of a different kind. The large guided missile ship "Smelyy" returned from an extended cruise. Who was there to welcome it? Only medical personnel. There were no people from headquarters and the political section, let alone a band, at the dock to greet them. Most probably the loss in morale to those who return to their home base and encounter such indifference is irreversible.

The cohesion and solidarity of a ship's company, a high degree of discipline, and mutual understanding between commanders and subordinates are an essential element of moral-psychological training and an important component of a ship's combat readiness. Military rituals and their skillful utilization accelerate attainment of these goals.

We should emphasize that the great majority of navy rituals derive from tradition, constituting a formal, graphic, clear manifestation of this tradition. Without this organic relationship they degenerate into a barren display. And since we are on the subject of crew cohesiveness and solidarity, we must mention the particular importance of combat experience and the rituals which derive from it. There are many such rituals. These include acquainting new personnel with the history of a warship and the traditions of the crew. These include standing one's first watch. These also include a patron relationship between the veterans and the young men who will be replacing them. It also includes reading before the assembled men letters of commendation to the parents of the top-performing personnel. It includes formal awarding of medals and decorations, badges of military valor, and testimonials.... Such rituals are unique landmarks which mark a serviceman's movement through service, help military personnel emulate worthy models, and help maintain enthusiasm and zeal. They demand an atmosphere of comradeship and solicitude toward each individual on the part of commanders and activists, and in turn promote maintenance of such an atmosphere in the military unit.

Let us recall the famed crew of the guards destroyer "Gremyashchiy," headed by Hero of the Soviet Union A. Gurin, who subsequently rose to the rank of rear admiral. This outstanding commander skillfully utilized the above-listed rituals to unify his crew; he considered it his duty to take part in them and demanded the same of his officers. Anybody on the "Gremyashchiy" who shunned this work and kept his distance from the men was given a hard time.

And yet even today not all commanders sagaciously see, in the Gurin manner, the living link between rituals, solicitude toward the men, and success in combat training. Efforts to unify the crew on the ship under the command of officer V. Kosyak, for example, suffer from serious deficiencies. They have not yet totally eliminated cases of disciplinary infractions, and some officers are poorly acquainted with their men. It is true that recently the commander and party organization have been devoting greater attention to these problems than in the past. We believe that enrichment of the indoctrination process with military rituals and comprehensive utilization of combat experience and the recommendations of military education science and psychology will help a ship's commanding officer increase the effectiveness of efforts aimed at unifying the crew.

Warships put to sea on national holidays.

Garlands are lowered over the side onto the water, to be carried away by the swell.

But the garlands of our memory of those who have given their lives for the homeland are eternal.

Mine-Disarming Episode Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Feb 80 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Explosion in the Ocean"]

[Text] The minesweeper was returning to base when the following message was received by radio: a mine had been caught in the net of the seiner "Rovesnik."

Altering its course, the naval ship rushed to the fishermen's aid. The seiner's crew had abandoned ship, except for a skeleton operating crew. A boat put out from the minesweeper, accompanied by a raft carrying a demolition team, and approached the fishing vessel, where they could see the mine tangled in the raised net.

The sailors, under the command of subunit underwater weapons officer Capt-Lt S. Sagitov, proceeded with the hazardous job. The conditions in which they would be disarming the mine were difficult. A swell was running, the seiner's sides were sheathed in ice, darkness was fast approaching, and the wet life jackets were becoming coated with ice, restricting movement. An inertia detonator and the explosive charge could be seen through gaping holes which had rusted through the mine case in several places. The officer thought to himself as he inspected the lethal device: "You drifted along the sea floor a long time before getting into these shallow waters."

The captain-lieutenant climbed down onto the raft and carefully placed onto it the mine, which was lowered by his men.

The raft submerged. Only the upper part of the mine could be seen on the water's surface. Up to his knees in the icy water and struggling to keep his balance in the swell, Sagitov secured the mine with capron ties. He then attached a blasting cap, another one to make sure, and ordered the men in the boat to pull the raft away from the fishing vessel.

Thirty minutes later the officer lit the end of the blasting fuse. The seiner, without turning, withdrew to a safe distance.

Soon a harmless blast reverberated over the ocean.

Capt-Lt S. Sagitov is one of the unit's most experienced specialists and holder of the "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" decoration, 3d Class. This was the fifth mine rendered harmless by this courageous officer.

Underway Watch Procedures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 80 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Reliability of Underway Watch"]

[Text] At the end of May 1943 the submarine Sh-422, under the command of Capt 3d Rank F. Vidyayev, was on patrol. Each man was performing duties at his battle station with skill and awareness of personal responsibility which fully ensured reliability of underway watch. And this brought success -- sonar section commander V. Zhuchkov, under conditions of unfavorable sea hydrology, promptly detected the sound of surface ship propellers. It was an enemy convoy. The submarine penetrated the convoy screen and sank a large fascist transport. The enraged enemy proceeded to drop depth charges. But the tactical skill of Captain 3d Rank Vidyayev and the reliable, precision execution of his comments by the men on duty at the controls and equipment enabled the submariners to outsmart the enemy.

One can cite from the history of the Great Patriotic War many examples of reliability of underway watch and immediate readiness of warships for battle upon suddenly and unexpectedly encountering the enemy. The present generation of Soviet navymen, competing to honor in a worthy manner the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of Victory, is skillfully utilizing and persistently building upon the experience of the combat veterans. Deeply aware of their duty to guard the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and to defend socialism, our enlisted personnel, petty officers, warrant officers, and officers are endeavoring to dedicate all their energy and ability to the cause of combat improvement and to raise to a higher level naval proficiency and political conditioning.

Whatever the time of year, ships do not remain long in base. A busy combat training routine is in full swing on board naval ships day and night, on extended voyages. The gale-tossed winter ocean severely and impartially tests the preparedness of the men for action in all, even the most unexpected, abruptly-changing situations. And the quality of performance of complex missions at sea depends in large measure on how reliably the men perform on underway watch, the role of which can scarcely be overstated.

Watch, as is stated in Naval Regulations, is a special type of duty on board ship. Watches are set in those cases when uninterrupted vigilance and continuous manning of stations is required. The watch crews, into which the entire ship's company is divided, ensure combat readiness, the specified course and speed, reliability of observation and communications, as well as precise, safe navigation.

Precision, flawless performance of these difficult duties by all categories of personnel is one of the fundamental conditions for a safe voyage. Watch duties demand of each and every individual a high degree of conscientiousness and a heightened feeling of responsibility. Indoctrination of these qualities is no simple matter, requiring constant attention on the part of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. Success depends on many factors. Commander demandingness should be constantly directed toward instilling in personnel who stand underway watch personal responsibility for the overall results of the cruise and the ability quickly to assess a situation, make a correct decision and carry it out. Party-political work should be organized taking into account the concrete situation, the missions being performed on the cruise, and one should endeavor to obtain exemplary performance by Communists and Komsomol members. It is essential, for indoctrinational purposes, skillfully to utilize the advanced know-how of the top-performing personnel and to show intolerance toward any deviation from the demands of regulations, lack of discipline, and diminished vigilance when standing watch. This is always borne in mind, for example, on board the escort ship "Neukrotimyy". The ship's commanding officer, Capt 3d Rank V. Kornyushko, his deputy commander for political affairs, and the party and Komsomol organizations stress matters pertaining to training all categories of personnel for standing watch, focusing special attention on work with watch officers. This results in the crew successfully performing ASW missions, other scheduled and unscheduled tasks, intelligent, precise actions by watch personnel when passing through narrow waters and when passing other ships.

Personnel stand special watches in the combat departments and services under the direct supervision of subunit commanders. The entire watch is under the immediate supervision of the watch officer, who when the ship is under way is subordinate only to the ship's commanding officer or executive officer when the latter is standing in for the ship's commanding officer and is on duty in the command center. The ship's commanding officer must personally handle training of officers to perform this responsible job -- Naval Regulations state that the watch officer shall be the commanding officer's immediate assistant in matters pertaining to maneuver and weapons employment during unexpected encounters with the enemy.

Leading ship captains proceed in this manner. They thoroughly instruct watch officers, skillfully monitor their actions and analyze them in detail. Before each extended cruise they organize training on board ship on a special program and analyze potential situations. All this helps watch officers master the complex art of ship management and control, the finer points of organization of watch service, and the ability to make maximum use of equipment combat capabilities. It is therefore not surprising that when at sea the subordinates of these commanders, competing for exemplary watch performance and for the title of best watch officer, do not become flustered when the situation becomes suddenly complicated, but make intelligent decisions.

At the same time there still occur instances where adequate attention is not being devoted to training of watch officers. On some ships they are taught simply to repeat the commanding officer's instructions, and are not taught initiative, decisiveness, boldness, and readiness to assume full responsibility for combat training task performance. But the absence of these qualities in watch officers inevitably leads to failure. With a sudden and unexpected scenario change dictated by a situation change, such an officer will be unable promptly to reach a precise decision and give correct instructions to personnel on duty on the most important equipment.

In order to increase the reliability of underway watches, commanders should more fully utilize the role of socialist competition, making an all-out effort to focus it, as noted by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his address at the November (1979) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, on qualitative indices. Precisely-organized competition for the best watch, station, and for the title of best watch officer makes it possible, as is indicated by the experience of leading ships, to maintain in the collective an atmosphere of morale where every man endeavors to stand watch today more vigilantly and reliably than yesterday, and tomorrow more reliably than today. Friendly competition helps overcome psychological and physical fatigue and helps maintain a high level of vigilance at all stages of a cruise.

Ocean cruises are a school of courage and skill. On these cruises ships' companies apply maximum efforts in order to accomplish assigned cruise missions efficiently and with high quality. At all latitudes in the World Ocean Soviet naval personnel are reliably performing special service — underway watch, ensuring the required combat readiness of their ships.

On the 'Zhguchiy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Savichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "Do Not Stop on the Way"]

[Text] "You are taking over a fine ship. I wish you all the best in maintaining it at the achieved level."

"Of course it will not be easy to maintain the achieved level and even more difficult to exceed it," Kibkalo thought to himself, but he kept silent, since this was not the first person to tell him he had lucked out. Many of those who had learned of his assignment as commanding officer of the large ASW ship "Zhguchiy" said approximately the same thing: with such a crew, things can be accomplished. They have a genuine navy spirit.

Indeed, the crew of the "Zhguchiy" was extremely cohesive. It was also noted for success in combat training. The majority of missile firings performed by the "Zhguchiy" had been successful. All this was pleasing to the new commanding officer. But a thought kept bothering him: "What is there left for me? To rest on somebody else's laurels? But if I immediately begin reorganizing everything in my own way, I could be doing things wrong. No, I must approach everything with careful consideration."

His first acquaintance with the crew, and particularly with the officers, indicated that the ship's company was a solid one. Success had unified all personnel. At the same time he also noticed certain details which, in the view of the new commanding officer, required a different approach.

Once he was checking through group exercise documents. These documents, prepared by the commanders of the combat departments and the chiefs of services, were competently done, but in some of them the commanding officer did not perceive lively thinking. In his opinion they were written without innovative inspiration.

"You see," stated Captain-Lieutenant Fedosov, deputy commander for political affairs, in whom Kibkalo confided his doubts, "I also noticed a decline in innovativeness in the work of some officers, but I have not yet been able to get to the real causes."

Kibkalo is an officer of action, a man of energy. It is extremely difficult for him to mark time. He wants to see the same quality in his subordinates. Therefore the political worker's observations strengthened his desire to look into the causes: "What is the matter here?" the captain kept asking himself.

A thorough study of the performance of each officer convinced him that indeed enthusiasm was lacking in some. They showed no fervent energy in their work. In general things were proceeding fairly well, but there was lacking an innovative approach to their duties.

It seems that both the captain and his deputy commander for political affairs arrived simultaneously at an answer to this question. They reached the same conclusion that one of the factors involved was that some of the officers were stuck in their jobs. They had not received a promotion for years. They could see no future, and therefore their work lacked inspiration.

"Of course," said Kibkalo to Aleksandr Viktorovich Fedosov, "our main job in boosting vigor and innovation in the activities of these officers should consist not in concern for their promotion, but this should not be ignored."

Thoroughly studying the state of affairs, he went to the combined unit commander with a request that Captain-Lieutenant Akent'yev be promoted.

"But he is your best officer," replied the rear admiral. "Don't you want to keep him? Other ships are not anxious to let such officers as Akent'yev go."

"I am submitting this request precisely because he is the best. The conclusion on his efficiency report should be implemented. I believe there will be double benefit. Akent'yev will carry the advanced know-how of the "Zhguchiy" to another ship, and the other officers will see that promotion is guaranteed for those who always work hard."

Orders were received, assigning Capt-Lt Yuriy Igor'yevich Akent'yev to another ship, with a promotion.

"Of course nothing astounding has happened," one of the officers said to the captain, "but, you know, it's like a breath of fresh air."

The commanding officer of the "Zhguchiy" was about to make a tour of inspection of the ship. He donned coveralls and gloves, and took a flashlight. He made inspection rounds on a daily basis, but today he would be particularly thorough. He went into the very bowels of the ship, as they say, which to the uninitiated might seem a labyrinth, which one can enter but from which one cannot find a way out.

Kibkalo, in spite of the fact that he had been assigned to the "Zhguchiy" comparatively recently, already knew the ship inside out. And every inspection tour of the ship enabled the captain to gain better knowledge of the concerns of the crew and what problems needed solving, because beyond the particular one can frequently see the general.

In the boiler room a young seaman strode toward him to report. The captain cast a critical look about the room. He noted to himself: "Things are in excellent order," but asked aloud: "Has this boiler ever had any problems?"

"I don't know," the seaman replied.

Later, in his quarters, Kibkalo recalled this incident. He then summoned Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant Fedorov, engineering officer.

"Boris Pavlovich, why do you suppose that seaman is not familiar with the boiler's operating history?"

"As you saw, he possesses excellent knowledge of operating regulations and procedures," replied Fedorov. "I do not believe he really needs to know the operating history."

"You are wrong," Kibkalo softly replied. "To know the operating history means to take into consideration typical malfunctions which have occurred at some time on this boiler and, consequently, to be able to prevent them in a timely manner. But he does not know these typical malfunctions because there are no custodians of experience and traditions in your department."

"Do you mean warrant officers?"

"Precisely."

"We get along fine without warrant officers," Fedorov replied with some vehemence. "And I hope we shall get along just as well without them in the future."

That same day the captain had a long talk with his deputy commander for political affairs.

"We are under strength in warrant officers. This situation must be corrected," began Kibkalo.

"That will require a change in the general atmosphere on board. Some officers are of the opinion that warrant officers are of little use."

"I have noticed that," replied the captain, "and there is nothing worse than such opinions.

Some time later candidates for specialist training were selected from the top seamen. They returned as 1st-class specialists. Training classes with warrant officers began to be conducted in a better and more organized manner, and the method of evaluating performance results was changed. Warrant officers began to be involved more actively in volunteer work. The situation on board the ship was perceptibly changing. The warrant officer complement was growing, and the quality of their work performance was improving. In time six of them became the top specialists in the combined unit.

"How are things in your department with the custodians of experience and traditions?' Kibkalo once asked the engineering officer.

"We have produced two warrant officers," replied Fedorov.

"I hope you will not call it quits at that."

"Of course, captain. You were right. With the help of the warrant officers, things in the department are going much better."

Year after year the "Zhguchiy" was considered a fine ship, but not the very best. It was firmly in the runner-up position in the combined unit.

"I think it would be worthwhile for us to compete for first place," Kibkalo once stated at a meeting of his officers. "What do you think? Can we do it?"

The officers supported their captain's proposal. It was also stated that it would require a good deal of work.

"Well, as I already know, none of you is afraid of work," smiled Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. "There are a few things, though, that we must change. First of all in work style. Some officers do the work for their petty officers, and do not give them independence. This narrows our activist ranks."

That same evening Kibkalo had a long talk with his executive officer, Captain-Lieutenant Dobroskotchenko. The executive officer of the "Zhguchiy" was distinguished by resoluteness of character. He was an extremely hard worker and, as Kibkalo had noted, viewed eveything in clear-cut categories.

"Vladimir Grigor'yevich," said Kibkalo. "Today I was discussing improving work style. You also must change your work style. You also frequently do the job for your officers. This thwarts their initiative. Why is it, for example, that when setting out the watch you personally check the proficiency and preparedness of all the men? Let their immediate superiors do this. And in general, be more flexible. You will soon be commanding your own ship. Evaluate the situation like a commander should."

...Gradually a great deal changed on the "Zhguchiy." The role of petty officers became greater. With the aid of political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations, the prestige of the Komsomol organization secretaries increased. Commanders of all echelons began to do a better job of studying their subordinates. Kibkalo himself had the following to say on this subject:

"When I am standing on the bridge, I know precisely who is at the helm, who is on the maneuvering valves, who is at the missiles, who is on communications, and who is on the radars. I not only know who is on duty, but have as much confidence in them as in myself."

The great amount of work which had been done was not in vain. A day came which will long remain in the crew's memory.

"According to socialist competition results," Captain 3d Rank Kibkalo solemnly announced to the assembled men, "our ship has earned first place in the combined unit."

Later, when the excited men were dispersing from formation, Captain-Lieutenant Fedosov, who had learned to understand his commanding officer well, asked: "I imagine we shall not be resting on our laurels?"

"Of course not," smiled Kibkalo. "Full speed ahead!"

Young Officer Training Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 80 p 2

[Interview with Vice Admiral Yu. Padorin, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red-Banner Northern Fleet, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Capt 1st Rank G. Savichev: "Area of Particular Responsiblity"]

> [Text] On the development of young officers, on instilling integrity and dignity in them -- This was the subject of an interview with Vice Admiral Yu. Padorin, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red-Banner Northern Fleet and military council member, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Capt 1st Rank G. Savichev.

This interview took place in an office from the windows of which one could see a vast bay. The bay was ringed on two sides by snow-mantled conical hills, crowding right down to the water's edge. It was perhaps for this reason that the water in the bay appeared thick and black. Warships were standing motionless in the ringing silence, as if brazed into the transparent, crystalline air. Our conversation also was of ships, cruises, and indoctrination of young officers.

[Question] Last year, Comrade Vice Admiral, the Red-Banner Northern Fleet performed a great many combat training tasks in an excellent manner. Of course there are many prerequisites for this success, but I should like to know what contribution the young officers made to this success.

[Answer] The fleet command highly rates the performance of the young officers on such ships as the missile-armed nuclear submarine "60th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution," on the large ASW ships "Marshal

Timoshenko" and "Leningradskiy Komsomolets," on the ASW cruiser "Kiev," and on many other ships. The commanders and political workers of these ships do considerable political-indoctrination work with the young personnel. Among the various areas covered by this work, we should probably mention in particular instilling in young people a sense of honor and worth. I should note that such a sense was also characteristic of officers of the Russian Navy. But one should not forget about the class content of these moral qualities. Only in a socialist society do they acquire their true significance. Concentrated in the terms "honor" and "dignity" are all the finest elements characteristic of members of a socialist society. As we see it, to live in a dignified and worthy manner means to follow Communist ideals and to implement them in every possible way. Worth and dignity means taking an active life position, observing Communist morality, and living the interests and concerns of the collective, of the entire society. For the military man it means dedicating oneself totally and entirely to the most noble cause of defense of the socialist homeland.

[Question] Could you tell us about some of the forms of work pertaining to instilling honor and dignity in young officers?

[Answer] This is achieved first and foremost by forming in young people a deep understanding of their duty and responsibility to the people, in other words by an understanding of their special role in society. If we take it at the fleet level, for example, the fleet command, headquarters staff and political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations exert considerable effort to ensure that the majority of ships and units and the entire fleet as a whole achieve high results in training and competition to honor in a worthy fashion the Lenin jubilee and the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory. An attitude for maximum achievement is created. You can understand that service on a leading ship directly influences officers' perception of honor and dignity. Official get-togethers of service school graduating classes are also organized. Special extended cruise sending-off rituals have been elaborated. Evening functions are arranged for young officers, lectures are given, and there are get-togethers with outstanding performers and Northern Fleet heroes. And this work is producing results. Young officers are serving better, with a deeper understanding of honor and dignity. They are developing professionally more rapidly and are proving to be intellectually and spiritually rich individuals, capable of displaying both independence and courage in the most difficult life situations. And this is confirmed by daily practical activities, by extended cruises taken by their ships, and by successful accomplishment of combat training tasks at the most diversified locations in the World Ocean. Along one of the walls of this office is a glass-encased cabinet, it contains trophies, pennants, ship models and other items connected with the heroic history of this fleet and with its heroic spirit today. Counting on young people and putting faith in them is a firm tradition in the Red-Banner Northern Fleet, and there is good reason for this. Daring is characteristic of young people. They are full of enthusiasm and energy. They are filled with a passionate desire to carry out their plans and projects. More than

20 officers of the Northern Fleet have become Heroes of the Soviet Union just in the years following the war. And the overwhelming majority were young when awarded this lofty title.

[Question] So there are no problems with the development of young officers?

[Answer] I would not go so far as to say that. The very term "stanovleniye" [formation, making, establishment] presupposes improvement, ascending movement -- from yesterday's cadet, who was still inexperienced in many respects, to an independent subunit commander, who skillfully handles equipment and correctly indoctrinates subordinates. It is understandable that successes and setbacks take place on this road. Young officers must surmount various obstacles and solve personal problems. Some, unable to stand up under the initial tests and trials, become disenchanted with military service. Others begin to be intimidated by difficulties; they lose faith in themselves and in their ability. Still others suddenly decide that naval service is not their calling. Of course individual work is done with all such officers. Commanders and political workers help them overcome difficulties and find themselves. Our main concern, however, is to ensure that the moods and attitudes I mentioned before do not occur at all in young officers. In other words, the principal work method is as follows: perform thorough preventive medicine, so that young officers do not lose faith and become timid, so that they develop feelings of worth and honor, responsibility and duty, because precisely these feelings help overcome difficulties, compel one to display daring and to strive for additional success. And the focus of this work is concentrated on naval ships.

[Question] I have visited many of your fleet's ships. Considerable work is indeed being done with the young officers; serious attention is devoted to them. But there are also exceptions. I was recently discussing with the commanding officer of one of the ships about which young officers should be singled out for praise in a newspaper article. We gave it a great deal of thought, going through the entire list of lieutenants, but we failed to find a worthy candidate. I personally had the impression that the majority of lieutenants on that ship were not doing that good a job.

[Answer] That is another aspect of the problem of indoctrination of young officers. That commander does not understand that precisely indoctrinational work with young officers is an area of special responsibility. They say that the strength of a ship's captain lies in his crew. I would add the following: in his officers. His worth is manifested in large measure in what he does to ensure that his subordinate officers do an excellent job. (The vice admiral opened a drawer in his desk and removed a blue file folder.) Here is a request from Lt Vladimir Pakhomov (he said, removing a document from the folder). He requests that he not be transferred to another ship. And yet transfer of a lieutenant involves a promotion.

[Question] What is keeping him in his previous job?

[Answer] He writes that the officer team on his ship is an exceptionally strong one, that his naval service began well precisely due to the collective.

[Question] It seems to me that this report is the finest testimonial to the officer collective. It exerts great influence on forming and shaping of the individual.

[Answer] Attention is drawn to the role of the collective in forming a spiritually and intellectually rich, creatively active individual by the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Indoctrination Work." They speak of the enormous creative and indoctrinational capabilities of collectives. Guided precisely by these most important documents, commanders and political workers, staffs and political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations construct indoctrinational work with young personnel. One can judge the effectiveness of this work from the following facts: an early rank promotion was earned by Capt-Lt A. Zhidelev, and Sr Lt S. Tsvetkov, who graduated from service school in 1977, was awarded the "For Combat Merit" medal. Lt V. Makarov has been serving on the ship for slightly more than a year now, but has already made his group excellent-rated and is a top efficiency innovator; party members in his combat department elected him party bureau secretary. And what is remarkable is that all these officers are from crews which are noted for their unity and healthy spirit. The tone is set by Communists and Komsomol members, and therefore the officer collectives are strong. All conditions for the development of young personnel are created collectively on these ships. Young officers are collectively assisted in rising to the top levels of naval skills.

[Question] I once visited the large ASW ship "Marshal Timoshenko." I could see that breaking-in of the young officers was proceeding successfully on that ship.

[Answer] The majority of ships in the Northern Fleet -- both surface units and submarines -- are manned by smoothly-running, unified crews. Our task, however, consists in ensuring that every ship's company without exception be distinguished by its unity and cohesion. We devote special military council meetings to this problem. The experience and know-how of leading personnel are widely disseminated. We hold special courses of instruction on board those ships the crews of which are achieving particularly significant success. Considerable attention is focused on the role of the wardroom. This is not only the place where officers take their meals but also where they congregate in general. As a rule an exchange of views and know-how takes place in the wardroom. Thus unified views on matters pertaining to combat and political training and problems of indoctrination are consolidated. On some ships wardroom councils have been established experimentally. It is difficult to judge at the present time how expedient this is. But one thing is definite: the influence of the commanding officer, his deputy commander for political affairs, the party and Komsomol organizations on the atmosphere prevailing in the wardroom should be active and vigorous. (A warrant officer entered the office. He placed a stack of letters on the admiral's desk.) I maintain correspondence with the Northern Fleet heroes. The letters help us broadly disseminate their experience and know-how, skill, and traditions. The example of these people is of great importance in instilling integrity and dignity in young officers.

[Question] Then we can say in general that the force of influence of persons of authority and prestige or, as we put it, the personal example of senior comrades, exerts great influence on young personnel.

[Answer] I would especially emphasize the role of the ship's commanding officer. This is a person who is at the focal point of attention of the entire crew. He not only runs the ship and directs combat but also determines the ship's entire life and entire atmosphere of this life. As a rule the commanding officer's courage, composure, dignity and honor, his know-how and work methods are imitated and adopted by his subordinates, especially the young officers. When commanding officers display model job performance, subordinates also do a good job. Young personnel like to serve with such men. For example, the missile-armed nuclear submarine "60th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution" is well known in the Navy. It is under the command of Rear Adm Vladlen Vasil'yevich Naumov. In the last training year the crew of this submarine was initiator of socialist competition in the Navy. The men met their pledges with dignity and honor. And the commanding officer is a model and example. And we have many such commanding officers. The majority of these are young, men who have not yet or have just turned 30: they include Capt 2d Rank Yu. Shilin, Capt 3d Rank I. Petrenko, and many others.

[Question] But what if a commander does not serve as a model and example?

[Answer] It does happen. Recently it was necessary to remove a commanding officer from one of our ships. A crude, undignified, sometimes tactless individual, he was exerting a negative influence on the young personnel. How many times has that truism been repeated: he who does not himself possess a sense of his own worth and dignity is unable to develop it in others. We devote special attention to dissemination of positive indoctrination experience and know-how. And first and foremost the experience and know-how of ship's commanding officers. We are concerned with their prestige and authority and endeavor to ensure that they genuinely present a standard in performance of duties. (The interview had gone on more than an hour, and the admiral, glancing at his watch, continued). Today many people say that the process of development of youth has accelerated in our time. We are living in a tempestuous, swift-moving age. For that reason one should constantly seek new ways, new forms and methods of work with young personnel in the indoctrination process, alongside well-established methods and recommendations.

[Question] That is not easy....

[Answer] Search for the new is always a difficult business. Such is life, however. It demands continuous improvement. A great many new forms of indoctrination have been found and adopted in the Soviet Navy. What in my opinion is a fine idea was born in the undersea fleet, for example: to stand watch in honor of wartime submariner heroes. Prior to extended cruises we also follow the practice of recording on tape the voices of family and loved ones. As a rule good send-offs are accompanied by instructions honorably to carry out one's duty to the homeland. Out there in the ocean such statements are priceless. New forms of such work are also being born on aircraft-carrying ships. For example, those young pilots who log a specified number of takeoffs and landings receive special certificates in an official ceremony. Then the entire ship's company marches past the certificate recipients, honoring their achievement. This engenders pride in the young pilots and increases their sense of their own work. I could also enumerate other developments and innovations in this important area, but I should like to state in conclusion that if we educators expect the young personnel to show daring, then we ourselves should be daring, finding more and more new indoctrinational techniques which will help our young people accomplish their difficult military service with excellence, with honor and dignity.

On a Patrol Ship

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Kremnev, Red-Banner Pacific Fleet: "On an Extended Cruise"]

[Text] For the third year in a row the crew of our patrol ship has confirmed its rating of excellent. All missile, torpedo, and artillery firing exercises last year were performed successfully. This has been greatly promoted by concretely organized socialist competition among combat departments, crews and individual personnel.

Taking account of amassed experience, the crew adopted rigorously calculated pledges in honor of the Lenin jubilee, as well as covering the period of the extended cruise in which our ship is presently engaged. We focus constant attention on competition pertaining to tasks and performance standards.

For example, prior to the next missile firing at an air target, battery commanders Sr Lt S. Bulakh and Lt S. Ageyev competed for the honor of firing the first missile. Both batteries prepared well for the exercise, but Senior Lieutenant Bulakh and his men won the competition.

On an extended cruise watch officers compete on concrete indices. In determining competition results the commanding officer takes into consideration accuracy of calculations and precision of performance on the bridge. The winner receives a "Best Watch Officer" pennant. Performance of pledges by entire watch crews is evaluated equally objectively.

Prior to departure on the extended cruise, many of the men specified a concrete goal for themselves -- to boost their proficiency rating or confirm first class or the master proficiency rating. Those who are preparing to earn the master proficiency rating include engineering officer Engr-Capt-Lt S. Andreychuk, other officers and warrant officers.

In addition to scheduled training classes, we hold proficiency-rated specialist days, at which equipment and weapons experts exchange information and know-how. Mutual assistance in training is organized in a precise manner. Master proficiency-rated warrant officers B. Roshchin, Ya. Mamalyga, V. Opalak, B. Godunov, A. Prokopovich, V. Degtyar' and others are particularly generous in assisting their comrades. At practice drills they show their fellow crew members how one should perform when the situation becomes complex.

Improvement of crew member combat skills is greatly promoted by competition to score target kills with the first projectile fired and at maximum range. Such rivalry developed from the very first day out between the mine and torpedo weapons department, under Capt-Lt A. Krutov, and the missile and artillery weapons department, under Sr Lt Ye. Zamurayev. Zamurayev's men are leading at present. But their rivals have every capability to become competition leaders by the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth.

On the cruise we are also endeavoring to utilize the advanced know-how of our competition rivals, the crew of the escort ship "Retivyy." Before putting to sea our officers got together with the officers of the "Retivyy," which has been named the best ship in the unit. Officers I. Morozov, V. Drogan and others related to us the specific features of equipment operation at those latitudes at which the men of the "Retivyy" possessed previous experience and at which we would be performing combat training tasks.

Unfortunately, however, there are also unresolved problems on our ship. Not all officers and warrant officers have yet learned to conduct practice drills in complex conditions, and when totaling up training and competition results to evaluate with adequate demandingness the concrete contribution by each man to the overall success. And this naturally determines in large measure enhancement of the indoctrinational role of socialist competition. We are aware of these shortcomings and are endeavoring to correct them, in order to accomplish the missions of this cruise in an even better manner.

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LETTERS FROM READERS: EDITORIAL COMMENTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 80 p 2

[Article: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Mailbox"]

> [Text] In January 1980 the editors received 14,993 letters from readers containing articles, reports, comments, questions, requests, suggestions, and criticisms; 568 of them were published in our paper. We received 780 responses to articles in the paper.

In January the newspaper regularly published reports by our readers on preparations among the troops for elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union and autonomous republics and to local Soviets. "Our unit is arranging lectures and discussions for military voters concerning the successes of the Soviet people in carrying out the plans of the 10th Five-Year Plan," writes Sr Lt Yu. Oleshko of the Carpathian M. D. "Consultations and question-and-answer evening meetings are organized at the agitation posts. As we approach the elections, personnel feel pride in our Motherland and the heroic achievements of our people. These patriotic feelings show themselves vividly in military labor. One of the subunits of the unit recently made a long march. It took place under difficult climatic conditions across very rugged terrain in a situation approximating that of combat. The men commanded by Lt Col-Engr A. Malyy successfully overcame all difficulties and performed their assigned mission."

The flame of socialist competition to celebrate the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War is burning more and more brightly in all the branches of the USSR Armed Forces. These important events found reflection in the January mail. Maj A. Shirokov of the Leningrad M. D. reports that the personnel of the unit where he serves are competing under the slogan, "Carry out the teachings of Lenin as a sacred duty, improve combat and political training, raise vigilance, and be ready at all times to defend the Motherland and the great achievements of socialism." They are performing combat training missions with great inspiration. Fighting men there are filled with a desire to perform their obligations in competition completely.

Jr Sgt (Res) N. Torshilov of Rostovskaya Oblast writes: "In February our glorious Soviet Armed Forces will be 62 years old. On the threshold of this national holiday I recall my service in the airborne troops with special emotion. Those days are a vivid page in my biography, and a fine school of life and indoctrination. I am proud to have served in the army! And as a father I am happy that my oldest son, a tank soldier who has completed his service, carried on this feeling with dignity and that my younger son, a military driver, is faithful to the family tradition."

The letter from which these words are taken is just one of many in the January mail. The authors write with great love and gratitude of their service in the army and call on present fighting men to work tirelessly to build the combat readiness of their units and ships and to raise revolutionary vigilance.

In response to the newspaper's appeal to readers many veterans of the front have sent in their memoirs. Previously unknown chapters of the war and combat episodes came to light. The veterans are sincerely grateful for the concern shown for the needs of front soldiers and for the undying memory of those who gave their lives. But the letters also say other things. "I recently visited the Zhitomir region, my hometown of Podluby," reports V. Omel'chenko of Kostroma. "Many of the people of the town did not come back from the war. My own father died in the battle at Brody. I took flowers to the monument in honor of the town heroes, but I was deeply hurt by what I found. It turned out that the local authorities had forgotten to put my father's name on the list of those who died. And other kolkhoz members were also left off. The years are passing, and no one will care to correct this mistake which today causes people pain and suffering."

In January the editors received 661 responses to letters sent for review. Commanders, chiefs, and heads of local Soviet and party bodies and state and public organizations reported on the results of such reviews and on steps taken. As Maj Gen N. Cherednichenko reports that it was determined to be true that employees of the Sovetskiy Rayon military commissariat in Moscow took a bureaucratic attitude toward the request made by the family of servicemen V. Krysanov, and those at fault have been held responsible. The allotment for a serviceman's child has now been granted.

Unfortunately, the editorial mail indicates that officials sometimes fail to review reader letters when they should and that on occasion the responses given are mere formalities. These cases show that senior officers must check more carefully on local review of letters.

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OFFICER POLITICAL TRAINING: IMPORTANCE STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Feb 80 p 1

[Editorial: "The Main Thing Is Effectiveness"]

[Text] Officers are the skeleton of the army and navy, the party's reliable bulwark in the Armed Forces, the bearers of their class and military spirit and glorious combat traditions. The officers are the active political indoctrinators of personnel and concern for improving their ideological-theoretical conditioning and their professional, political, and moral qualities means the same thing as concern for further improvement of the entire indoctrination process in the subunits, units, and ships.

Officer study in Marxist-Leninist training groups plays a large part in shaping the ideological makeup of the officer. Commanders, political agencies, and party organizations must work constantly to raise officer political training to the level of current party demands and create all necessary conditions for thorough study of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin, the history of the CPSU, documents of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th party congresses, and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other party leaders on military development. Each training period should give the students new knowledge and develop their ability to apply the knowledge acquired creatively in practical activities, during indoctrination of personnel.

Marxist-Leninist training for officers is conducted on a good level and has a tangible effect on the state of affairs in the unit where Lt Col S. Sal'nikov is political worker. What is the explanation for this? Above all, it is explained by the constant concern which the commander, his deputy for political affairs, and the party organization give to improving the quality of lectures, establishing a business-like, creative atmosphere in seminars, and seeing that the knowledge acquired becomes a practical guideline for the men. They make active use of such forms of training as discussion of reference papers and collective analysis of public life and the international situation. Elements of lively discussion are woven into the fabric of the training periods and technical propaganda equipment is used. The unit party organization actively promotes political self-education by officers and has set up checks on their study of the recommended literature and attendance at training periods. It is such coordinated measures that make officer political training highly effective. They are all highly rated specialists, involved in public life, who skillfully train and indoctrinate their subordinates.

There also occur cases, however, where units tolerate shortcomings in the organization of ideological-theoretical training and poor-quality training periods, where instead of delving deeply into the essence of the problems under study there is merely a superficial familiarization with them and theoretical generalizations and serious, thoughtful analysis of phenomena are supplanted by repetition of platitudes, where instead of convincing arguments there are just showy words. This kind of formalism took place in the subunit where Maj K. Zubov was political worker and it was one of the reasons that political indoctrination work there slackened off.

To increase the effectiveness in training in officer Marxist-Leninist training groups means to insure that training periods are conducted on a high ideological and scientific level, that they are practical and concrete, and that the subjects are closely related to the missions being performed and to formation of the activist posture in life. This imposes high requirements for the quality of each lecture and seminar. Officers must work on primary sources, be held strictly responsible before the party for each case of inadequate preparation for a training period, and create that kind of moral atmosphere which promotes development of an interest in the subject and inspires the men to master the material creatively and use the broadest opportunities for political self-education.

The effectiveness of ideological-theoretical education of our personnel depends largely on the attention given to it by political agencies. They are expected to work persistently to introduce progressive techniques, eliminate dogmatism, and strive to see that every training period in the groups is truly an opportunity to learn creative Marxist-Leninist thought in its close association with actual life. This is possible if the group leader is profoundly aware of the fact that he is not simply a teacher passing a certain amount of knowledge to the students, but rather an active political indoctrinator. Where propagandists understand that this is their purpose the feeling invariably comes out in training periods and during everyday dealings with the students.

The group leader is the key figure. His training and exacting attitude toward himself and others are decisive with respect to the success of political training. Political agencies must do everything possible to broaden the ideological-theoretical perspective of group leaders, enhance their skill as lecturers and methodologists, and increase their sense of responsibility for the important sector of party work entrusted to them.

Improving Marxist-Leninist officer training in the spirit of the demands of the CPSU Central Committee decree "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" unquestionably does not demand general appeals; it requires painstaking effort and concrete steps. It is important for each political branch, unit, and ship to determine precisely what steps are necessary to improve the knowledge and methodological skills of group leaders, establish more effective checks on the progress and quality of training periods and attendance at them, and improve independent work by students with primary sources. We must look carefully to see whether the potential of clubs, libraries, reference information centers, and methodological offices, which are expected to help political self-education by servicemen, is being used well. Finally, the main thing is how to strengthen the impact of training on the service activities of the officers, their everyday work indoctrinating subordinates, unifying military collectives, and bolstering discipline and combat readiness. The only way one can truly fight to raise the effectiveness of training is by finding solid solutions to practical questions.

The current training year includes such important events as the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War. This is the year of immediate preparations for the 26th Congress of the CPSU. It is important to create all necessary conditions for broader education of officers in the riches of Leninist ideas to enable them to carry out the teachings of the leader on defense of the socialist Fatherland. Military cadres must be trained to think broadly and creatively, to pose and solve urgent problems in a Leninist style, straightforwardly, following high principles. A profound knowledge of revolutionary theory should inspire commanders, political workers, engineers, and technicians, everyone who carries the title of Soviet officer, to be even more active in performing those lofty missions which the party has placed before the Armed Forces.

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CRITICISM: OFFICER EXPLOITS FAMILY CONNECTIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Shevchenko and Capt A. Borovkov, Red Banner Odessa M. D.: "A Time for Serious Decisions"]

[Text] At one of the first artillery firing drills after arrival in the unit Lt Vladimir Belonogov made such a bad mistake in orientation of the gun that if the order to fire had been given the target could not possibly have been hit.

While solving a firing problem at a check training period, the same officer copied the final firing data from the notebook of the battalion chief of staff and reported these figures to the training leader. To test the officer's knowledge further the training leader changed the situation slightly. Once again the battery's fire was far from the target.

For flagrant violations of the rules for organization and conduct of fire Lieutenant Belonogov was warned of possible unfitness for service.

These are just two incidents, but from them it is easy to form a picture of the military competence and training of the officer. From them one may surmise the position which this person occupies in the world, so to speak. After all, facts are hard to argue with. But we will give one more fact and show that the obvious on occasion turns out to be unlikely. Lieutenant Belonogov, after graduating from school with average grades, was immediately appointed commander of an artillery battery, bypassing the platoon level.

Let us put Belonogov's service record aside for a time. Let us picture the lieutenant hunched over a sheet of paper, writing a request to be transferred to the position of leader of a fire platoon.

What emotions are throbbing inside him? How difficult this is, to agree that you are in the wrong place! It is a hard, courageous step, but also justified and necessary. It is a step that arouses sympathy for the young officer. We will not rush ahead, however, composing a cheerful mental picture of reeducation based on a, so to speak, voluntary change in attitude and an objective reevaluation of values. The report was written, but immediately afterward the lieutenant took a short trip home, to his parents, and after that there was not another word about submitting the report. He described his earlier decision as plainly not well thought out.

We had an interview with Belonogov, if it can be called an interview when the subject responds unwillingly with brief, guarded statements. We tried to get to the roots of his mistakes and understand his posture in life. His answers were, "I do not agree with the commander's opinion. They are prejudiced against me." He used roughly the same words to explain his behavior to his fellow servicemen. Furthermore, in talking with them and with the battalion commander he said several times, "When my mother comes, she will find out everything."

Well now, is this an article about nursery school? Is there any meaning to such a statement by Lieutenant Belonogov? Alas, it turned out that there was.

Col Nikolay Vasil'yevich Belonogov, now retired, is a very respected man. He traveled a hard road in the war and received combat orders and medals. It was entirely natural that the family wanted their son Vladimir to make his career in the army. And because Nikolay Vasil'yevich has served as deputy commander of the cadet battalion for political affairs at the Odessa Higher Artillery Command School imeni M. V. Frunze in recent years, his son's studies there went smoothly and evenly, as if on a well-beaten track. Vladimir had privileges over his classmates. He visited home more often, and he did not have to strain during examination periods, correctly counting on his teachers to be easy with him. Under such conditions some people would have attained a diploma with distinction. Cadet Belonogov was not interested in this at all, apparently thinking that when he was given a real job he would show what he could do.

We have already seen what he showed with respect to special training. We will add one more fact of a different order. Lieutenant Belonogov was late returning to the unit after leave and tried to deceive the commanders and his fellow servicemen by claiming to have been sick.

That is how he stands before us today. Needless to say, if we seek those to blame for the situation in which Belonogov finds himself, first of all the finger must point at Belonogov himself. What kind of infantile, irresponsible, flippant behavior is this! After all, he is a grown man, not a boy. Furthermore, he is an officer and a commander. How can his behavior be correlated with these titles and with the enormous responsibility that he carries? His commanders and fellow servicemen should also be criticized; everything would have been better if they had given the young officer serious attention from the first day he joined them. The service, we say, indoctrinates a person. But the indoctrination process begins much earlier, before the officer arrives in the unit and takes men under his command. It begins in the family, in regular school, and then at the military school. Here, like it or not, we must speak of Vladimir Belonogov's parents. They used every means to protect their child from extra hardship and, willingly or not, taught him that everything in his life should be smooth and easy.

The validity of this idea is being confirmed today by the behavior of Lieutenant Belonogov and the actions of his mother. Judge for yourself. Desiring to defend her unjustly (in the opinion of the parents) insulted son, she visited a number of officials: the unit commander, the formation commander, the chief of the political branch, and other senior officers. She even went to the district political directorate, and then recently the same purpose took her to Moscow.

Vladimir Belonogov's mother did not, of course, find support at any of these levels. Col N. Bodrov, secretary of the district party commission who investigated her complaint of injustice toward her son, minced no words in discussion with us: basically, Belonogov's parents hampered his development as an officer by their overprotection.

There are many military dynasties in our Armed Forces. It is remarkable that the sons inherit the noble and honored profession of their fathers and grandfathers and continue the work. Almost every garrison has young squad leaders and company commanders whose fathers are still in the ranks, occupying high positions. They have them by right, having earned them by irreproachable service and great deeds during the Great Patriotic War. We cannot help being pleased that these young officers are outstandingly independent and overcome the difficulties of the service straightforwardly. "Natural military leaders" — that is what they say about the people who have been accustomed to the Spartan discipline of military life and frequent changes of posts from childhood years, who firmly and consciously accept the hardships of the service on behalf of its lofty, sacred purposes. The contributions of the parents, no matter how great they may be, are only to the credit of the parents, and not in any case for their sons. Military dynasties are strong because each generation makes its own contribution to their glorious history. It is "their own"!

Sergey, son of Col Lev Ivanovich Gus'kov, graduated from military school in the same year that Belonogov did. He graduated with distinction and received the right to choose his place of service, which could have been Odessa, near his parents' home. But Lev Ivanovich advised his son to choose a post in the Far North: "Up there, beyond the Arctic Circle, you will strengthen your spirit, toughen up, and become a real commander."

Lev Ivanovich showed us letters from Sergey. Here are some short fragments from them: "Thank you, papa, for giving me the beauty of Arctic sunsets over the low hills, the Northern Lights in the midnight sky, and the first hardships which, I feel, I can handle." "Everything is okay here. I have more jobs to do, but it makes me happy that I can handle them." "When you are on leave and coming to visit me here, please arrive at the post in civilian clothes. Don't feel bad, I simply do not want any unnecessary talk."

Colonel Gus'kov did as his son asked, and when he presented himself to the regimental commander, he did not tell him the position which he occupies.

Lev Ivanovich recently received another letter from his son in which Sergey wrote that he had been promoted to senior lieutenant and that the company which he commands had been declared outstanding after the final inspection. Indeed, the success is natural. In large part it is based on Sergey's correct indoctrination. No one made it easy for him; from childhood he was taught that nothing comes without working for it.

The dependent attitude toward life is certainly strange to even mention in speaking of military men. But we have before us Lieutenant Belonogov and his whole story. It is a story which forces us to consider many things: the duty of parents, the roads we choose, and how a person travels along them, struggling with a headwind or bending under its power and trying to get off the road. It is time for Vladimir Belonogov to think about this. If he does not it will be too late, absolutely too late.

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PHYSICAL TRAINING: IN THE SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 80 p 4

[Article by Maj Gen V. Burdov, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Southern Group of Forces (SGF) and deputy chairmen of the sports committee of the SGF: "They Toughen and Discipline"]

[Text] In the final stage of the tactical exercise when the men seemed to be completely exhausted, the chemical defense battalion commanded by Maj B. Pavlov received the following input: conduct a march, deploy the equipment, and carry out special treatment of tank subunits. The men successfully handled this mission and earned a high evaluation. Privates A. Malyy, Yu. Mayakovskiy, and A. Shindin and Sgt N. Chebotak performed especially well at the exercise.

Not long after Maj B. Pavlov's subordinates distinguished themselves again. This time it was in the final phase of an inspection of sports work. During the control inspection they had demonstrated a high level of physical training, organization, discipline, and desire to achieve good results. The battalion looked outstanding in the inspection, and this was reflected in the final documents. Once again, the familiar names appeared among those who distinguished themselves: Malyy, Mayakovskiy, Shindin, and Chebotak. They are all rated sportsmen and holders of the Military Sports Complex Badge. This example confirms that, where other conditions are equal, the fighting men who participate regularly in sports and are active in morning exercises and physical training periods do best in combat training.

Leading commanders and political workers have already been convinced that sports drills and participation in competition not only toughen the men physically, but also have a very considerable impact on the formation of such qualities as sense of duty and responsibility to the collective. They promote harmonious development of the personality. Experience has shown that the state of personnel military discipline and organization depend significantly on the level of development of mass sports in subunits. There is also no doubt that where commanders and political agencies devote constant attention to improving the quality of the physical toughening process and where the party and Komsomol organizations are involved in this work, the proper regulation order is usually maintained and harmonious military collectives joined by a common purpose form.

The personnel of the battalion mentioned above can provide an example of this. In this battalion virtually all of the men have won the Military Sports Complex 1st degree badge and are rated sportsmen. It is not accidental that the level of military discipline and field skills is also high in the subunit.

The command and Military Council of the SGF devote a great deal of attention to the development of mass sports in the units and subunits. We view the inspections of sports work held each year in the Armed Forces as an important stimulus in the campaign for all personnel to master combat skills. Special attention is devoted to organizing socialist competition to achieve good results in physical training and sports. It is competition that helps commanders and political workers mobilize personnel, bring those who are behind up to the level of the leaders, and strengthen military discipline even further. Giving publicity to readily comparable results and constantly monitoring fulfillment of obligations have made it possible to exclude virtually all formalism in sports work.

For example, competition for high sports indexes is precisely organized in the unit where Lt Col V. Sernevich is a member of the sports committee. I recall that the obligations for training Military Sports Complex badge holders and rated sportsmen assumed by these tank soldiers seemed unlikely to some at first. But the regimental commander, party committee, sports committee, and Komsomol activists did the necessary work with personnel. The result was that every single man in the regiment fulfilled the plan by the concluding stage of the inspection of sports work. More than 90 percent of the tank soldiers became rated sportsmen and a similar percentage fulfilled the standards of the Military Sports Complex 1st degree.

In my opinion, the regimental commander correctly attributes this success to the great explanatory and organizational work done by communists and other officers of the unit. Training periods and sports drills are held regularly there with an appropriately high methodological level. The regiment organizes frequent mass competitions. Communists and Komsomol members are the initiators and most active participants in them.

The party committee has reviewed questions of physical training and sports many times. But adopting decisions is one thing, and carrying them out is another. This problem has not arisen in the regiment, and I think this is largely because the party committee makes skillful use of the activism of Komsomol members, guiding it into the necessary channels. All servicemen, especially young men, participate enthusiastically in socialist competition related to sports. It is especially deserving of attention that the competition is not just for personal achievements, but equally for the sporting honor of the crew, platoon, company, and battalion.

That is why no one is surprised that this regiment is considered the best in the group, not just for sports indexes but also for the results of combat and political training and discipline. It holds the title of outstanding.

Physical training and sports are by no means a minor part of forming the military character. Therefore, the organization of drills and sports holidays in the units and garrisons of the group is considered very important. Most of the units have sports holidays with participation by all personnel every month. The programs of events usually include crosscountry running, the 100 meter dash in military uniform, grenade throwing, sports games, and multifaceted relays which include exercises and elements from combat training programs.

It is noteworthy that in many units the Komsomol committees have been the initiators of sports holidays and other useful activities. They disseminate the achievements of leading military athletes by all means and willingly help those who are lagging behind. Foremost among these committees is the Komsomol committee made up of officers V. Murzayev, V. Kapytovskiy, S. Doroshenko, and S. Kornyushin.

However, it must be remarked immediately that some Komsomol workers do not show this kind of activism and involvement in the development of sports. The men of the subunits where the Komsomol organizations are headed by comrades V. Savchenko, V. Sedykh, and V. Sych did considerably worse than expected at the physical training inspection. Incidentally, they were not at all impressive in combat training either. When speaking of the inertia of certain Komsomol committees, I am unable to refrain from a criticism of the party organizations of these subunits. The facts show that the party activists there take a cool attitude, to put it mildly, towards sports.

We are already accustomed to the fact that the outstanding athlete is usually an exemplary soldier. He is strong, enduring, and faithful to his duty. It is very important that commanders and senior officers see these qualities in him first of all. But it does happen sometimes that behind the laurels of the champion are a lack of discipline and moral turpitude. Although they are not common, such cases, unfortunately, still occur. For example, Jr Sgt Ext Serv A. Kolpakov, a member of the wrestling team, had a certain fondness for alcohol. Coach V. Saunin, it came out, knew of this but took no steps. He seemed to think that Kolpakov was a very important man on the team. Strict disciplinary measures had to be taken with the athlete, and at the same time the coach's failures in indoctrination work were pointed out to him.

Sports toughen and discipline. While steadily improving the process of physical training and the organization of mass sports work, we must also strive to continue raising the level of combat training in personnel and to strengthen discipline and regulation order.

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END

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*Cover-to-cover

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23 May 1980

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1515

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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JPRS 75762

23 May 1980

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1515

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MILITARY DISCIPLINE: MILITARY COUNCIL TOPIC

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Khorunshiy: "Strengthen Discipline"

[Text] Northern Group of Forces. The regular session of the military council in the Group of Forces was devoted to the state of discipline in the units and subunits. The lecturer--Maj Gen N. Lushnichenko, a member of the military council and the chief of the political directorate for the Group of Forces--and the commanding general of the Group of Forces Col Gen Yu. Zarudin, who spoke before the assembly, told of the experience gained in strengthening military discipline in the Orshanskiy Guards Tank Regiment, which is decorated with the Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Alexander Nevskiy, and in other leading units.

Specific measures were planned at the meeting to increase the responsibility of commanders and political workers in strengthening military discipline and in improving the education of their subordinates in the spirit of diligence and loyalty to the principles of communist morality.

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ADMINISTRATION: INSPECTION RESULTS REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen L. Balashov, deputy chief of the political directorate for the Moscow Military District, Order of Lenin, in the column "Party Life: Efficiency and the Creative Approach": "Through the Efforts of the People's Inspectors"]

[Text] The people's control group headed by Lt Col T. Shevchenko was in good repute. It was working according to a precise plan and making regular checks, going into all the detail of the unit administration and services. In the partkom the units could not have been happier with their scouts.

Then, suddenly, like a bolt from out of the blue: a commission from the okrug people's control committee discovered in the unit very gross violations of storage rules and violations of the servicing and operating procedures for engineering equipment, and exposed serious defects in the accounting procedures for POL products, clothing and rations.

"How can that be?" said Maj V. Andreyev, a member of the partkom, in disbelief. "Our group often checked just these areas and discovered nothing that would cause alarm."

Of course, there was no mistake about it. But the fact remains that while the group was not idle, its work efficiency turned out to be quite low. Why?

Lt Col Shevchenko, the chairman of the group, explained it by claiming that the group's members lack experience. Hence, allegedly, the superficial nature of the inspections done.

And you must admit, there was a certain argument in what the chairman said. It is true that many of the comrades had been selected for membership in the group for the first time. To which must be added that the majority is, with regard to the type of its service, far removed from the problems of unit administration and services. It does not know the nuances involved, and you cannot grasp them in one fell swoop.

There are, however, other reasons, more significant ones, in my view. One of them is to be found in the lack of daily attention paid to the group's work by the commander and unit partkom.

Here the training of the scouts in the art of control is not as well arranged as it should be. Logistics specialists and other officers and warrant officers with competence in the area of unit administration and services are rarely conscripted into the group. Nor did the partkom react properly to the results of the checks done by the investigators. In the majority of cases they were not made public, were only "referred for your information," and no fundamental conclusions about them followed.

The example given indicates clearly what unskilled leadership in the people's control work by the partkom revolves around.

But that is a matter which can be corrected; people can be taught. It is a more complicated situation when there is no coordination of work between the partkom and group of scouts because the secretary himself sets limits to their activity and restrains their initiative.

A year ago people's controllers led by V. R[illegible]lina, the chairman of the group, uncovered inflated statistics at a facility being repaired by the construction directorate headed by Engr-Maj G. Ageyev. N. Kuznechuk, the partkom secretary in the office of the work supervisor, was informed of it. He promised to take appropriate action

A half year passed, and the people's controllers decided to check on how the defects were being eliminated. But the partkom secretary recommended that they "not bother" the builders. Allegedly, all their work was going on according to the plan.

At the end of November the builders reported the work complete. The commander and members of the people's control group for the unit, jointly with representatives of the office of the work supervisor, toured all the facilities ready for takeover. It was a sorry sight that awaited them. The builders had taken not less than 15 months for the repairs. It would seem that in that period everything could be accomplished in an outstanding manner. But in actuality such was far from the case: it was obvious that there were still many defects.

None of this would have happened, had these bad workmen been made accountable right away. But the partkom did not intervene even after being signalled by the people's controllers. The partkom secretary verbally called on the scouts to be more active. All went well when just petty defects were at issue. But then the inspectors "dug deeper," as they say, and uncovered negative phenomena characteristic not only of the construction sector, but of the whole office of the work supervisor. And here the partkom secretary surrendered his principles and let the people's inspectors know that they were "interfering in others' affairs."

The district political directorate condemned in principle the fact of such direction of the army's scouts by political bodies and organizations. At the same time the reasons for all this were revealed too. One of them is that certain newly-selected partkom and party bureau secretaries do not understand the tasks of people's control very precisely. When speaking about independence of action among the scouts they outline the range of their obligations very indistinctly and forget that control is only effective when it is concretely directed by the commander and reinforced by his organizational work and by the work of the party body entrusted with the elimination of defects and the reasons which underlie bad management practices as well.

Of course, such facts cannot be termed typical. But they do exist. And it must be definitively stated that this harms our overall cause, fetters the initiative of the people's inspectors, and reduces their level of purpose and the effectiveness of their activity.

The depth and effectiveness of popular control depend upon precise planning of the work of the social scouts, careful selection of the activists, efficient review of the results of their investigations, and decision making. Concern about publicity on the work of the people's investigators and about sharing the experience of the best groups and posts is of great importance as well. Those political bodies and party organizations which devote daily attention to these matters and strive to improve the forms and methods for directing the people's investigators have, as a rule, greater effectiveness in the struggle for conservation and economy, fewer losses, and less bad management and waste.

In this regard the experience of coordinated, purposeful effort by the commander, partkom, and group of people's investigators in Eng-Lt Col I. Ukrainskiy's unit deserves attention. What is it that is good here? First of all, all activity of the group is precisely planned with regard to assignments, time, and facilities. People's control posts have been established and actively function at every site, and a wall newspaper titled "Through the Vigilant Eye of the Scouts" is published. The partkom systematically listens to the chairman of the group and the senior members at the posts. Comprehensive checks are organized for sectors that lag. Members of the partkom, social investigators, experienced specialists, and also activists from the "Komsomol Searchlight" participate in them.

As a rule, after each such raid an expanded session of the partkom is conducted, to which the site and facility directors are invited. The discussion is principled and concrete, as befits the Party. Not only are the facts of bad management presented here; the names of those comrades through whose fault the defects were permitted are given as well. And here steps are planned to eliminate these defects. It is after just one such session in the unit that a campaign really developed to introduce small-scale mechanization, improve the quality of the departments' work, and conserve construction materials.

The military builders in this unit work well. All their projects are of high quality and are accepted on the first presentation; great financial and material resources have been conserved. The weighty contribution of the people's investigators and the results of their profound, concrete work can be clearly seen in the achievements of the collective.

The experience of this unit's people's control group, like that of the majority of other okrug groups, convincingly attests to the fact that success is achieved where the activity of the social scouts receives daily support from commanders, party organizations, and is directed toward one goal: to persistently enhance quality and efficiency in the struggle to conserve assets and materials, to care for our weapons and combat equipment, and in the final analysis, to constantly support a high level of combat readiness.

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GRADUATE SCHOOLS: ADMISSIONS INFORMATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 80 p 4

[Article by Lt Gen A. Trofimov: "To Those Who Have Chosen the Path to Science"]

> [Text] How to enter a graduate school. Our mail to the editor contains many letters from readers who are interested in knowing who is admitted for graduate school, when the entrance exams will be given, and what benefits are granted to applicants. In particular, Capt Ye. Malkov, Sr Lt N. Osadchiy, and others ask about this topic.
>
> We have asked the directorate chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Lt Gen A. Trofimov, to answer our readers' questions.

Officers of the armed forces of the USSR who are on active duty and have a higher education (military, military-specialized, or graduates of civilian institutes of higher education), practical work experience in officer billets of not less than 2 years following graduation from a higher education institute, and who have shown the ability for pedagogic work or scientific research are accepted for graduate work. With the recommendation of the council of a military training institute officers may be admitted immediately following graduation from a higher education institute, if they have had at least 2 years' experience in officers' billets prior to entering that institute.

It is predominantly officers from the billets of deputy regimental commander, their equivalents, and above who are admitted into the operational-tactical departments of the military academies, while those from the billets of deputy batallion commander, their equivalents, and above are admitted into the tactical departments of the higher military institutes.

Officers aged 35 or below--and for the operational-tactical and party-political specialties up to 38--are accepted as resident graduate students. Officers up to age 40 are accepted for graduate coursework by correspondence. The term of study for resident graduate coursework is 3 years; for correspondence work--4 years.

A graduate school application is submitted via chain of command. Along with it the following will be presented: a list of published scholarly works and inventions (those applicants without scholarly works or inventions must present scholarly papers on their selected specialty); properly certified copies of a graduation diploma from a higher education institute, and an extract from one's record book (transcript); service and party-political (or Komsomol) references; a report on one's state of health, with remarks regarding the possibility of doing graduate work; an extract from the record of proceedings for the council session at the higher education institute (for officers entering directly after graduation from a military training institute); a certification that the applicant has passed the candidate's exam called for by his specialty (for those individuals who have passed the candidate's exams fully or in part); and one's service card.

A decision on admission to the entrance exams or on rejection is made, taking into account the written evaluation of the paper or scholarly works by the proposed supervisor of studies. The applicant must be notified not less than 2 months before the beginning of the entrance exams regarding the decision of the selection board.

Officers permitted to take the exams are granted, in addition to regular leave, additional leave of 30 calendar days (with pay) to prepare for them. Applicants who have passed part of their candidate's exams and who are exempt from taking the corresponding entrance exams are granted additional paid leave in the amount of 10 days per exam.

An additional paid period for travel from one's place of duty to and from the site of the higher education institute (scientific-research establishment) is added to the leave time. Officers accepted for graduate study without taking the entrance exams do not have the right to additional leave. Those who earlier used additional leave to prepare for graduate school entrance exams and take them will not be granted it again.

The notice of admission to an administration of the entrance exams, signed by the director of the military training institute or the scientific-research establishment, is the document which attests to the applicant's right to such leave.

The entrance exams for graduate work in 1980 are given during the period 1 June to 30 August; for those military training institutes and scientific-research establishments located in Moscow--from 20 August to 10 September.

Graduate school applicants take competitive entrance exams on the material in the higher education institute's program in their specialty discipline, in CPSU history, and in one of the foreign languages (English, French, German, Italian, or Spanish). The entrance exam in the specialty discipline precedes those in other disciplines. The exams may not be retaken.

Officers who have passed all of the candidate's exams called for by a specialty for which graduate students are taken are exempt from taking entrance exams and have a preferential right to admission.

Those who have passed their candidate's exams in part (those in the major specialty and a foreign language) can be exempted from taking the corresponding entrance exams through a decision by the selection board, upon their personal application for such dispensation. In this case they are assigned the grades received on those candidate's exams. The candidate's exam in a specialty discipline should, as a rule, be taken at the military training institute or scientific research establishment to which the officer is applying for graduate work.

Officers who have passed their candidate's exams in part, as well as those who have scholarly works and inventions, are permitted to take candidate's exams instead of entrance exams between 1 June and 30 August (in Moscow, between 20 August and 10 September).

Detailed information on graduate school selection rules and the specialties for which applicants will be accepted in 1980 can be acquired in headquarters and the personnel sections of units, establishments, and military training institutes.

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CRITICISM: WARRANT OFFICER'S DISCHARGE QUESTIONED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Shchekotov, correspondent for Red Star, the Ural Red Banner MD: "...And a False Note Came Out" in the column "On the Track of the Mail"]

[Text] Warrant Officer N. Gorshkov, OIC of a warehouse, was discharged from active duty into the reserves. Dismissed for faults which discredit the profession of arms. These faults--systematic drunkenness, lack of punctuality, and other violations of military discipline--are described in detail in a report compiled in connection with the warrant officer's dismissal and on his service card as well. And if we believe these documents, then it can be said that the decision made regarding him was correct. But that is, if we believe them. And if we check?

After finishing in the training subunit, Warrant Officer Gorshkov filled successive billets as battery chief, regimental paymaster, and then was assigned as the OIC of a warehouse. Sure, he had his faults. But in contrast to his four commendations earned as the paymaster, he received but one reprimand. One would think that the overall evaluation of the warrant officer's service should correspond to this.

And so it was, in fact. A man who had never been faulted while in the regimental fiscal office was assigned to run the warehouse. It was believed that Gorshkov would square away an area clearly neglected by his predecessor, Warrant Officer A. Pimenov. But someone or other was clearly bothered when the new warehouse OIC began decisively imposing order.

While taking over the warehouse, Gorshkov discovered a significant shortage of property. A report on it was drawn up. Day after day the warrant officer reminded the chief of the unit's supply department Sr Lt A. Shutov and other officials that somehow the shortage had to be accounted for. But they took no action. And then Gorshkov wrote about it to Red Star.

At the editorial board's request the district logistics headquarters began looking into the state of affairs. A notice from the unit commander concerning a new inspection of property was rapidly dispatched there. Its results led to a decision to withhold from Warrant Officer Pimenov's pay the cost of the missing articles. Now, it seemed, all would be in order, and the man who had shown such principles would be thanked. However, events took a different turn.

Warrant Officer Gorshkov was ordered to turn over the warehouse. While doing so a new shortage was discovered. So as, beyond all expectation, not to repeat what happened when Gorshkov took over the warehouse, the report on that acceptance was destroyed. But if the man permitted a property loss, not only does he have no place in the warehouse, but in the army as well. Major V. Puzanov, the unit's deputy commander for logistics, in fact decided on his own to dismiss the warrant officer from the armed forces.

But so that the decision would not look too much like getting back at a man because he had "cleaned house" by turning to the newspaper, Maj Puzanov thought it possible to pin something on his obstinate subordinate of which he was not guilty. Since there had never been any discussion of Gorshkov's "amoral behavior" in the unit, no one had seen him drunk on duty.

Unfortunately, a letter about such a turn in affairs arrived too late at the editorial offices. The "reaction machine," though, wound up with just amazing speed in response to the warrant officer's appeal to the paper.

The unit's headquarters had "not noticed" either the backdated reprimands on the service card or the false sounding conclusions in the investigation report. Moreover, the forged signatures of several members of the investigation board appeared on the report, and beneath a copy of the service card--the "signature" of Gorshkov himself. It was simply not considered necessary to acquaint him with the report's contents.

But what about the personnel department's workers? Shouldn't they know the detail of their qualified specialties, and that white does not become black in an hour's time? But Maj Yu. Prostorov, despite his own rule to consult with political workers any time something like this occurs, failed to do so this time. Maj G. Bratus', who works in the district personnel department, also failed to give proper attention to the fate of this man. Even when the real story of the decision to dismiss the warrant officer became known, he categorically refused to believe the facts. You see, people who complain to the newspaper do not deserve his trust.

And so it happened that the desire of Maj Puzanov to rid himself--through any means at all--of a man whom he did not consider fit turned out to be more weighty than elementary logic, than the party principles of personnel work, and the best interests of the unit. The unit is openly discussing the episode and doing so with quite understandable astonishment. Really, why was the false note that sounded in the conclusions about Warrant Officer Gorshkov's service not noticed by anyone and permitted to work against him?

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COMPLAINT: BATH FACILITIES INADEQUATE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Feb 80 p 4

[Article by Col A. Pinchuk, Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent, in the column "Letter with Commentary": "Why Spoil the Mood?"]

> [Text] Dear Editorial Board: When the regular bathing day approaches, the mood of the students at our warrant officers school turns bad. Everything in our school is exemplary--the commanders, instructors, training classes, equipment, Lenin Rooms and quarters. But we have not been as lucky with the bath. The dressing room is dirty, there are no stands, few benches, the faucets work badly, the steam room is shut, and wind blows through the cracks. And it is terrible to walk onto the cold cement floor. Whenever we remember that we still have to bathe in such a bath, our mood turns bad at once. (Signed) Warrant Officer Students N. Yerankin, A. Tootman.

I arrived on post at precisely the time when the men were bathing. My own mood was spoiled when I visited the bath too. All that the students had written about was true. The bath, as they say, left much to be desired.

I spoke with the officers D. Grin'ko, N. Boldin, and V. Khokhlov. They all agreed: the complaint was justified.

"We have often asked workers in the district housing operation administration about major repairs," said Dmitriy Ivanovich Grin'ko. "We were promised that the needed work would be done in 1977. But as you see, this mess is still around, although the job was assigned to someone in the office of the work supervisor."

"Let them give us the pipes, sanitary equipment, and paint," interjected Nikolay Sergeyevich Boldin, "and we will fix everything ourselves. You cannot do anything without material from the fund. Otherwise we just rob Peter to pay Paul."

But I kept waiting for them to say what upsets the students most, since stands can be set up, benches repaired, and the cracks in the doors fixed even without material from the fund. It is not hard to build wooden platforms either, so that the people would not need to walk barefoot on the cement floor.

"That is a trifle," I was assured. "It can be done in two shakes."

Old timers relate that this bath has been causing reprimands for a good decade already. But the "trifle" which can be eliminated in 2 shakes has become a serious problem for some reason. One would think that the problem is not so much lack of fund material as lack of attention to the troops' well being.

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BORDER GUARDS SCHOOLS: ADMISSIONS INFORMATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 80 p 4

[Announcement of application procedures for KGB border guards, MVD interior troops academies: "For Those Who Want to Become Officers"]

[Text] The Officer Academies for Border Guards of the USSR Committee for State Security Announce Admissions to the First Course at:

The Mossoviet Red Banner Officers Academy for Border Guards of the USSR KGB in Moscow (129328, Moscow I-328)

The F. E. Dzerzhinskiy Red Banner Officers Academy for Border Guards of the USSR KGB (480075, Alma-Ata, 75)

The K. Ye. Voroshilov Red Banner Military-Political Academy for Border Guards of the USSR KGB (143040, Golitsyno, Moscow Oblast)

These schools prepare officers for the USSR KGB border forces. The term of study is 4 years. Graduates of the schools are commissioned lieutenants and awarded an all-union diploma with their qualification as follows:

--for the border guards officer academies, as "line officers with a general higher education." In the Moscow Border Guards Officer Academy the officers receive in addition a specialization in foreign language: "officers with a higher military-specialized education. Translator-foreign language specialist."

--for the military-political academy, as "officers with a higher military-political education."

The military academies accept reenlistees from all branches of the USSR armed forces who are not over 21 years of age, regardless of military specialty. Civilian candidates between 17 and 21 years of age (on 1 September of the year of admission) are also admitted for study; junior troops and sergeants in the reserves who are up to 23 years old may be admitted if they have completed their term of active duty in the USSR armed forces.

The schools accept those individuals who have completed their secondary education and are physically fit for study in the military training institutes.

The political academy accepts CPSU members, candidate members, and Komomol members who have shown the inclination for political work, if they are recommended by their political organizations of Komsomol raykoms (gorkoms).

Servicemen who desire to attend a school must submit a request to their unit commander via chain of command not later than 25 February; civilian youths must submit a statement to that effect to the personnel department of the KGB-KGB Directorate in their place of residence by 30 March.

Entrance exams are given covering secondary school material as follows:

for the officer academies--on mathematics (written and oral), physics (oral), and Russian language and literature (written). Applicants for the Moscow Border Guards Officer Academy and a foreign language specialty--on Russian language and literature (written and oral), history of the USSR, and foreign language (oral); for the military-political academy--on Soviet history, geography, mathematics (oral), and Russian language and literature (written).

In addition, to determine the applicants' physical readiness, servicemen must take a practical test on exercises contained in the Military Sports System of the USSR Armed Forces, and civilian youths--on exercises in the All-Union System "Ready for Labor and Defense of the USSR."

The exams begin as follows: for the Mossoviet Academy and military-political academy, for servicemen--on 5 August, and for civilians--on 18 August. For the F. E. Dzerzhinskiy Officers Academy, for servicemen--on 1 July, and for civilian youths--10 July.

Officer Academies of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs:

The Novosibirsk Officers Academy of the USSR MVD (630114, Novosibirsk, 114)

The S. M. Kirov Red Banner Officers Academy of the USSR MVD in Ordzhonikidze (362005, Ordzhonikidze, 5)

The F. E. Dzerzhinskiy Officers Academy of the USSR MVD in Saratov (410023, Saratov, 23)

The Komsomol-Sixtieth-Anniversary Political Academy of the USSR MVD (198075, Leningrad, L-75)

The Kharkov Logistics Officers Academy of the USSR MVD (310005, Kharkov, 5)

These schools prepare officers for service in the interior forces of the USSR MVD. The schools accept junior servicemen and those liable for military service who are not older than 21, reenlistees (at the expiration of 2 years of their reenlistment) who are not older than 23, warrant officers who are not older than 25 (at the expiration of 2 years' service in warrant officers' or officers' billets), and civilian youths aged 17-21. Applicants for the military training institutes must have completed their secondary education.

The Political Academy of the USSR MVD accepts CPSU members, candidate members, and Komsomol members who have shown the inclination for political work, if recommended by the political organizations of their military units or Komsomol raykoms (gorkoms).

Warrant officers are accepted for all military training institutes of the USSR MVD in a specialty corresponding to the one in which they rendered military service or for which they received training in special secondary training institutes, if they have served for at least two years as follows: for the officer academies--as a platoon commander or company senior NCO; for the political academy--in non-attached political billets or in the billet of platoon commander or company senior NCO.

The term of study is 4 years.

Servicemen desiring to attend the school must submit an application via chain of command by 25 March of the year of matriculation; those liable for military service and civilian youths must submit a statement to this effect to their rayon (city) military commissariats or to the internal affairs departments at their place of residence by 30 April of the year of matriculation.

The following will be appended to the application:

an autobiography, a questionnaire, service (work, school) and Party references, copies of the birth certificate and documents concerning secondary education (secondary school students will present current progress reports), and 3 certified photographs (without head attire, size--4.5 by 6 cm.).

The passport, record of service or draft registration slip, the original documents concerning secondary education, and birth certificate will be presented to the selection board by the candidate upon his arrival at the military academy.

All academy applicants will take entrance exams. For the political academy: on Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, Soviet history and geography (oral); for the Novosibirsk, Ordzhonokidze, and Saratov Officers Academies, and for the Kharkov Logistics Officers Academy as well: on Russian language and literature (written), mathematics (written and oral), and physics (oral). Applicants for the quartermaster career field at the Kharkov Logistics Officers Academy will take an exam on chemistry (oral) in place of the exam on mathematics (written).

The entrance exams begin for servicemen on 15 June and for civilian youths on 15 July.

Candidates are provided with free travel, quarters, and messing.

Individuals who graduate from the academies are commissioned as lieutenants and awarded an all-union diploma with their qualification as follows:

--at the Novosibirsk, Ordzhonokidze, and Saratov Officers Academies, as "motorized rifle officers with a higher education."

--at the political academy, as "officers with a higher political education."

--at the Kharkov Logistics Officers Academy, as "motor transport officers, engineer-mechanics" (for the motor transportation career field); as "ordnance officers, engineer-mechanics" (for the ordnance career field); and as "food and material supply officers, engineer-economists" (for the quartermaster career field).

Warrant officers and reenlistees draw the rate of pay authorized for their last billet and have the right to live in private quarters.

9610
CSO: 1801

ARMED FORCES: ACHIEVEMENTS, TASKS NOTED

LD021409 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Always on Guard"]

[Text] Spring is progressing throughout our immense motherland. In the south orchards are already in blossom and the grainfields show green. But in places people are still only preparing to sow, and in places the spring sun has not yet melted the snows. Our motherland is great and beautiful, and strenuous creative labor is in full swing throughout its vast territory, in every corner of it. The Soviet people are accomplishing giant deeds under the party's leadership. Our socialist homeland is advancing along its constant, immutable course bequeathed by V. I. Lenin. It is a course of peaceful creation, further transformation of the country's immense expanses and augmentation of the people's materials and spiritual wealth. Soviet people have every reason to look calmly and confidently to the future. With a sense of pride in our achievements and imbued with the desire to continue working persistently to implement the plans of communist building, they are greeting the May Day festival and the 35th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War.

For 35 years the peoples of the Soviet Union and the socialist community have been enjoying the benefits of peace. This results from the fact that our party and our country together with the fraternal socialist countries are persistently and indefatigably waging the historic battle for peace on earth and for lasting, just peace for all peoples. At the same time it results from the fact that the Soviet Union together with its Warsaw Pact allies possesses everything necessary to deal a decisive and mighty rebuff to any encroachment on our country and our allies. We have something to defend, something with which to defend it and the people to defend it!

"...The Soviet people," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress, "can rest assured that the fruits of their creative labor are under reliable protection.

"No one must have any doubts that our party will do everything to ensure that the Soviet Union's glorious armed forces continue to possess all the necessary means to fulfill their responsible task--to guard the Soviet people's peaceful labor and be the bulwark of world peace." The years since the congress have convincingly confirmed the correctness of the party's high assessment of the armed forces and provided graphic new evidence of its indefatigable concern for strengthening the country's defense capability and enhancing the combat might of the army and navy.

The communist party's leadership is the fundamental basis of Soviet military building and the inexhaustible source of the Soviet armed forces' strength and invincibility. This is evidenced by the entire heroic history of our army and navy. The modern stage is characterized by a further increase in the CPSU's role in leadership of the armed forces. The party makes skillful and purposeful use of the advantages and potential of the developed socialist society to strengthen the country's defense capability and to enhance the armed forces' combat might and combat readiness. In terms of technical equipment, organizational structure, personnel training and combat morale they meet the strictest modern demands.

Soviet servicemen hold sacred the nationwide attention toward the armed forces. The motherland's defenders respond to the constant concern of the party and the government for enhancing the combat might of the army and navy with new achievements in combat and political training and increased vigilance toward the vigilance and the USSR constitution's demand on the armed forces--be in a state of permanent combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor--sound especially topical today. Imperialism's recent deliberate exacerbation of the international situation, which expresses its fear of the consolidation of socialism's positions, the upsurge of the national liberation movement and the strengthening of forces advocating detente and peace, dictates the need to raise vigilance still higher, to improve combat readiness and to strengthen organization and discipline.

New confirmation of the Soviet servicemen's loyalty to their patriotic duty is provided by the high results which they have achieved in the competition for a fitting greeting for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth in the concluding winter training period and by the increased field, air and sea training. Many formations, units, ships, subunits, military educational institutions and also servicemen have been awarded the honorary Lenin Certificate. The recipients of the high award include the Marshal of Armored Forces M. Ye. Katukov Chertkovskiy Guards Tank Regiment, in a unit of surface ships, the artillery division commanded by Maj A. Kovalev and the Leningrad Higher Military Political School of Air Defense.

What has been achieved in the winter training period is a good foundation for further progress. It is the duty of commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations to make an in-depth analysis of what has been done from positions of high exactingness and with regard to the constantly increasing demands of modern combat, to point out those who have distinguished themselves and to reveal the reasons for shortcomings which have occurred. The preliminiary results of winter training show that certain units and ships failed to achieve the required quality in fulfilling combat and political training plans and did not fulfill their competition pledges in full. The struggle for quality and efficiency in combat training has still not become the main direction everywhere, and the slogan "not one laggard alongside" is not being implemented with proper persistence everywhere.

In addition to subunits which have achieved high results, in a number of units and formations there are still companies, batteries, squadrons and battalions which have not risen beyond a satisfactory assessment. It is all the more important to introduce progressive experience in a businesslike way and to strive persistently to bring laggards up to the level of foremost workers. While summing up what has been achieved during winter training, it is necessary at the same time to prepare for the start of summer training purposefully and without delay so as to start it in an organized manner, and to do everything necessary for the successful completion of this training year--a year of shock military labor.

Soviet servicemen keep their continuous combat watch shoulder to shoulder with servicemen of the armies of the states of the Warsaw Pact, whose 25th anniversary will soon be celebrated by the socialist community countries. The bonds of combat friendship linking the fraternal armies are strengthening yearly. Imbued with the ideas of socialist internationalism, our comprehensive cooperation is constantly deepening and developing and serves as an effective factor insuring peace and the peoples' security.

The Soviet people can rest assured that their armed defenders are utterly loyal to the heroic traditions of their grandfathers and fathers, bear aloft and will continue worthily to bear the combat banners covered with the glory of victories. They are always ready for an exploit in the name of our socialist homeland. They are responding with new achievements in military labor to the CPSU Central Committee May-Day slogan:

"Soviet servicemen! Improve combat and political training, vigilantly and reliably guard the Soviet people's peaceful labor and socialism's great achievements!

"Long live the valiant armed forces of the USSR!"

CSO: 1801

AIR DEFENSE FORCES DAY: MARSHAL KOLDUNOV INTERVIEWED

LD050845 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 80 p 2

[Interview with Marshal of Aviation A. I. Koldunov, Air Defense Forces Commander in Chief and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, by PRAVDA correspondent, under the rubric "Today Is USSR Air Defense Forces Day": "Guardians of the Aerial Frontiers"]

[Text] On the eve of the holiday twice hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr Ivanovich Koldunov, commander in chief of the air defense forces and USSR deputy minister of defense, answered questions from a PRAVDA correspondent.

[Question] Please tell me about the purpose and combat potential of the country's air defense forces.

[Answer] The purpose of the country's air defense forces is to defend our people, economic, administrative, political and industrial centers and troop groupings against enemy air attack and to safeguard the vital activities of the Soviet state and Soviet people's peaceful labor.

The achievements in developing Soviet science and technology and the increase in the country's economic potential have made it possible to considerably enhance the reliability of our defense. The country's air defense forces now have arms which make it possible to destroy every kind of air attack weapon.

The basis of the country's air defense firepower is the antiaircraft missile troops armed with missile complexes for destroying airborne targets over a wide range of altitudes and speeds. Missile-carrying avaition constitutes a highly maneuverable category of troops. It is equipped with supersonic all-weather interceptor aircraft with powerful missile weapons and radar equipment. Radio engineering troops occupy an important place in our branch of the armed forces. Their purpose is to gather radar intelligence and to provide backup for combat operations by missile troops and fighter aircraft.

Automatic control systems have been introduced insuring the fullest utilization of the troops' combat potential and optimum decision-making in fast-moving and dynamic air defense actions.

[Question] This year the country celebrates the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The air defense forces made a considerable contribution to that victory....

[Answer] Yes, it was on the morning of 22 June, 1941 that antiaircraft artillery units and air defense fighter aircraft suffered the first strikes of a fascist air armada numbering some 5,000 warplanes.

The air defense forces--antiaircraft gunners, pilots and soldiers manning air observation, air raid warning and communications posts--together with air force fighter pilots boldly and selflessly joined battle with the fascist aces.

All of us who took part in the Great Patriotic War saw fighting until our hearts were pounding and destroying the enemy at all costs as our duty as soldiers, requiring all of us to stretch to the limit our will and strength and our courage and skill. The air defense forces covered themselves in unfading glory in the fighting around Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad and Novorossiysk and in the liberation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries from fascism. They successfully provided cover for troops on the battlefield, defended landing forces, sealed off surrounded enemy groupings and protected logistical installations. The air defense forces' main task was to prevent at all costs enemy aircraft from reaching an installation which was being defended. At all costs! Let me remind you of Jnr Lt V. Talalikhin, a pilot in the 177th fighter aircraft regiment who carried out a night ramming attack [taran]; Lt A. Katrich, a pilot in the 27th fighter aircraft regiment who carried out a high-altitude ramming attack; and Jnr Lt M. Borisov, who downed two German aircraft in the sky over Novorossiysk by ramming them with his own burning aircraft.

The air defense troops did not only fight enemy aircraft. Under complex combat conditions antiaircraft gunners frequently trained their guns and fired on tanks, assault guns and other enemy ground forces. Thus, for example, in the heroic days of the defense of Tula, under the command of Maj M. Bondarenko the gunners of the 732d antiaircraft artillery regiment engaged in heavy fighting both with aircraft and with fascist tanks which had broken through.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the air defense forces destroyed 7,300 enemy aircraft, more than 1,000 tanks, around 1,500 guns and mortars and much more enemy equipment and manpower besides.

The motherland paid fitting tribute to the military exploits of pilots, antiaircraft gunners, air observers and aerostat crews. Some 80,000 soldiers and commanders were decorated with orders and medals, 92 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and the names of 34 heroic soldiers were immoralized in the rolls of military units.

[Question] Since that time there have been striking changes in combat equipment and arms, but the essence of defense against air attack remains the same: a target appears in the air and it must be destroyed. I would like to know how the combat experience accumulated by the air defense troops in the years of the Great Patriotic War is "employed" today.

[Answer] Of course there have been substantial changes in every sphere of military theory and practice since the forties. There have been changes both in the organization of air defense and in the tactics of the country's air defense forces. Throughout these years they have been developed on the basis of taking into all-round consideration the experience of the Great Patriotic War--with due regard, of course, for the achievements and development prospects of modern military science and technology.

The air defense forces' main task today is to safeguard our motherland's aerial frontiers and this is achieved by constantly keeping troops in a state of high combat readiness and insuring their efficient cooperation with the other branches of the armed forces. Day and night in missile installations and interceptor aircraft and at radar screens and command posts the air defense forces keep their crucial watch over the entire length of the Soviet Union's borders.

And everywhere and in everything the air defense troops compare their service with the heroic deeds of those who in the difficult war years defended our motherland's honor, freedom and independence. We have adopted their combat experience and are ready to carry on their exploits.

[Question] Aleksandr Ivanovich, the supersonic speeds of modern means of air attack and their sharply increased strike power make it necessary for air defense to be particularly efficient and absolutely reliable. What demands are placed on soldiers and officers in the air defense forces today?

[Answer] Of course, military equipment alone does not determine the armed forces' might. Our advantage lies in people's ideological commitment and consciousness and in their high degree of socialist patriotism and excellent training. The main requirements of soldiers and officers--high moral-political and combat qualities, professionalism, impeccable discipline and organization--follow on from this.

Under the impact of scientific and technical progress the demands placed on military and technical training and on the officer corps' general cultural level have increased substantially. Almost all unit commanders in the country's air defense forces now have higher military and specialist military education. All the military academies which train officers for our troops are higher academies. Engineering specialities are now the main ones in our troops.

The standard of competence and training of young people joining the army is increasing every year. Now, for example, 80 percent of the intake of young people have higher and secondary education. Within a short time most soldiers become class specialists and master several military specialities....

[Question] How are the soldiers celebrating their annual holiday--USSR Air Defense Forces Day?

[Answer] In an atmosphere of political and labor enthusiasm generated by the approaching 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the victory over fascism. Socialist competition for the best and most effective solutions to tasks and for the right to call oneself the best formation, unit, subunit, squad or crew is getting keener every day.

In 1980 the order-bearing antiaircraft missile regiment commanded by Lt Col G. P. Klimentov has taken the lead in socialist competition among the country's air defense forces. The competition motto "To hold sacred Lenin's behests, improve combat and political training, increase vigilance and be always ready to defend the motherland and socialism's great gains" has become a canon in the lives of missile troops, airmen and radar operators.

Soldiers' ideological lives are filled with rich content. Guided by the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee November (1979) Plenum and the recommendations and instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations are persistently striving to increase the effectiveness and purposefulness of party political work and to improve servicemen's ideological tempering. An integrated approach to solving the tasks of training and education is actively helping to mold the personnel's political and military maturity and to successfully fulfill the tasks facing the troops.

Many officers, ensigns and soldiers have proved themselves to be masters of the military art. They include, among others, comrades N. Timofeyev, R. Bashirov, B. Pismennyy, A Angolenko, V. Skibo and A. Sergeyev.

The outstanding successes of our motherland's working people in communist building are inspiring the soldiers to achieve new successes in improving their combat proficiency and finding the best solutions to great and crucial tasks. In close unity with the air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact countries' armies our air defense forces are vigilantly standing guard over the gains of socialism and are ready to immediately rebuff any aggressor.

CSO: 1801

VICTORY DAY: VLADIVOSTOK CELEBRATION

OW101331 [Editorial Report] Vladivostok Domestic Service in Russian at 2347 GMT on 8 May begins live coverage of a meeting in Vladivostok of the city's working people and soldiers of the Vladivostok Garrison to mark the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. The announcer notes that the meeting will take place at the square adjoining the monument dedicated to fighters for the Soviets' power in the Far East.

At 0000 GMT [on 9 May] an unidentified speaker announces the opening of the meeting. This is followed by the playing of the national anthem. Then Viktor Pavlovich Lomakin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Primorskiy Rayon, makes a speech.

In his 13-minute speech, Lomakin first greets the people of Primorye, working people of Vladivostok, sailors of the Pacific Fleet, soldiers of the Soviet army border troops and war and labor veterans on the anniversary. He then goes on to recount the events of 35 years ago when the Soviet people and their armed forces won their world historic victory in the Great Patriotic War. He describes the unprecedented staunchness and loyalty manifested by the Soviet people in the war against the fascist aggressors, the organizing role of the CPSU in that war and the deep impact the victory has made on the entire course of world history, noting in this connection the sharply weakened positions of imperialism and reaction and the creation of favorable conditions for establishing a world socialist system. He remarks: "One of the most important consequences of the great victory and of the increased might and authority of the Soviet Union is that our people and other peoples on the planet have been living under peaceful conditions for 35 years."

Attributing the continued peaceful conditions in the world to the party's Leninist policy, Lomakin says: "Our communist party has firmly and consistently been pursuing a peace-loving policy during the postwar years. It has been actively coming for the relaxation of international tension and against the arms race and has been rendering all possible support to peoples struggling for their national and social liberation." He notes that meanwhile imperialism and its aggressive essence have not changed. "Therefore," he continues, "it is necessary to maintain high vigilance against the intrigues of the enemies of peace and the liberation struggle of peoples.

"Lately international reaction headed by U.S. imperialism, alarmed by the profound consequences of detente and the objective development of the world revolutionary process, has been trying to resist detente and return the world to the times of cold war. It has followed the course of unprecedentedly stepping up the arms race and provoking and complicating conflicts in various parts of the world and has striven to intimidate our people with new war preparations and all sorts of economic blackmail.

"The bellicose imperialist circles have seen fit again to considerably complicate the international situation. The Beijing leadership, which has constantly come forward against peaceful coexistence, detente and disarmament, has been serving the role of active accomplice of the reactionary imperialist forces. Comrade Leonid Ilich Breznhev has said: The Soviet Union cannot be intimidated by anyone. Our forces and resources are vast and we and our allies will always be able to defend ourselves and repulse any hostile hit-and-run attack. Nobody can provoke us. We reply to the doctrine of war hysteria and feverish arms race with the doctrine of consistent struggle for peace and security on earth.

"The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have adopted all necessary measures to further strengthen our country's defense and are making every effort to guarantee the peaceful labor and security of our people. The Soviet armed forces are in a constant state of military preparedness and are capable of immediately giving crushing rebuff to any aggression wherever it comes from. Victory day is a serious warning to all those who fancy military adventures and have forgotten the lessons of history. A fate more dismal than Hitler's awaits any aggressor who attempts to make a military attack on our country."

Lomakin stresses that the Soviet people are firm in their striving for peace and actively support the CPSU's internal and foreign policies and the beneficial activities of the Central Committee and its Politburo headed by Brezhnev, adding that the Soviet people are marking the victory anniversary with an overall upsurge of political and labor activities.

Lomakin then describes the achievements of the working people of Primorskiy Kray and their plans, and adds: "In response to the aggressive intrigues of the imperialist reactionaries and their Beijing accomplices, the people of Primorye together with all Soviet people will rally even more closely around their beloved communist party and devote all the strength, knowledge and energy in the cause of making the Soviet fatherland flourish still further and strengthening its economic and military might."

After Lomakin, the meeting was addressed by reserve Col Boris Ivanovich Aleksandrov, veteran of the Great Patriotic War; Stepan Ivanovich Gatishchev, docker team leader of the Vladivostok mercantile seaport; Larisa Temeneva, student of the Far Eastern Institute of Soviet Trade, and Admiral Emil Nikolayevich Spiridonov, commander of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet.

In his 9-minute speech, Admiral Spiridonov first describes the achievements of the Soviet people and recounts their feats in the Great Patriotic War. He adds: "The memory of those who fell in the battle for the freedom and independence of the motherland will remain forever. This memory continues to evoke sharp feelings of hate for war mongers and fascism and prompts the greatest vigilance against the intrigues of the new pretenders to world supremacy."

Spiridonov continues by recounting feats of the Soviet people and their armed forces during the war and the contributions made by military personnel from Primorskiy Kray to the final victory. He says: "Thirty-five years have passed since the last salvos of the Great Patriotic War. It was indeed a battle not for the pursuit of glory but for the sake of life or death. But even now (?under peaceful conditions) the battle to preserve life on earth continues. Imperialism has again been aggravating the international situation, launching a counterattack against detente and peace, trying to stop the course of history and the liberation movement of peoples and intensifying the arms race and the threat of war. Under these conditions the party and the government have paid due attention to strengthening our country's defense capacity."

He adds: "Today, on the significant anniversary of the great victory, we can speak with justifiable pride of the military might of our armed forces. The party Central Committee, the Central Committee Politburo, and Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev himself, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, who has experienced all the fiery years of the Great Patriotic War, are devoting constant and close attention to the armed defenders of the motherland so that the fruits of the Soviet people's creative labor will be reliably defended."

Spiridonov's speech is followed by a solemn roll call during which the names of 10 fallen Soviet military personnel are read and their feats briefly described. This is followed by a roll call of members of a company of war veterans and of five companies of the Vladivostok Garrison, with Major General (Kusitskiy), commander of the Vladivostok Garrison, making a report to Admiral Spiridonov.

The roll calls are followed by 1 minute of silence and the playing of the national anthem, and then the meeting is declared closed. This is followed by a 4-minute report on a marchpast of war veterans and Vladivostok Garrison troops. The reportage ends at 0056 GMT.

CSO: 1801

VICTORY DAY: KHABAROVSK CELEBRATION

OW110024 [Editorial Report] Khabarovsk Domestic Service in Russian at 0052 GMT on 9 May in a live report says that its microphones are located at the Slava Square in the kray capital where a solemn meeting devoted to the victory day holiday will begin in a few minutes. At 0100 GMT the announcer gives the microphone to journalist Yuriy Belkov, who says that the square is filled with columns of the working people and soldiers of the Khabarovsk Garrison with the honorary places occupied by the glorious veterans of the Great Patriotic War; he goes on to describe the elated mood of the veterans and their feats in war.

At 0102 GMT the announcer reports that bureau members of the kraykom and the Khabarovsk Gorkom, representatives of the command of the Red Banner Far East Military and Border Districts, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, leading production workers and representatives of the public are mounting the platform erected for the holiday. Following this announcement, the meeting is opened by Aleksandr Grigoryevich Popov, first secretary of the Khabarovsk Gorkom, who in his 4-minute address quotes Brezhnev's remarks stressing that in their war against fascism the Soviet people thought of peace and of preventing new wars. He continues by saying "the working people of the order-awarded Khabarovsk, like all Soviet people, clearly realize that the economic might of our country and its great international authority depend on the selfless work of everyone and their personal contribution to the common cause. And this is most important today, when the U.S. imperialist circles (?together with) Beijing (?leaders) constantly attack the Soviet Union and the socialist community countries, and through their adventurist policy threaten the cause of peace in the Far East, Southeast Asia and Europe. Realizing this, the city's working people have been more persistent in making a befitting contribution to strengthening the economic and defense potential of the Soviet Far East."

After the playing of the national anthem, Popov yields the floor to Aleksey Klementyevich Chernyy, first secretary of the Khabarovsk Kraykom, who delivers a 15-minute speech.

After congratulating all working people of Khabarovsk and Khabarovsk Kray, war veterans, soldiers of the Red Banner Far East Military District, border guards, Pacific navymen and soldiers of internal and railway troops on the holiday, Chernyy recounts the feats and sacrifices of the Soviet people in the war against fascism and calls for a minute of silence to honor those who perished in the Great Patriotic War. He then continues by dwelling at length on the effects and victories of the Soviet people during the war; the role played by Far Easterners in the war, in protecting the Far Eastern borders and in crushing militarist Japan, and the postwar efforts and achievements of the Soviet Union and Khabarovsk Kray.

Noting that during the past 35 years the Soviet people and the people in Europe have had no war, Podgayev attributes this to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and to the wise and farsighted foreign policy of the CPSU and its Central Committee Politburo headed by Brezhnev. He adds that the CPSU's peace-loving foreign policy enjoys the support of all progressive mankind and serves as a mighty factor in restraining the aggressive aspirations of reactionary and imperialist forces.

Continuing his speech, Podgayev says "The threat of war has not been eliminated. The militarists and reactionary circles have stepped up their actions against detente, strive to change the correlation of forces in the world arena in their favor, increase the arms race, provoke military conflicts, stir up hotbeds of tension and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

"A testimony to the serious aggravation of the situation in the world arena is the development by the American imperialists and Chinese hegemonists of the undeclared war against Afghanistan, the forced delay by the U.S. administration of ratification of the SALT II treaty, NATO's decision to deploy American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the concentration of an armada of American ships in the Persian Gulf, with the aim of military pressure on Iran and blackmail of other countries in the Near and Middle East.

"Using the notorious (?thesis) of a Soviet threat, the imperialist forces and Maoist China have been taking active steps aimed at aggravating the situation in the Far East and Southeast Asia. An aggressive military and political alliance is being openly (?formed) with the participation of U.S.-Japanese imperialism and Maoist China near our motherland's eastern borders. To the intrigues of the aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction, the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries are counterposing high vigilance and an invariably firm, active and consistent struggle for peace, combining it with the strengthening of defense capacity and constant readiness to rebuff aggression, regardless of where it may come from.

"In warning the advocates of a new world war, Comrade Leonid Ilich Breznhev said that the Soviet Union cannot be scared by anyone. Our forces and possibilities are enormous, and we and our allies will always be able to stand up for ourselves and rebuff any hostile hit-and-run raids.

"The Communist Party and the Soviet state are doing everything so that the peaceful labor and security of our country will be reliably defended. We have what is necessary to defend ourselves and the defenders to do it. A militant detachment of the Soviet armed forces are the troops of the Red Banner Far East Military District, our border guards and Pacific navymen who are [words indistinct] to insure the safety of Soviet state. The Far Eastern servicemen are fulfilling their military duty in a worthy manner. They have been tirelessly improving their military skill, persistently mastering complex military equipment, raising the quality of military and political training and vigilantly standing on guard for the peaceful labor of the Far Easterners."

Following Chernyy's speech, the meeting is addressed by Mikhail Zakharovich Petritsyn, war veteran and director of an industrial combine; Vasiliy Semenovich Goryazov, war veteran and electric welder of the shipbuilding plant; Vera Vasilyevna Michutkina, war veteran and nurse of City Hospital No 6; Natalya Vasilyevna Bantova, student of the Polytechnical Institute; and Lt Gen Vasiliy Petrovich Novikov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Far East Military District.

In his 6.5-minute speech, Lt Gen V. P. Novikov first dwells at length on the significance of the war against fascism, the feats performed in that war by the Soviet people and their armed forces, the postwar achievements of the country and the kray and the leading role played by the CPSU.

Continuing his speech, Novikov says "In recalling the past and what we went through, our people under the leadership of the communist party, as in the past, are energetically striving for a peaceful tomorrow for all peoples of the world. But there are forces (? in the world) that encroach upon these peaceful aspirations. First of all are U.S. imperialism and its Maoist stooges. There beyond the Amur River, just a few dozens of kilometers away, they (?have built a nest) of anti-Sovietism and aggression and are nurturing delirious plans for attacking our great Soviet Union. But we know how such adventures end.

"The complexity and acuteness of the military and political situation in the Far East places a special responsibility on the troops of our border Red Banner Far East Military District, the Pacific navymen, the border guard troops and internal and railway troops for insuring the security of our motherland. Every Far Eastern soldier deeply realizes this responsibility and is ready to fulfill his military duty as dictated by our military oath of allegiance.

"Today on victory day we assure the communist party, our beloved Soviet Government and our heroic Soviet people that the Far Eastern soldiers will continue to wholeheartedly serve the motherland, and if necessary they will crush the enemy the same way their fathers and grandfathers crushed enemies on the Chinese eastern railroad, [words indistinct] and Halhin Gol, in the fields near Moscow, near Stalingrad and Kursk, on the (?Dnestr) and in Berlin and in Manchuria."

Novikov's speech is followed by laying of flowers at a memorial monument. A report on the meeting and on the marching past of columns of the working people and soldiers of the Far East Military District ends at 0158 GMT.

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1 July 1980

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1521

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NAVAL TRAINING, RELATED ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED

Submarine Commander on Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank T. Mezhalis, captain of an outstanding missile submarine: "Move Forward With Certainty"]

[Text] We were unable to covertly get through the powerful antisubmarine barrier. The ships in the "enemy" hunter-killer group detected our submarine and began to take up positions for a decisive strike. Usually in these instances one must try to break away from the "enemy." However, apparently the ASW personnel maintained the contact so firmly that we would probably not get away. Then I decided to employ a tactical procedure which I had thought up quite a long time ago. The sudden maneuver left the ASW personnel confused. Putting this to use, we successfully accomplished the assigned mission.

During the exercise critique the senior chief noted our non-standard actions, our tactical ruse. It came to my mind that I had just thought up this skillful maneuver several months ago and was not sure whether my subordinates would be able to implement it.

This is not to say that the submarine crew was poorly trained. No, overall it consisted of pretty good specialists. It was made up of specialists, so to say, of average qualifications. But, these same "average qualifications" also led to average accomplishment of combat training missions. It often is the case during a training battle that the favorable situation arises for an original maneuver which leads to success. But, I was forced to ignore this opportunity since such a maneuver requires that the sailors at one of the posts not simply accomplish, but with certainty exceed the combat norm, while at another post they ensure not simply faultless operation of the equipment, but work in an atmosphere of extreme stress. But, I was uncertain whether they were capable of doing this.

Every innovation in military affairs appears in different forms. Any new tactical procedure is not simply the fruit of a commander's brilliance. It springs to life primarily because an atmosphere of creativity has been created in the crew, the specialists have learned to detect targets at a range greater than usual, more reliably than before, they track them and employ weapons at maximum ranges and with great accuracy.

During the exercise I was describing, my captain's idea occurred because the sonar men headed by master of combat qualification WO [michman] P. Kravchuk was able under very unfavorable hydrology to obtain exhaustive information about the situation. Because the stokers--subordinates of master of combat qualification WO A. Maksimov--worked with the precision of a jeweler. Because the electricians working for WO V. Il'in (by the way, also a master) were able to maintain the submarine at the assigned speed when required. In other words, because at all combat posts one found now not simply "average" specialists, but real masters who grew, multiplied, and took an important step to the heights of combat skill.

And this step--from the average level--in my view is one more difficult to take than even the very first steps in achieving one's specialty.

Work at the so-called "average level," as a rule, does not lead to serious breakdowns in combat training. It does not jump out at you like, let's say, blatant negligence and therefore does not always get the bad evaluation from the captain and from the party organization.

The following comes to mind. Our crew was doing our missile firing. Conditions were complex but they were even made more complicated due to errors committed by the navigator, Sr Lt A. Vorob'yev. In the final analysis the firing was accomplished successfully. And, this gave the officer the opportunity to announce at the critique of the firing, in response to complaints addressed to him, that he had erred supposedly at the limits of his tolerance, as if this was fully justifiable for such errors....

Yes, in life it does happen that a sailor learns to accomplish combat norms and remains at that level of skill. Nothing too much is expected of him. The sailor during practical training receives good evaluations. Should he be criticized for this? But one must be demanding, and doubly demanding. For the norms have been calculated overall based on the average sailor. This in its own way is only the start point for movement forward.

In my view, if one seriously is concerned about raising the quality indicators of combat training, one must very carefully orient people to the maximum, require full response from them. Ignite their desire for the best results. This is the overall task of both the captain and the party organization. How can one overlook Lenin's behest--never be satisfied with what has been achieved, go forward with certainty, with certainty achieve more. Organizing the competition for a proper greeting for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, we comprehensively strove to implement this behest as it pertains to our missions.

Here is an example. When the mission is assigned the submariners to support the combat training of ASW ships, the training goals call for operations containing specific limits--maneuver in a strictly-assigned area, with specific courses, at an assigned depth. The advantages for the ASW personnel under such conditions are evident. However, no one and nothing restricts our right to take a justifiable risk, to employ tactical cunningness, to strive for victory. In the final analysis the more difficult the conditions for us, the greater the possibilities for fruitful training.

Once, having been assigned the next mission to support ASW training, I gathered the officers together and shared my point of view with them. Some at the beginning were a bit skeptical: What's the difference, another set piece exercise. But, then the people became interested and began to seek reserves. Engr-3rd Rank M. Stuzhinskiy calculated the optimal speed for the submarine which would not reveal its presence in the region. Sr Lt A. Danilenko determined the special features of the sea's hydrology and the optimum ranges for detecting the ships, calculated the optimum depths and speeds which would ensure covert operations. The navigator really had to go to work on the computations for the ship's maneuver.

After the exercise the captain of the opposing force thanked me for the interesting, as he expressed it, support. Naturally, there is no need to mention that this cruise for us turned out to be more useful than usual.

Getting the maximum out of people and their work is, it could be said, half the battle. And, development of combat competition in the collective does a great deal here. Only there is no need, in my opinion, to reduce everything, as it is sometimes done, only to working out schedules and compiling evaluations. It goes without saying that it is also important and it also can be interesting, especially for young seamen. But, you will agree that warrant officers who have been in the navy a couple of decades like, let's say, WO V. Grigorash and A. Maksimov and officers who have finished higher schools and who have a certain amount of know-how look upon these evaluations in a slightly different way. Apparently one also needs some sort of additional stimuli along with the evaluations. And primarily stimuli of a moral nature, recognition of the creative nature of the mission.

I also note that the higher the goals which people must achieve, the more specificity and proficiency required in the competition. Sometimes the opposite is the case. When an individual takes only the initial heights in combat training, his pledges contain a mass of specific points--either pass a particular proficiency rating or overfulfill the norm by a certain amount. But, when specific levels have been achieved, more and more one finds overall statements in the pledges: "Improve," "Better," and then simply "Affirm"....

But after all, if you go right into it at some high level of skill, possibilities arise for applying a new skill to the competition. And, there is all the specificity that you need here. Last year our officers, warrant officers, and petty officers at the initiative of the communists, actively competed, for example, to master responsibilities at a level higher than that occupied. Capt-Lt S. Dryanin, WO V. Grigorash and A. Peshkov, and others successfully achieved this. They facilitated a growth in the skills of the seamen, improvement in the crew's combat coordination, improvement in the competition for the best watch officer and in the struggle to master secondary and associated specialties. Today no one among us asks how it was before, why, let's say, a missileer is able to start a water pump or why a mechanic-engineer learns tactics.... It is required! Because combat readiness does not fall within the narrow limits of "from" and "to."

Once, for example, Engr-Capt 3rd Rank M. Stuzhinskiy, commander of the electrical and engineering division, in a very difficult situation thanks to this same ability to analyze a tactical situation maintained the submarine at the trim which was the only possible one leading to quality mission accomplishment. Another time missileer Sr Lt Ye. Rasparkin, standing the night watch on the submarine when the crew was ashore, was able in response to a surprise input organize the battle for ship's survivability in an excellent manner....

These examples speak of one thing--when people are faced with the requirement to creatively approach military labor, to work tomorrow better than today, a certain type of stability reserve is created within a crew.

We are now concerned about utilization of yet-unused reserved and eliminating deficiences which from time to time come to light. And the step with which we are faced naturally is more difficult than that which has already been taken. However, I am confident of the crew. We can handle the most difficult things when the people see in what has been achieved only the initial point en route to higher proficiency.

Simulators Not Used Effectively

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 2d Rank A. Zlydnev: "The Price for Lack of Supervision"]

Simulators are not being used effectively in the Unit X training center.

The building housing the training center stands at the foot of a hill which rises up along with the docks that stretch off into the depth of the bay. Excellently-equipped classes and offices, many simulators, operating displays, diagrams, and mock-ups--all respond to the requirements of modern methods. The training facility in the main was created and is being improved by the unit's troops themselves. Officers Yu. Khaliullin and A. Kuz'min, WO V. Perchuk and V. Kuranov, Sr Smn I. Lovyagin, and many others have made a great contribution here.

Lessons in the training departments are a viable means for improving the quality of base training for sailors. Solution of many problems which confront crews at sea have their beginning right here, on the shore, at these simulators and displays. Take, let's say, such problems as the battle to conserve fuel and operating hours, ensuring accident-free cruises. Much can be said about this, but success is not achieved if the troops go to sea without a reliable reserve of the corresponding knowledge and skills.

The training center set up at the unit makes it possible to ensure this reserve. Here, for example, are the offices where specialists from engineering subunits [podrazdeleniya] study. An operating refrigerator unit has been installed in one and in another is an electrified mock-up of a ship in cross section clearly displaying all systems and watertight bulkheads, location of pumping devices, and a third a fine large-scale diagram of power distribution throughout the spaces. Here, using specialized electrified overlays, the sailors are able to develop skills in firing up boilers and starting diesels. Boiler room and damage control mechanics, electricians and engine-room ratings are continually training here, preparing for sea cruises. And, the payoff is visible--the quality of equipment maintenance by the specialists is growing.

The training equipment in many other departments is also being used just as effectively. But, it is a strange thing that in this same unit, in this same building one sometimes also sees a completely different picture.

It is a special training day. Several ships are tied up at the dock. The sailers have a good opportunity to study at the training center and polish their skills on beautiful simulators. But, not a single individual from the ships' radiotechnical services showed up here.

Perhaps the radar operators have solved all the problems involving special training? No, the fact is that there have been some complaints recently about these specialists--several while at sea demonstrated poor skills and were guilty in the manner in which they maintained equipment.... How then do you explain the fact that simulators stand idle and the diagrams and posters gather dust? The fact is that the requisite control over use of the training base is lacking. Staff officer Capt 3rd Rank M. Katsnel'son, responsible for training the specialists in the radiotechnical service, long before his transfer to another unit shifted the concern on this point to the shoulders of WO M. Shafronov. He in turn shifted it to the ships' chiefs of radiotechnical services. And they unfortunately prefer to avoid problems linked with conducting exercises at the training center. Where is it simpler to conduct such training than using a familiar diagram aboard the ship itself.

It is strange but at the unit staff for some reason they look upon this situation calmly. One cannot but react here also to the poor utilization of the navigation department. Staff officer Capt 3rd Rank V. Manskikh lets it run by itself. The conduct of training sessions is done willy-nilly by poorly-trained individuals possessing a confused idea about the capabilities of training equipment. The result is that sailors gather at the department, sit, look at the simulators, then depart.

Yes, the efficiency of the training base is not as good now as it should be. And moreover it can be greatly improved. The main thing is to eliminate spontaneity in its use. One would think that the unit command and the staff party organization must be made to answer for this more strictly. What must be done is for the personnel on each ship to clearly know when and who ought to be studying what theme at the training center and who is responsible for conducting the lessons or practical training sessions.

The methods training of group leaders has enormous significance. Here at the training center at one time they held several demonstration exercises during which leading methods experts such as officers Yu. Khaliullin and B. Marchenko shared know-how in training the troops using simulators and operating displays. One would think that such exercises should be conducted regularly.

The distance between the ships and the training center is not very far. They are a stone's throw apart. We must see that there are no obstacles along this path created by lack of organization so that not a single simulator stands idle during training time.

On the ASW Cruiser 'Leningrad'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Engr-Capt 2d Rank V. Nechitaylo, commander of the electrical and engineering division in the ASW cruiser "Leningrad": "What Will the 'Crown' of Smoke Come To?"]

[Text] Engr-Capt Lt L. Gorelov came to my cabin with a complaint. His subordinates--specialists from the stoker group--were given a low evaluation based on the results of a duty day on a long cruise.

"What for?" the officer wondered. "The sailors stood watches vigilantly in the main. They maintained the ship's way reliably."

Yes, in actuality the mechanics worked fairly well. But overall they did not deserve a high evaluation since at times the sailors forgot elementary engineering culture. Thus, for example, the troops on PO 2d Class N. Snegirev's shift when coming on watch did not regulate the fuel and did not clean the boiler burners. This at first glance is a minor insignificant violation of equipment operating modes. But, this is only at first glance. The fact is that the boilers smoked. What will the "crown" of smoke above the ship lead to? Figures speak louder than words. A quick calculation clearly showed that PO 2d Class Snegirev's crew in comparison with, let's say, that of PO 2d A. Savchuk, whose subordinates maintained the equipment in model fashion, expended hundreds of kilograms of mazut more over the period of 1 watch.

Not a lot needs to be said about the importance of saving and preserving fuel. This is a generally-evident truth. But, when a ship departs on a long cruise, it acquires special meaning. It is not a difficult task to fuel a ship at base: the order goes to the corresponding office and, at the exact time, the tanker approaches the cruiser. It is something different far from home shores. A planned rendezvous with a tanker for the most varied objective reasons might not take place. And if at that time the crew suddenly is assigned a new mission? You do not achieve success with empty tanks.

The individual that is most careful is better prepared for combat. It is from this very position that I strived on the long cruise to organize competition for economy and preservation in my own subunit [podrazdeleniye]. This is what I based my own increased demandingness on. This approach brought good fruits. People became more demanding of themselves and they heightened their activeness in a search for fuel reserves. That same officer Gorelov after our conversation significantly strengthened control over how the sailers stood watch. Fuel no longer went up the stack along with "crowns" of smoke. Upon the ship's return to home base the savings indicators of the boiler room group were quite significant.

And the entire crew of our cruiser saved on the long cruise many dozens of tons of fuel. I wish to emphasize the term entire crew. Naturally, missileers, torpedomen, or even sonarmen, yes and all other specialties, don't have much to do with the electrical and engineering division (BCh-5) or directly with the taking on, storage, and utilization of fuel as a rule. But, the struggle to conserve fuel involves everyone.

They look upon this differently on several ships, unfortunately. This, in my view, decreases the range of options for finding reserves for savings. Look at this situation. Search for a submarine is underway. The troops of BCh-5 skillfully maintain the equipment and exhibit concern to make sure that not even one gram of mazut is wasted. At the same time the sonarmen let the team down. They poorly tuned the equipment, they search for the target for a long time and unskillfully, having established contact they rapidly lose it. All this requires the ship to make additional maneuvers and places additional loads on the power plant. Kilograms of fuel fly off on the wind.

The result is the same when as a result of errors by specialists from the rocket and artillery or the mine and torpedo division the ship has to make repeat attack passes. But if they destroy targets at maximum range with the first volley, the first launch, or on the first pass, fuel expenditures are significantly less.

Our ship's command and party organization, actively struggling to solve all combat training problems during the long cruise with high quality, continually accented the sailor's attention also on the fact that this was done where possible with the least expenditures. The economic indicator mandatorily was considered along with other qualitative indicators achieved during a particular exercise. And, it influenced the overall evaluation not only of the troops in BCh-5, but also the specialists of all subunits upon which savings depended to a particular degree. This approach stimulated the search for reserves and facilitated expansion of the movement of those aboard ship who wanted to be economical.

There were occasions in the past, chatting with officers or warrant officers from the radiotechnical service (RTS) about their possible contribution to more rational use of fuel and operating hours, they only shrugged their shoulders: This is your concern, we have enough concerns of our own. Now there has been firm contact established in this important matter between the two subunits. As a rule, prior to each ASW exercise we meet with the

RTS chief, coordinate our interests with him, and refine the sequence for cutting in consumers of electric power. This will permit us to activate the optimal number of generators, thinking through the equipment operating modes so that, on the one hand, the maximum favorable conditions for the sonarmen will be created, and on the other hand, the modes will be the most economical.

We attempted to establish similar coordination during the long cruise also with specialists from other divisions.

I want to especially underscore the role of the ship's captain in the struggle to economize and save. Of course, the captain has many responsibilities and on his shoulders falls the colossal responsibilty for the ship's combat readiness. And, on this background, to them it seems like "petty items" to reverse more than necessary or, let's say, extra work for the engines is nothing, as sometimes some captains allow.... But, this is not so in fact.

Capt 2d Rank M. Kulak, captain of the ASW cruiser "Leningrad" profoundly understands this. He is a strict individual with a soft spot for economy, is able to himself evaluate and preserve the national good, and he teaches all officers to take this approach. Prior to the ship departing for Mediterranean Sea, the captain invited me to his cabin and was interested in what speed it would be advisable to maintain for the ship to arrive in the area on time and, at the same time, save the maximum amount of fuel. We did the compuations together, we called the navigator in to help. The same was done as we prepared for the return trip. And always, regardless of the complexity of the situation and regardless of the responsible missions we are called upon to accomplish, he did not violate his rule: "It is mandatory to also think about economy." There was not an instance when we changed speed without a reason, when the engines operated with a load that was not called for by necessity. When the situation allowed, Kulak ordered that we maintain way using 1 engine.... One can only state that the captain himself put dozens of tons of fuel in the overall ship's "cash box."

In his speech at the November (1979) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, comrade L. I. Brezhnev underscored that "consistent maintenance of the mode of economy" is required. What does the word consistent mean? It means that we must attract to the movement for economy not only enthusiasts, but the entire crew from captain to seamen. This means that we must maintain the struggle for economy not during campaigns, not case by case, but constantly, every day and every hour. This means that there are no "petty items" where economy is concerned--we must economize in the important matters and in the small matters.

Communications, Combat Control

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank A. Drobot, master of military affairs: "Guarantees of Reliability"]

[Text] The weather rapidly deteriorated. A thunderstorm raged above the sea during the concluding stage of the training battle. It placed the communicators in a most difficult situation since powerful atmospheric interference blocked the operating radio channels. But, Capt-Lt O. Bazhenov, commander of the communications division in the destroyer escort "Sil'nyy" was not distraught. Manipulating the technical capabilities of the equipment, he ensured that the flagshp had uninterrupted communications with the shore and with the ships, and guaranteed the reliability and precision of command and control. This greatly facilitated the training battle leading to victory.

Officer Bazhenov's success and that of his subordinates was no accident. For a long time now aboard this ship there have been no substantial write-ups concerning communications discipline and the personnel possess firm skills. In his practical activities the division commander ensures that communications remain the nerve of control and he strives to see that this "nerve" stands up under the most powerful loads. He is able to do this, something unfortunately one cannot always say about his colleague Capt-Lt O. Starostenkov.

On one occasion Staostenkov, due to equipment breakdowns during one sortie, encountered difficulties in accomplishing a training mission. An accident? There is much evidence which says that Capt-Lt O. Starostenkov is undoubtedly a knowledgable and experienced specialist. But, more careful analysis showed that the officer seemed to place too much store in his own know-how. It did not bother him that preventive maintenance and equipment checkouts were being done in a formal manner, that the specialist rating training sessions and exercises were not always conducted with the communicators according to plan and their maintenance training had not been improved.

To Capt-Lt Starostenkov's credit, it should be said that he has made the correct conclusions from what occurred. Matters at the present time in his division are being corrected. But, you must call a spade a spade--there were "errors." And naturally, comparing the two combat training episodes, one cannot but note the following. In the first instance the communicators ensured command and control under the most unfavorable circumstances. In the second instance, they placed the flagship in a difficult position in a very conventional situation while accomplishing a standard mission.

The unit's staff could not remain passive in the presence of such contrasts. This required analysis, recommendations, practical conclusions.

First the "Sil'nyy" know-how was studied. Here they rationally used communications exercises, as well as practical training using the "ship-communication center" and "ship-training class room." The practical training conditions were gradually made more complex: radio exchanges were made without ECM, with ECM, and with a change to reserve frequencies.

The division commander skillfully guided the competition. Hung at the combat posts here are schedules for norm accomplishment by those competing and, when summing up, Capt-Lt Bazhenov by subject analyzes troop accomplishment of their socialist pledges. Fliers are published about those leading in the competition and they regularly tell their comrades about their approach to the job.

Everything is done the same way in other communications subunits as well. But, comparing how training and competition are set up on them with how it is done on the best ships, one easily notices differences in the level of execution. This relates to the greatest degree to the sphere of competition where reserves are still great. Competition progress is not skillfully analyzed on all ships. Division commanders do not always accurately know who is leading in the competition among signalmen, radiotelegraphers, and telephone operators. Lacking are the data from monitor equipment here which point in seconds and signs to the mastery of each specialist. Where does one obtain these data if the recordkeeping is not done regularly? Not every division commander monitors the time it takes information to go from the radio shack to, let's say, the main command post and systematically analyzes where and in which elements valuable seconds and minutes are being lost. Meanwhile transmission and reception of reports are not a goal in themselves. Communications accomplish their mission when the information is used by the captain to evaluate the situation and make a decision.

Solution of these problems requires not only enthusiasm on the part of communications subunit commanders, but also specific assistance to them on the part of ships' captains. Instances of specialists rating exercises being postponed until "later" have not been eliminated everywhere yet. This is sometimes motivated by the arrival of a commission for which emergency clean-up and painting is done.... And, when the notorious "later" arrives, the next impediments to practice training arise. This will lead to disruption in training rhythm and non-accomplishment of exercise plans, as we have already seen in the example of O. Starostenkov.

Practice shows that ships get the most write-ups on communications during the initial period of intensive cruises and those same ships where base training for communicators is set up in the least meaningful manner. Upon their return from the cruise some captains complain that the ship is receiving lower grades.... "What is wrong?! It's been a long time since this happened!" No, a violation of radio traffic rules is no petty matter. Since antiquity such errors have not been written off. But, some commanders look for this to happen initially and do not make proper conclusions until they find themselves in trouble.

Let's take an ideal situation. Here we have a ship with a communications subunit trained in model fashion. Can one count in a combat situation on the communications being reliable, flexible, and covert at a level meeting all modern requirements?

The answer to this question to an enormous degree depends on the training of those individuals who make the decision about utilizing communications. In a majority of instances these are flag officers, ships' captains, watch officers. Their culture greatly determines communications reliability and command and control efficiency. Sometimes the ether is filled with follow-on reports and instructions whose essence could be described much more clearly and shorter using formalized information and abbreviations. A great deal of time is spent on the preparation and transmission of expensive texts and they reduce command and control proficiency.

One would think that the question of improving command and control culture requires complex solution at all levels and by all elements. I would like in this connection to emphasize the special role played by the example of the flagship. If ships put out to sea obliged to accomplish a particular part of the missions under radio silence, then this requirement is disseminated, if there are no special provisos, to all ships, including the flagship. In actuality, some flagships are not ashamed of violating radio silence.... How then can one demand that subordinates adhere very strictly to communications discipline?

These violations relatively often occur through the force of habit of using radio where visual signaling means would be completely feasible: flag and light semaphore and signal flares. The article "Shumnoye 'molchaniye'" ["Noisy 'Silence'"] published on 7 December 1979 in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA discussed in detail the reasons for this negative phenomenon in particular the insufficient development of the missions for the crews during the time at base by some ships' captains. I would like to add one thesis to those elaborated by the author of this article: Underestimation of visual signaling resources often stems from the insufficient skill of signalmen.

It goes without saying that this is correctable. Experience from the Great Patriotic War shows what enormous capabilities for covert command and control are to be found in highly-qualified signalmen, signalmen aces. And, if aces are now encountered rarely on signal bridges, more rarely than we would like to have it, then we must intensify the practice training schedules for signalmen and improve the effectiveness of each trip to the range. It is possible that special sorties dedicated mainly to development of communications missions might also prove to be worthwhile.

On the 'Razitel'nyy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank D. Chumak: "ASW Troops Attack"]

[Text] Capt 3rd Rank V. Balashov, captain of "Razitel'nyy," went out onto the conning bridge with binoculars in his hand: the signalmen had reported a NATO aircraft at low altitude. Heavy, a dirty green color, it resembled a large beetle. The pilot's face was very clear through the cockpit. The NATO pilots, attempting to demonstrate force, make similar flights in this cruise area often. This, however, could not disrupt the rhythm of the combat training aboard the ship. At this point in time, vigilantly monitoring the airspace, sailors at this same time carefully prepared to accomplish the next combat practice session--a search for a submarine. Sr Lt A. Bykov, commander of the mine and torpedo division (BCh-3) and Sr Lt A. Cherkasov, commander of the sonar group, came onto the bridge. They reported to the ship's captain that their subordinates were prepared for intense work and would strive to demonstrate their skill which was improving during the cruise. The officers supported their reports with the corresponding computations made considering the situation: sea state, hydrology, and so on.

This was one more day during the cruise where I observed combat training aboard the ship. One senses that the entire crew lives with concern for reaching the intended high goals in competition for a proper greeting to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday, a concern that each mile underway be employed with maximum effect. From morning until evening, for example, the sailors in BCh-3 set about inspecting and checking out equipment and weapons. Then Sr Lt Bykov conducted practical training of the torpedo men on a complex tactical background with numerous inputs. Later, after theoretical lessons, there was an additional intense simulation with experienced specialists demonstrating progressive work methods at the equipment.

Training is organized with this intensity daily. This all facilitates the young sailer's obtaining the requisite practical skills in a short period of time. On the cruise the captain often conducts tactical skull sessions and seminars which facilitate an improvement in officers' special and technical skill. Sr Lt Cherkasov is successfully mastering the responsibilities for a position higher than the one which he now occupies. Establishment of Sr Lt Bykov as a commander is drawing to a conclusion. The division he heads has been recognized as the best aboard ship and he himself is one of the best watch officers.

Here is the assigned region where "Razitel'nyy" is to duel with a submarine. The sonarmen have already set about searching for the "enemy," but data on the contact still has not reached the primary control station. The captain ponders several variations for attacking the submarine. Everything will depend on the range at which the sonarmen detect the "enemy."

The establishment of Balashov as a commander mainly took place during long cruises. The most fruitful, in his opinion, was that which occurred late last year. At that time the ship was tasked on a number of occasions to go one-on-one with submarines whose commanders had a different "signature," different tactical training. In one duel Balashov was taught a good lesson. That time he treated the "enemy" with contempt, overestimated the capabilities of the shipboard search equipment, and began the attack late. Putting this delay to use, the sub was able to break contact. Much time had to be spent re-establishing contact.

After this incident Balashov began to more carefully achieve during practical training sessions full coordination among the shipboard ASW crew. The ship returned from the cruise with an excellent rating. And, they talked about Balashov in the unit both as a captain able to organize combat training and competition on a cruise, as well as a master of the search and the attack.

Sr Lt Cherkasov sent up a report about a sub contact. Balashov analyzes the situation: Is this the target they are searching for? Specialists from the combat information center express their opinions. There is no doubt that the "enemy" has been detected. The ship's captain queries the torpedo men about their readiness for combat and immediately receives an affirmative report.

"Torpedo attack!"

The maneuver to close with the target and selection of the position for the volley turned out to be correct--the navigator had done his work accurately and rapidly. The attack was a victory for the ASW personnel.

Capt 3rd Rank Balashov again went from the forward post to the bridge to get away from the stress of combat. One after the other officers flush with success came there and the critique of the training battle began with their reports concerning the results of operations at the battle stations.

Effective Staff Work Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank B. Prikhod'ko: "Staff Aggressiveness"]

[Text] Ships accomplish difficult combat training missions far from home base. The ocean strictly impartially tests the skill of the sailors and their ability to proficiently and decisively operate in a rapidly-changing situation. It is primarily on these same long cruises that know-how is accumulated in organization of training and competition, especially along such trends as ensuring cruise safety, effective utilization of each mile travelled, and development of new tactical procedures. Sailors introduce rationalization proposals directed towards improving equipment reliability and they seek ways to save energy.

And, the more rapidly this know-how and everything new and progressive given birth to on a long cruise becomes the property of other crews, the more effectively it will work to improve ships' combat readiness. In his speech at the November (1979) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, comrade L. I. Brezhnev named support and dissemination of leading know-how and of progressive work forms and methods as among the main trends in organizational, mass political, and ideological work.

Solution of the problem of how rapidly and completely leading know-how obtained from long cruises is generalized, supported, and disseminated depends greatly upon staff aggressiveness and proficiency.

The ship in Unit X where Capt 3rd Rank V. Rodinov is a political worker achieves stable results year after year. The crew fully accomplished the pledges from the past training year and excelled during a difficult long cruise. Today approximately 90 percent of the sailor's here are masters of military affairs and 1st- and 2d-class specialists.

Staff officers V. Sadovyy, V. Zimin, N. Denisyuk, and others along with officers from the political department analyzed in detail the work style of the leading ship's captain, party, and Komsomol organizations.

Analysis showed that each mile traveled is used here with maximum return primarily because there exists aboard this ship a carefully thought-out truly integrated approach to organizing training and competition on long cruises. Officers and warrant officers when training and indoctrinating subordinates strictly consider the level of their training, capabilities, and other individual qualities. Exercises and practical training are conducted on a complex tactical background. Each innovation in combat work is introduced at other posts and each mistake is examined in detail.

Personal pledges which the sailors make for a sortie or for a competition stage are comprehensively founded and aimed at improving the quality of military labor and combat proficiency. Progress in pledge fulfillment is continually monitored and summing up training and competition is done in a demanding atmosphere. Technical circles work aboard the ship and competitions for the rank of best specialists are conducted regularly. Experienced sailors demonstrate on the equipment the most effective ways of maintaining systems and complexes for young sailors.

From a staff initiative came a business-like discussion on the know-how of the leading crew at a special seminar attended by ships' captains. Staff officers, having generalized the know-how, gave speeches based upon specific examples from the practice of those setting the pace and gave recommendations to improve the organization of training and competition on long cruises under conditions simulating combat to the maximum. All captains were urged to more aggressively use, based on the experience of the progressives, the capabilities of socialist competition to form among the sailors high moral and combat qualities. The staff officers subsequently monitored how leading know-how is introduced aboard other ships.

Naturally, this integrated work by the group of staff and political department officers to generalize and introduce leading know-how has a signifant effect. But, as is known, there is not always an opportunity to send a staff officer group to a ship. More often each ship is called upon to operate on a long cruise or after returning to base according to an individual plan. Staff officers with initiative are not restricted in such cases by narrow departmental interests of their own specific specialty, let's say, navigation or electrical engineering. Teaching shipboard officers the ability to correctly, with the greatest efficiency, use the equipment and to conduct lessons and training sessions with methodological skill, they enter into the competition aboard ship and diligently identify everything new and useful that is not found in other crews and then, in a business-like manner, implement it.

Thus, in the excellent engineering division (BCh-5) commanded by Engr-Capt 3rd Rank V. Baranov, 12 specialists became masters of military affairs. The progressive engineer-mechanic interested himself in how such high indicators could be achieved in a relatively small collective. It turned out that in BCh-5 a long-range plan had been compiled for work with those sailors who had received a 1st-class rating and have the right to become masters. Supplemental lessons and practice sessions under complex conditions and reduced norms are conducted with the master candidates. They are trained aboard ship for the main exam by stages. The best specialists actively assist those who have made a pledge to become masters and they consult with them. A competition for profound study of the equipment has been organized among the master candidates.

Know-how in training masters in the excellent BCh-5 on the initiative of the progressive engineer-mechanic was brought to the attention not only to engineering division commanders, but also to the commanders of the other shipboard subunits. The officers put them to use and the result is that the number of masters of military affairs aboard ships has now noticeably increased.

Practice shows that there is no limit to the search for forms and methods of mobilizing personnel to improve the quality of combat training on ocean cruises, especially in the sphere of socialist competition. This also confirms the know-how of the best captains and party organizations who approach the struggle for competition viability creatively. It is a shame if this know-how remains in the shadows. This means that staff officers who were unable to properly evaluate creativity and initiative of captains and communists in one of the vital trends did not do their work here. And, on the other hand, approaches noted and implemented in a timely manner very rapidly begin to produce fruit.

The staff and political department in the unit we are discussing was interested in the carefully organized competition among the combat shifts on one ship. (It was greatly facilitated by the fact that the crew received an excellent evaluation for an ocean sortie). Competition was stimulated by establishment of a travelling pennant named for renowned submariner Hero of the Soviet Union Vice-Adm (Ret) G. Shchedrin. The idea for establishing the pennant came from the ship's communists and was supported by the captain.

Before departing the crew sent Grigoriy Ivanovich Shchedrin a letter which formed the basis for a correspondence. Excerpts from the famous submariner's letters were read over the loudspeaker during the cruise and the possessors of the pennant--as was agreed upon--sent the veteran a special letter about their successes in training and service. Based upon cruise results first place went to the combat shift led by watch officer

Sr Lt Yu. Lavrinov. The political department and staff, having studied know-how and organizing competition between combat shifts on this ship, looked into its introduction into other crews.

Recognizing something new and progressive, generalizing it, seeing that the know-how becomes the property of a broad circle of sailors will be easier for the staff officer who himself has behind him the good school of ocean cruises, who knows equipment and weapons to perfection and the special features of their employment, and one who is distinguished for high demandingness and impatience with deficiencies. But regardless of how high the personal qualities of officers, their work aboard ship must be carefully planned and initiative supported and approved. Careful planning facilitates the elimination of boredom.

Participation of officers in competition facilitates improving staff aggressiveness and proficiency in generalization and dissemination of leading know-how. Introduced here are so-called control rosters, which indicate accomplishment of individual socialist pledges by staff officers. It clearly depicts the goals towards which the officer strives, what he has achieved, what is left to be done, what his contributions are towards dissemination of progressive forms and methods of military labor, and his participation in political and ideological work aboard ships. These checklists make it possible to determine which staff officers are going forward and which individuals must be assisted and in what area.

Unfortunately, however, some officers lack aggressiveness and proficiency in analyzing and introducing leading know-how and the ability to fully use the mobilizational and indoctrinational role of competition in the interest of improving combat skill and military discipline in subunits. Officer V. Cheskidov, for example, deserves such criticism. Apparently it is no accident that specialists whose training was the responsibility of this officer last year were unable to move forward in skill development and some even gave up positions previously won.

Winter combat training grows more incandescent. And the extent to which ships' crews successfully accomplish the winter training period missions greatly depends on the aggressiveness and proficiency of the staff, on its painstaking, daily, goal-oriented work to bring to light, generalize, and implement everything new and progressive that is given birth to on long cruises.

Vice-Adm Zub: Background Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank S. Bystrov: "Decision"]

[Text] This was not the first time that Vice-Adm Vitaliy Ivanovich Zub spent his days and nights on the bridge. Commanding a detachment of ships during exercises, he soon fell into the mode of round-the-clock intense work and continually kept himself ready for unexpected changes in the situation. These changes are unavoidable. Moreover, combat is built upon them--first in the imagination of the commander, then in reality. However, the intensity of the problem was that, although he was a very skillful captain, there could always be a turn of events which he did not suspect. And a captain must do the things that even the most capable computers still cannot be taught to do: on the basis of incomplete, sometimes even contradictory, data, banking upon computations and instructions, experience and guesses, make a specific decision, make and subordinate to it activities of all resources, knowing that in the correctness of the decision lies one's authority and success, in the erroneous nature of the decision, regardless of reliability, lies incompetency.

The sea this time did in not Zub, but those who still avoided encountering his detachment. The large ASW ship sent forward detected the "enemy." However, the fierce stormy waves, low overcast, strips of fog, and finally the radar countermeasures greatly complicated mission accomplishment, the finale of which was to be a missile strike against the main target.

Vitaliy Ivanovich Zub watched the navigator plotting the targets. Although order was po rly depicted, it was not difficult to guess what had happened--dozens of miles away, where the "enemy," having called to its assistance all equipment capabilities, all of nature's kindness, tried to slip away from the pursuit by the still minor forces.

The detachment commander sensed the expectant glance of missileer Capt 1st Rank Yu. Gladkikh and understood what he wanted: To rapidly get the "okay" to fire. Overall it was possible to take the risk. But, the vice admiral desired more specific data on the location of the main target.

Suddenly the next report from the large ASW ship surprised everyone. The "enemy" order of battle had split. Contact with several targets was lost and it was impossible to determine the main target.

Another strip of fog rolled by. The ship's bell gave out the alarm in the dense quilted lightness. Vice-Adm Vi aliy Ivanovich Zub sensed the seconds slipping by unhindered, sensed the vessel of time literally shrinking.

Decisions were easier in past years. Nothing seemed impossible to Zub when he was young. This was a time when, as they say, eyes are full of decisiveness and the only thing lacking is experience. The mark of that time was a fervent inner belief in oneself, a thirst for difficult situations, the desire to test oneself fully.

At age 23 Vitaliy Zub already was a ship's captain. It was a small, albeit independent, combat entity. Even then he was recommended as a captain selflessly dedicated to the service, decisive, not afraid to take a risk. Later on, it's true, his effectiveness report said it rather sharply: "Inclined towards recklessness."

...Two large subchasers commanded by Sr Lt Zub departed together from their bases. The captain of the second ship requested that he be allowed to visit with his famility at a neighboring garrison. Then unexpectedly came an order for both ships to go out on a raid. So, both subchasers went out on the raid. Even though there were no officers aboard the latter who were officially permitted to command a ship. One subchaser went in tow with the other. Sr Lt Zub completed the maneuver faultlessly and was completely satisfied with his actions but, in spite of expectations, he had a very unpleasant chat with the commander of the division of ships.

Vice-Adm Zub now would not approve such actions either. He is now a very experienced sailor who has sailed in different jobs more than 200,000 miles and not once due to the force of circumstances has he been forced to take a risk and, all the same, critically evaluates past actions as a youth. The years taught him to value in all decisions not only effectiveness but certainly advisability and foresight equally as much. Overall one cannot be a real captain without this.

These two forces--personal inspiration and circumspection and the sagacity of seniors also primarily form a captain. In the final analysis a captain's decision is also structured so as not to disrupt the proportions of bravery and carefulness, intuition and calculation.

Vitaliy Ivanovich now recalled the expectant glance of missileer Capt 1st Rank Gladkikh. Apparently the latter had been extremely surprised by the admiral's doubts. If they had struck sooner, even though there was some risk involved, then they might have avoided the situation that had just occurred with the "bifurcation" of the order.

This was not the first time that Vice-Adm Zub had read doubt in the eyes of his juniors: "When it seemed to them that everything was clear and simple, he suddenly demanded refinements and additional substantiation." Naturally, the officers agreed but, based on the shallow replies and the elusive exterior details, he guessed what was going through their minds: "You are being over cautious, comrade vice admiral, and this is uncharacteristic of you based on what we have heard."

Again back to the earlier times. After all every job requires its own norm of responsibility. Zub was executive officer aboard a destroyer and, often standing in for the captain, fulfilled his responsibilities with complete confidence.

The joy of controlling a ship which the wind, waves, and current are also trying to control, and to have it respond defiantly completely only to you--this is also the joy of self-affirmation. In one's eyes, in the eyes of subordinates and of comrades. This is entrancing and you are prepared to take on any responsibility. But, are you capable of any responsibility?

He once was bringing a destroyer back to base. Everything was as usual, familiar, well studied: he asked for more rpm and it was a little bit too much. As is always the case, the formation commander noticed this from the flagship.

This called for an explanation in the admiral's cabin, in the presence of the chief of the political department, no less.

"You were underway with high rpm?" The rear admiral sternly gazed from his thick eyebrows on the executive officer.

"Yes sir, comrade admiral," Capt 3d Rank Zub answered honestly.

"Why was this necessary?" the rear admiral asked but, in a manner indicating that he would like to hear a substantiated answer.

"I wished to avoid a snow shower," Zub snapped sharply and none the less noted the lack of conviction in what he had said.

"What shower, Zub?" the admiral cocked his eyebrows. "This is recklessness. Learn to avoid that."

The formation commander sat at his desk and turned his glance to the chief of the political department.

"What a shame, Zub. We thought that you were a serious executive officer and wanted to appoint you as captain. But now we have our doubts...."

"Have no doubts, comrade admiral!" the officer suddenly blurted out.

"Well, Zub!" the rear admiral wished to say something else but restrained himself, looked at the chief of the political department, and waved his hand. "Go!"

Several days later came the order appointing Capt 3d Rank Zub as ship's captain. He was unhappy, even sad, about the last conversation with the admiral. The young captain made for him a firm conclusion: He would operate the ship well, and not be so confident in himself always.

How many other situations were there in his long service as a captain when the success or failure of many people, their security, even their lives depended on self control and self possession? And he found himself equal to the tasks....

"Let me hear your proposals," Vice-Adm Zub said, glancing at the officers of the underway staff. He remained calm and the speech seemed as if it were a secondary matter, but he himself waited: Would they say what he wanted them to say, what was already the foundation being laid as a variation of the decision?

There was a pause. Zub understood that each officer, prior to stating his thoughts out loud, tried to reconcile himself to the scale of his, the detachment commander's, activities.

It seemed that the officers' proposals contained advisability, consistency, and logic. But, having made a new maneuver, the "enemy" had already disrupted the sequence of events. The vice admiral listened to the officers and barely interrupted them. His face began to become more stern and harder. Suddenly he lifted his head and without any hesitation concluded:

"We have no more time to mull this over. We will seek the departing group here," and he drew a circle with a pencil around a small area of the enormous sea. "The ASW aircraft will cope with this best of all."

...Each officer is well familiar with the lines from the shipboard regulations which state that the ship's captain must operate without the fear of responsibility for a risky maneuver dictated by the situation. But, few wish to fully test what this may cost.

They returned from the long cruise. They encountered a heavy storm in the Bay of Biscay. Turn back or try to make it across the treacherous Biscay? Capt 2d Rank Zub considered it necessary to continue the cruise. He laid out his decision in a message and sent it for confirmation to his senior chief. There was no answer immediately forthcoming. Confident that his decision would be confirmed, he went across the bay. He was very surprised by the late answer with instructions to return to the starting point. Now this meant once more going through the stormy Bay of Biscay. Therefore, he reported that the bay had been crossed and was considered inadvisable to return, to continue on the present course, the situation is perfectly clear, request confirmation of the correctness of the decision.

Capt 2d Rank Zub's actions led to his appointment to a new position, previously confirmed, being temporarily delayed.

Yes, at that time he was prepared to bemoan the decision made in the stormy ocean. But facing him was a raging sea, clouds falling into it, a ship being lost between the waves. No, whatever is said he could not have done anything else....

...A large ASW ship reported that it did not observe the main target in the group being pursued. At that time Vice-Adm Zub had already brought his detachment to the area earlier marked by him on the map. The support aircraft, leaving the screens at the radar stations, took a course to the same place. If the departing portion of the "enemy" forces actually turned up in the area of their new search, then this means that the main target is there.

Capt 1st Rank U. Gladkikh, having received instructions to prepare to inflict a missile strike, noticeably excited, all the same was unable to hide his doubts: There was absolutely no confirmation of the correctness of their actions yet. These doubts also involuntarily crept into Vitaliy Ivanovich's thoughts--how can this be avoided even by the most decisive individual. Zub knew that he would only be content when he received the confirming report. Such a report was received from the pilots.

...At the exercise critique, reporting the actions of the detachment of ships, Vice-Adm Zub did not dwell in detail on his decision at the peak moment of that battle. It was practically speaking impossible to catch this on the diagram depicting the maneuvers. The detachment's course changed in natural dependency on the displacements of the main target. One was left with the impression that the detachment commander had tracked it the entire time without a break.

In essence, that was the way it happened.

'Tambovskiy komsomolets'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt S. Cheypesh, Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "The 'Tambovskiy komsomolets' Fires"]

[Text] Not far from the dock where modern ships are berthed at eternal anchor stands a patrol boat from the patrol boat detachment commanded by the renowned front-line soldier Hero of the Soviet Union Gds Capt-Lt B. Ushchev. Nearby is a tall mast. After they wrap up each socialist competition they raise a flag in honor of the victors.

From the very beginning of the training year leadership in the formation was held by the crew of the missile patrol boat "Tambovskiy komsomolets." The sailers accomplish all combat training missions with high quality.

Now comes the next sortie. The patrol boat personnel are to conduct artillery fire.

Surprises occur even during the approach to the range. "Enemy" aviation struck the patrol boat. In accordance with the input, the captain and several other sailors were put out of action. Lt V. Lidinchuk, the executive officer, had to take command. The crews completed preparations for the firing in a reduced complement....

This is training. But, how can one forget during this time about the experience of the front-line heros? After all, the subordinates of the aforementioned Gds Capt-Lt B. Ushchev during the war often excelled in an exceptionally complex situation. Friendly coordinated work at all combat stations, full effort on the part of each Red Navy sailor, the ability at any moment to replace a comrade put out of action brought them victory.

Competing in the year of the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory, the sailors on the patrol boats steadfastly learned courage and proficiency from the war heros. A battle is actively pursued within the crew to master related specialties. Now each third sailor is mastering such a related specialty and, at many battle stations, the sailors have developed complete interoperability.

Preparing to conduct the artillery firing, ship's captain Capt-Lt B. Sivoplyas and the other officers and warrant officers devoted special attention to development of close coordination between the crews and the battle by the sailors to exceed the norms.

Thus, for example, during practical training with one crew Sivoplyas noted that combat coordination between radar operators and gunners was insufficient. As soon as the situation deteriorated, confusion appeared in the reports and the operating rhythm among many of the troops broke down.

At the captain's advice his executive officer Lt V. Lidinchuk, as well as first-class specialists PO 1st Class V. Chebulayev and PO 2d Class B. Pozdeyev timed each operation. Having determined the cause of the errors, during the next intense practical training sessions they assisted young sailors V. Lodkin, V. Sokolov, and others to correct them and to master proficient operating procedures.

The same diligent care was also taken with other elements of the crew. And, all of this worked out well.

...Lidinchuk's voice grows stronger from command to command. The sailors work with reduced crews, but they work rapidly and confidently. The radar operators detected the small target at maximum range. Lidinchuk rapidly analyzed the situation, confirmed the elements of target motion, and determined the moment when to open fire.

The ship was on a combat course. The target entered the firing zone. The gunners accurately destroyed it. Then the sailors masterfully broke off from the "enemy." The training battle lasted seconds, but it demanded from the sailors great skill and full exertion of physical and moral forces. The patrol boat crews received a deserved excellent rating.

The sailors returned to home port in a good mood. Far from port they saw the flag hoisted on the mast in honor of their victory. In honor of those who steadfastly multiply the glorious traditions of the war heroes through successes in military labor.

Cruiser 'Admiral Ushakov'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "The Price of Leniency"]

[Text] This was the title of correspondence from Capt 2d Rank L. Buchinskiy and Capt-Lt S. Malikhov published in the newspaper on 3 January of this year. It brought to light deficiencies in the operating style of the party committee aboard the cruiser "Admiral Ushakov" in organizing socialist competition and ensuring that communists set an example in combat training and service.

As Capt 1st Rank A. Tsikalo reported to the editorial board, the correspondence was discussed at a meeting of the supervisory command and political staff in the formation of ships, as well as at an expanded meeting of the cruiser party committee.

Commander of BCh-2 Capt 3rd Rank A. Ryabchenko has been removed from his post for serious omissions in the training and indoctrination of personnel.

The weak organizational and political-indoctrinational work to mobilize communists to improve the quality of tactical, firing, and special training has been pointed out to party committee secretary Capt 3rd Rank I. Mel'nik and specific measures designed to strengthen party influence on solution of these problems have been noted.

Aviation Support: Criticism Follow-Up

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "There Can Be No Complaints"]

[Text] Correspondence from Lt Col V. Kaz'min was published with this headline on 6 February. It described the heart of the conflict which arose amongst the leadership of the Northern Fleet aviation repair enterprise and presented facts which gave witness to a reduction in the level of indoctrinational work within the party collective.

As member of the Military Council, chief of the fleet aviation political department Maj Gen Avn M. Mamay reported to the editorial board, the correspondence was discussed by political department workers as well as at a meeting of commanders, political workers, and party activists within the garrison's units. Measures have been taken to fundamentally improve indoctrinational work in the party organization and to create in it an atmosphere of intolerance to any deviation from the norms of party life and regulation interrelationships.

Enterprise chief Engr-Lt Col V. Chernyak has been replaced due to serious omissions in supervision of the military collective and a reduction in the quality of aviation equipment repair. Deputy enterprise chief for political affairs Maj A. Kozodayev has been called to party account.

By order of the fleet aviation chief engineer a more diligent system of monitoring the quality in preparing repaired aviation equipment for flight testing has been implemented, changes have been made in engineering instructions, and supervisory responsibilities have been refined.

Political Work in the Northern Fleet

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "The Worthy--For the Party"]

[Text] A report by chief of the Northern Fleet Organizational Party Work Department Capt 1st Rank F. Khorin "On The Work of Fleet Political Organs and Party Organizations To Bring Into The Party and Indoctrinate CPSU Candidate Members" was heard and discussed in the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.

During discussion of the report it was noted that fleet political organs and party organizations, fulfilling 25th CPSU Congress directives and CPSU Central Committee decrees concerning the party organizations of Kirgizia, are intensifying their influence on the quality of selection of servicemen for the party ranks and indoctrination of young communists. Political organs are concentrating attention on the ideological and organizational strengthening of primary party organizations and increasing the level of their practical activities in military collectives. In the fleet the party layer has grown among leading categories of servicemen, the network of party organizations has developed, and their structure has been improved. This work has been subordinated to accomplishment of specific missions involving combat readiness, improving the effectiveness of ideological work, and strengthening military discipline and is exerting a noticeable influence on their solution.

In addition, as was pointed out during discussion of the report, not all political organizations and party organizations with the requisite specificity and steadfastness are fulfilling 25th CPSU Congress instructions concerning regulatory actions involving entrance into the party. In several of them the system of analyzing practice in this field has been insufficiently thought through and there is not always careful representation of the ways of effecting the growth of the party ranks, at times the arsenal of work forms and methods with CPSU candidate members is very narrow. When evaluating work concerning entry into the party attention is often incorrectly centered on comparison of quantitative indicators. A number of political organs and party organizations are not adhering to the demands of the CPSU regulations concerning careful examination of the political, official, and moral qualities of those who wish to join the CPSU and they forget about the importance of such things as bringing people in at open party meetings. They note cases where matters concerning party entry are examined at meetings on the day invitations are given out or the meeting itself begins in an urgent manner on the eve of the party commission meeting. This approach brings with it a reduction in demandingness when joining the CPSU.

Political organs, it was noted during the discussion, do not always give a principled evaluation to similar facts and do not inquire into the specific members of the political group and party aktiv who permit formalism and laxity in this matter. Measures are also still not being taken everywhere to improve the responsibility by communists for the objectivity of party recommendations. All this leads to the CPSU ranks sometimes being augmented by people with low moral-political qualities and those who are unworthy of the high rank of communist.

Emphasized once again at the meeting was the necessity to strictly carry out 25th CPSU Congress directives and Central Committee requirements concerning questions of membership in the party and steadfastly implement a line to improve the quality of the individual selection for the party and indoctrination of young communists as a vital condition of ideological and organizational strengthening of party organizations and improving their aggressiveness and fighting spirit.

A recommendation was made to the fleet political administration and political organs to profoundly and comprehensively analyze quantitative and qualitative changes in party collectives and develop from this careful recommendations for party organizations, and strictly deal with political departments, party commissions, and party committees and bureaus where accomplishment of overall party requirements concerning entry into the ranks of the CPSU are concerned.

The attention of political organizations was directed towards consolidating the work of party organizations to indoctrinate members and candidate members of the party in a spirit of high responsibility for belonging to the CPSU, development in them of an aggressive vital position, and creation in every collective of communists of a situation of comradeship, mutual demandingness, and strict adherence to Leninist norms of party life. This will facilitate improvement in the fighting spirit of party organizations and the mobilization of communists and all personnel for a proper greeting to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, the 35th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, and successful accomplishment of the missions assigned by the USSR Minister of Defense for 1980.

Navigator's Complaint Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Engr-Capt 2d Rank A. Kontiyevskiy: "The Biography is Written Completely"]

[Text] "Practically speaking my chiefs ignored navigator training. Ships' captains, sensing this, looked upon it apathetically, to say the least. As was to be expected, violations of navigational rules occurred. And, I turned out to be the chief guilty party. The chiefs forgot that I had often turned to them for aid, but did not receive it and worked the problem in isolation."

These are from a letter to the editorial board from Sr Lt S. Maleyev, navigator in a support ship subunit. What are the actual facts?

Maleyev's service as an officer began very successfully in 1975. He was assigned to a missile submarine and, one year later, was selected as the best navigator in the unit.

An excellent start. One would think that, acquiring experience, the officer communist will confidently continue up the ladder to improve proficiency. But, things went, as they say, "a rather different course." There were serious family problems and he was unable to extricate himself from them honorably. This was followed by obvious problems on the job. ("I shrugged everything off," Maleyev now recognizes). Then came a serious violation of military discipline and, early in 1977, the officer was forced to leave the ship and, naturally, not due to his own wishes. And again--with a severe party penalty.

Sr Lt Maleyev arrived at his new duty station with this "money in the bank." He was properly received and no one brought up the past. On the contrary, everyone emphasized the fact that the main thing is to get down to work and serve honorably.

The navigator's property which Maleyev received turned out not to be in the best shape. The officer he replaced had for a long time "prepared himself" for transfer into the reserves and had become negligent. The first to assist Maleyev in coping with the situation was experienced sailor Capt-Lt (Res) G. Yeropolov, then Capt 3rd Rank G. Cherokov, commander of a division of ships, and staff officer Capt 3rd Rank V. Beloshapko worked with him. By the way, Sr Lt Maleyev himself, gradually gaining experience, matured in the new job. Time passed and all penalties, including the party penalty, were removed from the record. He received his promotion on schedule.

Then, completely unexpectedly, several of his subordinates made unforgivable navigational errors. During an inspection on one of the ships located at another port, a senior staff officer discovered major deficiencies in the navigator training of technicians and sailors. The corresponding message was received at the unit from the fleet staff. The unit commander had an unpleasant chat with Sr Lt Maleyev. The officer did not agree with the criticism and announced that others rather than he were guilty.

That was the situation when Maleyev sent the letter to the editorial board.

Detailed analysis demonstrated that several of the complaints expressed in Maleyev's letter were based on fact: Some captains look apathetically upon navigator training and often postpone lessons with ship operators. There is food for thought here for captains. The question concerning assistance from chiefs, the absence of which Maleyev complained about, requires further explanation.

If the assistance had been quantifiable and measured in some type of unit, then overall order would be the case based on "gross" indicators. On the whole officers Beloshapko and Cherokov worked a great deal with Maleyev. But, in what way? Practically speaking prior to the telegram from the fleet staff, that is over a period of 2 or more years that the officer served in the new job, Maleyev was treated literally like a sick man making a slow recovery. There were many errors and deficiencies in his work, as is now perfectly clear. But, no one as regulations call for ever strictly required that the officer himself take action to eliminate deficiencies in navigator support to the ships. Most often Capt 3rd Rank Beloshapko did this.

"We wanted Maleyev to more rapidly get his next promotion, and therefore did not treat him strictly, in other words, we didn't punish him," Cherokov and Beloshapko explained their position. "Now we are not letting him off easy and therefore his penalties are building up."

It's strange, has it been the case for a long time that the way to assist someone is primarily to close your eyes to deficiencies in an officer's service or conduct? Constant, principled, fair demands and good advice along with mandatory monitoring of implementation, rather than substitution or tutelage is, as life teaches, the most effective support and assistance for a young officer mastering a new job.

Political worker officer Ya. Romanovskiy and party bureau members were well aware that Maleyev was not fully successful in his relationships with several captains and their assistants. Some ship operators possess rich cruising experience, are well-versed in navigation affairs, and look upon a young sometimes-lost officer navigator somewhat disdainfully. Others have only a passing acquaintance with navigator support, and, they often told Maleyev "This is a tug, not a cruiser, we will get by."

It would seem that the party bureau would study and discuss this problem and, at the party meeting, there should be discussion of the unsolved problems involving navigator training. However this did not take place. The errors and friction between the navigator and ship operators continued.

Now the other side of the story. When one discusses slow development of individual young officers, their mistakes in service and discipline, conversations as a rule end up with complaints directed towards captains, political workers, and party organizations. But, only a passive role is usually left to the officer himself. But, can it be possible to achieve real development of a young officer without indoctrinating within him the firmest captain's character, without an active life's position, without a readiness to take upon himself the entire responsibility for the assigned task?

When we met Maleyev, he eagerly and with interesting details discussed the early period of his officer service. But, as soon as the conversation turned to problems and errors, a pall was cast over the discussion: "Nobody supported me," "They did not want to correct this," "As long as you are not writing it up, no one speaks to the ship operator about the error." As if in all of this the officer himself has an indirect relationship. As if not he but others must take responsibility both for his personal errors and for those of subordinates.

I listened to Maleyev's sad tale and involuntarily recalled a meeting with another officer--Capt 3rd Rank Ye. Zakharov.

Zakharov's path to becoming an officer began with difficulty, with a penalty assigned by the fleet commander. But, the lieutenant did no throw up his hands, did not flow with the tide which in the final analysis leads to a "rash of bad luck." He set a main route for himself--through honorable labor clear the record and with great fervor subordinating service and life to the main task, step by step head for the intended goal. Depending upon the understanding of his commanders, he went for support to comrades, to the collective, in whose force and justice he believed infinitely. He counted on coworkers, but did not hope that anyone would do his work for him or close their eyes to his errors.

And, one year later, Zakharov was designated the best battery commander on the cruiser; no one was surprised. Victory was deserved and correct. He was accepted into the ranks of the CPSU on the cruiser and while still a senior lieutenant was designated assistant captain. He was then transferred to an important job on the staff. Everywhere Zakharov went one found the rule--primarily be most demanding upon yourself.

This then is the demandingness and the uncompromising strictness upon oneself which Sr Lt Maleyev lacks still. Moreover, it is a fact that he did not demonstrate special zeal for service. He tried hard only initially after arriving in the subunit, then he began to indulge himself.

Apparently there is no sense in enumerating all of the officer's errors and mistakes concerning navigation. Many occurred also in his personal conduct. For instance, there was a fuss concerning Maleyev the day our meeting took place: They explained why the officer was absent from the unit and why he did not come to work on time.

"I very much wish to help myself during this difficult time," Maleyev writes to the editorial board. Meanwhile, it is difficult to assist a person who trips himself up time after time.

Sr Lt Maleyev is a capable navigator and this is a unanimous opinion. But, every officer I spoke with almost verbatim said the same thing: "Only he must seriously take a look at himself. It is time for this, otherwise it is too late."

Sr Lt Maleyev has a dream of again becoming a navigator on a submarine. This is a fine, noble dream. But, everyone knows that one must strive for a dream. A biography is always written completely. But, since it turned out that the biography's other chapters do not add to a person's honor, one must do everything possible to see that subsequent chapters compensate for losses. As they say in such instances, make yourself the best.

On a Small ASW Ship

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank V. Koshcheyev, Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "It Was Considered Minor"]

[Text] The mooring lines had been secured and the small ASW ship which had returned from the sea was locked to the pier. Shortly thereafter the crew was gathered to sum up the socialist competition. There was a detailed discussion of how the combat training missions had been accomplished during the cruise and how effectively the underway miles had been used for training. They also discussed the battle to save fuel and lubricants. They analyzed achievements and noted all progressive steps that had been discovered in this important matter.

At the beginning of the training year the crew made high socialist pledges and decided to conserve a significant sum of money during the winter training period. The figures contained in the pledges initially seemed to some too high for a small ship. But, the months passed and now it was possible with confidence to state that the intended economy goals would be achieved. On each sortie out to sea the crew aktiv logged more figures showing kilograms of fuel and kilowatts of electric power that had been saved....

Take this fact. The ship was once called upon to sail under complex conditions when the engines worked with an overload. One would think that great fuel losses were unavoidable here. But Engr-Capt-Lt A. Tuishev, commander of the electrical and engineering division, having computed the optimal quality of fuel with which the ship had been supplied, was able to reduce the nonproductive expenditures to the minimum.

A search for economy reserves is senseless without strict accounting and control. The ship's captain and communists did not overlook the slightest manifestations of negligence and extravagance. This, it seems, is a minor matter: During the ship's departure from the quay several machine operators did not carefully observe the amount of fuel fed to the burner. Aboard ship they had found out how to go about avoiding such "minor matters." It turns out that they burned up dozens of kilograms of fuel. After this it became a rule in the crew to carefully compute the expenditure of fuel for each watch.

This strict demand heightened the sailors' attention on other "minor matters" as well. Will the engine overheat? Is the oil dripping at all? Saving fuel also depends on all of this.

Not only specialists from the electrical and engineering division, but the entire crew participates in the battle for economy and conservation aboard the ship. The following was a rather typical picture before: The engine is in operation, but the ship does not move an inch from the dock--we are waiting for someone, someone is slow casting off the lines... Similar instances are a rarity now. Each minute when the engine is idling is now strictly recorded and it is mandatory to establish whose fault it is that this happened and to take it into account when competition is summed up.

The crew places great attention on studying leading know-how accumulated on other ships. For example, a trawler aboard which Engr-St Lt V. Kochura is commander of the electrical and engineering division recently returned from a cruise. His subordinates achieved good results in saving fuel and engine operating time. Tuishev with a group of specialists visited their neighbors and learned a great deal from them.

...The ship again is departing the dock. Again the course is out to the open sea. Ahead lay difficult cruise miles and complex combat training missions. The crew has many concerns and among them is to return to port with a reserve of fuel saved and with new successes in the struggle for economical expenditure of resources.

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TANK UNITS: TRAINING, RELATED ACTIVITIES

Battalion Training Shortcomings Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Shevchenko, Red Banner Odessa Military District: "Wasted Minutes"]

> [Text] We know, of course, that the methodological training level of exercise directors is crucial to the quality and effectiveness of exercises. Is that level always good enough? Does it measure up to modern demands? This is the subject of a report from N regiment.

The companies in the tank battalion commanded by Captain V. Volkov arrived promptly at the exercise sites that day. Not all of them began the exercises at once, however. The company commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Utyakov, for example, began the tank gunnery exercise a full hour late, for example. What was the matter?

First, it was learned that Captain V. Zubarev, battalion chief of staff, had not filled out the necessary papers on time. Then, Senior Lieutenant V. Zalesskiy, the training center chief, disappeared somewhere, and without him no one was permitted to enter the firing grounds.... In short, the training process was held up by all sorts of organizational failings. The situation was not straightened out until Lieutenant Colonel L. Kirpach, an officer from higher headquarters, arrived at the firing grounds.

Those involved thought that Senior Lieutenant Utyakov would now try to make up the lost time and organize the exercise so that not a single minute of training time would be wasted. The remaining time was also not used in the best possible manner by far, however. At the training site where Lieutenant V. Nesterov, platoon commander, was in charge of the exercise, for example, the tankmen were working on the norms for dismantling and assembling a machine gun. A total of seven people were involved. Despite this, each of them only managed to dismantle and reassemble the weapon twice during the training hour, taking a total of 3 minutes to do so. The rest of the time the trainees stood around. It is not surprising that at the end of the exercise not one of them was able to fulfill the excellence norm.

Unfortunately, the situation was no better in the other subunits. Personnel in the company in which Lieutenant Ye. Dudnin was serving as temporary commander was supposed to perform its next firing exercise. The schedule allotted 3 hours for this. The soldiers and NCO's, however, were busy for only a few minutes, that is, for exactly the amount of time required to receive the ammunition, load the magazines, prepare to fire and fire. The rest of the time they stood in formation or smoked, taking shelter from the wind behind the central tower. The most amazing thing about the incident, however, is the fact that Lieutenant Dudnin, as he said himself, believed that organizing the exercise in this manner was not in conflict with the methodological requirements. The most important thing, in his opinion, was to perform the firing exercise. How the exercise was organized was unimportant. This is a basically incorrect attitude. Incidentally, the company's firing performance that day was far from brilliant, although the fighting men had had the opportunity to prepare for the exercise and to perfect the necessary skills. Lieutenant Dudnin was unable to take advantage of the possibilities, to set up the firing lesson in accordance with the methodological requirements.

We encountered an even more disappointing situation in the company commanded by Captain G. Sheredko. After arriving for the tank gunnery exercise the tankmen waited almost 3 hours for the target field to be readied. Training time was passing, while the field was being readied.

"We will do the exercise another time," Captain Sheredko said, and took the company off.

I visited the battalion again sometime later. What had been done there to straighten out the training process, to improve the quality of exercises and drills? The only step taken in the battalion was to punish the company commanders. This was not the solution to the problem, of course. The winter training period is entering its final stage. Right now it is especially important to make efficient use of every hour of training time, to see that every exercise and every drill is performed at a good methodological level. And this means a radical change in the methodological training of the officers. This is discussed a great deal at meetings and assemblies. The situation cannot be corrected with words alone, however. Our task is one of organizing the officers' training more efficiently, and particularly, of improving the quality of the instructors' methodological classes.

Battalion Economy Measures

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Maj S. Margin, tank regiment commander, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Important Grams"]

> [Text] The army and navy continue their campaign for conservation and thrift begun last year at the initiative of personnel of a tank regiment in the Red Banner Baltic Military District. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported on the tankmen's fulfillment of their socialist commitments. Today we shall talk about how the unit's personnel utilized their accumulated experience last year to expand the campaign for conservation and thrift.

Before leaving for the range, Major V. Petukhov, commander of the tank battalion, and the deputy commander for technical affairs calculated the amount of fuel which had been saved. It turned out that by saving literally grams of fuel each day, more than 500 kilograms of the valuable petroleum product had been saved in the subunit during the month. This is extremely typical for the outstanding collective, which was awarded the challenge prize "Best District Tank Battalion." It has become a firm rule in the subunit to save the grams which add up to a ton. Reserves for economizing are persistently sought.

Of the fuel allocated for the technical servicing of the machines alone, for example, hundreds of kilograms has been saved. The valuable petroleum product is not discarded after using it for its primary purpose, as was formerly done, but is left to settle in specially devised containers, strained and then put to use again.

The tankmen have reequipped the lubrication stations in the pool, and each station now has a display showing the procedure for servicing and operating the equipment and giving the materials consumption standards. It is an interesting fact that this team's combat training is improving by the day and that material expenditures have not only not increased in the process, but, on the contrary, have actually dropped.

The battalion commander and the party and Komsomol organization work tirelessly to instill in the men a sense of personal responsibility for the thrifty use of each liter of fuel and the efficient utilization of every training hour.

A special commission for the conservation of materiel has been set up in the unit. Its members include Majors L. Chovnyuk and S. Zobak, Captain V. Drobinin and other officers. They thoroughly analyze the state of affairs in all areas of unit management, see that the most efficient conservation methods are adopted and identify unutilized reserves.

The party organization devotes a great deal of attention to this matter. The campaign for conservation and thrift is centered in the company itself.

When the monthly results are summed up, there is a serious discussion based on principle, which covers not only the gunnery and tank operation exercises performed but also the consumption of fuel and spare parts and of other materiel. Regimental headquarters and the party organization are dealing more strictly with those responsible for wasting materials.

Following one of the tactical exercises it was discovered that an excess amount of fuel had been consumed in the subunit commanded by Captain Yu. Kalmutskiy. A thorough investigation showed that certain of the drivers in that subunit had violated the vehicle operation rules. Specifically, the motor vehicles had frequently been filled with the wrong grade of gasoline. Two pistons in the vehicle driven by Private A. Avakimyan stopped functioning as a result.

This incident was severely criticized in the regiment. It was discussed at a unit party meeting. The ruined pistons went on display in the technical preparation classroom. The room contains a special display containing parts which have been ruined through the fault of one specialist or another, and his name is given. I have to say that this technique for promoting conservation and thrift, a fairly simple one at first glance, is extremely effective. Fewer and fewer ruined parts are showing up in the display.

Another display, the "Thrift List," is far more popular in the regiment, of course. It is located at the vehicle pool. It shows the best results achieved by the tankmen in the campaign for conservation and thrift. A photograph of Private V. Yakovlev, a driver, is attached to the board. He is well known in the regiment as the winner of the fuel conservation competition. In just one year the soldier entered 880 liters of fuel on his individual conservation card, one of which exists for each of our specialists. Yakovlev is now undergoing training at a warrant officer's school. He will return to his regiment upon completing the training.

Matters of conservation and thrift are extensively represented in the mass-agitation plans. All of this is helping to develop in each soldier a sense of great responsibility for the careful handling of socialist property. And from this point of view, every gram of fuel and every kilowatt-hour of electric energy saved are becoming even more important.

Officer Training Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col N. Arsenov, Red Banner Ural Military District: "After the Assemblies"]

[Text] Instructional methods assemblies for platoon commanders were recently conducted in tank regiment N. The young officers witnessed many things of instructional value. A demonstration tank gunnery drill conducted by Captain A. Makhov, commander of an outstanding company, was particularly good.

During the drill there was a lively battle to better the norms at one of the training positions. The results of the competition among the crews were shown on an illuminated display board, of which everyone had a good view.

At another training site the tankmen learned to apply the gunnery rules.

Interesting training techniques and innovative methods were also employed at the other training sites. The assemblies provided the platoon commanders with models of effective organization of exercises. It appeared that they would have a perceptible effect upon the quality of the future training.

It did not turn out exactly that way, however. I recently attended a tank gunnery training session in the platoon commanded by Lieutenant A. Solomin. The exercise was in no way similar to the demonstration class conducted during the assemblies. The instructor set up only three training positions instead of seven. Only two of the trainees fulfilled the norm, and not all of them, as specified in the recommendations. The others watched passively as their comrades performed. A great deal of time was wasted. Lieutenant Solomin was not able to explain what prevented him from planning and conducting the class in the manner recommended at the assemblies.

One had to ask the question: Where was the follow-up work on the part of the senior comrades, those who managed to conduct the assemblies at a fairly high level? Did they perhaps feel that their mission consisted only in setting up the assemblies? It was difficult not to think so, because at a number of other exercises which I attended I also failed to see any of the training techniques demonstrated at the assemblies.

It seems to me that an extremely widespread shortcoming in organizational work has to underlie all this. It is naturally important to skillfully publicize progressive know-how. It is even more important, however, to see that this know-how is adopted by demonstrating party persistence and consistency.

Technical Training of Officers Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 80 p 2

[Introduction by Lt Col V. Bogdanovskiy and Maj V. Zhitarenko, and five comments, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "To Infect with One's Personal Example--Discussion of the Letter 'From the Equipment--The Maximum Possible'"]

[Text] From a meeting of officers of the Guards Tank Ural-L'vov Volunteer Division imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy

"On the battlefield man's fate merges with that of the machine. Love your vehicles and care for them so that they always give you trouble-free service.... Take full advantage of the great maneuverability of the remarkable combat vehicles. Become masters in the execution of tank attacks." These words, which have such a modern ring, were written during the Great Patriotic War. They were taken from a mandate issued by the Ural workers to their sons, the fighting men of a tank corps. The volunteer corps fought heroically. With their bravery and fighting skill the Ural soldiers matched the fortress of Ural armor and the reliability of the remarkable equipment created by the minds of Soviet designers and the hands of the workers. The honor of the legendary corps was inherited by one of the divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

The division received with great enthusiasm the letter from Major V. Shipitsin, "From the Equipment--The Maximum Possible," published in the 24 January 1980 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. It was enthusiastically discussed in the subunits and was then placed on the agenda for a division officers meeting. The following statements by participants in that meeting are presented below for the readers.

Guards Colonel Yu. Vodolazov, division commander:

How thoroughly must an officer know the equipment? Must he match the mechanic-driver or the gunner-operator? These questions, raised in the letter, are perfectly valid. I would answer them by saying that it is the officer's duty to know the equipment better than the ordinary specialist, to master the entire list of techniques and methods for its combat employment.

Guards Major M. Fabritsiy, recently promoted, was one of the best battalion commanders in our division. Everyone recognizes him as a skilled tactician. Good things were said about the battalion commander during the critique of every exercise. And behind all this lies a thorough knowledge of the equipment. More than once I observed the officer's great gunnery and driving skill. I say the great skill, the engineer's understanding, with which he directed the reinforcement of a bridge to be crossed by the heavy tracked vehicles. I know that he frequently helped the young vehicle drivers and radio operators find and quickly eliminate a malfunction. These might sound like only details. Taken together, however, they are what create the foundation for a commander's skill.

When a commander has only an incomplete, approximate understanding of the equipment, this lowers the caliber of the decisions he makes and hinders their implementation. In a recent exercise, for example, the battalion commanded by Guards Major V. Zdunov was almost hit by its own artillery fire. Why did this happen? Because the battalion commander had only a general understanding of the capabilities of the supporting subunit and did not thoroughly coordinate matters of interaction.

One more incident. The officers in a subunit of self-propelled artillery units had been assigned the mission of forcing a river from the march, but decided to wait for a crossing to be erected. The current was too rapid, they felt. The senior commander had to intervene. And it was found that the self-propelled vehicles could cross the obstacle without any difficulty. The officers had been misled by their ignorance of the equipment's real capabilities.

The experience of many officers, Guards Major M. Fabritsiy, among them, has shown that the commander's daily concerns in no way prevent him from mastering the equipment. It is not a matter of lacking the time. The trouble lies more in a lack of focus, a sense of responsibility.

There are officers in the division who can no longer be called newcomers: They have served in the division around 5 years without improving their class ratings. There are various reasons for this. One of them lies in the laxity of commanders and chiefs and of party organizations. I am confident that our discussion of the letter, "From the Equipment--The Maximum Possible," will help us to work out stricter criteria for evaluating the professional skill of the officers.

Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Sherovarov, tank company commander:

There are no officers in our company who do not complete the exercises at the firing range or the tank training ground. The officers' ratings are always up to par, as they say. When we take a closer and more searching look, however, we see numerous shortcomings.

The company has a commitment to raise the skills level of two-thirds of the specialists. It is not an easy matter to achieve this goal. In addition to the scheduled training, we also needed to set up a technical group. We began looking for a leader. We found out that none of the officers was prepared to accept the job. They would have to cover matters not included in the program, to delve into subtleties and details. This meant that they themselves would need a perfect understanding of the vehicle.

A solution was found: The group began to function on a battalion scale. At this level we found enthusiastic volunteers, men with a real technical bent. Can we derive satisfaction from such a "solution," however, especially moral satisfaction? Naturally, the answer is no. Each of us must require more of himself.

Guards Major A. Kolomiyets, deputy battalion commander for technical affairs:

The commander's main job is that of supervising the subunit. This is more difficult and important than all the others. I would not argue with Major V. Shipitsin on this issue. He misses a point, however: Why should the commander become deeply involved in mastering the equipment, in its maintenance and servicing, when he has a deputy unit commander for technical affairs? It is for the latter to put the commander's instructions into concrete form and implement them.

I have met commanders who lacked self-confidence without their deputy for technical affairs. In a practice battle they keep their deputy always alongside: They might suddenly need his advice. The officer of technical service has numerous duties of a higher order, however.

It is the duty of the deputy commander for technical affairs to organize the equipment repair service, especially in the field. It is also his job to conduct classes on the more difficult subjects for the company's officers and other personnel. The deputy commander for technical affairs who only covers gaps in the commander's work loses a great deal himself. And the job suffers.

One frequently hears the question: Where is an officer to find the time for improving his technical knowledge? It seems to me that the question should be stated differently: How can we make better use of our time? The officers can learn a great deal, for example, on servicing days in the vehicle pools. While the work is underway in the pool, however, the commander is frequently busy with paperwork in the office.

Guards Senior Lieutenant Ye. Shevchuk, secretary of the battalion party organization:

The author of the letter to the editors is right: Some officers, in fact, do not bother with improving their skills classification, and this situation is not assessed from a position of principle by the senior commanders and party organizations.

Until recently the technical training of the officers did not receive adequate attention in our battalion. The classes conducted by officers and communists Yu. Sypkov and A. Kharchenko did not always measure up to our high demands. We had a no-nonsense discussion of the matter. The suggestion was made that we initiate a competition for subunit with the most highly rated officers. The party activists now set up additional classes for the young officers and warrant officers, assist them and publicize advanced know-how. It has become customary to hold evening meetings of questions and answers on technical subjects, quizzes, competitions for the title of best specialist and reviews of technical journals. The benefit is apparent: The officers have greater confidence in the exercises and classes for the personnel, and the training quality has improved.

Guards Major G. Ovechko, regimental staff officer:

The battalion commander's letter makes the following statement: The commander needs a detailed understanding of the specific vehicle more for the methodologically competent training of subordinates than for combat. Can we consider supervision of the training process a secondary task, however? It is akin to organizing combat operations. Victory in a battle can only be achieved by thoroughly trained men who have mastered the equipment and weapons. The commander prepares them for this test.

The commander is expected to be the first to move up to the firing line and the first to perform a driving exercise. This is his service and his moral duty. The men should be led by conspicuous example and exemplary exhibition.

I recently heard a conversation at the tank training ground between Guards Private I. Muslimov and Guards Senior Lieutenant Yu. Karasev, battalion chief of staff. The soldier promised to learn without fail to operate the vehicle as the officer operated it. I had the feeling that the mechanic-driver was deeply affected, excited by the seconds saved by the officer on the track. The soldier had an inspirational reference point.

This is the way it should be in every exercise. In order to get the maximum possible out of the equipment in a battle, we must learn to draw the maximum out of it on the training field. Today, tomorrow, and always.

Follow-Up on Training Criticism

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt N. Panyukov, Red Banner North Caucasus Military District: "They Have Grown Accustomed..."]

[Text] A critical report, "A Step In Place," was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in September of last year. It dealt with the fact that in the tank battalion commanded by Major V. Tkachenko no real concern was shown for improving the professional skills of the officers. Many officers, including the battalion commander himself, had not raised their class ratings in a number of years. Some of the platoon and company commanders achieved poor results in a testing exercise. The report noted that socialist competition was having little effect upon the quality of officer training. It was organized only formally among the battalion officers. There was also criticism for the battalion staff workers, who were satisfied with observing from the sideline. In short, the report pointed out serious deficiencies, the elimination of which would require the focused efforts of the subunit and unit commanders.

The editors hoped to learn about the nature and the effectiveness of this work from a response to their critical article. No response had been received by the date set, however. Nor did battalion personnel reply immediately to a reminder that they are supposed to respond to criticism with an answer. A reply finally came, but not until 3 months had gone by following publication of the article. I shall cite that portion of the reply, which discusses the steps taken:

"We report that a certain amount of action has been taken on the article 'A Step In Place.' It was discussed at a battalion officers meeting and at a meeting of subunit commanders and unit service chiefs. The critical comments were correctly appraised by the battalion communists at a party meeting. We have conducted extra classes on the operation of combat vehicles. The main focus was on the quality of those classes."

And not a word about whether this work eliminated the shortcomings. The response was signed by the secretary of the unit party bureau. We could have welcomed the fact that the party bureau secretary reported to the editors on steps taken, if this had not required a reminder and if there had been a response to the article by those to whom criticism applied to an equal degree. In this case the editors hoped to receive a response from the headquarters or the battalion political section. It was important to learn how the proper district directorates regarded the deficiencies. After all, the article was about an extremely important problem, that of improving officer training.

I repeat, however, that the editors did not receive the anticipated response. It was decided to look into the entire matter on the spot, in the unit. And this is what was learned. The report on steps taken did not reflect the actual situation, to put it mildly. I was never able to find the officers who attended those meetings at which the article was ostensibly discussed. They did not exist. The secretary of the unit party bureau simply decided "to pacify" the editors. Nor do the minutes of party meetings refer to the newspaper's critical article. It was as though they had not noticed it. Finally, there were none of the so-called extra classes for the officers. And there could not have been any, because not even all of the scheduled classes were conducted.

The overall result--the subunit received a satisfactory rating for the results of the year's training but did not fulfill its commitments.

What is the situation in the battalion this training year? What has been done to see that the errors of the past are not repeated?

When one learns how socialist competition is organized among the officers, it is not difficult to conclude that there have been no changes. There continues to be a great deal of formalism in this area of the work. I will describe just one incident by way of illustration: Lieutenant L. Aleksanyan was challenged to enter into competition by three officers. Judging from the words of Aleksanyan himself, however, he is not competing with any of them. This fact is confirmed by his commitments. In fact, half of the battalion officers do not have personal commitments.

The article mentioned deficiencies in the organization of officer training. Incidentally, the superior headquarters had also pointed out these shortcomings, and they were noted in an order issued by the district troop commander. The quality of the officer training is still not what one would call good, however.

I had the opportunity to attend a class in which the officers were being tested on the motor vehicle service. The test was an unusual one. First, Captain G. Rubanenko, class instructor and chief of the regimental motor vehicle service, read the required paragraphs, and the officers then wrote down what they had heard.

"We are just wasting our time," one officer said with feeling after the test.

The article "A Step In Place" noted that the battalion officers had kept the same class ratings for years. The battalion commander was also criticized. Has anything been done to eliminate the shortcomings? Practically nothing. Both Major Tkachenko and the officers under him (we mean those who have accepted personal commitments) have committed themselves to confirm their class rating this year. The same old "step in place."

In September the author of the report noted that there appears to be no desire to look the situation in the battalion square in the face, to acknowledge the shortcomings self-critically. Nor is there any apparent desire on the part of the personnel to make strict demands of themselves today. One has the impression that they have become accustomed to shortcomings in the subunit and in the unit as well, that they have become accustomed to them and have stopped reacting to criticism in a party manner, stopped combating indulgences and simplifications with determination. It would also be difficult to say that the higher headquarters and the political organ are acting correctly in this situation.

Anti-Helicopter Defense Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Demko, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "When There Are Helicopters Above the Battlefield"]

[Text] According to intelligence reports the "enemy" was preparing to use fire support helicopters on the company's sector of attack. This was no surprise for Captain P. Tolkach: The scrub-covered hills, of which there were many in the area, were conducive to the use of helicopters. And these are terrible antitank weapons. Helicopters, as we know, are capable of maneuvering rapidly and assemblying without detection for delivering strikes. The great firing range of the antitank guided missiles and the great maneuverability of helicopters all helped to make the rotorcraft an effective weapon against armored targets. Therefore, when the company commander prepared for the attack, he devoted special attention to anti-helicopter defense.

Captain Tolkach could not count on the support of the antiaircraft weapons at the battalion commander's disposal: The battalion commander had warned him that they would be used on a more important sector. He therefore had to get along with his own forces.

Tank subunits, as we know, have effective means of combating planes and helicopters. The combat vehicles are armed with antiaircraft machine guns capable of destroying airborne targets at considerable distances. It is one thing to arrange cover for the subunit when it is deployed in place. He was dealing with an offensive in this case, however. Everything had to be done on the move. The surprise element and the limited time in which the helicopters would remain within firing range meant that the platoon commanders would have to be able to predict the "enemy's" actions. It was important to ascertain the possible positions from which the helicopters might make their attacks and focus the crews upon repelling their raids. A great deal also depended upon the commanders' ability to react to changes in the situation.

After making a decision for the tank platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Gritsko to approach the "enemy's" flank under cover, the company commander assigned the officer the mission of monitoring the air continuously and remaining in constant readiness to engage in battle with the helicopters. On a map Captain Tolkach indicated the positions at which the tanks might be attacked from the air.

And he was not wrong. As soon as the platoon approached one of the hills, an "enemy" helicopter rose into the air from behind it. It had been waiting on the opposite slopes to ambush the platoon. The tankmen had only moments in which to act. If they did not destroy the helicopter it would launch antitank guided missiles....

It would be difficult to say how this situation would have turned out if not for the company commander's foresight and the vigilance of the platoon personnel. The "enemy" did not catch the tankmen unawares. The ridge of the hill above which the helicopter hovered was already in the sights of the antiaircraft machine guns. A few seconds sufficed for the crews to forestall the "enemy" in opening fire. The platoon's concentrated fire accomplished its purpose.

The fighting men of other platoons also directed accurate fire at air targets in that exercise.

The tankmen's success was only natural. Problems pertaining to preparing the subunits to engage in antiaircraft defense in general, and anti-helicopter defense in particular, receive constant attention from the officers in the unit in which Captain Tolkach serves. In all the classes, drills and exercises the commanders attempt to create a complex ground and air situation requiring initiative, determination and skill on the part of the trainees.

The antiaircraft machine guns are fired by the tank commanders, of course. They are the first to acquire the necessary skills in that unit. The gun layers and the mechanic-drivers in the subunits are also drilled in combating airborne targets.... The task is defined in the following manner: Each tankman must be able to fire accurately at planes and helicopters. And complete interchangeability in this area has been achieved among the crews.

Questions having to do with combating airborne targets are worked out in each tank gunnery exercise. Experience derived from exercises, which have been especially numerous in the concluding phase of the winter training period, has shown that all of this produces perceptible results: The soldiers demonstrate increased skill.

Battalion Commander on Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Kotov, tank battalion commander, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "It Is Not Just Seconds"]

[Text] There has been an incident in the company commanded by Captain V. Taranchenko: Two junior commanders were late in returning from leave. Now, Taranchenko and I were mulling over what had happened. And there was something to think about.

The company was in good standing in the battalion and the regiment. We had previously mentioned the NCO's who returned late from a town pass more than once among the outstanding participants in the competition. Perhaps what happened was simply an incidental occurrence to which no special significance should be attached? Not at all. This infraction was a long time in the making.

We recalled the following incident. The battalion had just returned from field exercices. The equipment had to be serviced in short time. As always, there was lively competition among the crews. Senior Sergeant M. Postnikov's crew completed the job ahead of all the others. It was subsequently named the winner. And rightly so, judging from the time it took them to perform the job and the quality of the work. One circumstance of considerable importance was not taken into account, however. Some of the crews were working in the pool at less than full strength, and one of the vehicles was serviced by a single mechanic-driver. Senior Sergeant Postnikov knew about this but did not come to the aid of his comrades. Nothing was said about Postnikov's uncomradely act when the results when summed up. On the contrary, he and his crew were praised for their skill.

The company commander recalled other incidents in which the senior sergeant was cited as an example, without noting his defects of behavior, ignoring the "trivialities." These "trivialities" ultimately began to determine the individual's pattern of behavior. It finally reached the point at which Postnikov "permitted" himself to return late from a town pass.

Captain Taranchenko regretted that the defects in the junior commander's conduct had not been correctly assessed before he committed such a serious infraction. He could have been helped to appraise his own conduct in a stricter and more demanding way, for example, following the incident at the vehicle pool.

It would be difficult to find an officer who does not recognize the great indoctrinational possibilities which lie in socialist competition. We do not always fully utilize these possibilities, however, by far. The evaluation of a soldier's performance sometimes takes into account only the holes in the target and the seconds cut from the norm. The individual's moral qualities are pushed into the background, as it were. This is why, sometimes, "out of the clear blue sky" an outstanding soldier will end up among the violators of military discipline and lose respect in the collective.

Our battalion's staff and party organization devote a great deal of time to organizing competition. And the return is obvious: Two-thirds of the tankmen have earned a higher class rating. During the winter training period we will also fulfill our commitment to turn out experts in the training, rated sportsmen and VSK [military-sports complex] badge holders. With respect to percentages and overall figures, we are in good shape, so to speak. Our use of competition as a tool for indoctrinating the men is still not entirely satisfactory, however.

Violations of regulation requirements like the one mentioned above do occur in the subunit, and this has to alarm us. It means that there is a flaw in the work performed by us, the educators. Among other things, we have not learned how to indoctrinate the men in the process of competition, to consider moral "parameters" along with the record-breaking seconds.

Recently, one of the companies returned from the range. The commander reported that the platoon commanded by Lieutenant N. Ivanov had demonstrated good training in the firing practice. I was prepared to praise the young officer at a service meeting, to call upon the other platoon commanders to emulate him. I suddenly learned of the following "trait" in the lieutenant's conduct. Prior to the practice firing Ivanov had been ordered to see that the equipment was ready for the exercise. He did everything required of him to the training tanks assigned to his platoon. He paid no attention to the other vehicles. Did the company commander know about this? He did. He considered the platoon's good gunnery performance more important than this "triviality," however.

One encounters this sort of thing every once in a while.

Accurate firing, skillful operation of the vehicles and efficient organization of the training battle are, figuratively speaking, our production indices. We have to be proud of them. As the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Continued Improvement of Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work" stresses, however, we have to take more than those into account in the competition. It would be impossible to overstate the importance of moral indices, and we must not forget the fact that competition is designed to improve the personality, to help the individual grown, both professionally and spiritually.

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MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS: TRAINING, RELATED ACTIVITIES

Training Problem Critiqued

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Maj E. Belyayev, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Close Combat"]

[Text] Having received a mission to destroy the "enemy" in a population center, Sr Lt S. Lukpanov hurriedly began to prepare to carry it out. It was necessary to hurry. First, only a very little daylight remained and the volume of work which had to be completed before the advance of darkness was rather great. Second, the preceding battles had been very strenuous and the senior lieutenant hoped to give the platoons a break -- even though a small one -- before the night attack.

Having moved with the platoon commanders to the slopes of a hill, Lukpanov carefully studied the terrain on the avenue of advance. A line of trenches, occupied by infantry, could be seen before the attack's front. The terrain on the approaches to the population center was open. Only to the north -- along a hollow--did bushes appear. The company commander considered all this. He decided to advance echeloned to the right and to order the platoon commanded by Lt V. Cheparov to move into the "enemy's" rear along the hollow.

The platoons moved to the attack with the advance of darkness and under cover of artillery fire. The left flank platoon headed by Lt A. Davletov advanced especially quickly. It attacked the "enemy" in the trenches on the edge of the population center. The successful beginning inspired the lieutenant. Having decided that the "enemy" had been neutralized, he ordered his subordinates, who were advancing in a dismounted formation, to take their places in the vehicles again.

At first glance, it seemed that the officer had acted correctly. However, here is how the regimental commander, who was observing the course of the battle, evaluated his actions.

"The platoon commander committed a tactical error. Sometimes it is indeed possible to advance in machines in order to reach a center very quickly and seize more important objectives after breaking through a defense created by limited forces. However, it would have been risky in this case. The defenders had fortified themselves in the houses and organized a dependable system of antitank fire and obstacles. An attack in machines -- even at night -- in a situation like this is of little effect, as the experience from exercises shows. Before seating the platoon in the machines, Lieutenant Davletov should have destroyed the most important centers of resistance, especially at the crossroads. This could not be managed here without close combat."

Close combat.... This, perhaps, is the most typical feature of operations in a population center. Very much depends here on the ability of motorized riflemen to use small arms and hand grenades effectively, overcome different obstacles, conduct hand-to-hand combat, and coordinate with the tanks and artillery which normally advance right in the combat formations of the motorized rifle subunits or behind them. As subsequent events showed, Lieutenant Davletov's subordinates were insufficiently prepared for this.

The platoon, commanded by Lt V. Zarudskiy, which was spearheading the attack did not achieve success. He managed to break through to the center of the population center. However, the platoon was separated from its neighbors, lost communications with them, and fell into a distinctive fire pocket. The "enemy" quickly made use of this and organized a powerful counterattack. Lieutenant Zarudskiy, fearing an encirclement, had already made up his mind to retreat. However, the company commander interfered . The counterattack managed to be beaten off with the help of the attached tanks.

"A battle in a population center, even if the attackers begin it with large forces, quickly acquires a broken up nature," the regimental commander commented on this episode. "Subunits become separated because the stubborn battle of the defenders for each house, floor and cellar leads to the breakup of the attack's continuous front. There is no clearly defined FEBA [forward edge of the battle area] here. Is it necessary to talk about how the role of the commanders of squads and individual groups, which must operate independently, grows in such a situation? Unfortunately, the company commander did not take this into consideration, and he did not even invite the squad commanders on the reconnaissance when he was organizing for the battle. This, as we saw, had a negative effect on their actions. Lieutenant Zarudskiy's decision to retreat was also unjustified. Great Patriotic War experience teaches: One must not make the slightest concession to the enemy in street fighting. The struggle for each house, floor and cellar in a population center requires from a commander special efficiency in making decisions...."

How did events subsequently develop? As was already mentioned, the company commander had sent the platoon commanded by Lieutenant Cheparov to go around the "enemy" along the hollow overgrown with bushes. However, the "enemy" had also considered the nature of the terrain when organizing the defense. The platoon, having completed the move, was met with organized fire as it moved out of the hollow. To the honor of Lieutenant Cheparov it is necessary to say that he quickly oriented himself to the situation, made a correct decision, and displayed persistence in carrying it out. Having accepted the fire-fight imposed by the "enemy" who were positioned on the exit from the hollow, he secretly moved to their flank with part of his forces. However, this attack was not able to change the overall picture of the battle. The company's surprise blow from the front and rear did not turn out well.

The regimental commander said, "In my view, many deficiencies were based on one thing -- the set pattern in the officers' actions. A set pattern is intolerable during any type of combat --even more so in close combat in a population center. When seizing each successive objective, its own methods of operating, applicable for those conditions, are needed."

Yes, this training battle on a specially outfitted field, where conditions close to those which could take shape during an actual battle in a population center were created for the students, taught quite a few lessons to the motorized riflemen. By gradually complicating the tactical situation through inputs, the exercise director provided the company officers an opportunity to see the deficiencies in the training of their subordinates and in the controlling of men and equipment in close combat.

Firing Training Results

Moscow **KRASNAYA ZVEZDA** in Russian 13 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Guards Sr Lt A. Davidenko, a motorized rifle company commander, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "It Depends on Each One of Us"]

[Text] The shots of infantry combat vehicles thundered over the moving target gunnery range; the patter of machine gun volleys is heard. It is the gun layer-operators in the platoon commanded by Guards Sr Lt. I. Gerchin performing a firing exercise. The motorized riflemen operate skilfully, destroying the target with each round and with each machine gun volley. Training is also intensely taking place at the other training sites. At one of them, motorized riflemen are solving firing tasks; at another, they are learning to launch an ATGM with the aid of an electronic trainer; at a third, they are learning to reconnoiter for targets and determine the range. Based on the accuracy of the motorized riflemen's actions, it is not difficult to determine that the men in this subunit have been trained to use each minute of training time with the most effectiveness.

The training results also speak about the skilful use of training time. The platoon under the command of Senior Lieutenant Gerchin is an excellent one and a right flank one in socialist competition. The officer achieved high effectiveness in the use of training time thanks to the use of advanced instructional methods and the skillfull organization of socialist competition during classes. The desire of the motorized riflemen to work today better than yesterday is sensed here during each training session. The commander's persistence, creative research, and daily and painstaking organizational work help him in this. He does a lot, for example, to achieve publicity in competition; he strives to have all his subordinates know who is marching in front and what is helping him to do this. The officer sees to it that each platoon fighting man sees his growth prospects. The fact that the officer continuously works on himself and improves his professional and instructional methods skills, also helps him.

Guards Sr Lt A. Pen'kov is also noted for this same activity and enthusiasm in work. He pays special attention to the effective dissemination of progressive experience. One of his subordinates has only to better the norms or perform an assigned task in a more qualitative way and the officer immediately suggests that the one, who has distinguished himself, demonstrate his actions in front of his colleagues. This has a great effect since the progressive experience is immediately adopted by everyone. Guards Senior Lieutenant Pen'kov displays a lot of concern for the organization of competition under field conditions. When assigning tasks to subordinates, he invariably reminds them about what norms they must compete on and sets specified goals for them in improving military skill. By creating an atmosphere of healthy rivalry in the platoon, the officer sees to it that each fighting man desires to demonstrate the highest result during classes in the field, better all norms without fail when solving the assigned tasks, and destroy the target with the first shot or the first volley. This desire is embodied in concrete work. The platoon, which Guards Senior Lieutenant Pen'kov commands, operates in an excellent manner during tactical classes and exercises.

Guards Sr Lt Ye. Zababurin arrived in our company at almost the same time as Gerchin and Pen'kov.

The platoon which he received was no worse than the others but it has now surrendered its former position. Why? There are several reasons, but the basic one -- it seems to me -- is the sluggishness in Zababurin's work style. It is necessary to push him all the time and remind him at times of completely evident truths. In contrast to his comrades, he pays little attention to the organization of socialist competition in the platoon during classes and training sessions, considering it completely sufficient that the men know their duties.

This attitude of the officer toward work, of course, cannot fail to have an effect on his subordinates. They do not always act with initiative and enthusiasm during classes. And this is not only displayed when working on norms during training sessions. For example, the platoon fell behind during the move to the attack line during a recent tactical exercise because of the sluggishness of the mechanic drivers. It was said that Guards Senior Lieutenant Zababurin had paid little attention during daily classes when working on driving exercises to training his subordinates in driving the machines at high speeds when there are no roads, and did not display concern for using the mobilizing force of competition.

The errors, committed by Guards Senior Lieutenant Zababurin in training his subordinates and in organizing socialist competition, served as the grounds for a serious discussion during a recent meeting of the battalion officers. It appears that the critical comments, expressed to him by Gerchin, Pen'kov and other officers, helped Zababurin to understand more deeply that a subunit's success is determined to a decisive degree by the attitude of the commander to his job, his work style, and his ability to mobilize subordinates to achieve the planned frontiers.

It is important to remember this always, especially now when the end of the winter training period is approaching. It will soon be asked of each officer: What has been done during the past months, have the obligations in competition been carried out? It is quite evident that the specific results will primarily depend on each one of us, on our energy, initiative and responsibility for the entrusted task.

Company Training on Skis

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Maj B. Kozyp', Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, "A Company Attacks on Skis"]

[Text] The white caps of the hills clearly appear on the horizon in the flashes of the northern lights. Somewhere spring streams already babble at full speed, but here in Zapolyap'ye surrounded by snow and more snow -- this, of course, makes its own imprint on the troops' training.

From reconnaissance information, the commander of the motorized rifle company, Capt V. Zalutskiy, knew: the "enemy" had dug in on the slopes of one of the hills. The officer also understood that it would not be easy to dislodge them from there: Directly to the front was an area well covered by fire, and to the left and right were steep rocky slopes. The "enemy" will hold on to the strong point with all his strength because the key to their defenses is here. However, it is necessary to take the hill. Otherwise, not only the company but the entire battalion will be tied down here in deep snow. What to do?

It is possible, of course, to wait for dawn on the line which had been reached. The situation suggests the conducting of a final reconnaissance, and the determination of the fire system in the strong point, and there .... If the company is supported by artillery fire, then they will surely succeed in completing the move with part of their forces and, having attacked the enemy simultaneously from the flank and front, carry out the mission. All this is tempting. However, time .... The battalion must already be at a new line in the morning.

Zalutskiy thought, "But what if we try from the rear? It will be necessary to move more than two dozen kilometers on skis. This is within the company's capabilities. All the motorized riflemen are rated sportsmen on skis; every third one is a firstclass skier. The skis are ready, as always. It is necessary to act. Until dawn comes, it is possible to cross the open terrain sector unnoticed.

The motorized riflemen begin to ski and proceed along a difficult path. Only the squads headed by Jr Sgt V. Krivenko and P. Sadykov and the antitank platoon remained in place. They were ordered to conduct engineer work intensely. Let the "enemy" think that the company is strenuously preparing for a defense....

The motorized riflemen moved in two ski-tracks. Sr Lt O. Dashkov, a candidate for master of sports was in front. Capt G. Kirillov, Lt A. Sazonov, and Sgt I. Nikitin moved in turn to replace him in breaking a path for the skis. They moved quickly. Long marches on skis were no novelty for the company.

The following detail struck me even in the barracks. Skis stood in homemade boxes along the wall next to the room for storing weapons. A detail typical of serivce in Zapolyar'ye: they regard skis as weapons here. And they, these weapons, are always ready for combat. On the assembly signal, I remember, the motorized riflemen when leaving the barracks picked up their automatic weapons and skis without any special order to do so.

Tundra.... Like congealed waves, the snow-covered crests conceal in themselves quite a few dangers for skiers. At the same time it is necessary to maneuver now and then between boulders and sharp projections of a rocky nature. This is not easy in full combat equipment and with a considerable burden of ammunition. Nevertheless, no one falls behind. True, it happened that a soldier's ski bindings became inoperable. It seemed that a delay was unavoidable during these times. However, the company master sergeant comes in the very nick of time. It is not the first year that WO [praporshchik] V. Stepanov is serving in Zapolyap'ye. He knows what a master sergeant must have when setting out on a ski march. A minute does not pass and the "victim" is again in the column.

While the company was making the move, the stars went out and the quivering flashes of the northern lights vanished. The sun's first light slid over the cold whiteness of the tundra. The company was already at the slope of the hill. Now, it remained to slide down, right onto the heads of the "enemy".

Captain Zalutskiy aimed his binoculars at the line from which the company had taken off under cover of darkness. The two squads and the antitank platoon were exchanging fire with the "enemy." Evidently, the latter thought that the company was firmly tied up in a fire-fight and had given up any further advance. This was also necessary for Captain Zalutskiy. Having deployed the company into a combat formation without noise, he gave the signal to attack.

They came down from the hill like an avalanche. The skiers swiftly rushed into the "enemy's" strong point. The motorized riflemen, who were simulating the defense, also rose up to attack from the front.

The company won the battle.

Regiment Reconnaissance Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col P. Panasenko: "A Reconnaissance Chief"]

[Text] The commander of the Guards motorized rifle regiment looked at the officers as if wishing to convince himself that everyone, who was supposed to be here, was present. He had to explain his decision to them. In carrying out the assigned task, the regiment had moved forward quickly, but now the battalions were halted. The forward reconnaissance detachment had detected a prepared "enemy" defense. It was necessary to decide how to act in the new situation. It was a two-sided exercise. The "enemy" was also striving for a victory. What are they planning? What capabilities do they have? In order to understand the situation which had been created, it was necessary to listen to the opinions of his deputies and chiefs of services. The commander once again looked around at those present and tarried on a short lean officer.

"Reconnaissance chief, your views...."

Guards Capt Boris Tikhonovich Plyusnin went to the map and began his report. He expected, more than that -- he knew that the regimental commander would address him first. A reconnaissance chief always has the first word when analyzing the opposing side's men and equipment and its intentions.

He spoke concisely and confidently. He had the latest information on the "enemy". Nevertheless, he was not completely calm. A normally unnoticed but now clearly seen small scar over his left eyebrow -- the old trace of a not quite successful storming of a specially equipped obstacle zone -- testified to this.

An element of risk is always present in a commander's decision for combat. The reconnaissance chief is required to do everything to reduce the risk to minimum. The main thing is to find out the "enemy's" capabilities and determine what they are capable of. The opposing sides always try to confuse each other.

It is not Guards Captain Plyusnin's first year in operational intelligence. More than one case of successful deception during exercises is in his memory. Once, he was its "victim".

The task had been assigned to him, at the time still a lieutenant and the commander of a reconnaissance platoon. Determine the forward edge of the "enemy's" defenses. To the armored personnel carrier, forward! He determined it. He reported it. They praised him for his efficiency. A night sweep should have been conducted again. But illumination flares flew up now and then over the defense lines with the advance of darkness. It was clear that the "enemy" was there, why take the unnecessary trouble? During the night the enemy main forces moved to prepared positions, only small subunits remained. The attackers did not perform their task, they did not break through the defense. The blow came on an almost empty place. Such a simple ruse, and reconnaissance did not discover it. The scouts caught it heavily at the time. The general said during the critique of the exercises.

"The key to victory is reconnaissance. The one who discovers the enemy's designs earliest is the one who will be victorious. However, this key is not achieved by easy work...."

Guards Captain Plyusnin remembers this. He does not doubt the accuracy of the reconnaissance information. He had collated reports which had been received from the regimental scouts with those that came from other sources, summarized them, and analyzed them. No contradictions had been detected. Something else worried him. What surprises had the "enemy" prepared for the night, "for later"? Outwardly, Boris Tikhonovich almost didn't give away his inner tension. Both when he was finishing his report and when he was answering questions, his voice remained just as level as at the beginning, his sentences -- clear and concise.

The commander decided "attack." Having received the mission from him and instructions for a reconnaissance from the chief of staff, Plyusnin went to the reconnaissance subunit. He had been there the night before. The scouts had had interesting observations. Individual items, which at first glance were immaterial details, had under careful analysis helped to reveal several "enemy" platoon strong points which were in hiding to ambush the combat vehicles.

The weather was extremely changeable. During the day -- slush and by evening the mercury column had almost fallen to minus 15.

A young soldier, Tachmurad Bel'dyyev, was jokingly indignant. "Why the disorder, comrade Guards captain" We don't have this in Turkemenia."

The officer answered him in the same tone: "It's also different with us in the Far East."

He himself had not been able to adapt to weather like this right away. Not in Khabarovsk where he lived before his service in the army, not in Blagoveshchensk where he studied in the Higher Tank Command Red Banner School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov, not in Kamchatka where he began his service as a lieutenant, did he remember such weather.

Special attention must be paid to the equipment when there is such sharp drops in temperature. He held a discussion about this with the mechanic drivers. They listened to the officer's advice with both ears, so to speak. They had been convinced a long time ago that the reconnaissance chief knew the construction and operating rules of the equipment well. He felt confident behind the BMP levers. If required, he could do the work of the gun layer.

However, Boris Tikhonovich was calm about the condition of the equipment. There is a good specialist -- Guards WO [praporshchik] Lev Zubanov -- in the subunit. A diligent individual, he does not overlook anything. But is it possible that something has been overlooked in what is being done in the "enemy" positions? This concern was bringing him to the reconnaissance subunit again. He was going to instruct those who were being sent on the night sweep, to talk about things "for tomorrow" -- once again to convince himself that the soldiers and sergeants had high combat morale.

He was in the regimental scouts' tent until late in the evening. They talked about events in the world and about the tasks which had to be solved. Tomorrow an independent reconnaissance patrol will move forward. Guards Sr Lt Mikhail Vagin will head it. He is a thinking officer full of initiative. The commander of the machine will be Guards Sgt Aleksandr Bragin. He is a tested scout. He had gotten to know him well in the summer of last year during the "Neman" exercises. At the time he had been entrusted with being the first to swim his machine across a river. They trusted his skill and resourcefulness. They also considered the fact that he was not new to water. Prior to his service in the army, he had been a seaman and sailed on the Barents Sea. Bragin had performed the task excellently.

In the morning, the regiment moved to the attack. It broke through the defenses and squeezed the "enemy". The scouts had credit for this also. They had managed to detect about 80 percent of the platoon strong points and other important objectives. The artillerymen destroyed almost all the detected targets. The success of the motorized riflemen made one happy. However, the reconnaissance chief's thoughts were at the time ahead -- there where Vagin's reconnaissance patrol was located. He had not reported anything alarming, and this well-being worried Plyusnin. And not only him. The regiment's chief of staff inquired: "What's new with the scouts?" The commander asked: "Where is the 'enemy'?"

The tension grew. It was time to commit the main forces, the tank subunits. But where are the "enemy's" main reserves? What are they planning? The hilly terrain, covered with forests and groves of small trees, where the attack was being exploited, was very suitable for a hidden concentration of reserves and an antitank ambush. The regimental commander was trying to understand the situation better. Therefore, "Where is the 'enemy', scouts?"

The lack of vigilance by one side gives the other side an opportunity to inflict a surprise blow. Once I had occasion to experience this. It was here, on the Baltic lands, 30 years ago. In breaking through the deeply echeloned defenses of the Hitlerites, the Soviet forces were irrepressibly straining forward. Not everyone remembered the need for vigilance and careful reconnaissance in the offensive rush. And several of our subunits were unexpectedly hit by a counterattack. Some did not withstand the onslaught and fell back. It is not known how everything would have ended if our battalion of heavy assault guns had not been close by.

An event,as they say, of local importance. The commander, who was now leading the regiment in the attack, hardly heard about it. All the more commendable that he was acting vigilantly, and intelligently. Frontline experience also teaches this. In the situation which had taken shape, the reconnaissance chief was the first assistant of the commander. A clear-cut task faced him. Determine in an accurate and timely way the concentration area of the forces for the counterattack.

The patrol's report. The sound of engines is on the right, the source has not been determined, the forest is interfering. This immediately caused Plyusnin to prick up his ears. "What is this noise?" He estimated on a map where the scouts were, where the noise was coming from, and the terrain. Is the "enemy" moving up reserves, is he preparing a counterattack, an ambush? Hardly. No surprise massed attack will come from here. The terrain does not permit it. But if he is trying to confuse us: he gives the appearance that he is pulling up reserves here in order to force us to deploy to the right?... Then, it is possible to strike unexpectedly from here,from behind this hill covered by groves of small trees. It is necessary to suggest to Vagin that he pay special attention to this area.

A concentration of tanks was indeed detected here.

... The regiment managed its assigned task. During the critique, there were no criticisms addressed to the regimental scouts.

After the exercises -- new concerns. It is necessary to think about how to improve the special training of the soldiers and sergeants in the reconnaissance subunit. A discussion about this took place during a Komsomol meeting where the progress of socialist competition was examined. The regimental scouts know and are able to do a lot: drive the machines, fire excellently, complete multi-kilometer cross-country races, detect ambushes, read foreign tracks and muddle up their own.... However, the demands on their training are growing constantly.

Reconnaissance is a type of combat support. Rapid and sharp changes in the situation are inherent in modern combat. The obligation and duty of a scout is to help the commander to clearly take the pulse of battle all the time. This means to improve knowledge, abilities and habits tirelessly. Otherwise, it is not possible to cope with assigned tasks. The capabilities for conducting reconnaissance have been considerably expanded. Scouts now "see" several times further and move considerably faster than, let us say, 10 - 15 years ago. The equipment helps. In return, concerns for the training of highly rated specialists have been added....

Current tasks have accumulated. It is necessary to analyze the results of the exercises carefully. It is time to conduct a scheduled short exercise on reconnaissance training. Tomorrow -- a political information class for the soldiers and sergeants. Prepare for it. Here is the report with which to address a Komsomol meeting; it is still not quite worked out.

One also cannot forget about replenishing the supply of one's own knowledge. Guards Captain Plyusnin compiles a personal long-range plan -- not for a report but for a self-check in order not to overlook something important in day-to-day cares. Service and social tasks and studies are provided for in the plan. True, everything is not always carried out as planned. Unforeseen circumstances introduce adjustments.

The responsibility for training all the regiment's personnel in his specialty is on his shoulders. Short exercises, seminars, officer and warrant officer examinations, check-out classes in the regiment's subunits on reconnaissance training -- everything so that motorized riflemen will know the probable evemy better, so that commanders will be able to conduct reconnaissance intelligently. The training base again is his concern. There is a good reconnaissance training classroom in the regiment. "Scout corners" have been set up in the companies. The next stage is stands in the battalions. He is the reconnaissance chief of a regiment. Therefore, the scouts in all the other services are in his field of view.

Normally, everyone remembers about reconnaissance in a combat situation. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, non-T/O reconnaissance platoons were even created in rifle battalions. Under normal combat training conditions, they sometimes forget about one of the basic requirements of reconnaissance -- its continuity. Who must be concerned that this does not happen? Primarily -- the reconnaissance chief. He has the first word in this job.

... By evening the temperature had again fallen. The crunch of the snow under the boots of the short and lean captain rings out resonantly. Boris Tikhonovich is hurrying to a motorized rifle battalion. It is necessary to conduct a demonstration class for the battalion commander: a motorizedrifle platoon on an independent reconnaissance patrol. The reconnaissance chief wants to talk about all the details of this class in advance.

Battalion Training Exercise

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Maj B. Dorokhov and Maj N. Ron, Red Banner Volga Military District: "By Fire and Maneuver"]

[Text] The motorized rifle battalion commanded by Capt V. Troitskiy had assumed the defense on the bank of a small river. There was no contact with the "enemy". Based on information from higher headquarters, the "enemy" who was superior in tanks, was pressing our subunits. Here near the river, the battle could begin at dawn of the following day. Night remained for the engineer preparations of the strong points.

Captain Troitskiy issued the necessary instructions. The company which Sr Lt P. Alekseyev commands was deployed on the river bank itself. Without delay, the company command sent out combat outposts, ordered the engineers to determine the thickness of the ice and reconnoiter the places where the "enemy" could set up fords. The reconnaissance information did not make him happy. The ice would not support heavy equipment; however, there were six places in the sector suitable for setting up fords and it was possible to set up crossings with the aid of bridge layers. The company commander gave orders to mine the approaches to the river. He positioned the platoon strong points so that the enemy would come under flanking fire if he managed to drive a wedge into the defense.

The antitank platoon headed by Lt V. Mityayev dug in on the edge of the forest. It was possible to move from here in a swift rush to where the greatest threat had arisen.

The work boiled all night. The motorized riflemen succeeded in setting up alternate positions as well as the primary ones, and installed mock-ups of infantry fighting vehicles and other equipment in them. Meanwhile, estimates were made in the battalion's headquarters of the most probable variants of "enemy" actions". Captain Troitskiy allotted a special role to the attached tank company. Located in the rear behind the right flank, it was prepared to strike the "enemy's" flank if the latter managed to force the river.

The "enemy" was also preparing for the battle. His reconnaissance and sabotage groups were able to cut several communications lines, they put an electric power station out of action, and find at one of the tents for warming personnel. Thus the defenders had occasion to solve the tasks of combat security completely.

The attacking side's scouts headed by Lt V. Mikhaylov, "felt" the defense in three places and in general determined the trace of the FEBA correctly. Based on the information received, the battalion commander, Maj V. Koryukin, assigned tanks to the artillerymen. A hail of fire had to plaster the defenders' positions during the fire preparation for the attack.

Senior Lieutenant Alekseyev, whose company was defending in an especially dangerous sector, decided however not to wait for the beginning of the "enemy's" fire preparation. With the permission of the battalion commander he withdrew two platoons to the rear. The third platoon commanded by Sr Sgt S. Obydennov, which was divided into squads, simulated the defense in all the strong points. The BMP which remained in the positions "warmed up" their engines more frequently than normal. The motorized riflemen in a thinned out combat formation repulsed the "enemy" reconnaissance groups with intense machine gun and automatic weapons fire.

The plan succeeded. At dawn, the attackers' artillery opened fire on a site which was practically empty. When the "enemy" tanks, forced the river and moved to the attack, the subordinates of Senior Sergeant Obydennov left the positions which had been occupied. Having advanced about 400 - 500 meters without meeting any resistance, the attackers fell into a fire pocket. Guns and grenade launchers beat at the tanks from the ambush. Captain Troitskiy also used the attached tank company successfully. It counterattacked the "enemy" in the flank and rear. The attackers, cut off from the crossings, "lost" a large part of the machines in the first echelon. The battles outcome was predetermined.

...What made this two-sided tactical exercise instructive? First of all it was the creative approach to the solution of the combat tasks. Captain Troitskiy had conducted the defense skilfully and was able to outwait the "enemy". The motorized riflemen held on to the occupied line although the superiority in men and equipment was not on their side.

Political Work Evaluated

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col P. Kolotovskiy, political directorate inspector, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and Maj V. Zhitarenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Not by These Methods"]

[Text] The motorized rifle battalion which Maj L. Shevchenko commands, was considered the best one in the regiment for almost all of the last training year. During party meetings and sessions of the party committee the communists of this battalion were invariably praised, and confidence was expressed that the progressive people would not let down. But they did let down. Two of this battalion's companies did not carry out the obligations in competition and finished the training year lower than their capabilities.

After this, the party committee went to an extreme. Reproaches were strewn on the battalion's communists and punishments were announced for some. During a session of the party committee where the results of the inspection were examined, the communist leaders of this battalion were subjected to severe criticism without going into the reasons for the failure. These also were not silent. To them -- a reproach; in reply -- an excuse. Another reproach -- a new attempt to justify themselves.

"You overloaded firing training."

Answer:

"The firing range equipment is obsolete."

Reporach.

"The condition of the equipment is not top rate ...."

In reply -- a list of spare parts not received from the technical unit....

And no one stood up, no one said: "Enough, comrades! This is not a party discussion you are conducting." It was necessary to say this because it is not its task to boil a party meeting down to skirmishes. It is also not its task to examine a question, forgetting about its party aspect.

For example, why did the company, which communist Sr Lt S. Martynenko commands, receive an unsatisfactory rating? If one agrees with the argument of the obsolete firing range equipment, then in this case it would be necessary to ask officer Martynenko and the other communists why they had not displayed the necessary party principleness earlier and why they had reconciled themselves with oversimplifications in gunnery training.

Other companies also worked on the firing range using this same equipment. However, their ratings were higher, and even were excellent. Logic suggests that it is high time to raise the question of the battalion communists' attitude toward the performance of their immediate duties and talk about the desire of some of them to embroider the state of affairs in a subunit, about the absence of self-criticism, about complacency, and about violations of CPSU regulation requirements for party members by some comrades.

All these questions remained somehow to the side. The party committee members were thus not able to tell the men to their faces the sad truth that they had lowered their party demandingness on themselves. Therefore, it was not a session of the committee that took place but rather something similar to an "administrative dressing down."

Several other sessions of the party committee took place in this same spirit. A similar style was also reflected in the nature of party meetings. The discussion during them was limited to duplicating the conclusions drawn by the commander and staff from the combat training results, and as "practical measures" only calls "to work better", "to pay more attention" ... rang out. Such a superficial approach, the repetition of already known facts, and general discussions of them deprived the party meetings of their militant political spirit. They tried ever less frequently here to examine how and in what ways to ensure the vanguard role of the communists and their militancy in the struggle for the best and what is progressive in training and indoctrinational methods and the struggle against weaknesses in training and complacency. Such concepts, as the responsibility of a party member, his active and vital position, political standards, moral purity, ..., came to the fore less and less. Instances of failure in combat training and the personal work of the communists were not examined through the prism of these criteria, and therefore a "purely managerial" discussion often took place during the meetings. They talked about the shortage of spare parts, nuts and screws, about the fact that somewhere the walls were not painted in this color,....

Let us stipulate right away: We are not at all against discussions of purely practical questions. We are talking about examining them not from an administrative and work viewpoint but from a party viewpoint -- and to solve them from this viewpoint, through the indoctrination of people, by creating an atmosphere of exactingness and friendly work in the collectives.

One company recently received an unsatisfactory rating for its performance of firing exercises. Maj L. Matorin, the chief of the regiment's missile and artillery armament service, who because of an error or carelessness had shorted this company several hundred rounds, was recognized as the guilty party. However, the reason for this -- they did not begin to examine.

One of the communist leaders declared his decision: "For that matter, we will institute party proceedings against him."

They have become accustomed to such declarations in the regiment. The phrase has become common. They simply scare one with it. As they say, a lot of brains are not required here. It is not necessary to examine some matter. True, they sometimes do "examine": They interfere in the progress of the classes, substituting for its leader.

All these facts are far from being harmless and innocuous. In the final analysis, party influence on the state of affairs is weakened. It is a pity that Maj A. Mikhailenko, who was the party committee secretary here during the last reporting period, did not attach importance to this. They did not get around to correcting it in time. In general, an industrious and conscientious secretary but one who did not have sufficient experience, "stewed in his own juice". He did not receive any business-like and concrete help from the political section. Throughout last year, a representative of the division's political section was present at only one regimental party meeting. During that same year, more than 30 sessions of the party committee were held here. And all of them did without the attention of the political section. Of course, seminars, assemblies and meetings of the party aktivists were conducted. Here on the spot they "did not find" an opportunity to examine the life of the regimental party organization in the political organ. They began to do this only when comrades from the higher political organ came to the regiment.

The work of the party committee and its new secretary has now been revitalized considerably. The exactingness on communists for their performance of party member duties was increased, and the plan for carrying out the critical comments -- which were expressed during and after the meeting to hear reports and elect officials -- is being carried out.

However, far from everything has been done. The faulty work style of the party committee and the party bureaus of the battalions has still not been completely eradicated. For example, the party bureau of the battalion, about which we talked above,has still not drawn the necessary conclusions for itself from the failures of the two companies at the end of the training year. Some mistakes of the past are being repeated. Little is being done to increase the effectiveness of socialist competition among the men. Just as before so now, feedback information on hitting targets is not always achieved on the firing range because of the obsolete equipment. This drags out the firing time very much and created nervousness for the leaders. The new party secretary knows all this. However, it looks as if he has been contaminated with adherence to the same methods which were used earlier -- to punish, to penalize. This adherence also comes from the lack of desire or inability to delve into a matter, and find the reasons for the trouble and more effective party work forms and methods to eliminate a specific deficiency.

It is simple to punish. However the main thing is to prompt an individual, to inspire him, to raise his attitude, to enkindle a creative fire in him, to help him, to direct progressive experience to the question being inquired into .... This is the path, as practice proves, that it is necessary to follow.

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AVIATION UNITS: TRAINING, RELATED ACTIVITIES

Bomber Regiment Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Col V. Izgarshev: "Competition Initiators: With the First Bomb or the First Missile"]

[Text] "The tactical environment for 1932 hours is shaping up as follows...." Col G. Treznuy, the air regiment's commander, glances over the pilots and navigators sitting in the classroom, takes the pointer and goes to the map: "The 'enemy' is conducting retrograde combat in the northern sector toward his prepared line of defense. His fighter aircraft are providing cover for his forces and targets against air strikes...."

"Flight leader LtCol Aleksandr Shestakov, think about how you can penetrate these covering forces the best, get through to the targets in the 'enemy's' defensive depth and deliver violent strikes against them with the first bomb or the first missile. And you, squadron commanders, LtCol Viktor Kamenev and Capt Viktor Rumyantsev and everybody who will be flying tomorrow night, think it out on paper, as the saying goes, think about all your possible inflight options considering the difficult tactical land and air environment...."

It has become a firm rule in this outstanding bomber air regiment to always conduct their flights in a difficult, fluid tactical environment, both on the ground and in the air. I would especially like to emphasize this fact because it is no secret that in some places they only take tactics seriously during tactical flying exercises.

This resourceful regiment considers the well-known Air Force flying triad--equipment, aerodynamics, tactics--as a unit while training fighting airmen. Perhaps this is why they are successfully mastering aircraft systems and accomplishing very difficult operational flying training missions with an invariable rating of outstanding and why the regiment has operated without any flying accidents for over 20 years now.

We are over three months into the training year. What has been done here to reach the planned milestones? What new changes have been made in the airmens' affairs by the lofty position of competition initiators? Let's begin with a few facts. The pledges to increase the class rating of flying personnel are being successfully accomplished. Even now, all the aircrew commanders and 87 percent of the navigators are specialists 1st class. The remaining navigators also have a high class rating--they are specialists 2nd class.

The average grade for navigation and bombing skills is 4.6 and it is 4.7 for tactical missile employment. If the reader could compare these figures to the ones noted down in the men's pledges, he would be convinced that all these figures already only differ slightly from those planned for the end of the year. It should also be pointed out that the qualitative side of these figures has been a great deal higher than in past years. The outstanding level of personnel training, their technical and tactical maturity make it possible to fly and conduct missile launches and bombing under more adverse weather conditions, at night, above the clouds and in the clouds.

While the airmen have already almost reached their final goals, this does not mean they have nothing to do. For the airmen, each subsequent flight is not a repetition of of the previous ones. Without fail, there will be something new, something more complex and difficult in it. With this in mind, the commanders, political officers, party committee and headquarters mobilized all the men's efforts--from the air crew commander to the junior aircraft specialist--to achieve outstanding results for each flying day and for each flight. In a spirit of competition, healthy rivalry and friendly, reciprocal assistance, the competition for outstanding training day results has developed on a widespread basis within the regiment's aircrews, teams, maintenance crews, air squadrons and Technical Maintenance Unit (TMU).

All the units are equipped with competition screens. Who distinguished themselves today? Who is ahead? Who is behind? The competition screen provides an answer to these questions. The men see their successes and their errors. Everything is taken into account--training, conduct and participation in the group's social life and political affairs. Two pilots have the same high mark. Both are communists, specialists 1st class and outstanding in training. But, first place goes to Capt Valeriy Nikitin: he has a slightly higher performance rating for bombing flights. Within the TMU, one of the crews achieved the same result as the outstanding crew headed by Tech Svc Capt V. Nikolayev. But, first place remained with officer Nilolayev's subordinates. They have a higher degree of organization and military and work discipline.

The desire to achieve a high degree of effectiveness in competition is an important desire which distinguishes the affairs of today's airmen. And, too, high standards and an uncompromising attitude in group interactions. Things which were negative, things which sometimes interfered with normal training and activities and things which were previously accepted evoke a sharp protest and hostility today. People who are not pulling their load do not feel at home. And, it has been extremely bad for people who violate prescribed procedures and our moral norms. For example, the communists were forced to expel Engr-Maj V. Sotnikov from the CPSU; he had abused alcohol and had flagrantly violated party and military discipline. He was also removed from the position he held.

...An evaluation of the month's competition results is underway. Reports were given by Col G.Treznyuk and LtCol A. Mironov, the regimental political officer. But, there was little in the reports about what had been achieved. Primary attention was focused on outstanding problems and on uncovering slack.

The discussion in the regiment's units was exactly the same: objective, sharp and principled. Only a group which is strong, healthy and sure of its strength can criticize regardless of the individuals concerned and can drag out into the open everything that hinders its progress.

But, in my opinion, there is something lacking in the competition; it is more concrete publicity on advanced techniques and persistence in implementing them. For three months in a row, the squadron commanded by Lt V. Kamenev, a pilot 1st class and communist, has held first place within the regiment. And, the same amount of time has been spent in last place by the squadron commanded by Capt V. Rumyantsev, a pilot 1st class and communist. Do the stragglers know all about the leading unit's methods for organizing training? I don't think so. Another example. During one of the flying days, the weapons specialists in Capt Rumyantsev's squadron distinguished themselves. Their job gurarанteed the lead crew's success in bombing. For some reason, the technicians' experience and skills were not accessible to their colleagues from the adjacent squadron.

And, another case attracts our attention. During my four-day visit to the regiment, four extremely representative higher headquarters and branch commissions arrived there. It is completely understandable that they all arrived at the regiment with the best of intentions. But, you will have to agree that assistance is extremely difficult when it comes from four headquarters at the same time. The airmen joked that: "We Live under the Motto 'Not a Single Day Without a Commission.'" This is all overhead--an excess of commissions. They have to be met, escorted and given the appropriate documents and information. All of this takes lots of time. It would be advisable to take a more rational approach in sending various commissions to the regiment.

...1932 hours. In the light of the search lights, the roar of jet engines breaks the frosty, evening twilight as a powerful missile-armed aircraft dashes along the runway on afterburner. Behind it comes a second, a third.... Like bright fiery stars, they suddenly dart off into the sky. The deputy regimental commander, pilot 1st class and communist, A. Shestakov, is leading a group of bombers across the "frontlines" into the "enemy's" rear. As always, their missile and bomb strikes will be invincible and on target.

Airbase Support Activities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Col V. Yumashev: "The Airfield is Ready for Flying"]

[Text] According to the calendar, this was the first month of spring. But, how changeable the weather is. There was a thaw yesterday evening. Then, suddenly thick of flakes of snow began to fall. And tomorrow is a flying day. Having been warned ahead of time by the weathermen about the increased snowfall, SrLt Yershov, the flightline duty officer, also informed SrLt S. Shalayev, the flightline support company commander, in advance that it would be necessary to put his men and specialized vehicles on immediate standby.

Although the snow was coming down heavily, it was dry. "This means we will not have to send out the heat vehicles yet," Yershov decided. "We can limit it to the multiple-unit spray trucks.

And, indeed, the multiple-unit spray trucks were effective in cleaning the light, loose snow off the airfield. The special-purpose vehicle section NCOIC's experience also played a considerable part in this. SSgt V. Pen'kov accurately established the most advantageous speed for the vehicles and gave them their bearings while strictly monitoring the drivers' observance of the assigned intervals and distance.

SrLt Yershov contentedly watched the clear-cut actions of the drivers and the uninterrupted operation of the equipment which was sweeping the snow to the side of the runway He knew that no matter what surprises the elements had in store for them, the airfield support specialists would meet them fully armed. The battalion efficiently sees to it that the airfield is prepared for flying. As the party organization's secretary, Yershov makes a considerable contribution to these preparations.

I recall that, before the beginning of the training year, he recommended that the unit communists discuss the issue of how to boost the airfield's readiness for all-weather flights even higher. "For this purpose, it is necessary that all the equipment be in good working order," said Maj S. Narmakhambetov, a communist and presently acting commander, in his appearance at the meeting. "And, I hope the participants in the suggestion program will help us modify some of the vehicles to blow sideways."

"Outstanding equipment status, is of course, an important factor," the party bureau secretary supported him. "But, to a decisive extent, on-the-job success depends upon the men and their aggressiveness. Let's develop the competition for best specialist and for mastering related specialties on a more widespread basis."

The company communists set the example in their military work. All the equipment was repaired and ready for action. Specialists from the regimental TMU headed by Engr-LtCol G. Pechenkin provided skilled assistance to the airfield support specialists in performing routine maintenance on the aircraft engine-equipped heat vehicles.

Suggestion program participants have made an important contribution to preparing the equipment for operational use.

"We don't need the runway sweeper right now. Will you let us modify the vehicle by installing a jet engine?" WO V. Chishonkov asked the commander. After receiving his approval and with

SSgt S. Chirvin's assistance, he carried out the necessary installation work and terminated the controls for the engine in the vehicle cab. This unit efficiently blows the snow aside. So, they called it the "sidewind."

They modified another vehicle as a "sidewind." There could have been more. But, although the heat vehicles were effective, they required a lot of aviation fuel. And the men of the unit are competing to conserve POL. So, they decided that it would be more advantageous to use chemicals which speed up the melting snow. It's true that there was no equipment to disperse them at first. So, participants in the suggestion program came to the rescue again. WO Yu. Voykin made a device which worked out very well in practice.

Many hours of worktime are required for relieving special-purpose vehicle drivers. Men who have mastered related specialties came to our assistance here. Incidentally, they presently make up over 80 percent of the company's personnel. For example, WO V. Chishonkov can skillfully operate all the unit's current equipment. SSgt's V. Palyakov, S. Chirvin and V. Pen'kov have also matched him. Moreover, the most experienced drivers in the adjacent transportation company have also mastered the operation of airfield cleaning equipment.

...The air regiment commander glanced from the flight schedule to the clock: the time for the weather reconnaissance sortie was approaching. Would the airfield support specialists be able to cope with the elements?

The telephone rang. It was Maj S. Narmakhambetov's voice on the receiver. He reported, as always: "The airfield is ready for flying."

Helicopter Search-Rescue Activities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by LtCol V. Seledkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent, Moscow Air Defense District: "At the First Signal"]

[Text] The flight controller's commands and the pilots' responses could be heard over the loudspeaker. The radio communications were the visible thread that linked the now empty, quiet airfield with the aircraft crews that were carrying out their mission.

"Roger...course...altitude...," the loudspeaker clearly announced after a pause filled with the rasping rustle of the airwaves.

"Maj Orlov is reporting," explained Capt A. Baburin after hearing the pilot's callsign; the captain was sitting at his desk and was leisurely making notes in the operations log. After listening to the radio traffic, he named the other airmen who were airborne at that time: "Capt Kovalev, SrLt Kostyakov.... Outstanding pilots!"

Baburin thoughtfully looked out the window through which the low, gray shroud-covered sky was visible. It looked like he was leading the helicopter over the expanses of distant snow-covered fields in his mind, was listening to the measured roar of the engines and felt the brisk pull of the controls. But, today the captain's combat post was on the ground, in the small hut where the alert crew for the search and rescue (SAR) helicopter was located.

The rules of the sky are strict. They do not forgive the slightest error or even a malfunction which is barely noticeable at first glance. Therefore, with the maximum possible foresight, flying safety regulations are directed at ensuring that the pilot will be able to successfully carry out any mission. But, even if there is an unforeseen emergency situation, the airmen must be sure that somebody will immediately come to their assistance. While flights are in progress, a SAR aircraft or helicopter is on alert at the airfield.

This is why Capt Baburin's crew is presently located in a room of the small hut not far from the POL point. The airmen only have a few minutes to take their positions in the helicopter and immediately take off. As a rule, the rescue team usually receives its SAR mission when it is airborne. Time is especially valuable to them--each second can be decisive.

It is no accident that there is active competition among the SAR helicopter crews which take turns pulling alert while flights are in progress to reduce their preflight time. During the last training session, Maj Yu. Turbayev's subordinates achieved the best results. They were able to beat the standard for an outstanding rating by a factor of 1.5.

Pilot 1st class Maj Yu. Turbayev's crew also distinguished itself during exercises. The airmen were assigned the training mission of finding the "survivors." By skillfully using radio direction finding facilities, the helicopter crew quickly arrived in the search area. From altitude, the aircraft commander noticed an orange triangle below in a snow-covered forest clearing. It was made out of the "survivors'" spread-out parachute canopies. The prearranged sign told them that the men needed food and warm clothing. Maj Yu. Turbayev immediately reported this to the command post. Then, he skillfully guided the regiment's SAR team to the site of the "accident."

The unit pays a great deal of attention to improving the expertise of the crews participating in SAR operations. Special drills and training sessions are conducted on a regular basis here. The airmen learn to locate the site of an "accident" accurately and quickly and they learn to make a skilled assessment of it. During their training, the trainees acquire skills for rendering first aid. For example, they must be able to make an improvised lean-to out of the materials at hand and they must be able to prepare hot food.

The helicopter unit has a lot of first-class specialists and military affairs experts. Among them are Majs G. Galuzo and Yu. Turbayev and Capt A. Semenov. They willingly share their experience and knowledge with the junior officers and they willingly help them master the art of SAR work quickly.

...A routine day of operational training is drawing to a close. The aircraft are landing one after the other. The loudspeaker in the crew alert room is quiet. But, it will be a while before Capt Baburin and his comrades get home. Their combat watch continues.

Transient Aircrew Complaint

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt V. Gvozdev, pilot 1st class: "Letter to the Editor: We Went Away Empty-Handed"]

[Text] While returning to our unit, two of our crews landed at a Red Banner Siberian Military District airfield. We had to have the aircraft checked out and serviced here while the flight crews had to rest and get ready to continue their flight.

"Now, we will be able to taste the Siberian meat dumplings," the crews joked among themselves. "The Siberians are a hospitable people...."

Indeed, the unit duty officer told us how to reach the flight crew dining hall and wished us bon appetit. However, we had barely crossed the threshold when we encountered a cold reception. The acting dining hall NCOIC, career MSgt R. Agayev, stated that he would not feed the crews. We were not able to get any help from Tech Svc Maj M. Trunin, the airbase support unit commander.

Finally, we made our way to the Pip, the local BX's snack bar. We really made our way there because we had to fight our way through a crowd of drinkers. The problem was that the snack bar was doing a brisk business in cheap ersatz wines and almost everybody who was thirsty gathered here from throughout the base. They were helping the public catering employees fulfill their sales plan. Alas, they were doing this by lowering the standards of service for other guests.

The Pip was dirty and the selection was not great. We were not able to savor the famous Siberian meat dumplings, as the saying goes. So, we left empty-handed although we had a flight in the morning and had to accomplish a difficult mission.

Aircraft Technician Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Tech Svc Lt G. Dombrovskiy, TMU section chief, Far East Military District: "Good Lessons"]

[Text] My first steps on my own in an air regiment. Based on my own experience, I was convinced that they do not exactly come easily. But, how was it then? I graduated from the Vasil'kovskoye Air Force Technical School imeni the 50th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Leninist Komsomol. I arrived in a flying unit with the firm intention to carry out the duties of an aircraft technician only in an outstanding manner. But, soon afterwards, I ran up against a lot of problems. I probably would not have been able to overcome some of them myself if it had not been for the senior, experienced comrades alongside me. I will always remember their assistance and their kind attitude with gratitude.

How did I feel at first? I lacked practical skills. At school, I had specialized in bomber maintenance and there were fighters here. I immediately had to begin training. I relied primarily on independent study. But, the deadline set for me and my classmates to master a new aircraft seemed extremely short based on our preconceptions as cadets. But, an order is an order. And we had to make every effort to execute it precisely. While poring over the equipment specifications and manuals, I had many kind memories during those tense days of Engr-LtCol Ye. Malyutin who taught aircraft engine design at the school. He carefully armed us with in-depth knowledge and with principles for independent study of training aids.

Moreover, we, the newcomers, had our fair share of attention in the unit. We frequently received qualified advice from Engr-Capt V. Lobas, a recent military academy graduate. At the same time, we acquired our technical standards from him and our skills for working with aircraft operating instructions. This was subsequently very beneficial to us in our practical activities. I passed the test for the right to maintain aircraft on my own. Then, later.... The saying that life teaches and tests you at the same time is true. I remember my first winter in the Far East as a severe test when I had to get aircraft ready in fierce cold and severe winds. But, was this really the only problem?

Once, after the fighter assigned to me had already flown several sorties and was being prepared for the next sortie, I was standing, as usual, on the ladder next to the cockpit and was watching the pilot. He pressed the engine start button. I looked at the tachometer and didn't believe my eyes: the rpm's were not increasing although you could hear the turbine starter operating. Another try. Another. The same result. It was no joking matter, I was upset. Recalling the starting circuit, I decided that it was clear that the cause of the malfunction would be found in the starting units. I opened the hatches. I was satisfied: fuel was being injected but there was no spark. The section technician--who had rushed to my assistance--and I quickly changed the glow plug. We repeated the start-up procedure--another failure.

So, the next sortie did not take place. When our excitement cooled down, the section technician thought it over and said: "I'm sure that the cause is superficial and we rushed to dig into the interior. Haste in our business is the number one enemy...."

We conducted an analysis proceeding"from the simple to the complex." We remembered who had worked on the aircraft the evening before and what maintenence teams they were from. There had been more electrical equipment specialists than anybody else. Consequently, we decided to begin with the basics in their department--an inspection of the electrical circuit for the automatic engine start system. And, what did we find? Upon opening one of the hatches, our attention was immediately drawn to a plug connector. It was not fastened and had obviously come apart from the vibration when the aircraft taxied up to the hardstand. A few minutes were required to correct the malfunction. But, in the final analysis, a lot of time was unjustifiably wasted in troubleshooting it.

I drew a basic conclusion from this: since you are the aircraft technician, in other words, the owner of this aircraft, this means that it is mandatory for you to know it down to the slightest detail and it is mandatory that you carefully monitor everything the specialists do to it. Strict supervision based on in-depth knowledge--this is the assurance of outstanding aircraft equipment maintenance, one of the guarantees that the maximum can be obtained from it during the flight shift.

And, here is another lesson. We were getting a fighter ready for a follow-on sortie at night. Suddenly I noticed that the pressure in the pneumatic system had dropped to almost the half-way mark. What was the problem? I will not hide the fact that I lost my head at first: this was the first time that I had encountered this situation. The most incredible ideas rushed to my head. Its a good thing that the deputy squadron commander for aviation engineering services arrived in the nick of time and brought me back down to earth, as the saying goes.

"Did you check the valve?" calmly asked Tech Svc Capt A. Kanashevich.

I remember that I tried to object: I said nothing can happen to it--the cause is obviously more serious than that. But, following my senior officer's instructions, I inspected the valve anyhow. What a surprise for me when I found out that this was the problem. The accumulated moisture had frozen and the valve had begun to bleed off air. In short, an elementary malfunction which was easily corrected. But, the conclusion from this was instructive: do not dig into engineering areas until you have studied the simplest causes.

In the young inexperienced specialist's fancy, even an insignificant equipment malfunction is at times blown up many times over its complexity. He begins to rush about looking for the cause. And, this unsystematic search frequently turns out to be empty effort.

How does an experienced technician behave? Before beginning to look for the cause of the malfunction, he calmly analyzes all the circumstances which led up to it and he soberly evaluates the probability of a particular situation. Then, there is a goal-directed search which, as a rule, wastes the minimum amount of time.

Experience, they say, comes with time. It is just a problem of how quickly you acquire it. This is something to think about. I do not recall an incident where any of my co-workers were indifferent to my concerns. For example, take Tech Svc Capt Kanashevich. More frequently than the others, he found the opportunity to see how I was doing in getting the aircraft ready to fly. After finding out what problems I had, he carefully explained why this was happening and what should actually be done. But, did we, the junior specialists, willingly ask the senior officers for advice? No. At times, false pride kept us from asking for assistance.

The road to experience would probably be a great deal shorter if more attention was devoted to military school cadets during their probationary service in line units. In my opinion, it would be beneficial for the future aircraft technician to gain firstline practical experience as a mechanic during his freshman and sophomore years. As the saying goes, he would learn the business from a to z. During his junior year, it would be beneficial for him to improve himself in his primary specialty.

The first lessons.... They were difficult but not in vain. I still follow the conclusions I drew from them now.

Flight Safety Violations Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col A. Yarchuk, USSR Military pilot emiritus: "Flight Safety: Grandstanding is no Substitute for Training"]

[Text] Pilot 1st class Capt A. Gritsenko had to work on a mission in the flight training area. The evening before, the officer received a detailed briefing from experienced training specialists and he worked on the simulator. But, in the training area, he disregarded his instructions and began to work on more advanced maneuvers thereby violating the sequence established by the mission. While carrying out one of the maneuvers, a hazardous situation developed; a laconic note was made on it in the flying safety hazard log: "Exceeded aircraft operational limitations."

How should the pilot's behavior be categorized? It belongs in the category of grandstanding. Unfortunately, this incident is not the exception. Certain other high-class pilots also commit the same kind of flying safety hazards. But, they should be setting the example in complying with flying safety procedures. What is the problem? A thorough analysis has shown that the cause is usually a vain desire on the part of certain experienced airmen to show off their expertise to their co-workers: look, they say, this is how you should fly!

How else, for example, can pilot 1st class Capt D. Plakhtiy's behavior be explained than as wreckless barnstorming? At the range, he pulled his aircraft out of a dive at such a low altitude that it was almost damaged by fragments from the bomb he had dropped. And, Lt A. Piven' began to show off his "expertise" to his wingman while in formation. This led to a dangerous convergence between the aircraft.

Why are cases of grandstanding still encountered in some units? Because, the effectiveness of the campaign against these incidents is not high enough in some places. In other words, "the grandstanding sickness" develops because strict demands are not made on some of the pilots who are not disciplined enough and because poor preventive measures are taken against violations of flying procedures. Let's return to the facts. Once, Maj B. Priurov exceeded the prescribed taxiing speed for his aircraft. What was the reaction? He was gently taken to task. Later, during his landing descent, he intentionally deviated from the glide path and it was only by happenstance that things turned out okay. Even this did not evoke any serious concern. The third time, Priurov flagrantly violated flight rules.... If he had been given an honest evaluation in the first case, I am sure the pilot would not have committed the follow-on violations.

Flying is difficult work and it is not always possible to guard against some mistakes. But, the problem is not so much that they still occur at times as it is that individual commanders close their eyes to them, considering them to be insignificant, and they do not honestly evaluate "minor" infractions. Furthermore, some people are of the opinion that experienced airmen supposedly do not have to observe flight rules as precisely as the junior pilots and that the experienced pilots' grandstanding is due to their in-depth knowledge and confident control of the equipment. In the squadron commanded by LtCol V. Solov'yev, the mistakes made by pilots 1st class were not recorded in the flying safety hazard log for a six-month period. There was no analysis of the causes of them. Although deviations from flight rules became more frequent in the squadron, neither the commander nor the party organization increased their standards at that time. Even when the pilots made five mistakes during a single day while landing, there was no critique of these mistakes with their personnel. The commander simply limited himself to the general observation: "violations of flying procedures." But, the airmen did not get to hear what each violation consisted of specifically and which of the pilot's actions were incorrect.

There are also officers from the command element among those committing flying safety hazards. It is absolutely intolerable when they commit violations. The commander's authority is undermined and the training principle "do as I do" is depreciated. For example, what can LtCol Krasnov teach a junior pilot when he makes a hazardous descent in his aircraft trying "to shine with his expertise" during a joint mission? After all, he undoubtedly knows that precise observance of the requirements regulating flying is mandatory for everybody, without exception.

As a rule, a top-notch pilot is an experienced airman who is able to carry out the most difficult assignment. But, even his experience can let him down if he does not reinforce it with systematic lessons. If you analyze the causes of flying safety hazards committed by pilots in the top classes, you will note that they frequently occur because the airmen have not made sufficient preparations for a specific mission. Satisfied that top-notch airmen know everything and are able to do everything, certain units have relaxed their supervision over their preparations and are devoting significantly less attention to them during lessons.

For example, flight leader Capt V. Barsukov did not believe it was necessary to work with SrLt N. Liskovoy on the simulator during the preflight preparations or to find out how sound his skills were. He believed that the top-notch pilot had mastered everything once and for all. But, what happened then? While wrapping up his flight, Liskovoy "jauntily" touched down his aircraft at a high speed but was not able to keep it on the runway. As it turned out, he had lost certain flying skills.

It is not an idle saying that grandstanding is no substitute for training. In other words, it is only when a pilot has in-depth knowledge and solid skills in his job that he is able to make full use of his aircraft's performance characteristics without exceeding the limitations set by the manuals and orders. When these conditions are not met, grandstanding is the equivalent of boasting, which can lead to irreparable harm in flying.

I once had an opportunity to talk to a pilot who had disregarded certain flying restrictions shortly before our conversation. He was an experienced officer. He understood that he had acted willfully. But, what of it? He tried to justify himself with the desire "to fly like Chkalov." But, he was basically wrong. V. P. Chkalov's outstanding talent for flying, his heroism and courage were combined with a sober estimate and an ability to quickly analyze the situation in any environment and make the correct decision. It was Valeriy Pavlovich who said: "A truly brave man will never take a risk senselessly, purposelessly or needlessly." So, citing Chkalov was not at all justified in this case.

Each violation of flying principles must be the subject of a serious discussion within the military group. It is very important that the commander and party activists take an irreconcilable attitude toward grandstanding and obstruct it in a timely manner. Naturally, it is not proper when junior pilots are severely lectured for similar violations while experienced pilots are only gently taken to task. This is an incorrect approach. To the contrary, the demands on 1st class pilots must be higher. Flying principles must be implemented by everybody, without exception, regardless of their flying time, official position or past services. It is only in an environment of high standards that there is no room for grandstanding.

This was the kind of environment established in the squadron commanded by Maj A. Gladkikh. They thoroughly analyzed each error in flying procedures and each violation of flight rules regardless of who committed them. Not a single squadron airman will take off until every detail of his previous flight has been critiqued. The data from the flight recorder is projected on a special screen and the airmen can see how they performed all the elements of the flight. Moreover, the actions of the squadron commander himself are also scrupulously analyzed.

The campaign for strict compliance with safety procedures has become an integral part of competition here. When evaluating the flying day's results, the commanders inevitably consider how precisely a particular pilot observed the requirements of directives and manuals. There have been cases where flight evaluations for specialists 1st class have been reduced because of the liberties they have taken. This is the kind of performance obtained from high standards: for the third year in a row now, the squadron has functioned without any flagrant flying safety hazards.

Military daring and the ability to quickly get one's bearings in any environment, supported by stringent daily preparations, and intelligent initiative within the framework of strict compliance with flying principles--this is what guarantees the success of every airman.

Fighter-Interceptor Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Maj A. Berezin, pilot 1st class, Baltic Military District: "An Attack in the Clouds: Report from a Fighter Interceptor"]

[Text] It's a flying day. The supersonic interceptors are taking off. Our crew was assigned a mission of low-altitude air-to-air combat in the clouds. Capt Nikolay Velichko, the weapons systems operator, and I recheck our actions in the air and safety procedures. Nikolay Velichko is a graduate of the Stavropol' Higher Air Force School for Air Defense Pilots and Navigators. He and I have completed his transition program into a new aircraft. At first, he did not have enough experience or skill. But, the young officer was persistent and he was able to overcome his difficulties. Of course, his senior comrades helped him. Now, Velichko is a pilot 2nd class.

We are approaching our aircraft. A pentagon is painted on the side of it. It testifies that the fighting machine is in outstanding technical condition. It is a pleasure to fly in such an aircraft. Tech Svc Lt V. Gorev maintains it. He is a communist and a member of the squadron's Komsomol bureau. He is a zealous worker. And we, the pilots, rate his work highly.

While climbing into the cockpit, I saw the training missles shining under the interceptor's beveled surfaces. The Soviet people have given us powerful, formidable weapons and outstanding equipment.

Today's flight is also a test of our operational readiness. At the prescribed time, I taxied out to the take-off runway. Scorching the concrete with flame, the interceptor separates from the ground and climbs into the clouds. I am flying the aircraft on instruments. Target data arrives from the command post. I recognize him by his voice: Maj G. Tsagareyshvili will control us. He is an experienced specialist who knows his business. We head for the area of our air-to-air combat. Although it is a training fight, it will test our level of training and our preparedness to win over a real enemy.

"The AI radar parameters are okay," Capt Velichko reports over the intercom. Then, we received a command to turn. The target is somewhere straight ahead. I check the instrument readings. Course, altitude and speed are as commanded.

"To the right ten, I see it on the right," I hear the weapons systems operator's voice. The GCI controller confirms the target data. Now, it is a matter of seconds. Capt Velichko superimposes the strobes on the "enemy" aircraft blip and "locks on." But, the blip moves aside. The target is maneuvering. "Commander, to the left ten!" the report rings out over the radio. I put the aircraft in a high-G turn. I accelerate. The closure rate with the "enemy" increases sharply. The blips slips aside again. But, the attack can now be considered inevitable. The signal lights permitting missile "launch" are lit up on the radar frame. Mission accomplished.

While "homing" on our airfield, I climb above the clouds. How beautiful it is here! A bright sun. A light blue expanse. The snowy white foam of the clouds below the wing. Our crew is not alone in the endless sky. Callsigns and brief reports from aircraft ring out over the airwaves. The radio traffic is between Maj Vladimir Zakhrebetkov and Capt Vladimir Alabushev. Both are top-notch pilots. Their valiant military work has been recognized by Orders for Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3rd degree. Such airmen are able to carry out the most difficult missions.

We receive a command to make our landing approach from the "checkpoint." Capt Velichko checks our course to the estimated point. Now our flight is being controlled by the shift landing control officer, Capt S. Glazkov, a top-notch specialist. Even after we have landed at our airfield and while we are taxiing to the hardstand, I hear the clear-cut reports of our young engineer-pilots who are taking off. Among them are SrLt Aleksandr Abramyan, commander of an outstanding flight, and SrLts Rishat Ravilov and Aleksandr Kharchenko. With a great deal of enthusiasm, they are steadily improving their combat expertise. In their second year of service in the regiment, they became pilots 2nd class. Now they are carrying out missions based on the syllabus for 1st-class specialists.

At the airfield, Capt Velichko and I analyze our actions in the air. Specialists from the radar equipment team approached the aircraft. They asked if we had any comments about the AI radar's operation. No, everything's okay. Our crew will have another sortie. It will be a flight in the stratosphere. It will also have its own special features. We must consider them now during our preparations for the next mission.

The winter training days within the regiment are filled with a high degree of patriotic enthusiasm. Having actively joined the socialist competition for a welcome worthy of the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of Victory Day, our airmen are honorably striving to carry out their pledges and to achieve higher marks in training and service and in strengthening combat readiness.

Gagarin Air Academy Activities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 80 p 1

[Article: "At the Yu. A. Gagarin Air Force Academy"]

[Text] The Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Gagarin Air Force Academy--one of the Soviet Armed Forces major training and scientific centers--is accomplishing important missions in training and educating highly skilled air force officers. During its 40 years of existence, the academy has prepared thousands of officers with a higher military education, 28 doctors of science and over 660 candidates of science. There is probably not a unit within our Air Force where academy graduates are not serving.

Like all the men of the Soviet Armed Forces, the academy's collective is getting ready for a worthy welcome for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The efforts of the command element, the political section, party organizations and the teaching staff are directed at guaranteeing an implicit unification of the training and educational processes and at molding a scientific outlook, superior morale and fighting traits, command skills and social action in students.

The academy has established all the conditions and resources necessary for productive training--it has valuable training facilities which meet modern requirements and it has an experienced teaching staff. The training process makes widespread use of frontline experience. There are 242 veterans of the Great Patriotic War working here; of them, 13 are Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Academy personnel are rightfully proud of the fact that a large number of astronauts have studied within its walls.

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MEDALS, DECORATIONS: WEAR REGULATIONS REVISED

Ukase Passed by Presidium

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 80 p 1

["Ukase Passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Establishment of Regulations for the Wearing of Orders and Medals of the USSR, Order and Medal Ribbons on Bars and Other Insignia"]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet hereby decrees:

1. That regulations be established for the wearing of orders and medals of the USSR, order and medal ribbons on bars and other insignia.

2. That the following are no longer in effect:

1) Article 2 of the Ukase passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 19 June 1943 "On the Establishment of Models and a Definition of Ribbons for Orders and Medals of the USSR and Regulations for the Wearing of Orders, Medals, Order Ribbons and Insignia" and the Regulations for the Wearing of Orders, Medals, Order Ribbons and Decorations established by this Ukase (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, No 23, 1943);

2) The Ukase passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 26 June 1943 "On Establishing the Procedure for the Wearing of Foreign Orders and Medals and Foreign Order Ribbons" ("Sbornik zakonov SSSR i Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR" [Collection of Laws of the USSR and Ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet], 1975 edition, volume 2, p 605);

3) Article 2 of the Ukase passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 9 March 1973 "On Modifying and Supplementing Certain Legislative Enactments of the USSR as a Result of Passage of the Law of the USSR

'On the Status of Deputies to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in the USSR'" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, No 11, 1973, p 156).

Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
L. Brezhnev

Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
M. Georgadze

Moscow, The Kremlin
28 March 1980

Definition of Regulations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 80 pp 1, 2

[Definition of regulations by M. Georgadze, secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "Regulations for the Wearing of Orders and Medals of the USSR, Order and Medal Ribbons on Bars and Other Insignia"]

[Text] In accordance with the General Statute on Orders, Medals and Honorary Titles of the USSR, citizens presented with state awards of the USSR ordinarily wear orders, medals and badges bearing honorary titles of the USSR during sessions of the soviets of people's deputies, congresses and conferences of public organizations, general state celebrations and formal meetings. On other occasions individuals so decorated may wear only orders and medals of the USSR or their ribbons on bars.

The following regulations are followed for wearing state decorations of the USSR, order and medal ribbons on bars, and other insignia:

1. Special decorations--the "Gold Star" medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union and the gold "Hammer and Sickle" medal of the Hero of Socialist Labor are worn on the left hand side of the chest above orders and medals.

When wearing two or more special decorations, they are attached to clothing in a single row, with a space of 10 millimeters between the lateral tips of the stars, in the following order: The "Gold Star" medal and then the the gold "Hammer and Sickle" medal. Special decorations of the same kind are arranged in the chronological order in which they were awarded.

2. The Order of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Labor Red Banner, the Order of Friendship of Peoples, the "Emblem of Honor" order, the Order of Glory First Degree, the Order of Glory Second Degree, the Order of Glory Third Degree, the Order of Labor Glory First Degree, the Order of Labor Glory Second Degree and the Order of Labor Glory Third Degree are worn on the left hand side of the chest.

When wearing two or more of the above orders, their five-pointed holders are joined together in a row on a single bar. The orders are arranged in a row from right to left, in the order in which they are listed in this paragraph of the Regulations. Orders of the same kind are arranged in a row in the chronological order in which they were conferred. Orders which will not fit on the same row are placed in a second or additional rows located below the first row and are also arranged from right to left in the order indicated.

The "Victory" Order, the highest military order, is worn on the left hand side of the chest, 12 to 14 centimeters above the belt.

The "Mother-Heroine" Order is worn on the left hand side of the breast, above any other orders or medals which may be worn, and to the left of any special decorations--the "Gold Star" medal and the gold "Hammer and Sickle" medal.

The "Maternal Glory" Order, First, Second and Third Degrees, is worn on the left hand side of the breast and is arranged from right to left in descending order, above any other orders and medals which may be worn.

3. The Order of Suvorov First Degree, the Order of Ushakov First Degree, the Order of Kutuzov First Degree, the Order of Nakhimov First Degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy First Degree, the Order of Suvorov Second Degree, the Order of Ushakov Second Degree, the Order of Kutuzov Second Degree, the Order of Nakhimov Second Degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Second Degree, the Order of Suvorov Third Degree, the Order of Kutuzov Third Degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Third Degree, the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy, the Order of the Patriotic War First Degree, the Order of the Patriotic War Second Degree, the Order of the Red Star, the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" First Degree, the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" Second Degree and the Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" Third Degree are worn on the right hand side of the chest.

When two or more of the above orders are worn, they are arranged in a row from left to right, with a space of 5 millimeters between lateral tips of the stars, in the order in which these orders are listed in this paragraph of the Regulations. Orders of the same kind or of the same degree are arranged in a row in the chronological order in which they were conferred. Orders which will not fit on a single row are carried over to a second or additional rows located below the first and are arranged from left to right in the order indicated.

4. All medals of the USSR, except for the medal "For Outstanding Military Service" First and Second Degrees, are worn on the left hand side of the chest following the orders.

When two or more medals are worn on the left hand side of the chest, and when medals and orders are worn together, their five-pointed holders are joined together in a row on a single bar. Medals are arranged after orders in a row from right to left in the following order: the medal "For Bravery," the Ushakov medal, the medal "For Combat Merits," the Nakhimov medal, the medal "For Labor Valor," the medal "For Outstanding Labor," the medal "To a Partisan of the Patriotic War" First Degree, the medal "To a Partisan of the Patriotic War" Second Degree, the medal "For Distinction in Guarding the State Border of the USSR," the medal "For Distinguished Service in Guarding Public Order," the medal "For Bravery in a Fire," the medal "For Rescuing the Drowning," the medal "For the Defense of Leningrad," the medal "For the Defense of Moscow," the medal "For the Defense of Odessa," the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol'," the medal "For the Defense of Stalingrad," the medal "For the Defense of Kiev," the medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus," the medal "For the Defense of the Soviet Polar Region," the medal "For the Victory Over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the anniversary medal "20th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the anniversary medal "The 30th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the medal "For the Victory Over Japan," the medal "For the Capture of Budapest," the medal "For the Capture of Konisberg," the medal "For the Capture of Vienna," the medal "For the Capture of Berlin," the medal "For the Liberation of Belgrade," the medal "For the Liberation of Warsaw," the medal "For the Liberation of Prague," the medal "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the medal "Labor Veteran," the medal "Veteran of the Armed Forces of the USSR," the medal "For Strengthening the Combat Fraternity," the medal "For Rebuilding Ferrous Metallurgy Enterprises in the South," the medal "For Repairing the Donbass Coalmines," the medal "For Developing the Virgin Lands," the medal "For the Building of the Baykal-Amur Trunk Line," the medal "For Transforming the Non-Chernozem Zone of the RSFSR," the medal "For the Development of Mineral Deposits and the Oil-and-Gas Complex of Western Siberia," the anniversary medal "The 20th Anniversary of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]," the anniversary medal "30th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy," the anniversary medal "40th Anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR," the anniversary medal "50th Anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR," the anniversary medal "60th Anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR," the anniversary medal "50th Anniversary of the Soviet Militia," the medal "In Memory of Moscow's 800th Anniversary" and the medal "In Honor of Leningrad's 250th Anniversary."

The anniversary medal "For Valorous Labor (For Military Valor), In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," when worn with other medals and orders arranged on a common bar, is located to the left and above the common bar but below the "Gold Star" medal and the gold "Hammer and Sickle" medal, and when these medals are not present, in their place.

The medal "Maternity Medal" First and Second Degrees, when orders and other medals are worn, are placed on the same row with or below them.

The medal "For Outstanding Military Service" First and Second Degrees, is worn on the right hand side of the chest, arranged from left to right in descending order by degrees. The medal is worn beneath any orders.

5. An order of the USSR awarded to an enterprise, association, institution, organization, Union or autonomous republic, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, rayon, city or other community is attached to the front side of the banner in the top corner, 15 centimeters from the edge of the banner and 10 centimeters from the staff. Two or more orders are arranged from the bottom down along the staff, 5 to 10 centimeters apart in their established sequence. Order ribbons are attached to the staff above the banner itself.

The procedure for displaying and storing orders on the fighting colors of a decorated military unit is defined in the Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

6. When the orders are not worn order ribbons on bars are worn on the left hand side of the chest, from right to left in the following sequence: The Order of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov First Degree, the Order of Ushakov First Degree, the Order of Kutuzov First Degree, the Order of Nakhimov First Degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy First Degree, the Order of Suvorov Second Degree, the Order of Ushakov Second Degree, the Order of Kutuzov Second Degree, the Order of Nakhimov Second Degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Second Degree, the Order of Suvorov Third Degree, the Order of Kutuzov Third Degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Third Degree, the Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy, the Order of the Patriotic War First Degree, the Order of the Patriotic War Second Degree, the Order of the Labor Red Banner, the Order of Friendship of Peoples, the Order of the Red Star, the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" First Degree, the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" Second Degree, the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" Third Degree, the order "Badge of Honor," the Order of Glory First Degree, the Order of Glory Second Degree, the Order of Glory Third Degree, the Order of Labor Glory First Degree, the Order of Labor Glory Second Degree, and the Order of Labor Glory Third Degree.

The ribbon of the "Victory" order is worn separately, 1 centimeter above the bars with the order and medal ribbons.

The order "Mother-Heroine" and the order "Maternal Glory" First, Second and Third Degrees do not have ribbons on bars.

7. When worn without the medals, medal ribbons on bars are worn on the left hand side of the chest, from right to left, following the order ribbons and in the following sequence: the medal "For Bravery," the Ushakov Medal, the medal "For Combat Merits," the Nakhimov Medal, the medal "For Labor Valor," the medal "For Distinguished Labor," the anniversary medal "For Valorous Labor (For Military Valor), In Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," the medal "To a Partisan of the Patriotic War" First Degree, the medal "To a Partisan of the Patriotic War" Second Degree, the medal "For Distinction in Guarding the State Border of the USSR," the medal "For Distinguished Military Service" First Degree, the medal "For Distinguished Military Service" Second Degree, the medal "For Excellent Service in Guarding the Public Order," the medal "For Bravery in a Fire," the medal "For Rescuing the Drowning," the medal "For the Defense of Leningrad," the medal "For the Defense of Moscow," the medal "For the Defense of Odessa," the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol'," the medal "For the Defense of Stalingrad," the medal "For the Defense of Kiev," the medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus," the medal "For the Defense of the Soviet Polar Region," the medal "For the Victory Over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the anniversary medal "20th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the anniversary medal "30th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the medal "For the Victory Over Japan," the medal "For the Capture of Budapest," the medal "For the Capture of Konigsberg," the medal "For the Capture of Vienna," the medal "For the Capture of Berlin," the medal "For the Liberation of Belgrade," the medal "For the Liberation of Warsaw," the medal "For the Liberation of Prague," the medal "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," the medal "Labor Veteran," the medal "Veteran of the Armed Forces of the USSR," the medal "For Strengthening the Combat Fraternity," the medal "For Rebuilding Ferrous Metallurgy Enterprises in the South," the medal "For Repairing the Donbass Coalmines," the medal "For the Development of the Virgin Lands," the medal "For Building the Baykal-Amur Trunk Line," the medal "For Transforming the Non-Chernozem Zone of the RSFSR," the medal "For Developing Mineral Deposits and the Oil-And-Gas Complex in Western Siberia," the anniversary medal "20th Anniversary of the RKKA," the anniversary medal "30th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy," the anniversary medal "40th Anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR," the anniversary medal "50th Anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR," the anniversary medal "60th Anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR," the anniversary medal "50th Anniversary of the Soviet Militia," the medal "In Honor of Moscow's 800th Anniversary" and the medal "In Honor of Leningrad's 250th Anniversary."

The ribbons for the "Gold Star" medal and the gold "Hammer and Sickle" medal are not worn separately from the medals. The medal "Maternity Medal" First and Second Degrees do not have ribbons on a bar.

8. When two or more order and medal ribbons are worn, the ribbons are attached side by side on a common bar, from right to left in the order

specified in paragraphs 6 and 7 of these Regulations. Ribbons which will not fit on a single bar are placed on a second, third or additional bars attached to the clothing below the first bar.

9. The gold medal of the holder of the International Lenin Prize "For Strengthening Peace Among People," the badge of honor of the holder of Lenin and State Prizes of the USSR and the chest insignia for an honorary title of the USSR are worn on the right hand side of the chest above any orders.

Decorations for wounds are arranged on the right hand side of the chest above any orders.

10. The departmental medals "For Irreproachable Service" First, Second and Third Degrees, established by the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Committee of the USSR, are worn on the left hand side of the chest to the left of any orders or medals of the USSR in the descending order of the degrees.

The ribbons of the departmental medals "For Irreproachable Service" First, Second and Third Degrees are arranged on bars following the ribbons of orders and medals of the USSR.

11. The chest insignia of deputies of the soviets of people's deputies are worn on the left hand side of the chest.

All other chest insignia and decorations are worn on the right hand side of the chest, below orders and medals.

12. Orders and medals of foreign states are worn below orders and medals of the USSR. Such orders and medals attached to ribbons are arranged on the left hand side of the chest, while those without ribbons are worn on the right hand side of the decorated individual's chest.

The ribbons of foreign orders and medals are worn on separate bars, below the bars for the ribbons of orders and medals of the USSR.

11499
CSO: 1801

ARMED FORCES: TV FILM SERIES DESCRIBED

Moscow GOVORIT I POKAZYVAYET MOSKVA in Russian No 19, 5-11 May 80 pp 3, 16

[Article by V. Yanchevskiy: "The Invincible and Legendary--The Premiere of a Television Documentary Film Series"]

[Text] The film series on the valorous Soviet Armed Forces continues. The series was created for the 35th anniversary of the Victory by the producers of television and motion picture documentaries of the creative artists' association "Ekran."

Our correspondent met with the military consultants for the films, which will be shown during the coming week, and asked them to introduce the films to the television viewers.

Film Two--"Vakhta v okeane" [Sea Watch]--Monday, 5 May, First Program, 2010 Housrs; "Vostok," 1740 Hours

This film is discussed by the chief consultant, Rear Admiral Yuriy Anatol'yevich Il'chenko. Yu. A. Il'chenko entered the navy in 1941. While still a cadet at a naval school, he took part in the war against imperialist Japan. He served as navigator on the legendary Guards boat Shch-303. He has served as commander of a submarine and of submarine squadrons. He has served in all four of our homeland's fleets. Rear Admiral Il'chenko is presently deputy chief of the nation's Main Naval Staff.

Our film is about the modern Navy, about its famous traditions and about the equally famous successors and continuers of these traditions. The frames of the military film chronicle included in this film remind the viewers over and over of the awesome and destructive force our surface and submarine fleet presented to the enemy during the Great Patriotic War and how the Hitlerite scum were defeated by the naval landing troops and naval infantry, pilots and the sailors on the surface ships and submarines. The names of many heroes of the Great Patriotic War are mentioned in the film.

You will see how the navay reveres the memory of the heroes and how the commanders and political workers use them as an example in indoctrinating today's sailors. Our Navy has become an ocean-going fleet since the war. It is reliably guarding our homeland's marine borders and standing watch on the enormous expanses of the World Ocean. When I was a boy I dreamed of becoming a submariner. What a difference, however, between the diesel-powered boats on which I began my naval career and the atomic-powered submarines on which today's submariners sail!

Our Navy has become so powerful it is absolutely unrecognizable. Naturally, it would be impossible to show everything in a brief film. I think that what you do see, however, will make a great impression. Aircraft, which take off vertically from a ship's deck and reach supersonic speeds.... Tanks which float on the sea.... Ships which leave the water and go on shore to perform combat training tasks in cooperation with other branches of troops.

Separate ships or naval squadrons can now perform combat tasks either independently or in cooperation with other services of the armed forces. This is depicted well in the film, especially in the episodes which tell about combat exercises on the cruiser "Kiyev."

I feel that the authors of the film have succeeded in portraying the everyday military work of the sailor, his good fighting spirit, his everyday life and his spiritual world. Naval duty has always been and remains a manly and rigorous type of service. The sea and the ship unite the men to an extraordinary degree. When danger threatens, after all, everyone at sea is equal in the face of that danger. This is why, in addition to the irreproachable performance of one's every duty, courage, calmness, mutual assistance and the traditional naval friendship are so highly important in the navy. And I feel that the film makes this clear.

Continuous watch is performed by sailors of the Soviet Nation on the expanses of the ocean, in the depths of the sea and in the air above he ocean. They are always on guard!

Film Three--"Porodnivshiyesya s nebom" [Akin to the Sky]--Monday, 6 May, First Program, 2010 Hours; "Vostok," 1740 Hours

> Hero of the Soviet Union and honored military pilot of the USSR, Lieutenant General of Aviation Petr Vasil'yevich Bazanov, chief consultant for this film and a fighter-pilot with 38 fascist aircraft destroyed in the Great Patriotic War to his credit, told us the following:

This is a film about military pilots, simple and ordinary people who are very much like everyone of us and yet extraordinary. What makes them extraordinary? Is it, perhaps, their particular mentality, certain inborn qualities or traits, or the uniform with its light blue lapels? No, their special occupation makes them that way. The film shows what gives us the right to call an individual who has mastered the skills of a military pilot "extraordinary," what distinguishes him from hundreds and thousands of representatives of other honored and respected, ground occupations.

A pilot is an individual with an exceptionally complicated and stressful job, an individual whose work, especially that performed on single-seat combat aircraft, has no parallel on the ground. He is an individual of extremely great moral fortitude, dedication and courage. The pilot's romantic winged occupation is combined with great moral beauty and makes special demands of his personal qualities.

He must know a great deal and be able to do many things in order to fly, to be a real fighter, the true master of the equipment and of the situation in any, even the most complicated circumstances. Flying is organically connected with extensive, persistent daily work, work which sometimes goes unnoticed. Flight work has always been and always will be a job for the most courageous individuals, people dedicated to the last breath to their duty.

The film "Akin to the Sky" shows various generations of military pilots, their jobs, their actions and their thinking which gives the viewer a deeper understanding of the diversity and complexity of the job of protecting the homeland as a pilot.

The viewers will meet representatives of the various air arms: fighter pilots, fighter-bomber pilots, members of stunt-flying teams, long-range aviation and military transport pilots, and helicopter pilots from the Red Banner Regiment imeni Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. They will see unique frames from the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War and will certainly be affected by the remarkable career of frontline pilot Vladimir Yermolayevich Petrov. They will hear exciting stories by famous Soviet pilots about military wisdom and combat experience, and by pilots who are successfully mastering the third generation of modern aviation systems and are preserving and adding to the combat traditions of their older comrades-in-arms. These are individuals of inexhaustible energy and unheard-of diligence, capable of seeing any job they begin through to the end.

The film convincingly demonstrates the fact that the ideological maturity and the communist consciousness of Soviet airmen are constantly demonstrated in their routine, everyday work....

Soviet military pilots are prepared to perform the assigned mission in any situation and under any circumstances, with great detachment and demonstrating unbending will, iron stamina, valor and daring.

It is a world of unrest and alarms. And the military pilots who go off into the sky to perform their job are simple people who are made extraordinary by their special occupation. They enter the skies like fighting men, in order always to be on guard, keep their powder dry, to see that our homeland's defenses are strong and reliable, because the main significance of their lives and their occupations is nothing other than that.

Film Four--"Na strazhe neba rodiny" [Guarding the Homeland's Skies]--Wednesday, 7 May, First Program, 2010 Hours; "Vostok," 1740 Hours

> This film is explained to us by the military consultant, Major General Semen Potatovich Panzhinskiy. During the Great Patriotic War, S. P. Panzhinskiy served first as a private and then a political worker. Following the war he served as a deputy regimental commander for political affairs and as deputy chief of a unit (soyedineniye) political section. He is presently deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the National Air Defense Forces.

The National Air Defense Forces are among the forces always in a state of combat readiness. It is with good reason that the combat watch of our fighters, like that of the frontier troops, always begins with the formal command: "I hereby order! Guard the air borders of our homeland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics! Take over." The all-weather interceptors have roared into the skies, the duty teams have settled down at the control panels of the ground-to-air missile systems, and the operators are at their stations. Outfitted with the most modern of combat equipment--ground-to-air missiles, aircraft and radio equipment--the air defense fighters are capable of beginning immediately to perform the responsible combat tasks involved in protecting people, cities and industrial centers, as well as groupings of the Armed Forces, against enemy air attack weapons.

The film "Guarding the Homeland's Skies" is about the birth and development of the National Air Defense Forces, about what they are like today, about the remarkable people who have served and are presently serving in our units and subunits.

In October 1917, at V. I. Lenin's personal orders, workers at the Putilov Plant rapidly created a steel antiaircraft battalion. This was our nation's first air defense subunit. The film takes the viewer over that battalion's combat path. The producers of the film remind us that the battalion, subsequently made into a regiment, was the first in the nation to be awarded the Honor Banner of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The title "Putilov-Kirov" was subsequently conferred upon it.

The Air Defense fighters also battled the enemy courageously during the Great Patriotic War. They destroyed more than 7300 enemy aircraft during the war. The film includes priceless scenes: Junior Lieutenant of Air Defense Forces Viktor Talalikhin tells how he rammed and destroyed a fascist bomber one night.

And then there are scenes filmed today. A polar garrison, with soldiers starting out over a snowy ridge to stand watch.... A scorching desert, where radar operators carefully monitor the skies against a backdrop of isolated sand dunes.... One of the air defense garrisons in the interior of Russia. Interceptors on standby. Their life seems calm and regular. It only seems this way, however. On the morning of 1 May, 20 years ago, the fighting men of a missile subunit were also standing watch there. A moving dot suddenly appeared on the radar screens. Ignoring the signals transmitted to it, the foreign aircraft shifted its course and headed into the nation's interior. At this point the missile crew was given the command:

"Launch...."

A white flash appeared briefly on the radar screen and then dissapated. The duty officer made the following entry in the log: "Aircraft shot down with the first missile at 1053 hours Sverdlovsk time." And the airborne spy, Powers, did not know that for a long time prior to that fatal moment he had been expected, detected and vigilantly tracked by a Soviet lieutenant with the symbolic name Mogilin [Graves?]. Byacheslav Borisovich Mogilin is now a lieutenant colonel in the National Air Defense Forces. You will hear him speak in the film.

The present generation of fighting men in the National Air Defense Forces are carefully preserving and adding to the glorious combat traditions. They religiously carry out Lenin's bidding: "Study the military job seriously."

Film Five--"Chasovyye zemli" [Sentinels of the Land]--Thursday, 8 May, First Program, 2010 Hours; "Vostok," 1740 Hours

> The concluding film of this series is devoted to the Strategic Rocket Forces. It is presented to the television viewers by the chief military consultant, Colonel General Mikhail Grigo'yevich Grigor'yev. M. G. Grigor'yev has served in the Armed Forces since 1936. He was one of those prominent in the creation of the first Soviet Rocket Units. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded the 7th Guards Mortar Svirsk, Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Aleksandr Nevskiy Brigade of Headquarters, Supreme High Commander. He fought with the brigade in the fighting near Leningrad, in Norway and Poland and in fascist Germany. After the war he occupied a number

> of command posts in the Rocket Forces. Mikhail Grigor'yevich Grigor'yev is presently first deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

The Strategic Rocket Forces are the newest service of the Armed Forces. The film thoroughly covers their combat path and their prehistory, using scenes from the film chronicle and old photographs which have survived.

The year is 1933. The first liquid-fuel rockets have been fired by students of Tsiolkovskiy and Tsander, led by S. P. Korolev. We move on to 17 June 1941. At a range near Moscow test battery launchings have been performed with rockets fired from the BM-13 launchers (known by the name "katyusha"). Literally a few hours before the war began the Soviet government made the decision to begin series-production of the launchers and the projectiles for them and to begin putting military rocket units together.

The first rocket launchers ("katyushas") inflicted devastating blows upon the enemy in the very beginning of the war. Captain I. A. Flerov, commander of the Soviet Army's first rocket artillery battery, and his fighting comrades have been given fitting coverage in the film. And once again, there are frames showing the important stages in the creation of our nation's Rocket Forces.

It is now October 1947. The first ballistic rocket, the R-1 developed at the special design office headed by S. P. Korolev, was launched two years after the war ended. He coordinated the work of many different design offices to perform a task which was of vital importance to our nation at that time. Remember that the imperialists had opened the "cold war" gates at that very time and were blackmailing us with the atomic bomb. For the sake of safeguarding the recently won peace and of carrying out the party's plans for socialist development we had to make haste with the development of a powerful defensive weapon--strategic missiles. And such a weapon was developed. You will see how, on the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, participants in the ceremonies in Moscow greeted the appearance of strategic missiles in Red Square. The creation of a new service of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, was announced at a January 1960 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The designation of the Rocket Forces as a separate service of the Armed Forces meant that some extremely difficult problems had to be rapidly resolved. These included working out the principles for the combat employment of these forces and for controlling them, selecting the sites for the missile complexes and building the launching positions, creating a system of training facilities for the rocket troops, and so forth.

The Rocket Troops are among those maintained in a constant state of combat readiness. The rocket troops have mastered to perfection the equipment entrusted to them. Around 70 percent of them have engineer training. They are constantly on stand-by duty. This is their main job, one of special state importance. This constant high level of combat readiness is a forced but necessary condition for restraining the aggressive endeavors of imperialism and its accomplices.

Our homeland's shield of missiles is a reliable one. And this is due not only to the fact that we have the most modern and powerful missile weapons, but first and foremost, to the missilemen, always prepared to carry out a combat order for the homeland. The film acquaints the viewers with one of the missilemen, Captain Viktor Mamonov. It seems to me that what Captain A. Tikhomirov, who wrote the script for the film, said in our conversation best describes the modern missilemen.

"We understand what an awesome weapon we are handling. We also know very well why we are on constant stand-by with this weapon. It is to make certain that the flames of war never flare up."

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9 July 1980

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1523

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9 July 1980

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1523

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MILITARY REGULATIONS: VIOLATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Justice S. Lugovtsov: "From Good Motives"]

[Text] Senior Lieutenant A. Fedorov's decision was dictated by concern for protection of a document. When an employee of the Soviet Army, F. Yakhin, asked him for his work book on leaving the unit, the officer calmly advised him to go to his new place of work. "And," he said, "we'll send you the book by mail."

But it happened that the sending of the document was delayed. And really, this time the mail operated more slowly than usual. The packet arrived at the indicated address when Yakhin was no longer there, and his work book was returned to the unit. But Senior Lieutenant Fedorov was no longer here, having departed for a new place of service. Not knowing what to do with the document which had been returned, the headquarters clerk, Junior Sergeant A. Ryzhkov, placed it in the safe. It was subsequently found there by personnel from the Judge Advocate's Office who were checking on the complaint of F. Yakhin: Because of the work book's absence, the man could not get a job for ten months!

In analyzing what had happened, of course one can complain about a rare coincidence. One also can and must reproach the unit headquarters personnel who did not record either the dispatch of the valuable letter or its return. The check also disclosed other shortcomings in work with letters and statements of citizens which arrive in this unit. But all the same, the initial reason for the red tape which was permitted here, of course, was the fact that Senior Lieutenant Fedorov did not give the man his work book directly upon his release, that is, as required by Article 39 of the Labor Code of the RSFSR. If an officer should try to do "better" than required, neither the interests of the worker himself nor of the enterprise which he would like to hire him would be violated, and really they could not be.

But just why did a competent, conscientious comrade commit such a blunder and proceed contrary to the law? Why did considerations of the owner's possible loss of his work book prove to be a more ponderable "argument" for the senior lieutenant? It is believed that this was only because the officer looked upon the provision of the law not as an immutable command, but as some recommendation which need not be considered if there is a "more reasonable" solution.

Alas, one must encounter such "solutions" every once in a while. Some officials do not understand that a law is equally applicable under any circumstances, in relation to all citizens. That, accumulating all the theory and practice of the question being touched upon, he proceeds namely in the interests of the matter, in which regard he considers the interests of the personality as well as those of the state and the near as well as the remote consequences of its application. But to proceed without agreeing with its requirements--this just signifies making the successes of the matter dependent on chance or even disregarding them completely.

One could calculate the loss of working time which the "initiative" of Senior Lieutenant Fedorov in employing labor legislation cost the state. But in other headquarters and offices, how often it is suggested that those being released from work come for their work book tomorrow because today the needed entry has not yet been made. How many forced absences stand behind this "unnoticed" departure from the legal norm! And how often were the entries themselves made incorrectly while the length of service of a conscientious worker is interrupted and an open violator of labor discipline appears both honest and conscientious in a new collective! But again, this all happens only because someone nevertheless is inclined to judge the legal norm in general and not the requirements which apply personally to him in a given specific situation.

But you see, it is not far from such a simplified view of the law to its arbitrary interpretation.

For example, not so long ago Engineer-Colonel A. Kuzovatkin displayed a unique understanding of the regulations concerning servicemen's material responsibility. He considered it possible to employ fines against two officers as...disciplinary punishment. You see, Lieutenants V. Karpin and V. Maksimov lost the railroad tickets which they used and which had been obtained using military transportation documents, and then followed the order to hold back the cost of the trip from both of them.

But in what regulation will you find such a measure of influence for self-evident negligence? In fact, you see, servicemen can be held financially responsible if they caused the state real loss. But how can we speak of any loss if the lieutenants actually used the transportation documents issued to them to acquire tickets and were where they were supposed to be? They caused the state no loss. By losing the tickets they only violated the order for accountability established by regulation and they should answer for that. How? In accordance with the rules of the Disciplinary Regulation.

The attempt to apply a law in falsely understood interests of the matter thus led to the opposite results. Engineer-Colonel Kuzovatkin proceeded from the interests of strengthening discipline, but he distorted disciplinary practice and inflicted certain damage on his own authority. I am not even mentioning the moral costs of the legal error. It occurred because the official opposed the clear rule of law with his own conjecture.

It is easy to note that both in the case with which these paragraphs were begun and in the one just presented it was sufficient for the comrades to delve into the specific norm of the law for everything to fall into place. But alas, they have not yet developed such a habit--to compare their actions with the norms of law. So a respectful attitude toward law in general was not formed. How great is the risk of error for such an official when the discussion concerns a decision which is not specially stipulated in a legal document or is only basically stipulated and it is to be carried out in accordance with the aggregate of a number of legal norms.

Major G. Osipov correctly assumed that to increase the combat readiness of the entire subunit considerable significance would be had by the way things are going in two platoons where the posts of platoon leader were temporarily vacant. And unquestionably this would have been correct if he had used his authority to attain an increase in the role of the sergeants in these platoons, had intensified the checking of the state of affairs there by the company commander and other officials to whom the people were subordinate in their service, and was concerned about strengthening party and Komsomol influence on the training and indoctrinational process in these collectives. But the officer proceeded differently He "appointed" Warrant Officers [praporshchik] G. Bogatyrev and Z. Pliyev "unofficial platoon leaders."

It cannot be denied that, as a matter of fact, Major Osipov's motives were good. And actually, in the regulations there is no direct prohibition for the commander to proceed in this manner. But it by no means follows from this that he can proceed in this way.

The very absence of such terms as "wearing two hats" and "unofficial commander or chief" in the legal acts which determine Soviet military organizational development should stimulate a person who respects the law to doubt the permissibility of such a decision. Nor did Major Osipov have the official authority to shift the warrant officers subordinate to him in their service. But even if he had such authority, just how did the officer conceive the responsibility of the warrant officers for the performance of the duties of two posts at once? And their rights in regard to "unofficial subordinates?" And even the rights of other officials in regard to the "unofficial commanders?" In short, this time, too, the good motives of the commander did not lead to the desired results but, on the contrary, only aggravated the shortcomings with which he decided to struggle using incorrect methods.

It is clear that where deviations from the law are possible from the completely sincere desire to organize matters better, it is easier for the one who violates the law for different motives. We are not speaking of them today.

But it is all the more important constantly to help those in authority to be correctly oriented in the legislation which is in effect and to consider not only the "letter," but also the "spirit" of the law. A large reserve for the further raising of combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline and order can also be seen exactly in the correct employment of legal norms by all commanders and chiefs.

6367
CSO: 1801

CHIEF OF REAR SERVICES ON LIVING CONDITIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Army Gen S. K. Kurkotkin: "Concern for People--Our Party Duty"]

> [Text] Hundreds of letters reach the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA daily. Their authors touch on the most varied questions of combat training, service, and the daily life of units and subunits. Often, they also discuss the living conditions of the servicemen, their families, and favorable experience and shortcomings in this matter.
>
> On the request of the editors, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief of Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces, Army General S. K. Kurkotkin, comments on this mail.

First of all, it is necessary to note the correctness of the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the newspaper's readers concerning the fact that the living condition of the troops is an important factor in their high combat readiness. The working efficiency and attitude of people and their success in soldierly labor depend to a great extent on how they are provided with housing, food, and clothing as well as medical service. This was mentioned with all definiteness at the army-wide conference on improving the troops' living conditions in a speech at it by member of the CPSU Central Committee's Politburo, Minister of Defense of the USSR, and Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. To be concerned about satisfying the daily requirements of the personnel and members of servicemen's families is an oblication of each chief which is prescribed by the regulations and our lofty party duty.

It is pleasant to become acquainted with letters addressed to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA which reflect the fatherly concern of commanders and political officers for the living conditions of their subordinates and the skillful activity of the rear services which display initiative.

"We live in a remote taiga garrison," writes the wife of serviceman L. Dikalov, "but the organization of the public services and amenities on our post is the equal of a big center. Modern residential buildings, an excellent Officers House, a stadium, and stores have sprung up here. Each new family receives an apartment and the children visit preschool institutions. Behind all this is the tremendous work of commanders, political officers, administrators, and the men themselves...."

I can only add that last year, for example, in such military districts as the Kiev, Belorussian, Carpathian, and Far East Districts and the Black Sea Fleet the military builders coped completely with the tasks for constructing housing and the public services and amenities of the military posts. Many garrisons received on-post gas, water, and electricity and hundreds of buildings were converted from furnace to central heating.

Judging from the mail to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, much has been done to realize the recommendations of the army-wide conference of the food and clothing supply services. Recently, there has been less unfavorable criticism of the rear area support of servicemen on exercises and of the work of officers' messes and coffee houses. I was pleased to read dozens of letters whose authors request that the military medical personnel be thanked for the restoration of health and the possibility to return to formation and to work.

The kitchen and galley farms in the units are receiving more and more development. "Last year," Lieutenant Colonel A. Makarov of the Leningrad Military District reports, "about 10 tons of meat were turned in for planned supply in the unit where Warrant Officer [praporshchik] V. Yasyuk is mess officer of the enlisted mess. The northern winter is now growing fierce outside the windows of the barracks but green onions, lettuce, and garlic which were grown in the hothouse appear on the dinner tables daily. A crop of cucumbers and tomatoes is expected in March."

Extended-service Junior Sergeant A. Klyzub also wrote about his kitchen farm. But here is what causes us to prick up our ears in his letter: how can the conduct of a composite farm be put right and where can the plan for a cowshed be obtained? It follows that the commendable initiative of the people still does not find the support of the corresponding local leaders in everything. Evidently, in the Kiev Military District from which this letter arrived as well as in others the available experience in running composite farms should be propagandized more actively and enthusiasts should be provided with the necessary documentation in good time.

By the way, we can have everything necessary, let us say, to ensure the good feeding of people but it will be bad nevertheless if the rules for preparing food are not observed and the cooks and ships cooks are not taught their difficult art. The letter of Junior Sergeant M. Kindrat, which the editors received from the Transcaucasus, forces us to ponder over this. You see, the boiler section where the junior sergeant serves was being repaired and they began to prepare the food in field kitchens. And its quality dropped at once and in the unit they began to forget about the proper setting of the soldiers' tables. But really, can the indicated circumstances excuse the responsible officials who are called upon to ensure the normal feeding of the personnel under any conditions? It is believed that both the chief of the food supply service, Captain A. Gorbik, and the mess officer, Warrant Officer A. Parasochka, have already drawn the correct conclusions from what occurred. Such conclusions should also be drawn by other comrades who did not correct matters in time and did not check the work of their subordinates.

The editors' mail contains many criticisms about a shortage of heat in the housing. Such messages arrived from a commander of a military construction company, Lieutenant A. Pushkarev of the Transbaykal region, from the residential buildings which are serviced by the house management office No 2 of the KECh [billeting unit] in Kostroma, from one of the garrisons of the Far East Military District, and from other places. Now, the majority of the shortcomings about which the readers wrote have been eliminated. But you see, many annoyances could have been avoided.

Judge for yourself. An emergency situation arose in a Far Eastern garrison because of interruptions in electrical supply. The pumps stopped, work in the boiler rooms came to a halt, and then the pipes burst. And only now have they decided to install mobile electric power plants in the garrison for insurance. One can ask, couldn't this measure really have been implemented ahead of time, without waiting for misfortune?

The barracks of the military builders from the Transbaykal are now well heated. For this, it was necessary to glass-in the windows, insulate the floors and walls, and replace the furnaces with individual steam-heat boilers. But really, couldn't the chief of the UNR [work supervisor's section], Engineer-Major V. Sapryga, and his subordinates--builders!--do all this in some way without "instructions" from Moscow? This means that we are speaking about the lack of normal concern for subordinates and of attention to their needs. A principled, party evaluation must be given to such facts.

Here, it should be kept in mind that there are no "minutia" in organizing the living conditions of people. The first sergeant was not sufficiently watchful, and we see a soldier in a crumpled, ill-fitting uniform. The activity of the finance service is poorly organized and, as Captain M. Damayev wrote to the editors, the servicemen cannot receive money for temporary duty or to go on leave in time. All these everyday messes affect the service of people and do not contribute to the strengthening of discipline and order in the units and subunits.

Specific difficulties are typical of remote and small garrisons. Not everything can be done in an hour here but, as they say, much is in our own hands. An activist of the women's council of one of the units wrote to the editors about the lack of bus transportation to the nearest rayon center. Now this question has been removed from the agenda: the bus is in operation. In another place, the children of servicemen could not get into a kindergarten. On the petition of the political organ, the local authorities allocated the needed number of places. So, it is important that the appropriate leaders "have time" for all this. Unfortunately, they do not always have the time.

The wife of Warrant Officer V. Knysh, for example, complains about the difficulties in obtaining bottled gas. Yes, the construction of a gas line to to this settlement is not yet planned. But the delivery of bottles directly to the homes of the servicemen and relieving people of the inconveniences, of course, should be organized.

As we see, the overwhelming majority of everyday messes are by no means engendered by objective causes, but by the lack of administrative abilities of specific officials and a lack of initiative and attention to people. An uncompromising struggle against these shortcomings should be declared. The principled position of political and party organs and their assistance to commanders in improving the living conditions of the troops are especially important here. Ways to eliminate everything which hinders people in serving, working, and resting normally are often suggested by the authors of letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA themselves.

For example, Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) I. Bavin reports about numerous new buildings of one garrison in the Carpathian Military District. By their own efforts the servicemen and members of their families built a store and soldiers' tea room, bath and vegetable storehouse, asphalted paths, and renovated the fence of the post on their Saturdays and Sundays of free work for the state. The letter's author names the initiators and organizers of the work, officers V. Saukh and N. Kravets and Warrant Officer G. Yusupov. If only we had a little more such initiative and organization of the matter!

A senior engineer of one of the organizations of the Northern Fleet, V. Smirnov, reports on the completion of the regular stage of the inspection competition for the best post and the best officers' dormitory. The units where officers P. Danilov and V. Len'shin serve and the dormitories which are managed by M. Makarova, D. Yushmanova, and L. Sinyagina were named the winners. A gratifying fact. The army-wide conference recommended that such inspection competitions also be conducted regularly where the proper attention is paid to their organization and the living conditions of the men become better and better arranged from year to year.

Thanks to the fatherly concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, our Armed Forces have everything necessary for combat training, service, and the daily life of the personnel and the servicemen's families. It is the duty of the commanders, political organs, and rear service organs to utilize material and financial resources efficiently, make available to the soldier, seaman, and officer everything prescribed, and ensure normal working and rest conditions for the people. The party and Komsomol organizations should constantly delve into these questions. The mail of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reminds all of us about all this once again.

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SCHOOLING AND PRIVILEGES: REPLIES TO READERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 80 p 4

[Reply to letters on military and DOSAAF schools by N. I. Makeyev, editor in chief of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA]

[Text] How to Become a Suvorov or Nakhimov Cadet

> The editors receive many letters in which the readers request a discussion of the rules for acceptance in the Suvorov Military School and the Nakhimov Naval School. Comrades V. Grigor'yev of Molodechno, A. Mikroshnichenko of Taganrog, N. Gagin of Neftekamsk, and others are making such a request.
>
> We satisfy their wish today.

Boys 15-16 years of age who have completed the eighth grade are accepted in the Suvorov Military School (SVU) and Nakhimov Naval School (NVMU). In this case, the 15th birthday should be reached no later than 31 September of the year of entry. No one is accepted in the 10th grade of the schools.

Documents necessary for entering the schools are drawn up through the rayon military commissariat for the place of residence. An exception is the groups of Soviet forces where documents are submitted through command channels to the unit (large unit) commander or chief of installation.

Applications for acceptance are submitted by parents or those substituting for them during the period from 1 through 25 June. The following documents are appended to the application: the personal application of the boy addressed to the head of the school concerning his desire to study in the Suvorov (Nakhimov) school and subsequently to become an officer; birth certificate (original); proof of eighth-grade education; reference signed by the class supervisor and school principal; Komsomol testimonial issued by the school Komsomol committee (for Komsomols); medical findings on the state of health and suitability for study in a Suvorov (Nakhimov) school and issued by the military medical commission with the military commissariat or garrison military medical commission; two photographs 3 x 4 centimeters in size; a certificate concerning the place of work or nature of labor activity of the parents or those substituting for them.

According to existing rules, one can enter only the Suvorov Military School closest to place of residence. Each oblast, kray, and republic is allocated places only in certain SVU's. It should also be kept in mind that the selection of the school depends on the foreign language being studied.

The Kiev SVU accepts boys who have studied English, German, or Spanish in school; the Minsk, Moscow, Sverdlovsk, and Ussuri schools--English or German; and the Kazan' and Leningrad schools--English or French. In the Nakhimov Naval School--English.

Acceptance in the SVU takes place from 1 through 15 August (in the Kalinin and Moscow SVU's in 1980-- from 15 through 29 August), and in the Nakhimov Naval School--from 15-30 July. Arriving at the schools, the candidates undergo a final medical examination and take competitive entrance examinations in mathematics (written and oral), Russian language (dictation) for the volume of an eight-grade school program, and in physics (oral) in the eight-grade program (section on "Mechanics").

Boys who have completed the eighth grade of school with excellent grades (except for singing and drawing) take only one examination at the discretion of the school's head. If they receive a grade of "excellent," they are freed from taking further examinations, and on receiving a grade of "good" or "satisfactory" they take the remaining examination on a level with the other candidates.

Graduates of the Suvorov Military and Nakhimov Naval Schools are sent by the heads of the SVU's and NVMU's for further study in accordance with the established allocation, as a rule to command schools. In determining the military schools for subsequent instruction, consideration is given to the level of general-educational, military (naval), and physical training of the Sukhorov and Nakhimov graduates, their professional and moral qualities, discipline, and state of health.

Information on other questions connected with entering SVU's and NVMU's can be obtained in the rayon military commissariats at the place of residence.

Privileges for Students at DOSAAF Schools

> Our readers S. Sotnikov, N. Rubanov, V. Kucherenko, and others request us to tell about the privileges which are granted to youths who are sent by the military commissariats to DOSAAF organizations for the training of specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces.

In accordance with Article 18 of the Soviet law, "On the Universal Military Obligation," specialists are trained for the Soviet Armed Forces in DOSAAF educational organizations and educational institutions of the system for vocational and technical education each year. Youths who have reached their 17th birthday are called upon to undergo this training in the established order.

In the cities, the training of specialists for the Soviet Armed Forces is accomplished without separation from production. A reduced length of work day is established for the youths for the period of training as applicable to the rules envisaged by legislation in force for workers and employees who are studying in the schools for working youth. They are granted 7-15 work days of leave for the time to prepare for and take the examinations (depending on the specialty and the extent of the training programs) with the maintenance of average wage for the basic place of work.

In rural rayons, the training of the indicated specialists can be accomplished with separation from production at assemblies in the fall-winter period. The place of employment is maintained and 50 percent of the mean wage for the place of work is paid for draftees who are selected for training with separation from production for the entire period of instruction including travel time to and from the place of instruction if this is connected with travel from the place of permanent residence. Kolkhozes, enterprises, institutions, and organizations in which predraftees are permanently employed pay expenses to rent housing for them for the period of the assemblies and also the cost of travel to and from the place of instruction.

Attendance at lessons by draftees selected by military commissariats for training in military specialties is mandatory.

The calculation of the mean wage for workers, employees, and kolkhoz workers is accomplished in accordance with legislation in effect.

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SIGNAL UNIT: TRAINING DEFICIENCIES NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Maj N. Belyayev: "But the Indicators Are Different" with follow-up report of 17 Apr 80]

[Text] The tactical-special exercises which summed up the results of the first three months of the winter training period ended. The best results were demonstrated by the subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Korotkov. All combat-training missions and standards were worked out here with high quality. Even the young specialists who recently arrived in the unit functioned confidently as crew members and accomplishing various special situations. And there were many of them. At the tensest period of combat work, for example, radio chiefs and specialists who ensure communications "were put out of action." They were replaced by drivers, Junior Sergeant V. Sherstnev, Private First Class N. Krol, and other men who had mastered allied specialties of radio telegraphers. In this regard, many of them operated in accordance with first- and second-class standards.

Complete interchangeability in the crews, their cohesiveness, and the high level of ability of each radio telegrapher as well as an ardent striving to accomplish socialist obligations completely ensured success. In accordance with the results of three months of winter combat training, the subunit was again awarded first place in the socialist competition.

Alongside Korotkov's subordinates worked the men of the subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Botov. If we take each of the specialists separately, they are not inferior to their rivals in the competition in their skill. However, on the exercises they operated in far from the best manner. This was felt on the initial stage when the subunit left the unit area, during the march, and especially when setting up the radios. Not one crew was able to accomplish the combat-training mission errorlessly.

Some of the comrades tried to explain the poor teamwork of the crews by the fact that here the officer personnel were completely new. They say that even Senior Lieutenant Botov assumed his post recently. However, he took over the subunit prior to the start of the winter training period. Three months of training is not a short period. During this time, in addition to the lessons on which the signalmen's individual skills were improved many drills were conducted on the teamwork of crews and platoons. But the methodological level in working out these problems was far from the same in both subunits.

Senior Lieutenant Korotkov saw to it that complete crews functioned on field lessons. He usually assigned the specialists of one station to details on duties within the unit. The working out of the standards was skillfully organized here. The officer required the quality performance of all elements separately initially by each radio telegrapher, and then the standard as a whole.

But then, Senior Lieutenant Botov proceeded differently: he assigned radio telegraphers from different crews to a detail. And what was the result? A radio crew is small; therefore, the absence of one specialist has an immediate effect on the quality accomplishment of the standards.

Now, let us analyze the lesson schedule. If Korotkov worked out completely all subjects planned for the month, Botov only worked out 87 percent of them. Just why did this happen? In preparing the schedule, Senior Lieutenant Botov coordinated it poorly with the unit's monthly plan for combat and political training. Therefore, the sequence for increasing knowledge and skills in special training did not show through in the schedule quite clearly.

"You can't foresee and consider everything in the schedule," he pleaded when the senior commander did not approve one of them. "Special situations will follow without fail...."

Special situations reach Senior Lieutenant Botov more often than other commanders. Why? Again, for the reason that he is not always in tune with the planning. Let us say, recently he had to transfer work on communication equipment from the radio range to the classrooms because he did not look at the schedule for use of the training center in time. And another subunit was engaged there this day.

But why was a lagging collective found alongside an outstanding subunit? First of all, because Senior Lieutenant Botov is noticeably inferior to officer Korotkov as an organizer and methodologist. But who hampers him in studying and using Korotkov's experience? It is believed that Botov's immediate superior also failed to do everything to help him in mastering leading experience in organizing the training process and competition. For example, when summing up results he named the winners and praised them, and then he stated the standard phrase which he directed to Botov to the effect that the latter should bear down. There was no mention of just what is meant by "bearing down" or why the collective is marking time. Unfortunately, neither did several unit staff officers who worked in both subunits delve deeply into why they had different indicators in combat training and competition.

Recently, a display appeared in the unit club on which photographs of the leading officers were placed and with a brief description of their experience and procedure in training and indoctrination. There is also a story about Senior Lieutenant Korotkov. His experience is often discussed at service conferences. However, the effectiveness of this work is not high enough. Why? It is believed, primarily because it is difficult to transmit the essence of experience, all its facets and nuances, in this manner. In such cases something always slips from the field of view and, at times, something extremely essential.

As life shows, the greatest value is had by the study of experience directly on the spot, in the leading subunit. Senior Lieutenant Korotkov should have invited his neighbors to a lesson and Botov, casting aside pride, should have responded to this invitation. For example, he would have seen what is the integrated method for training signalmen which was introduced into practice by Senior Lieutenant Korotkov and his subordinate officers.

Familiarity with the training-material base in the leading subunit would also have been useful for Botov. The rationalizers headed by Senior Lieutenant Korotkov created a classroom which makes it possible not only to improve the individual ability of the radio telegraphers but also to train drivers to take the test for a rating in an allied specialty.

Can the laggards be pulled up to the level of the best subunit? Unquestionably. All possibilities are present for this, and they must be realized.

Follow-up Report

"But the Indicators Are Different...." This was the title of a report by Major I. Belyayev which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA this 6 March. It discussed the unsatisfactory organization of the training process and socialist competition in a subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Botov.

As the chief of the unit's political section reported to the editors, the report was discussed in the headquarters and political section. Specific measures were planned and implemented to improve the organization of the training process and competition. Shortcomings in work on propagandizing and introducing leading experience have been eliminated.

Senior Lieutenant V. Botov was given assistance in raising the methodological level of lessons and drills and in organizing competition for tasks and standards under field conditions. For this purpose, staff officers Major A. Kholmov and Captain N. Zadunev worked in the subunit.

Indicators of the subunit's personnel in training and competition have improved considerably now.

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PERSONNEL: SPECIALIST SELECTION PROBLEM DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Med Serv V. Borovikov: "Who Should Be an Operator"]

[Text] Everything was ready for the start of the lessons with the young soldiers. The newcomers became acquainted with the equipment and armament, visited the work sites, and attended a drill where the men of various specialties demonstrated their skill. Soon the newcomers themselves would begin to master the combat equipment. But first, they had to pass a unique examination.

First, a talk is conducted with each soldier. The chairman of the commission, Lieutenant Colonel V. Koval'chuk, a political officer, an engineer, the unit medical officer, and other members of the commission are interested in many things: how the soldier studied in school or worked at a plant or in a kolkhoz, what kinds of sport attract him, and so forth. Then the newcomer is given an exercise with a test. And then he mentally moves over a diagram along a winding , intricate line, past complicated ""paths." They must not be confused and he must not jump from one to another.

A new assignment is more difficult: the test contains a logic task and it must be accomplished in a limited time. And then, assignments again and again....

The officers attentively follow the actions of the soldiers and their reactions. The psychophysiologocal characteristic of the man is gradually formed. One is concentrated, collected, joins in the work at once, and performs it accurately and assiduously. Another is distracted, excessively nervous, and becomes lost in an unexpected situation.

The results of the talks, observations, and grades for performance of the tests will be scrupulously analyzed and discussed, and the commander will make a final decision: which military specialty it is more expedient for the newcomer to master. Of course, there are special requirements for those who will become an operator.

Thus, a psychophysiological selection which has become an important element in the struggle to intensify the training process of the National Air Defense Forces is conducted in the N-th unit. It permits disclosing the professional abilities of a person and the special features of his mind, and it has him face namely that goal with the attainment of which his capabilities are most completely realized. Time will show how this will occur in practice and what effect the psychophysiological selection will provide.

The continuous improvement of combat equipment and weapons and the development of the methods of armed conflict dictate the urgent necessity for a further intensification of the training process and searches for and the introduction of promising forms and methods of instruction into practice. However, the use of these forms and methods provides the greatest impact in the case where commanders, in organizing training, give comprehensive consideration to the psychophysiological features of the specialists—their volitional tempering, temperament, intellect, emotional stability, and ability to withstand large psychological loads in varied stress situations. This is determined by the fact that under contemporary conditions the combat activity of the specialists in many combat arms is connected primarily with the performance of operator functions.

The soldier-operator should be able to accomplish tasks connected with the search for and recognition of signals, the analysis and processing of information, and the realization of data obtained from a computer. In which regard, under conditions of strong psychological and emotional influences. In addition, he is required to maintain a high level of readiness to make decisions and accomplish extreme actions with prolonged, monotonous processes, let us say, in cases where sparse signals of useful information appear against a background of continuous jamming. Clearly, the growth in the professional skill of the men will depend to a great degree on their intellectual abilities and the special features of their mind.

The correct professional orientation of the servicemen which is obtained as a result of the psychophysiological selection is an important, but not the only, element which contributes to the disclosure and, subsequently, to the development of the necessary abilities and psychological stability in the specialists.

Under conditions of high nervous-emotional stresses it is very important to be able to make timely employment of methods which reduce emotional tension and increase the efficiency of the specialists. Military medical personnel render great assistance to commanders in this matter. Investigating the actions of the serviceman in various difficult situations and analyzing the reactions which occur in his organism, they provide recommendations on how to increase the load in the process of combat improvement, which exercises should be used for physical hardening, and how better to organize the personnel's rest. All this reduces the fatigue of people to a considerable degree and develops "immunity" to distraction.

The specific activity of an operator who is performing combat duty, conducting missile firings, and under other conditions which approximate actual combat often takes place in a situation where extreme situations are created. Here the memory and thinking of the specialists are subjected to a strong, negative influence, as a result of which they may reduce combat activity and commit errors. Experienced commanders consider this special feature properly.

Deep relaxation of emotional tension is provided by so-called autogenic drill which is a special complex of exercises of the nervous system. In the course of combat training, it is receiving wider and wider employment and helps the specialists to control their own emotions, to train the memory and will, and it furthers the concentration of attention.

However, this method can be used only under the supervision of a physician who has taken a course of special training. Goals which are incorrectly posed for oneself in the period of such drills and the incorrect accomplishment of the exercises lead to negative results.

It is also necessary to keep in mind the fact that the serviceman, in beginning autogenic drills, must master its goals and tasks well and acquire a certain psychological attitude. It is better if only thosewho so desire first undertake it. Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service V. Ryabtsev, for example, began drilling in the N-th unit with a group consisting of only eight people. In a short time, when the first positive results became known, the number of those desiring to participate grew.

Officer Ryabtsev's initiative received the approval and support of the senior commanders. His experience is used in many troop collectives. And in one of the units, a special classroom for the conduct of autogenic drills has been set up under the supervision of Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service B. Dudka. The progressive method is finding followers among missilemen and aviators, radar operators, and signalmen.

It is now becoming a rule for the commander, in planning drill where the men are to experience great psychological loads, to consult with the military physician about which factors should be considered here and which work must first be conducted with the personnel. And this is understandable. Not knowing properly a person's psychophysiological features and not being able to create favorable conditions for the realization of all his latent possibilities, it is difficult to count on success in training.

I recall a talk with the commander of a surface-to-air missile battalion. The officer complained that under difficult situations individual men lose their self-control, display nervousness, and tire quickly. Really, it is as if the professional skill of these specialists reached some barrier which they cannot overcome. "Many soldiers and sergeants have begun to engage in physical training and sports more intensively, but this has little effect on the results," the battalion commander relates. "Perhaps the people have reached the limit of their capabilities."

Unquestionably, this is not so. As is known, human capabilities are very great. It is another thing that favorable conditions are not always created in which these capabilities can be manifested and improved. This is what happened in this battalion. In the course of the drills, the commander gave little consideration to the psychophysiological peculiarities of the men. By the way, the lessons in physical training themselves included the very same exercises for all the men. But you see, the specific nature of the work, let us say, of a launcher crew man, electrician, or operator is not the same. They experience emotional influences and physical and psychological loads differently. So, for each of them there should be a strictly individual approach to the tempering of his body and nervous system, too. And this special feature was not considered in the subunit, either.

I had the occasion to hear many times the statements of staff officers to the effect that in the period of final checks many specialists operate extremely wastefully on the equipment and make many uneconomical movements. The shortcoming is not as minor as may appear at first glance. Seconds often decide the outcome of an engagement. And it is exactly clear, most economical actions which require the least expenditures of energy and permit creating a supply of these seconds. How is this attained? The most important here depends on the initial conditions in which one or another skill begins to be molded.

The physiological basis of a skill, according to scientist I. P. Pavlov, is composed of a strengthened system of ties--some dynamic stereotype which originates in a specific psychological "atmosphere." Therefore, it is recommended that lessons and drills be structured in such a way that from the very beginning of their service the specialists would generate stable skills and habits which require the least expenditures of energy. How a young soldier "settles into" the work site and coordinates his actions with the use of the regulatory organs, how he distributes his attention and reacts to instrument readings, to signals and commands--all this should be the object of a thorough analysis of the lesson leader. If a man's errors are not corrected in time, nervous actions quickly develop into stable habits of which it is difficult to get rid subsequently.

The correct fitting of the work site, the well thought-out arrangement of instruments and reference tables, and effective illumination raise the accuracy of actions significantly and reduce fatigue. It is not by chance that scientists, designers, and specialists from the troops are devoting more and more attention to human factors questions and technical aesthetics.

But now, I should like to return to the beginning of the conversation. A year has passed since the psychophysiological selection which was conducted in the N-th unit, and it is possible to evaluate its results and draw conclusions. In training leading specialists, and first of all operators, the screening was reduced three-to four-fold and the times for their training were reduced by 20-30 percent. Naturally, a clearly organized training process was ensured here. Lieutenant Colonel Koval'chuk also notes that ecomonic expenditures were reduced significantly in training operators and other specialists.

Just as high results were also obtained in other units where the psychophysiological selection was conducted in a qualified manner, with the observance of necessary rules. Isn't this the best proof of its high effectiveness?

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POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: IN THE BELORUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen A. Debalyuk, member of military council, chief of political directorate of Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "A Matter for All and Each One"]

[Text] In any matter, it is useful to look fixedly at what has already been accomplished, make a critical interpretation of the work which has been done, introduce the necessary adjustments in it, and plan further prospects. This goal was also pursued by the district's military council which, at its session, discussed the course of implementation of the CPSU Central Committee's Decree, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work."

There is no need to say how great is the significance of this party document for the communist indoctrination of the servicemen. In accomplishing its demands as well as the recommendations of the all-union conference of ideological workers, the party organizations achieved noticeable successes in the indoctrination of the personnel.

I will take as an example the Rogachev Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet as an example. Strictly speaking, where did they start here and what was regarded as of paramount importance? In reflecting on how to raise the scientific level, on how to improve efficiency and specificity, the tie of propaganda and agitation with life, and raise their offensive spirit, in the division they proceeded from the basis that much depends specifically on the propagandists. This is why the most fixed attention was devoted to work with propagandist personnel and ideological activists.

With the participation of officers of the political directorate, the large unit's political section conducted a number of extremely useful theoretical and practical-scientific conferences and methodological seminars. The units began to conduct regular group and individual consultations for unofficial propagandists and agitators and surveys of political and military literature. They also thought here about how to increase the effectiveness of the activity of the reference-information center and the methodological offices.

Unquestionably, work with the ideological activists improved. But, you see, this by itself is not what interests us, but rather its results. What is the use, let us say, if more conferences and seminars are conducted for propagandists but the presentations of many of them repeat previous shortcomings--academic, poorly reasoned, not very timely, uninteresting?

It can be said that this is one of the most important problems. But it is still missed in some places. It would be incorrect to hope for an automatic return from measures conducted with the propagandists and undertake nothing further. It is necessary to place the struggle for the quality of ideological work at all its stages under strict control. In the Rogachev Division, such control is being accomplished more and more successfully. Let us turn to the same lecture propaganda. First, here they see that the prepared lectures were discussed in agitation-propaganda groups and the agitation and propaganda collective. For when the discussion is already under way one can obtain an impression of how the propagandist is working on the material and what he takes with him to the rostrum and can caution him against possible errors.

But they do not limit themselves to this. They decided to become interested in the responses of the audience more often and not as randomly as was done formerly, to generalize the listeners' opinions, and to draw practical conclusions from them.

The fruits from this approach and this work style are already evident. We generalized the experience of the Rogachev units and disseminated it in the district.

The district's political directorate accomplished a number of measures to improve the training of propagandist personnel. Several corrections were introduced in the organization of assemblies of ideological personnel, as a result of which their saturation with information was increased. Each month, we conduct small-group seminars with organizational propagandists on which we inform them about the urgent problems in the policy of the CPSU, about events in the country and abroad, and we examine questions of military organizational development. We prepared printed materials about the leading experience of propagandist activity.

Unfortunately, today we cannot say that high scientific character, a close tie with life, specificity, efficiency, and clearness in content and form have become a mandatory element of each ideological measure everywhere. In some units, outwardly-intensive political-indoctrinational work is not having increasing influence on all aspects of the collectives' life and the behavior of the servicemen. There still are many mass political measures and lessons on political training which take place dully, uninterestingly, and conventionally.

Officers of the political directorate encountered such shortcomings working in the unit where the propagandist is Major Ter-Akopov. Here, it can be said, an old disease was discovered where the accomplishment of ideological tasks is conceived only through an increase in quantitative indicators in indoctrination work. In this regard, we were convinced once again how difficult it is to smash settled psychology and what a difficult process it is to shift the center of gravity to quality criteria.

It was planned to work out 27 lectures in the unit for the winter period of this training year. Isn't that a bit too much for a regiment? But that's not all. The preparation of the lectures lay on a narrow circle of propagandists. The leader of the agitation and propaganda group himself, Major S. Yurkevich, assumed work which was beyond his capabilities--to work out six lectures in a short time. Major E. Ter-Akonov and Lieutenant Colonel N. Tishin were each to prepare their presentations on four subjects. At the same time, the majority of the agitation and propaganda group members did not receive such assignments at all. The leader of the unofficial propagandists had a rather simple explanation for this: so many accumulated texts are laying there in the cabinet--just take one and present it....

It is hardly necessary to state that such an approach to the assigned matter cannot be tolerated. This is how formalism is implanted in propaganda and its low quality is predetermined. In this connection, it is important to stress the necessity for a decisive and objective struggle against any manifestations of sluggishness in the thinking of the organizers of ideological work, inertness, and undemandingness toward oneself and others.

Unquestionably, it is necessary to improve methods for the analysis of organizational and ideological work for the successful accomplishment of such a task. Let us say directly that a style is still viable where the checking comrades base their evaluations only on an analysis of the plans, subject matter, and in the best case--the texts of prepared lectures. But how much of what has been planned in fact really became a good lecture, talk, or report? What caused the men's interest, and left a deep trace, and what passed without leaving a trace for them? Which measure was formal, dry, and impassive, and which was distinguished by genuine party fervor, offensiveness, and great emotional force? It is clear that a superficial acquaintance with the status of ideological indoctrination in one collective or another will not provide an answer to such questions. This is why the problem of improving the analysis of ideological activity was discussed with all thoroughness in the political directorate. This also pertained to the criteria of its completeness, quality, effectiveness, nature of the information reaching us from the troops, and work methods of the officers in the political directorate and the political sections in the units.

All those who participate in the organization of the political indoctrination of the men should be taught the art of analytical work. Recently, for example, the following fact was encountered. Visiting a political lesson, the unit propagandist reduced his remarks addressed to the group leaders primarily to shortcomings in the maintaining of record journals but did not call attention to serious omissions in the content and procedure of the lessons. His inability to see errors, generalize the favorable and unfavorable, and draw practical conclusions had an effect. In another case the secretary of the party committee could judge extremely approximately whether an integrated approach to the organization of indoctrination had been ensured, what gaps were present and where, and so forth. One more serious problem in the training of personnel stands behind these facts.

Yes, the key figure in ideological work is a person who comes to the men with the party word and who organizes the indoctrination process. Therefore, the activity of the propagandists and the ideological activists should properly be at the center of attention of the political organs. In this connection, we cannot fail to say several words about common political education days. They are an important form of participation of the leader personnel in the indoctrination of the masses. However, in some places, formalism in the conduct of common political education days is beginning to be manifested. Individual comrades are avoiding participation in them, considering that it is "undignified" for them to appear before a small company or battery audience. It is hardly necessary to state that such a position discredits the very idea of conducting common political education days: to make contact between the leaders and the men in the subunits regular.

Recently, we have done much to improve lecture propaganda and oral political agitation. But nevertheless, we are not completely satisfied with what has been done. The quality of many lectures, reports, and other measures leaves much to be desired. Some of the comrades are getting rid of habitual notions, hackneyed cliches, and sluggish thinking slowly, too slowly. In a certain sense, our shortfalls are being supplemented by the shortfalls of the military schools and academies where, in our opinion, the officer candidates and students could be taught the art of political work more effectively. It is believed that the Military Publishing House would do something important if it published a popular textbook on the problems of propagandist skill to assist the ideological activists. But the main thing, of course, is that we ourselves must struggle still more persistently, each one on the assigned sector, for ideological depth and combat offensiveness of the word addressed to people. For the wealth of content and clear form of our indoctrinational measures. For broad political erudition of the propagandists, lofty style of speech, and the ability to stir up others with the fire of our own conviction. Otherwise, in the future we will also have to encounter instances where propagandists who are unable to present thoughts logically and are unable to captivate and convince will "keep their word."

It will soon be a year since the decree of the CPSU Central Committee on ideological questions was published. It is appropriate to recall that it is a program intended for the long term, and a year is just that line which obliges us to evaluate the first results with all exactingness. The political directorate is also directing the political organs, political workers, and party organizations toward such a critical, comprehensive, and specific analysis and toward a persistent struggle for a further improvement in ideological and political-indoctrinational work.

6367
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MISSILE AND RADAR UNITS: TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Missile Battalion Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Capt A. Lazarev, Siberian Military District: "The Victors"]

[Text] The secretary of the Komsomol organization of the air defense missile battalion, Sr Lt Anatoliy Mel'nik, was nervous: The missilemen were expecting guests. The evening before the commander had said:

"I hope that the Komsomol will not let us down. A great honor has been shown to us...."

This is what the battalion commander had in mind: The Komsomol organization had been awarded the temporary Red Banner of the Komsomol obkom, which had been established for the winners in the competition dedicated to the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday. And now they were waiting in the unit for a delegation whose composition included young metallurgists, miners, chemists, and transport workers. Many of them had gone through the school of army service and now they head Komsomol youth brigades and shifts.

While the missilemen were taking their places in the formation and the commander was preparing to report, the secretary recalled the most significant events which had recently taken place in the life of the Komsomol organization. There were quite a few of them; however, the main ones could be seen particularly clearly.

... The range encountered heavy cold. The low temperatures were not unusual for Siberians, but even they began to fret: Will they be able to prepare the equipment in a compressed time and fire at targets? However, they were able to prepare the complex for operations and checked its functioning in a timely fashion. The eyes of the guidance officer, Engr. Sr Lt Vladimir Makogonyuk, closed from tiredness; however, when the target blip lit up on the screen, he reacted in an instant. They knocked down the small high-speed winged target with the first missile.

They also hit the second target with sharpshooter accuracy. This was a Komsomol gift to the commander on his birthday. Everyone except the battalion commander was at a line firing for the first time. Makogonyuk is now considered an experienced specialist and has been advanced in position and rank, but at that time the young officer, just as the others in the battalion, was just beginning the school of live missile launches. However, they do not say for nothing that any deed is done by man, and man -- is famous for the deed....

The missilemen returned from the range with a sense of fulfilled duty. Nevertheless, the question of completely using reserves was raised at the next Komsomol meeting. The commander of a progressive platoon, Lt Yevgeniy Ardashkin had assumed the obligation of teaching Jr Sgt Aleksandr Vasil'kov to perform the duties of an officer. Lt. Sergey Romanovskiy had certified that he would teach his subordinates in a very short time to detect targets earlier and work them under jamming conditions.

The search for reserves had seized all the battalion's specialists. The vehicle technician, WO [praporshchik] Nikolay Gulin learned to work as part of the crew. Engr. Lt Aleksandr Krasnukhin conducts classes in the technical circle and provides consultations. The launch personnel achieved the performance of daytime norms during night combat operations. The slogans: "To work in an allied specialty just as in a primary one! and "You yourself know how -- teach your comrades!", were consolidated in the life of the Komsomol organization. The call which was born at the range: "The detection -- further, the tracking -- accurate, the launch -- destructive!" was close to each one here.

However, good initiatives, if they are not strengthened with deeds, will remain good wishes. So that this did not happen, competition was organized during each class between the specialists. Thus for example, a complicated program for the radar operators was made up for the simulation equipment. A complete series of possible combat operation variants is practiced for one hour. After a short break during which a critique of the crews' actions is conducted, the conditions for duelling with aerial targets are modelled again. Here the Komsomol members are the commander's first assistants.

The high effectiveness of the classes, the strict check on the carrying out of obligations, the desire of the missilemen to become experts in their jobs -- all this is reinforced by day-to-day Komsomol work. The reports of Komsomol members are regularly listened to during a session of the Komsomol committee and in the Komsomol organizations of the batteries. Questions about strengthening their influence on the troop collective's life and training are discussed during meetings.

Fighting men of 12 nationalities serve in the battalion. Vladimir Purbuyev, a Buryat, is friends with Bakitzhan Turkeyev, an Uzbek. Driver Semen Kuz'mich, who was called to service from Belorussia, found a comrade from the Volga -- Jr Sgt Yevgeniy Maksimov. The missilemen live together as friends. This, however, does not prevent them from criticizing each other's slightest shortcoming during Komsomol meetings. They think that there should be no shortcomings at all. One has given his word -- be able to keep it! The Komsomol organization has been recognized as a progressive one -- this means that it must be that way indeed, without any reductions.

The snow which had fallen during the night crunched under their feet. The delegation of young production workers halts in front of the formation. The Red Banner takes fire under the rays of the sun and its light lies on the faces of the missilemen. In their eyes are emotion, pride, and the entire gamut of emotions which one cannot fail to experience when the scarlet banner with the depiction of great Lenin is deployed in the wind before the formation.

Missile Battery Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Kotov, a battalion chief of staff: "Demonstration Classes in a Battery"]

[Text] Scattered clouds sail over the gently rolling plain which extends to the horizon. They cover the sun for an instant and then the snow seemingly turns grey and does not blind one's eyes so. A freezing wind is coming from a hollow covered with widely spaced bushes, but the missilemen do not notice this. Their faces are animated. Drawn up not far from the missile mounts, the officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki], sergeants, and soldiers are observing with interest and even with jealousy the actions of their comrades.

There are demonstration classes today in the battery which Capt V. Tsvetkov, a specialist firstclass, commands. The need to conduct them had been caused by a number of reasons. Based on the results of the last training year, the missile battalion achieved the title of "excellent." However, soon after this several officers -- crew chiefs -- had been promoted to higher positions. In their place came young lieutenants. Many experienced specialists, whom young fighting men replaced, had been released into the reserves.

It was necessary to teach the men in a very short time to work on the equipment in an excellent manner -- and under more complicated conditions than before. The demands on the missilemen's special and technical training had grown.

This is why a course aimed at having the experience of the best specialists become the property of everyone, had been adopted from the first days of the training year. For this purpose, courses of instruction with the gunners, computer operators, surveyors, and meterologists were conducted in the battalion using the staff officers. They went from the simple to the complex. They invariably combined the theoretical part of the material with a practical demonstration. When doing this, special attention was paid to developing a single method for training the launch crew chiefs of which there were three -- Lts S. Chebotarev, U. Kruglov, and V. Kislukhin-- who were just beginning their service as officers.

It was immediately ascertained that theoretical training and the ability to think creatively distinguished the young officers, but they lacked practical skills. Lt V. Kruglov at first experienced difficulties in the most -- apparently -- simple situations. When checking on the correctness of the subordinates' actions, the lieutenant rushed about from one to another; he wanted to be on time everywhere. At times, he became nonplussed when it was necessary to determine and eliminate breakdowns in equipment quickly.

One of the better trained instructional methodologists -- Capt I. Klyunnikov -- helped him and Lt V. Kislukhin. He did not reproach them for a mistake and he did not hurry in explaining why it had occurred. It was as if the captain by his sound leading questions drew the young crew chiefs to a self-critical analysis of what had happened and to correct conclusions. And how satisfied the lieutenants were when they succeeded in understanding a truth completely on their own! In this case, the same mistake was not repeated, and knowledge and skill were dependably strengthened.

There were quite a few of these small but very important victories by the lieutenants. Their confidence in their strengths and instructional methods skill grew from day to day. Now, the young officers, as they say, are finding their hand in combat work. However, of course, they still cannot be up to the best crew chief, Sr Lt A. Martynov.

Lt V. Kruglov and his friends want very much to pull themselves up to the recognized expert. Solid experience is on Martynov's shoulders. He knows in detail where it is possible to shorten time, and in what operations one should in no way hurry.

However, once an incident, which became a life-long lesson for him, happened to Senior Lieutenant Martynov. It was this: Martynov had loudly given a command to the crew during one of the training sessions. However, the articulation let the officer down in the cold. His voice, so to say, "sat down", and as a result the specialists incorrectly understood the officer and set the sight setting inaccurately. Since nothing like this had ever happened before and the operation had always been carried out irreproachably, neither the crew chief nor the battery commander attached importance to this and did not check the sight setting personally. Had it happened during a live firing, the error would have had serious consequences. But now a low rating threatened the entire battalion. A missile is a crew-served weapon and inaccuracy in the work of any specialist cancels out the efforts of the entire crew.

From that memorable day, they changed somewhat the performance of a number of operations in the battalion. They made checks stricter. Now, if someone makes an error during the training process, it immediately becomes known who made it and in what step. The main thing, the battalion commander thought, is to jointly find a method for conducting a class on preparing a missile for launch in which all operations would be checked twice.

Today, battery personnel are demonstrating this repeatedly tested combat work model. Both Captain Tsvetkov and crew chiefs Sr Lt A. Martynov and Lt S. Chebotarev are working with great enthusiasm. Equal to the officers, all crew members are operating just as correctly and accurately.

In observing their comrades, Lieutenants Kruglov and Kislukhin are learning from them. The young officers realize that such teamwork is possible only where people have mastered to perfection not only their duties but also are able at any moment to replace a comrade. Valuable seconds are saved by dexterous and rapid work in removing the cover from the missile and by combining several operations that are permitted by the manual. When the time comes to set the final missile flight parameters, the specialists carefully fill out the technical documents, and check and recheck the accuracy of the data obtained. a double-check prevents the possibility of error.

... The demonstration class is over. What effect did it have, how were the young missilemen enriched? Here is how Lt V. Kruglov answers: "It was very interesting and useful. We seemingly checked ourselves with a double-check. We tried not to omit a single movement, a single instruction from Lieutenant Martynov. His work is the height to which we must raise ourselves." The other missilemen also gave a high rating to the demonstration class.

Training Procedures in AD Units

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen I. Stopnikov: "The Springs of Initiative"]

[Text] It is well known that socialist competition affects both the actions and hearts of people -- under the conditions, of course, that its organizers approach the task with initiative and creativity and contribute to the transformation of difficult military work into inspired work which gives happiness and deep satisfaction and which improves one's personality. Both its results and its effect on improving fighting men morally depend to a large degree on the competition organizers, especially the commanders.

Not so long ago it was necessary to analyze the following case: For a long time the N-skaya unit had not been noted for any special successes in competition. However, the regimental commander is changed and after some time the level of the man's training noticeably grew and organization and discipline were increased. What were the sources of the positive improvements? Both the former and the new commander were officers trained in instructional methods, they had an excellent knowledge of the equipment and their experience was the same. The methods used by them in the training and indoctrination of subordinates were seemingly the same. The whole matter, apparently was in a different approach to the leadership of competition. The first commander boiled it down mainly to having the men adopt obligations in a timely fashion and reporting them to higher headquarters, but the second displays creativity, arouses people to initiative and searches, and skillfully relies on the party and Komsomol organizations.

Creativity in the leadership of competition .... How should it be displayed, what are its criteria? It is evident that simple answers do not exist for these questions. For example, what permits the commander of an excellent air defense missile unit, Lt Col V. Alimov, to mobilize subordinates for the qualitative performance of combat training tasks and invariably achieve successes? High competency, personal example in mastering equipment and the methods for its combat employment? Undoubtedly, it is these. The ability to organize the training and indoctrination process and competition accurately? Yes, this is typical of the unit commander's work style. The fact that Lieutenant Colonel Alimov, the political section, and the unit's staff continuously maintain a healthy spirit of exactingness and an atmosphere of creative research and initiative in the collective, also has large significance.

It is known that many subunits of the Air Defense Forces are located at a considerable distance from each other. All of them -- on the scale of their unit -- compete between themselves. How things are going with their rivals, what experiences are their neighbors using, by means of what are they marching forward -- officers usually find out about this only during the summation of the results of the competition on a unit scale. If often happens also that in one subunit they successfully use an instructional methods find or a new method in training, but it is not known to their rivals, and if it is known, then only by hearsay.

However, any competition is strengthened especially by ensuring wide-spread publicity and comparison of results and by the opportunity to repeat progressive experience. But how can one realize these Leninist principles in the best way directly during the course of competition between subunits: artillery battalions, battalions, companies? Commanders, political workers and party aktivists are continuously reflecting on this.

Instructive experience in summing up the results of competition and in publicizing the achievements of progressive people has been accumulated in the unit which Lieutenant Colonel Alimov commands. A group of staff and political section officers works in the subunits before the next summation of results for the month's competition. Combat readiness, the progress in carrying out socialist obligations, and the state of discipline are checked. Then, all the best that has been achieved recently, is summed up, shortcomings are analyzed, indicators are compared, and the progressive subunit is determined based on the general results. Based on this, the unit commander sums up the results.

The commanders of the other subunits, the deputies for political affairs, the party and Komsomol aktivists, and the best specialists -- the winners in competition -- assemble here on the appointed day. The guests are acquainted with the organization of combat training and competition. An exchange of experience takes place; contests on performing norms and demonstrations at launch positions, in classrooms and at command posts are conducted. Each one can visually compare his and his neighbor's results and convince himself where his rival is strong and what experience he must arm himself with. Yes, the summation of results, itself, becomes more concrete, and objective, revealing more thoroughly the successes and shortcomings in the competition.

The results of the past training year and of several months of winter combat training permit the conclusion to be made. Those military collectives, in which commanders, political workers and party organizations skilfully and widely use competition to raise the fighting men's awareness and their moral perfection, primarily achieve success.

"The development of the consciousness of the masses is .. the basis and main content of our work" -- this instruction of V. I. Lenin is the instructional methods foundation which has been tested by life and an accurate compass which permits organizing one's work faithfully and purposefully, including the organization of socialist competition. The main thing here consists of creating an atmosphere of high patriotic enthusiasm in the subunit and in the unit, and to arouse fighting men for the conscientious and selfless performance of service duties and socialist obligations. The ability to create these conditions is a true art which requires from commanders and political workers vast knowledge, solid instructional methods skills, and a search for effective instructional and indoctrinational forms and methods.

I would like to cite as examples the subunits which Engr-Maj Yu. Kobyakov, Maj I. Ocheretyanyy, Capt Ye. Kudiy and Sr Lt V. Danil'chenko command. The combat skill of the fighting men in these subunits is known far beyond the limits of the unit. The fact that public life is in full swing in these subunits is also noteworthy. Here, one can visit an interesting debate and discussion of a new book, listen to a highly qualified lecture on the international situation, and attend a concert organized in honor of the competition winners. In many cases, the initiative comes from the soldiers and sergeants themselves. Not one of them stands aside from the cause for which the collective lives or from the concerns which stir their colleagues. In the subunits, there are no laggards and no discipline violations.

Very often life itself and the situation which has taken shape during classes dictate to commanders and political workers the need to avoid the usual and display creativity and initiative. It is important that the leader not overlook this opportunity, but use it with the greatest effectiveness.

During the training of the missilemen, which battery commander Capt S. Kharitonov was conducting, one of the crews twice did not confine themselves to the allotted time. The soldier through whose fault this had happened reacted rather peculiarly to the officer's comments.

"I am working in an allied specialty. Can I really be equal to the others?"

As it turned out, several other fighting men also considered that an allied specialty was a secondary matter. I have mastered, they say, the rudiments -- and that is sufficient. Yes and, they say, it is impossible to master several specialties equally well.

In changing his subordinates' mind, Captain Kharitonov cited examples where the interchangeability of missilemen had decided the outcome of a training battle. Then, he put a crew out of action with an input. The battery basically managed its assigned task, but the soldiers who took the places of their "out-of-action" colleagues, made many mistakes and errors. Then the officer put Jr Sgt N. Zanin in place of one of the crew members and gave the command to work on a norm. The result was excellent. He worked just as well as the second and third crew members.

The battery commander concluded: "Here is the skill that each should strive for."

The example of Junior Sergeant Zanin inspired his colleagues. Many wanted to try their strength there and then. Let their result be low, the desire to master allied specialties to perfection had appeared in the fighting men. Now during training sessions, they watch the actions of their comrades attentively and adopt their methods. The battery commander began to change the fighting men in the work positions more frequently, he considered the results of mastering allied specialties when summing up results. A competition for the title of best in an allied specialty was soon conducted in the subunit. Later, these competitions began to be conducted regularly. The battery became completely interchangeable.

The departure from a set pattern and the animation in competition evoked the fighting men's interest and aroused the desire to distinguish themselves and demonstrate results higher than their rival. Experienced competition organizers always consider this feature. Knowing that the performance of the same operations over a protracted length of time dulls interest and lowers activity, they try to place subordinates in unusual conditions and create a situation which requires actions full of initiative. The better one manages to do this, the more sharply a sense of rivalry appears and the higher the results.

Let us say that the loading of a launch mount is being practiced. The launch personnel are competing for the title of best crew. Replacing each other, the crews in turn perform the norm. However, here the leader announces that the result will be determined by the total of three loadings conducted one after the other. The tension immediately grows and the struggle intensifies.

Here is another example. It has become a tradition that experienced fighting men and excellent soldiers in combat and political training are obliged to help new men and their less trained colleagues to master a specialty. as practice shows, the results of this competition are higher where commanders, when summing up results, consider how effective this help is and how it is specifically expressed, and encourage those who have achieved successes. Results are even higher when the incentives for encouraging those who have distinguished themselves during definite training stages are known in advance. In one of the subunits, the better trained fighting men, those who helped colleagues to become rated specialists, receive after appropriate tests the right to conduct classes with the young soldiers during the hours of independent training. This arouses the experienced fighting men to study military affairs even more thoroughly and train in every possible way.

Everything that is valuable and instructive that is born during competition is our invaluable property. Its skilful use will help commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations to direct more effectively the men's struggle for the complete and qualitative performance of the socialist obligations in honor of 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Radar Operator Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Capt K. Shchanovich, a radar subunit commander, Carpathian Military District: "In the Search Mode"]

[Text] The white heat of our subunit radar operators' competition is steadily growing. They are preparing to greet the Leninist jubilee and the 35th anniversary of the Great Victory in a fitting manner. Numbers which testify to the growth of the sky scouts training appear each week on the stands in the Leninist room. We are seeing to it that there are no laggards in the subunit.

The successes of Lts N. Poltorako, S. Mantsevich and V. Kostrinchuk particularly make one happy. Having arrived here in a mountainous area after completing military schools, they did not shirk difficulties. The lieutenants assumed socialist obligations -- to master their duties in the shortest time and to carry out all combat training tasks with high ratings.

But there were difficulties in the formation of the young officers and they were not inconsiderable. For example, Lt S. Mantsevich lacked the skills to quickly and correctly evaluate the air situation and firmly control the crew. I remember how he directed a training session at the control post on his own for the first time. The young officer was not able to effectively control the actions of Pvt. A. Burlachenko, a radar operator. As a result, the information on one of the training targets was given late.

During the critique of the training session, it turned out that the lieutenant had evaluated the air situation basically using a map board and not using the display unit. The reason? He felt extremely unconfident behind the display screen.

It must be admitted that the thought flashed across my mind: Is it possible to entrust Mantsevich with a watch at the control post? All the threads of crew leadership meet here. However, having thought it over with Sr Lt A. Kramar, the political worker, we decided that such overcautiousness would lead to no good. By remaining, as they say, on the spare parts bench, the young officer would entirely lose faith in his strengths.

They acted otherwise: They helped the lieutenant to draw up a personal plan for independent work and to determine the main questions in it. Stress was placed on their practical working out. The chief of a progressive crew, Sr Lt A. Zhivoyedov, undertook to help Mantsevich in training. This was his socialist obligation during the competition.

In a month, the check-out class showed that Mantsevich oriented himself in an air situation and controlled the crews actions much more confidently. All the lieutenants have taken a considerable step forward in training and competition, relying on the help of our best specialists.

We are devoting very serious attention to high quality in the radar operators' professional training. This to cover the fact that it used to happen that some radar operators issued information mechanically, relying on the control post specialists. They, they say, examine everything and determine where the important target is and where the secondary one. This approach to combat work is, of course, not suitable everywhere. Our weapon is a crew served one. Each radar operator must feel responsible for timely and extremely reliable information on the air situation.

An exacting discussion took place on this during one of our work meetings. The officers and warrant officers [praporshchiki] began to struggle even more actively against weaknesses in classes and training sessions. We stressed the practice of the more complicated types of combat training, seeing to it that each specialist works, figuratively speaking, in the search mode for reserves.

There are such reserves. Take, for example, the training sessions on processing. In a number of cases, they have been impoverished by a tactical design. The "enemy" appeared weak and passive. It is no wonder that the operators and other specialists received high grades during these training sessions. However, it was worth expanding the tactical limits of the processing and give "enemy" actions novelty, surprise and a broader range of altitudes and speed since even our best operators, Jr Sgt A. Suslin and Pfc N. Proskuryakov, have begun to work notas confidently as before. Several training sessions which approximate a real situation as closely as possible were needed so that the specialists would learn to act not only intelligently but also more energetically, aware of the racing seconds and the breath of combat. The sense of rivalry during their training sessions has grown considerably.

Or let us take the briefings which are conducted on the eve of the radar operators standing watch. An analysis showed that they often had a formal nature. Essentially the same questions were posed to the radar operators. How the specialists had acted before was not analyzed in detail. This led to the repetition of the same mistakes.

The situation changed when we began to attach a task - short exercise form to the briefings and to analyze the reasons for the mistakes in combat work in detail. The radar operators now solve assigned tasks more intelligently and have a clearer picture of their actionsunder different changes in the air situation.

Objective control materials are being used more effectively than before. Formerly, they were used primarily for the critique of conflict situations and for the report. Another helpful use has now been found for these materials. Instructive moments in the air situation are again played on the screens and boards and are studied by all the specialists.

The spirit of searching arouses us to be more concerned about the effectiveness of socialist competition. For example, we have paid attention to this fact. In individual crews the palm of victory has been given to those operators who have the greater amount of time tracking targets. Other indicators, as for example, the quality of performing norms, the growth of the fighting men's skill, their social and political activity are taken into consideration poorly.

It was necessary to remind the officers that such an approach to organizing competition by no means looks objective -- and not only remind them. Instructional classes, during which the methods for organizing competition on tasks and norms and for summing up its results were discussed in detail, were conducted with the crew chiefs.

Of course, everything has not been done by us, and the search continues. All efforts are now being directed toward completing the winter training period successfully and carrying out the competition obligations completely.

8802
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UNITY AMONG WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES STRESSED

Sofia ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST in Bulgarian No 4, 1980 pp 24-30

[Article by Maj Gen Leonid Podkopayev, assistant representative of the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces in Bulgaria: "The Bases of Unity for the Military Alliance of the Fraternal Armies"]

[Text] The coming 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization is being celebrated under the conditions of a constant rise in the economic potential of the socialist countries which are members of it, and in a situation of the successful fulfillment of the task posed by the decisions of the congresses of the communist and workers parties and planned in the programs of the approved five-year development plans.

The successes in the development of the countries in the socialist commonwealth and the further strengthening of the alliance, friendship and all-round cooperation of the states participating in the Warsaw Pact are having an ever deeper effect on world development. The socialist commonwealth is a powerful accelerator of progress in each of the fraternal countries and a general guarantee for steady advancement.

The fraternal unity of the socialist countries and the invincible might of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces under present-day conditions are the most reliable obstacle against the forces who are endeavoring to attack and to weaken the socialist states and to undermine and destroy their victories.

The military fraternity between the Armed Forces of the USSR, the Bulgarian People's Army and the armies of the other socialist states has profound historical roots. One of the glorious pages in the history of international proletarian solidarity is the participation of revolutionaries from different countries in the armed defense of the victories of Great October in Russia. In 1918-1920, thousands of representatives from other peoples fought heroically in the ranks of the Red Army against the domestic and foreign enemies of Soviet power.

The men from the armies of the socialist states are proud of the revolutionary past of their peoples, and they are carefully protecting and adding to their revolutionary and military traditions. They well remember that the beginning of their military friendship on a basis of proletarian solidarity was started by the Great October Socialist Revolution which strongly linked the workers of Russia with their class brothers throughout the world. The names of the Bulgarian Sotir Cherkezov, the Hungarian Bela Kun, the Czech Jaroslaw Hasek, the Pole Pietur Borewicz, the Serb Aleko Dundic and many other glorious sons of the fraternal peoples will always remain in the history of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people.

V. I. Lenin saw this participation by representatives from different nations in the defense of the victories of the October Revolution as a model of the international militant solidarity of the peoples. In his speech at a meeting of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment before its departure for the front on 2 August 1918, he stated: "On you has fallen the great honor of defending the sacred ideas with weapons in hand..., and realizing the international fraternity of peoples in fact."[1]

In fighting against **fascim**, and for the freedom of the Spanish people, Soviet, Bulgarian and other internationalist fighters on the eve of World War II developed and enriched the glorious traditions of a joint armed struggle of their peoples against the imperialist tyrants.

During the period of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR against Nazi Germany in 1941-1945, the military fraternity of the Soviet Army with the armies of the Eastern European countries reached the greatest scope, and became one of the beneficial forms of cooperation among the peoples in their joint struggle to defeat the **fascist** aggressors, and for their liberty and independence.

The CPSU and the Soviet government were the initiators and main organizers of the military alliance of the USSR with the armies of the Eastern and Southeastern European countries. The communists from these countries were the most consistent and decisive fighters for the development and strengthening of the military fraternity of the armies.

The military alliance of the USSR with the Bulgarian People's Army and other armies during the years of the Great Patriotic War played an important military and political role, and its experience was of permanent significance for the further strengthening of military cooperation among the socialist states under present-day conditions.

After World War II, the balance of forces on the world scene altered, and imperialism once and for all lost its previous dominance over the world. No longer could it with impunity, as was the case previously, suppress the popular revolutions and forceably impose its "way of life" where the peoples rejected this. After understanding their historical doom, the ruling circles of the imperialist states followed a path of subversive activity against the USSR and the other socialist countries immediately after the conclusion of World War II. They began intensely to set up aggressive military blocs. In 1949, the main imperialist nations headed by the United States formed the North Atlantic Organization or NATO.

From the first days of its existence, this bloc served aggressive aims. It was directed primarily against the USSR and the other socialist states as well as against the peoples fighting for social and national liberation.

The inspired leader of the revolution, V. I. Lenin, pointed out that the peoples following the socialist development path "...without fail need a close military and economic alliance, otherwise the capitalists...will crush us and stifle us piecemeal."[2]

Consequently, the setting up of a joint military organization of the socialist nations in the form of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955 was caused not by the internal needs of socialist development, but rather by the necessity that these countries be protected against the aggressive policy of the imperialist powers aimed at unleashing a new world war and at destroying the socialist victories of the peoples.

The Warsaw Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid signed 10 years after the conclusion of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the development of all-round cooperation among the fraternal socialist countries and a strengthening of their military might.

In describing the relations which have been created between the socialist states that voluntarily joined the Warsaw Pact, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: "At present we all have one common priceless achievement. After World War II not just a whole group of socialist states arose. What was created was what we term the socialist commonwealth.... It is a question not of an ordinary alliance of states, but rather a socialist alliance which is founded upon a common ideology and goals, on international solidarity of the workers, and an alliance in which the driving force for the first time is the working class and its tried vanguard, the communist and workers parties."[3]

In terms of its content, goals and tasks, the Warsaw Pact does not contradict the UN Charter. It differs fundamentally from all previous coalitions and from all the military-political blocs and alliances of the capitalist states.

While the military blocs of the imperialists serve aggressive aims and are directed against the socialist countries and against the peoples who have won their freedom, the military alliance of the socialist states is a truly defensive organization. It has no other aim than to defend the peoples of the socialist countries, the revolutionary victories and the cause of peace.

The members of the Warsaw Pact do not threaten anyone, they do not claim foreign territories, and do not intervene into the internal affairs of other states. The communist and workers parties in the socialist countries have defended and do defend the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

The signing of the Warsaw Pact did not contradict the peace-loving foreign policy of the CPSU and the other fraternal parties. The main goal of the commonwealth of socialist countries is to ensure their full security with the presence of two opposing sociopolitical systems, to provide reliable protection for the most progressive social system against the encroachments of the aggressor, and to create the necessary conditions for the successful construction of socialism and communism. "We have created this commonwealth," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "primarily to counter the threat of imperialism and the aggressive military blocs created by it, in order to protect the cause of socialism and peace by common efforts."[4]

In struggling to lessen tension in Europe and to check the arms race, the Warsaw Pact countries have repeatedly proposed that their organization be disbanned under the condition that simultaneously NATO be eliminated. But the leaders of the aggressive bloc have not agreed to this. International imperialism is not only not inclined to abandon the policy of military blocs but is doing everything possible to strengthen them.

Under present-day conditions, the necessity for an all-round strengthening of the Warsaw Pact Organization is brought about by the difficult international situation and by its intentional exacerbation by American imperialism and Chinese hegemonism. The successes of the fraternal countries in building socialism and communism, the upsurge in the national liberation movement, and the strengthening of the forces fighting for detente and peace have caused rabid animosity and fear among the opponents of Marxism-Leninism. In attempting in every possible way to stop these positive phenomena, imperialism is resurrecting the Cold War, it is constantly strengthening the arms race and in every possible way is creating the pretexts for expansion in all regions of the world where a danger to its positions has arisen. In the aim of creating obstacles against a further activation of the world revolutionary process, the current U.S. leadership has chosen a line of an abrupt about-face in international development, from detente and the lessening of the danger of a thermonuclear world war to constant arming and the creation of confrontation and the threat of war.

At present, when the forces of imperialism have gone over to a counteroffensive against detente, peace and the rights of peoples, the unity of action of the socialist countries in defense of these greatest values is important as never before. The adventuristic "doctrine" of imperialism threatens the peace and security of all states and peoples. It is the duty of everyone for whom peace is necessary and dear to rebuff these malicious plans.

The strength and solidarity of the fraternal countries are particularly apparent in the friendship and cooperation of their armies. The armies of the Warsaw Pact member nations must solve not only national but also international tasks in line with the collective defense of the security of the socialist commonwealth. Their military fraternity is fully manifested in international proletarian solidarity. This is brought about by the desire to pool the military forces of the fraternal worker-peasant states to rebuff the aggression of the imperialist blocs.

The traditions of the military alliance of fraternal armies set up in the years of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany and further developed in the Warsaw Pact Organization are an inexhaustible source for indoctrinating the men of the armies in the socialist countries in a spirit of unshakable friendship and loyalty to the ideals of socialist internationalism and communism.

Among the armies of the Warsaw Pact member states there exist true fraternal relations based upon the principles of proletarian internationalism. Regardless of the fact that the socialist armies have certain differences in the staff and organizational structure, the weaponry and materiel, and possess their own particular features and traditions, they remain faithful brothers in spirit and weapons, they share a profound mutual respect and confidently rely on each other. Loyalty to their own peoples and loyalty to the cause of socialism and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are a characteristic trait of the unity and military alliance of the armies in the Warsaw Pact states.

The unity and the military alliance of the fraternal armies are founded on a strong economic, sociopolitical, ideological and military-strategic basis.

The economic basis for the unity of the nations in the socialist commonwealth and their armies is the socialist method of production and the uniform productive forces and production relations. This makes it possible to carry out all-round economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the allied socialist states.

Economic cooperation between the socialist countries, in contrast to the capitalist economic alliances, exclusively serves the interests of peace and social progress.

The sociopolitical basis of the alliance of the fraternal countries and armies is the commonness of the social and state system of the Warsaw Pact countries. From this derive the common class interests in the building of socialism and communism, in defense of socialist victories, as well as the common goals in the struggle for peace and social progress. A socialist society is a truly democratic society in which the alliance between the working class, the peasantry and the other strata of the workers is the main force in the struggle against imperialism.

The ideological basis of the unity between the socialist countries and the fraternal armies is Marxist-Leninist teachings, and loyalty to the ideals of socialism and communism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism and class solidarity.

The ideological unity of the Warsaw Pact member nations is incompatible with manifestations of nationalism and opportunism and with the refusal to carry out a common duty.

The socialist countries have organized their relations on the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty. Their fraternal mutual aid is an inseparable part of their relationships.

The military strategic basis for the military alliance between the fraternal socialist countries and their armies is the commonness of the goals of collective defense of the socialist victories. This is based upon Lenin's teachings about war and the army, on the uniform principles of organizing the armed forces, and on the common views and methods for training these forces in accord with the achievements of modern military science. The CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties in the socialist countries in their military policy proceed from the main demand of maintaining the armed forces in constant combat readiness in order not to allow the aggressor to get the jump on us.

The strategic concepts of the Pentagon and NATO, in being the reverse of our principles, are aimed at aggression and world war. In altering and adapting them to one or another balance of forces on the world scene, their aggressive imperialist essence remains unchanged.

"Under present-day conditions, when the aggressive NATO bloc is increasing its military might," emphasized Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, "a further strengthening of the unshakable friendship and solidarity in the socialist commonwealth, the maintaining of its defense potential and the necessary level of combat readiness in the socialist armies are an objective necessity and a clear manifestation of the unity of the international tasks and actions of the socialist countries."[5]

At the present stage, the Soviet Armed Forces and the Bulgarian People's Army fully meet the strictest demands for weapons, organizational structure, training and morale of the personnel. Intensive training activities are carried out in the units and on the ships. The combat readiness of the troops, and the field, air and sea training of the personnel are being improved.

"The men of the allied armies," emphasized Mar SU V. G. Kulikov, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States, "united in a single international family, are always on guard. And as long as the danger exists of military attack by the enemies of peace and socialism, they will improve their military skill and their readiness to repel any aggression, no matter where it arises."[6]

In showing concern for their defense might, the socialist nations rely on the collective military might of the military alliance of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States. This collective might, Comrade T. Zhivkov noted, is the best defense and support for each individual socialist country.... In an age of nuclear weapons it is essential to have a complete combination of one's own efforts in the area of national defense with the collective might of the entire socialist commonwealth, and above all the USSR, the armed forces of which are presently the most dependable shield for the socialist nations.

The development and strengthening of the military fraternity of the armies in the Warsaw Pact states is inconceivable without constant and diverse work by the communist and workers parties in the area of the internationalist indoctrination of the men. The Marxist-Leninist parties view these activities as one of their primary tasks, and without successfully carrying it out it is impossible to speak seriously of an effective military alliance of the fraternal parties, for if the officers and men are not fully and firmly convinced of the vital need of the fraternal alliance in arms with the armies of the other socialist countries, such a military alliance cannot be strong and secure in peacetime, let alone in wartime.

The struggle of the communist and workers parties in the Warsaw Pact member states to strengthen and deepen the military friendship of the allied armies is inseparable from the indoctrination of the men in a spirit of high military and political vigilance and strong class hate for the enemies of socialism and for the imperialist aggressors.

In our days the world socialist system has become the leading force in the social development of the world. Imperialism is powerless to regain its lost historical initiative and to turn this development back.

On the basis of the decisions of the congresses of the communist and workers parties in the fraternal countries and from the materials of the international conferences, one can see the fundamental unity of the main areas for the social development of all the states in the socialist commonwealth and their all-round reciprocal cooperation.

As a consequence of this, the internationalization of the policy of the communist and workers parties has been strengthened, and there has been a greater role and importance for the coordinated decisions aimed at ensuring the common interests of the socialist commonwealth in the political course of each state.

The most important condition for the might and invincibility of the nations in the socialist commonwealth and for raising the effectiveness of their military cooperation is the unity and solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist parties. Under their leadership the security of the socialist states is guaranteed and the positions of real socialism are strengthened in the world.

Since time immemorial the cherished dream of mankind has been...peace. The best minds have struggled and hoped that the time would come when destructive wars would be ended once and for all. The Warsaw Pact Organization is a strong fortress and reliable shield for socialism and communism. As long as the aggressive NATO bloc exists, it will play an important role in providing the security of the socialist countries against military attack by the imperialist states, and in preserving peace.

The military alliance of the fraternal socialist states has honorably withstood the test of time. The military might of the Warsaw Pact is a permanently indestructible barrier against which the intrigues of international imperialism have foundered and will founder in the future.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Such." [Works], Vol 28, p 26.

2. Ibid., Vol 30, p 294.

3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 5, p 112.

4. Ibid., Vol 4, p 68.

5. D. Ustinov, "Na Strazhe Zavoyevaniy Oktyabrya" [On Guard for the Victories of October], Moscow, 1978, p 76.

6. V. Kulikov, VOYENNAYA MYSL', No 5, 1979, p 10.

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CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

In Donbass Mines

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 9 Dec 79 p 2

[Article by I. Kotov: "Miners Take an Exam"]

[Text] The night-shift miners were working at the face when the warning signal sounded. Quickly and without any commotion or disorder, the men and commanders of the nonmilitary formations assembled at their designated points. I. Nikitin, the mine's CD chief, professed himself satisfied after observing his people form up: everybody was in place within the scheduled time. But the most difficult part lay ahead. According to the practice scenario, the mine imeni the SOTSIALISTICHESKIY DONBASS newspaper found itself in a "center of nuclear destruction." First to be tested were the reconnaissance specialists led by the surveyor N. Lozov.

The reconnaissance group demonstrated a good state of emergency training. It quickly established the limits of the "center of destruction," the condition of the "damaged" buildings and structures and the presence within them of "victims" requiring priority assistance. It also identified the points at which production lines and the municipal power system had been "damaged" and approximately how much emergency restoration work had to be done.

Reconnaissance data were quickly correlated and analyzed at CD headquarters. The necessary decisions were made to carry out rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations on the basis of comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the situation. A combined rescue team led by Ye. Sokolov performed skillfully in a "center of mass destruction." During the course of the rescue operations the leader concentrated his attention on the search for people in obstructed areas and collapsed buildings and protective structures. It was also necessary to render medical first aid to the victims and evacuate them from the "center of destruction." All team members accomplished their task with care, dispatch and initiative. This is extremely important in an emergency situation when every minute counts. DOSAAF members S. Kuznetsov and P. Kondratenko demonstrated especially high levels of training.

A great deal of work fell to the lot of emergency technical team members. Under the leadership of A. Staroverov they were able to deal with all "emergencies" within brief periods of time. They had to repair several water leaks, for example, and replace individual sections of pipe and damaged fittings.

The training of the civilian formation commanders and their skill in leading and directing their subordinates are worthy of praise. V. Gorbach, for example, skillfully organized the work of a radiation and chemical monitoring point, while N. Pavlichenko and N. Bolotskaya directed their formations skillfully and efficiently.

Political party work was effectively conducted among personnel in the course of the training exercise. The mine's party committee involved in this effort the communists, DOSAAF committee members and Komsomol activists. Everybody participating in the exercise was up-to-date on political events at home and abroad; they knew about those who had turned in outstanding performances as well as deficiencies in the performance of individual participants. Some people, for example, were wearing poorly adjusted gas masks, which would be fraught with serious consequences in a real emergency situation. Incidents like this were discussed during the critique. Generally speaking, exercise participants fully accomplished all their tasks and successfully passed their difficult examination.

In Donetsk

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 13 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by G. Teplyakov (Ponetsk): "They Acted Skilfully"]

[Text] "Fires," "destruction," interruptions in electric power transmission and disruptions in the water supply resulted from the "nuclear strike" delivered by the enemy in the area of the Lidiyevka mine.

Reconnaissance groups obtained more accurate information on the situation. The CD staff drew the necessary conclusions on the basis of this data. A. Angelovskiy, chief of the emergency technical service, gave oral instructions to begin urgent emergency restoration and rebuilding operations throughout the municipal electric power system.

Civilian formations had to negotiate an area of "radioactive contamination" over their route leading in to the "center of destruction." Firefighters skillfully put out the fires. Bulldozer operators V. Tomchuk and P. Guridov, both DOSAAF members, quickly opened up passages through obstructed areas and created routes of access to shelters. Personnel of a combined group led by N. Mironenkov rushed to these points and began work to rescue the "injured." Medical aid team members led by N. Chebotyuk gave them first aid.

"Disruptions" along the water, sewer and electric power transmission lines were dealt with quickly and efficiently. Personnel of the emergency technical team did a great deal of work. V. Dudka, the team leader and a DOSAAF member, assigned his men their tasks clearly and concisely.

This integrated facility-wide exercise showed that those participating in it are capable of performing skillfully in a complex emergency situation.

In Shakhtinsk, Kazakh SSR

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 5 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by I. Mingalev, chief of Civil Defense Shakhtinsk City Headquarters: "In Close Contact"]

[Text] The past training year was a productive one for the civil defense system in our city's enterprises, institutions and educational facilities. The level of civilian formation training was raised substantially. Instruction for workers and employees and for the population at places of residence was conducted in more organized manner. Attention in this connection was devoted primarily to the mastering of practical skills in providing protection against weapons of mass destruction.

This is the result above all of the great amount of attention devoted by party organization to the conducting of civil defense activities and of the participation in them of our DOSAAF organizations. It was thanks to the joint efforts of Society committees and the civil defense staffs that these tasks were fully accomplished in the facilities where V. Kolmykov, Yu. Solov'yev and Sh. Shamsutdinov are the CD chiefs.

The city's civil defense staff receives a great deal of assistance from the DOSAAF city committee, which is headed by S. Popuk. It isn't simply the fact that city committee activists participate directly in the activities conducted by the city CD staff. They also teach the aktiv of primary Society organizations how to render more effective assistance to the civil defense effort in our enterprises and institutions.

Working in close contact with the CD staff, for example, are the DOSAAF committees of the Molodezhnaya mine, the Gapayevskaya and the 2d and 13th secondary schools. Thanks to their harmonious efforts, these collectives achieve good results and earn prize-winning ratings in civil defense competition.

We recently conducted an integrated facility-wide demonstration exercise at the Molodezhnaya mine. This facility was not selected at random. A good material training base has been developed here, and first-rate instructional facilities are available. And the mine's primary DOSAAF organization is the best in the oblast in all areas. It has won the Society oblast committee's Red Challenge Banner in socialist competition three years in a row. I. Ovdin, chairman of the DOSAAF committee, has drawn together about him a tightly knit group of civil defense activists, DOSAAF members and war veterans. Through their joint efforts they have equipped a basic military training center, a full-scale outdoor training site and a classroom for CD instruction.

When we speak of the activities conducted jointly by our CD staffs and DOSAAF committees, we also have in mind the mutual assistance given in connection with work in the area of military and patriotic indoctrination. Civil defense activists participate in this effort together with DOSAAF members.

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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1524

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USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1524

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LETTER TO EDITOR: OFFICER CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Captain A. Krendelev, deputy chief of military motor vehicle inspection of the Red Banner Siberian Military District: "Conflict on the Road"]

[Text] Everybody knows how important are our efforts to prevent highway traffic accidents. Our district is doing a lot in this respect. But we still have a large number of violations of highway traffic regulations. I think one reason for this is the low degree of personal responsibility demonstrated by individuals designated to serve as vehicle officers. I will give only one example.

A motor vehicle was detained by the Omsk garrison's motor vehicle inspectorate. It was determined upon inspection not to be in proper operating order. It was then suggested that the vehicle be returned to the park. But the vehicle officer, Major of Technical Services V. Kalich, did not take the advice of the vehicle inspection representative.

The question is why, after getting into a vehicle in the capacity of officer in charge, some officers, like Major of Technical Services Kalich, consider it permissible to violate regulations. The fact is that with such an attitude toward their responsibilities they are creating conditions that cause motor vehicle accidents.

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EDITORS MAILBAG: FEBRUARY MAIL REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Mail"]

> [Text] The editors received 13,192 letters from readers during February 1980. We published 521 of them in the newspaper. We also received 1,348 responses to articles appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Each month in the life of our motherland and its Armed Forces is marked by important events. Thus it was during the month of February just passed. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers described in their letters the process of preparing for the elections of people's deputies to union- and autonomous-republic supreme soviets and local soviets and the great upsurge in patriotic enthusiasm displayed by the Soviet peoples as they voted for their candidates for deputy.

Election day was preceded by another national holiday--Soviet Army and Navy Day. Many subunits (podrazdeleniye), units (chasti) and ships greeted these occasions with great successes in socialist competition in honor of the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of our Great Victory.

"It was on distant high seas," Captain 3d Rank D. Chumak reported to the editors, "that the men of the outstanding destroyer Vozbuzhdennyy celebrated their holiday. Over the course of the long weeks of their cruise, many of them have improved their mastery of combat skills. Eighty percent of the seamen and petty officers now on board the ship are 1st- and 2d-class specialists. Retaining a solid hold on first place in competition is the engineer department, which is headed by Captain Lieutenant-Engineer G. Magazinov."

"It was with a feeling of patriotic pride in the successes of our motherland," Major V. Romanyuk wrote in his letter, "that my comrades-in-arms and I listened to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech to the pre-election meeting of voters of Moscow's Bauman electoral district. Leonid Il'ich declared that the Soviet Union's defensive strength is being maintained at the required level, that we have everything necessary to rebuff any military provocations and that the peaceful future of the Soviet state has been reliably secured. We took these words as a high evaluation of our performance of our military duties and as the party's call for us to increase our combat readiness. Many members of our unit turned in outstanding performances during our recent tactical training exercise. Tankers of the companies commanded by Senior Lieutenants V. Gvozdkov and S. Gavrilov skillfully combined fire and maneuver on the attack and succeeded in accomplishing their assigned mission. But in summing up our results we also discussed our deficiencies and how to prevent them from recurring in the future."

An exacting view of performance and, having discovered a deficiency or been alerted to one, promptness in taking measures to rectify the situation and insure adherence to legality--this should always be the party position taken by any commander or leader.

A letter written jointly by residents of one of our military posts contained a complaint that charges for communal services had been raised too high. The unit (soyedineniye) commander to whom we forwarded the letter named a special commission to investigate the complaint. It turned out that the charge had been figured correctly. But the money had not been collected in accordance with regulation procedures; there had been no timely publication of the regulations; and it had not been explained to housing residents that the need for some increase in gas charges was the result of increased gas consumption. Strict resource-accounting procedures have now been established within the unit. For violating regulations governing the calculation of charges for communal services and for underestimating the importance of working with the families of military personnel, Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenov has been called to account both officially and to party authorities. The decisive measures taken by the formation commander have eliminated the misunderstanding.

Now here is one more letter to the editors.

"Military unit commanders are turning to our military commissariat," reports Rechitskiy city military commissar Lieutenant Colonel Kachurinskiy, "with requests that we provide assistance to parents or families of active-duty military personnel in the way of repairing houses, providing fuel, getting their children into day nurseries and so forth. We try, of course, to give them the help they need; but in most instances we are forced to limit ourselves to forwarding their letters, since the questions they deal with properly fall within the competence, not of the military commissariat, but rather of local authorities and enterprise and kolkhoz managers."

Comrade Kachurinskiy rightly emphasizes the fact that commanders' ignorance of procedures, regulations and guiding documents results in more correspondence and paperwork than would actually be necessary, as well as in dragging out the time required to answer the requests of our military personnel.

The editors received 294 reports during February concerning steps that had been taken in connection with letters sent in with regard to matters to be looked into, which is evidence of the attentive consideration given to the requests, complaints and suggestions which readers have addressed to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

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CRITICISMS AND COMPLAINTS: FOLLOW-UP REPORTS

Military Representatives in Industry

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the Column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "A Quiet Backwater"]

[Text] That was the title of the letter from Lt Col Yu. Teplov, which was published on 23 December 1979. It told of an unhealthy situation which had developed in the party organization of a military representatives' office in industry. The editorial staff received 2 replies: one signed by Lt Gen-Engr M. Klimov and Col V. Tsyupko, secretary of the party committee, and the other from Maj Gen V. Lukin. The paper's report was admitted to be correct. The letter was discussed at a meeting of the primary party organization, in which a representative of the party raykom took part. Party member V. Khlopunov was issued a stern reprimand, and a set of measures was developed--which is being implemented--to improve the situation in the collective.

A surprise inspection was conducted of the representatives' military activity, and it revealed a number of deficiencies in Col-Engr Serv V. Khlopunov's work. As a result of serious omissions he was cautioned about his substandard performance of duty. Lt Col-Engr Serv N. Mozgunov, the Senior Military Representative was severely rebuked as well. The deficiencies in the work of the military representatives' office are now being eliminated.

Troop Movement Fraud

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Newton's Third Law"]

[Text] Col A. Drovosekov and Col-Quartermaster Serv R. Sinev's satirical article, published under this title on 22 January 1980, told of abuses committed by the officers P. Sosunovskiy and I. Lobanov, who used troop movement papers for personal gain.

As reported to the editorial staff by the chief of the political section of the combined unit where Comrade Sosunovskiy serves, this paper's report was discussed at a meeting of troop commanders and political workers. Their attention was directed to the need for strengthening party leadership by the people's control groups and improving the work of the internal investigating commissions. As stated in the article, P. Sosunovskiy was severely punished. The damage he caused to the state has been fully remunerated. The lack of integrity shown by Maj Yu. Kudlayev and Capt A. Shishinev received a fitting evaluation by the party as well.

For misuse of his position, another reply reports, officer I. Lobanov was cautioned about his inadequate performance of duty. As a party member he was issued a stern reprimand, which was recorded on his registration card.

Base Facilities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "At a Distance"]

[Text] That was the title of the letter from Lt Col A. Polyakov, which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 11 December 1979. It told how inadequately the facilities provided to the personnel and families of servicemen in the company commanded by Capt G. Golovizin were organized.

As reported to the editorial staff by the commander and the chief of the unit department for political affairs, the construction of an apartment house has been completed, a special vehicle has been equipped to serve as a school bus, and the water supply system has been repaired. A military sales store has been opened on base, and an electric power station has been allocated to provide the base with lighting.

The personnel have been issued a full set of winter clothing.

Training Deficiencies in NGF

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Corrections to the...Disorganization"]

[Text] That was the title of the letter from Lt Col A. Khorunzhiy, published on 15 December 1979. It notes serious deficiencies in the organization of training in a certain unit.

As reported to the editorial staff by Maj Gen N. Lushnichenko, chief of the political directorate of the Northern Group of Forces and a member of the military council, the letter was discussed at an officers' meeting, in the regiment's party organizations, and at a meeting of the combined unit active members (aktiv). Maj A. Murzayev, the battalion commander, and Lt V. Chizhikov, the platoon commander, were disciplined. The unit adopted measures to improve its officers' methodological preparation and put control over the conduct of its training back on the right track.

Unfinished Housing

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "The Document Is Signed, But the House Is Empty"]

[Text] The letter from Lt Col (Ret) I. Moshkovskiy, published with this title on 19 January 1980, told of the incorrect practice of accepting houses for use which are not ready for occupancy. Specifically, such a situation developed with regard to housing construction done by the military construction collective commanded by Col-Tech Serv V. Yefimov.

As reported to the editorial staff by Col-Engr Ye. Sivtsov, the unfinished construction which prevented occupancy of the house has been eliminated, and the new tenants are moving into their quarters.

Col-Tech Serv V. Yefimov, director of the office of the work supervisor, and Maj-Engr Yu. Ivanov, the chief of the billeting operations unit, were disciplined for the defects they permitted.

Bureaucratic Inertia

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "How Long Can You Wait?"]

[Text] The letter with this title published on 12 December 1979 told of the bureaucratic inertia shown by the headquarters of the Far East MD in presenting Capt V. Timoshinov with the document awarding him the title "Honored Radio Operator" and the breast badge to go with it. This title was actually conferred on him on 10 May 1976.

As reported to the editorial staff by Col A. Galashin, acting director of communications for the Baltic MD (where Capt Timoshinov now serves), the "Honored Radio Operator" badge and accompanying certificate were received on 26 December 1979 from the Far East MD and were presented to Capt Timoshinov the same day.

V. Timoshinov, now a major, sent a letter to the editorial staff thanking it for its assistance.

Thus, one might consider the matter at an end. However, it is surprising that no reply has yet been received from the Far East MD. Our readers would like to know what measures have been taken relative to those responsible for this situation.

Problems With Unauthorized Construction

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Such Misunderstandings"]

[Text] In remarks bearing this title and published on 16 November 1979 Sr Lt L. Teplov told of misunderstandings which arose in the construction of a shop at one of the concerns in the Transbaykal MD.

As reported to the editorial staff by Col N. Laguteyev and Lt Col V. Golikov the misunderstandings occurred because the construction had not been authorized, and permission for it was given late. Specifically, this led to alterations in the equipment foundations and to an inadequate supply of raw material to be processed in the shop.

The shop is currently bringing its new equipment up to capacity, and all 3 production lines are in service. The problem with the supply of raw materials has also been solved.

Job Assistance

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "Steps Taken On Our Readers' Complaints"]

[Text] A. I. Kuz'minykh, a resident of the village of Kozhevnikovo in Tomskaya Oblast and invalid from the Great Patriotic War, appealed to the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondence center in Novosibirsk for assistance in finding a job. The veteran's letter was forwarded to the Tomsk Obkom of the CPSU. In reply Comrade A. Zarembo, director of the obkom's agricultural department, wrote: "Taking into account Comrade Kuz'minykh's desire to work, the CPSU raykom believed it possible to recommend him to become director of the Kozhevnikovo office of the rayon sales department for the local fuel industry, where he is presently employed."

"I admit," reports Aleksey Ivanovich thankfully, "that my wounds have stopped aching. That is what it means to be in a collective and to feel that society needs you."

Veterans' Benefits

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "Steps Taken On Our Readers' Complaints"]

[Text] Ye. Podudanskaya, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, had often appealed to her city military commissariat to issue her temporary certification for the privileges established for front-line soldiers. However, this legitimate request remained unsatisfied, and Yelena Yefimovna wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about it.

The editorial staff forwarded Comrade Podudanskaya's complaint to the Kabardino-Balkarskiy republic military commissariat. As indicated by the reply we received, an investigation established that Ye. Podudanskaya was an actual participant in the Great Patriotic War, and that she served in troop units of the regular army. Her request for temporary certification was granted. The Prokhladnenskiy city military commissariat was counseled on the need for more attentive handling of letters, complaints, and applications submitted by the workers.

Certificate of Service

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 80 p 2

[Text] The letter which A. Belenskiy, a former serviceman from the settlement of Koryazhma in Arkhangel'skaya Oblast, sent to the editorial staff indicates the existence of bureaucratic inefficiency. He had twice appealed to workers in a military unit to issue him a certificate confirming his service in that unit, but he received no reply.

The commander reported to the editorial staff that an administrative investigation was conducted into the cause of the delay in answering the former serviceman's letter, and that those responsible for it were disciplined. Comrade Belenskiy was issued his certificate.

Flight Servicing

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "The Battalion Surrendered Its Positions"]

[Text] Lt Col R. Karpov's letter with this title was published in our 5 January 1980 issue. It set forth facts that indicate a reduction in the quality of flight servicing and deficiencies in the organization of training and educational work in a detached airfield/maintenance support battalion.

As reported to the editorial staff by Maj Gen-Aviation I. Zhabin, chief of the political department for aviation units in the Baltic MD, the political department had Maj A. Khokhlov, the battalion commander, give his account of the situation. The paper's report was discussed by rear aviation logistics specialists in the Baltic MD and at the unit's officers and warrant officers meeting. They planned the measures needed to hold organizers of training and educational more responsible for their work and charted a path for improving the quality of flight servicing. The transportation service command improved its program for training young drivers, and a system was devised for sharing experience in servicing flights under various meteorological conditions.

Superficial Performance of Duty

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 1980 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Red Tape"]

[Text] A letter with this title from Petty Officer 2d Class A. Ruzhnikov was published on 26 January 1980, with a commentary by Capt 2d Rank A. Zlydnev. It told of the superficial approach which certain officers took in their performance of duty, which was the reason for bureaucratic delays in drawing up Ruzhnikov's clothing and pay records.

As reported to the editorial staff by Vice Adm V. Sabaneyev, chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, and member of the military council, the events set forth in this paper actually took place, and all the issues raised by PO 2d Class Ruzhnikov have been resolved. Primarily to blame for the red tape was the officer G. Apryshkin, who was disciplined and against whom party proceedings were initiated. The report published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was discussed with the officers.

Heating System

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "It's Cold!"]

[Text] As reported by Maj Gen-Engr Yu. Komarov, Col (Ret) V. Arkhipov's letter "It's Cold!", published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 30 January 1980, was discussed with the commanders of the military construction units mentioned in this publication. Measures have been taken to provide the houses with normal heating.

Concurrently a design institute was assigned the technical responsibility for rebuilding the heating system. Control has been established over the course of boiler reconstruction.

Integrity, Cover-ups

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Training Fun"]

[Text] As reported by the chief of the unit's political department, the article "Training Fun" by Capt 1st Rank (Ret) Ye. Korovin, published in this paper on 18 January 1980, was discussed with the officers/warrant officers of the ships and with the crews of the minesweeper division. It was also discussed at a meeting of the active party members (aktiv). The command and political department worked out a plan for eliminating the deficiencies revealed in the newspaper report. The forms and methods for educating sailors about honesty, truthfulness and integrity were discussed with political workers and the most active party members. Measures are now being taken to improve the staffs' work style; this work is directed at strengthening the organization of service and raising the quality of training and education. At one session the party bureau heard a number of Communists--staff officers in the unit--speak about these issues. Capt 3d Rank I. Semyonov, the division commander; Capt 3d Rank Yu. D'yakov; and Sr Lt V. Soskin, the captain of the minesweeper, were disciplined for their attempted cover-up; party proceedings were initiated against them.

Bathing Facilities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 80 p 2

[Unsigned article in the column "After Appearing in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "Why the Mood Is Spoiled"]

[Text] A letter from N. Yerankin and A. Tootaman, cadets at a warrant officers school, was printed on 10 February 1980 with a commentary by a correspondent for this paper. It told of deficiencies in the operation of the garrison bath. As reported to the editorial staff by the commandant of the school and the chief of the political department, the garrison has introduced a new schedule for personal bathing and has established control over its implementation. The bath now possesses the requisite equipment. Resources for major overhaul of the heating conduits have been identified; the work is to be done in June-July. Maj Krayeshkin has been disciplined for neglecting to properly organize bath service for the troops.

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READERS' RESPONSES TO PUBLISHED CRITICISMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "Although Steps Have Been Taken..., In Connection With Some Responses to Critical Articles Published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA"]

[Text] "I read Captain A. Ladin's article, 'Somebody Ought To Step In Here,' in your newspaper. It produced a very great effect on me. I have been waiting ever since for the publication of some report on what steps have been taken. More than a month has gone by, but I still haven't seen anything. What's happening here...?"

A former front-line reconnaissance man, Ivan Panteleyevich Migunov, wrote this letter to the editors. Three of his sons have already put in their active-duty time and have returned to their kolkhoz with merit certificates, while the youngest is now finishing his service with the airborne forces. This front-line veteran was deeply disturbed by the conduct of a Captain Z. Patulyak, which was described in the article. It included, among other things, an account of the following incident. Warrant Officer I. Kammer had allowed one of his men to meet his parents at the check point. But Captain Patulyak then gave the warrant officer a dressing down for this in the presence of the soldier's father. This officer's "training methods" were no secret for his superiors. Political section personnel had visited his unit (chast') twice within the recent past. But they nevertheless concluded that there wasn't enough here to get alarmed about. In the end, though, Patulyak committed an offense which far exceeded the limits of what had by now come to be considered "normal," so to speak, for him....

We have to inform our readers, and Ivan Panteleyevich Migunov, that we did receive a response to this critical article. But we didn't publish it because it would hardly satisfy even the most undemanding, undiscriminating reader.

The deputy chief of the political directorate of the Central Asian Military District, Colonel M. Fomin, reported that "command and political-section personnel discussed the article at a meeting of the military construction unit leadership, in which participated Lieutenant Colonel V. Alekseyev, inspector of the political directorate."

It was gratifying, of course, that the inspector participated in the meeting. But discussion alone was obviously not enough in this case. The writer of the letter raised the question of the passivity of political section personnel, who were either unable or unwilling to put a timely stop to this behavior on the part of comrade Z. Patulyak. We all know, of course, that nothing happens in a vacuum. The conditions for this kind of thing first develop when there is created an atmosphere conducive to negative phenomena. The political section is the very organization which should exercise an active influence on the moral climate existing within our party organizations and military collectives. But the response over M. Fomin's signature, however, said nothing about either errors or miscalculations in the work of this political organization or any specific steps taken toward improving its manner of operation.

Yes, criticism is a bitter pill; taking it gives no pleasure. But it's beneficial. Practical success depends upon the adoption of a principled, businesslike approach to analysis of deficiencies which have been brought to light and upon the effectiveness of any remedial measures. And it is important that personnel in leadership positions set the example of a proper attitude toward criticism. That's the way the CPSU Central Committee put it in its decree on "The Status of Criticism and Selfcriticism in the Tambovskaya Oblast Party Organization."

But this isn't at all the way things were in the political section of the Rostov garrison's special-purpose units. A letter from a group of officers was forwarded there from the political directorate of the Northern Caucasus Military District reporting that Major V. Rastorguyev was exploiting his official position for his own personal purposes. A group of officers led by Colonel Yu. Omel'chenko followed it up but concluded that the facts couldn't be proved. But another investigation, undertaken with the participation of a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, revealed that those who had written the letter were right. This whole unseemly business was laid out in Lieutenant Colonel A. Polyakov's article "They Tried To Overlook It...."

And then the editors received a response over the signature of Major General V. Arapov, first deputy chief of the district political directorate. He reported that Major V. Rastorguyev had been strictly reprimanded, both officially and by the party with an entry in his personal record. Serves him right, they would say.... But what about those who "tried to overlook" the fact that Rastorguyev was putting his men to work on the construction of his own, private dacha and that he was using official vehicles and much else for this purpose? Why was it that conditions so conducive to official connivance became possible within the political section? And what, finally, underlay comrade Omel'chenko's motives in closing his eyes to Major Rastorguyev's abuses?

Unfortunately, the official response received by the editors contained no thoroughgoing analysis of the actions of these people. The impression is that the main thing to which the criticism was directed has again been overlooked.

Yu. Talpa, a draftee from Moldavia, submitted his application and paperwork to the Khar'kov Higher Military Air Pilots' School imeni Twice Hero of the Soviet Union S. I. Gritsevits, but the call he received to examinations came from...the Tambov Higher Military Command School of Chemical Defense.

The editors sent a telegram to the military commissar of the Moldavian SSR requesting that the draftee's complaint be looked into. It came to rest on the desk of the republic's deputy military commissar, Colonel V. Feklistov. He forwarded it to Major A. Grosulu, who in turn passed it farther on along the channels of command. Responding to the editors' inquiry as a result was a rayon military commissar, Lieutenant Colonel V. Shariy, the very same person the draftee who had written the original letter was complaining about in the first place. He attempted to defend himself somehow and wrote that the draftee Yu. Talpa's service record was forwarded to Tambov...at the request of the draftee himself. And to provide documentary proof of this, his application was removed from his service record and replaced with another one prepared and signed by Senior Lieutenant N. Bytko.

These facts formed the basis for Colonel-Engineer Yu. Galkin's article, "Not Admitted to His Military School...." But then what steps were taken after it was published?

Colonel Gorobets, chief of the political section of the military commissariat of the Moldavian SSR, reported to the editors in this regard. It had been recommended that the article be discussed; the offending parties had been reprimanded; while Senior Lieutenant Bytko, who, in the language of the legal documents involved, was guilty of forgery, had received a severe reprimand.

As we can see, the facts in these cases and the remedial measures taken are not to be found on commensurable levels. Are not the latter too lenient in the case of people guilty of committing a crime in their official positions, people who tried knowingly to mislead authorities at higher command levels? It should once again be recalled that the party requires that a decisive struggle be waged with the slightest departures from the Soviet socialist legal order.

We have commented on three responses to critical articles published in the newspaper. Three responses reporting remedial measures which have been taken; but after you read them, the question involuntarily arises: but have any really practical steps in fact been taken? "Every Soviet citizen must be assured that any well-founded suggestion, request or complaint will be given careful consideration and that a matter will be decided correctly and fairly," declared L. I. Brezhnev at a session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. These words should be taken as a practical guide by any person in authority empowered to make decisions and take measures in connection with requests and complaints.

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CRITICISM: OFFICERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS MISUSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by WO G. Trunov: "The 'Supports' Replace Sergeant Majors"]

[Text] Once I happened to read in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA an article on the sometimes happening practice of assigning various "persons in charge" for "supports" and so forth in addition to the daily detail established by the regulations. The article rightly condemned such practices. However, in our unit where I served as an instructor in the training lab, it still occurs.

The officers and warrant officers ["michman"] who are assigned as "supports," according to a special schedule on certain days must arrive at the unit by 0600 hours and supervise reveille, physical exercises, breakfast and so forth, right up to the beginning of exercises. And in the evening, from 1800 hours to taps, also "support" the carrying out of the daily schedule. And on days off, in addition, they must supervise the going on leave in the city and admit those who have been on leave, that is, remain at the unit until midnight.

To put it briefly, the "supports" replace the company sergeant majors who are on duty in the subunits, and in essence work for them. With such organization, certain company sergeant majors and junior commanders remove themselves from carrying out their immediate proper duties.

Instructors of the training labs are also assigned as "supports," and this in no way contributes to the planning of their work in the area of improving the training process and the training facilities.

In addition, in our unit one other unique detail has been established, duty for housing where the personnel is quartered. More accurately, this is termed assistant unit duty officer for housing. He is appointed in addition to the assistant duty officer provided for in the regulations. His duties are not defined by the instructions, and the detail was introduced at one time "temporarily, for establishing order," and thus took root. And it also has been a burden on the warrant officers. The "second" assistant has the task of walking through the quarters and making certain "that everything is in order." That is, he also takes over for the subunit duty officers, the company sergeant majors and junior commanders.

I have repeatedly voiced my perplexity on this question to the company commander, to his deputy for political affairs and the unit commander, but have not received a definite answer. It seems I merely angered them by my questions....

Incidentally, in the neighboring unit there is no such procedure and order has in no way suffered there. On the contrary, in competing with us, this collective often leads in the competition.

10272
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COMMANDER OF CENTRAL ASIAN M.D. ON NIGHT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen P. Lushev, commander of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Night Battle"]

[Text] The conditions under which the battalion commanded by Capt V. Malinevskiy had to carry out the mission given by the regimental commander were rather difficult. The motorized rifle troops were to advance in the mountains at night. On the one hand, darkness favored them, as at night, as is known, it is easier to achieve concealment of maneuvers and surprise of attack, and for the defending troops it is more difficult than during the day to determine the actual forces of the advancing troops, their grouping and the direction of the attack.... But, on the other hand, the night created a number of additional difficulties for the advancing troops. The conditions of terrain orientation were much more complicated, it was more difficult to control the subunits, to maneuver the forces and means, and to maintain their coordination. And since this was an exercise with field firing, the battalion commander was confronted with still another difficult task, that is, under the conditions of limited visibility to use the weapons with maximum effectiveness.

Let us immediately point out that in this most crucial stage of training combat the battalion performed well. Moreover, Capt Malinevskiy was able to carry out the mission, having maintained his reserve which was committed to battle at dawn for exploitation. What helped the battalion commander under such difficult conditions to ensure the dependable fire attack against the "enemy"?

First of all the high field skills of the subunit and the readiness of the motorized rifle troops to carry out the difficult combat training missions under any situation. Certainly an important role was played by the personal skill of Capt Malinevskiy and the other battalion officers. In organizing the night battle, they literally thought out their every step. And under conditions of limited visibility, this is particularly important.

For example, let us take such a question as the organization of the battle formation. As is known, both during the day and at night, it cannot remain fixed. But in each individual instance the commander's plan for battle without fail remains the basis of the formation. In the given instance, the plan of Capt Malinevskiy came down to making a strong surprise initial strike against the "enemy," and carry out the night's mission in the shortest time, without any change of formation and without committing the reserve to battle in darkness. The achieving of this aim was best achieved by a single echelon formation with the assigning of a reserve. And the battle formation was formed up in this manner. The battalion commander positioned the attached weapons in direct proximity behind the battle formations of the companies, in the spaces between them and on the flanks. For more dependable cover of the tanks, depending upon the situation, the motorized rifle troops advanced directly behind them, between them and in front. All of this, combined with skillful control of the subunits in the course of combat and the effective use of the night vision instruments and illuminants, led to success.

The night is an ally of the clever. This truth is affirmed by the daily life of the troops which is full of field exercises, tactical exercises, and field firings, a significant portion of which is conducted at night. Practice has affirmed that modern night combat--be it an offensive or defensive--requires particularly high skills from the personnel. In addition to the designated circumstances which influence the actions of the troops under conditions of limited visibility, one must not discard, for example, the fact that at night a person experiences increased fatigue, his activeness is reduced, and vigilance dulled.

As the first months of the winter training season showed, in a majority of the district formations and units, the task of improving night training was successfully handled. A question of constant concern for the commander and the staff is the improving of the procedures for organizing and conducting the nighttime exercises and training, for example, in the guards Rezhitsa Motorized Rifle Division imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Maj Gen I. V. Panfilov. In preparing to properly celebrate the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, the guards motorized rifle troops each day have increased their efforts in combat training. The training level of the personnel for nighttime actions here is considered one of the most important indicators for the combat readiness of the subunits. And such an approach has proven effective.

On this level there is much that is instructive in the motorized rifle regiment under the command of Guards Lt Col V. Musiyenko. Here, in all the exercises and training sessions, the personnel masters the skills of orientation in a mountain desert terrain, following a compass, and crossing various mountain obstacles, and they learn to make full use of the capabilities of the equipment and weapons, and in particular to employ illuminants and night vision instruments, and conduct reconnaissance. The corresponding facilities have been set up in the regiment for this.

The artillery training school, the moving target gunnery ranges for the infantry combat vehicles and tanks, and the troop firing range are equipped in such a manner that the subunit commanders do not have to waste time and energy, as still, unfortunately, occurs in certain units, on converting the training facilities from daytime to nighttime conditions. The automation of the target fields makes it possible for the commanders in the course of the exercises to create a difficult tactical situation, and to teach subordinates precise firing under conditions which are as close as possible to actual combat, using both the conventional and nighttime sights. Here the light and sound simulators, the infrared searchlights used for designating and illuminating the targets are always ready for use. Special attachments make it possible to illuminate the terrain if firing is carried out without using the night vision instruments.

At the same time, it must be said that in organizing the training process, certain commanders clearly underestimate the importance of nighttime exercises and training. And hence all sorts of oversimplification and weaknesses in training which are immediately felt as soon as the personnel is put under difficult conditions. The following episode comes to mind. In one of the exercises, the tank battalion under the command of Capt V. Novosadov, at the end of the day, was given the mission to take a line which was tactically advantageous. In all the previous stages of the exercise, the battalion had performed well, and scarcely anyone doubted that now the tank troops, in pursuing the retreating "enemy," would rapidly move up to the designated line. However, the hopes for success were not justified. With the onset of darkness, the battalion was literally unrecognizable. Having lost visual contact between themselves and being poorly trained in orientation under nighttime conditions, the crews were forced to sharply reduce the pace of the offensive. The "enemy" succeeded in escaping from pursuit and dug in on a favorable line.

One of the reasons that the battalion was able to rapidly shift from daytime actions to nighttime was that the subunit personnel was little trained for nighttime combat. The tank troops had been rarely trained in driving the vehicles off the roads, over unknown terrain, as columns under conditions of limited visibility. Nor did they have the required skills of using the night vision instruments.

In the range of measures to prepare the troops for nighttime actions, an important place is held by developing their high moral fighting qualities, and this is a question of constant concern for the commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations. One of the ways for carrying out this task is to use frontline experience. For example, in unit X, many field exercises, including nighttime ones, start with a description of how the Soviet soldiers fought in similar situations during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Often before leaving for the tactical field, the firing range or the tank driving range, the motorized rifle troops were shown documentary and training films which related frontline experience. All of this had a positive effect in the actions of the men, the heirs of the military glory of their fellow servicemen.

In speaking about the use of frontline experience in training the units and subunits for nighttime operations, at the same time I would like to caution certain comrades against rote duplication. Experience brings benefit when it is applied creatively, considering the specific conditions and the increased capabilities of the weapons.

For example, it is known that the work of a commander in organizing night combat under present-day conditions encompasses a whole range of special questions related to the use of equipment and weapons. For this reason, the commanders are given very important help in preparing for night combat by the chiefs of the branches of troops and services. As an example, here one might mention such specialists as Majs N. Silkin and I. Makarov, and Capt A. Avramenko. Each of them in his own area thoroughly goes into the questions of improving the field skills of the subunits, and in particular, their readiness for nighttime actions.

At the same time there are instances of another sort. Recently at a session of our district's military council, there was a sharp discussion of the shortcomings in the nighttime training of the subunits in one of the regiments. An inspection had shown that here nighttime exercises were often carried out under simplified conditions. Without having the necessary procedural skills, the exercise leaders, particularly from among the junior officers, at times wasted time. There were serious flaws in the planning of nighttime exercises. The chiefs of the regimental branches of forces and services were very rarely at these exercises. For example, it is no accident that the questions of combat support for the subunits under nighttime conditions here are a stumbling block for certain officers.

Unfortunately, there are also similar shortcomings in certain other units. Measures are being taken to eliminate them. The district staff officers are also contributing to this. With their help, in a number of garrisons, procedural conferences have been held devoted to the problems of improving the quality and efficiency of nighttime troop training. Control has been strengthened over the carrying out of the combat training plans in the units and the use of the training facilities. In particular, we have seen to it that each nighttime firing and tank firing exercise end with the working through of fire control questions on the subunit level using the night vision instruments and communications. Widely used in the troops is the experience of the moral-psychological preparation of the troops for actions in night combat as acquired in the Alma-Ata Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Mar SU I. S. Konev.

Certainly, we do not intend to limit ourselves to what we have done. The work of improving nighttime training of the troops is continuing, and in the final stage of the winter training period is assuming ever-greater concreteness. We see in this one of the important factors in raising combat readiness.

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INSPECTING OFFICER: DUTIES, QUALIFICATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Maj M. Ziyemin'sh of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "The Inspector"]

[Excerpts] Outside the railway car window was a plain cut by islands of birch groves and dotted with intricate fingers of rivers. Then the tracks ran along the ridges of high hills, and over them you could barely see a fragment of whitish-blue sky. The hills suddenly dropped away, and a low swampy brush began. The grey telephone poles flashed by.

My neighbor in the compartment was Col Stepan Illarionovich Rodin, an inspector from the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District. To the rhythm of the wheels, he slowly and reflectively shared his thoughts and described his work.

An official trip. Nature in the Far East is unique, isn't it? I have spent many years traveling here, and I know each piece, you can say, by heart. And also the caprices of nature here. Over there a small river is shining with ice still in the willows. The soldiers jokingly call it "Spit-Across." It is harmless in appearance, but when it floods it can show such an obstinate nature you had best beware! Last autumn it was raging: it ripped enormous sheaves of hay away and uprooted trees. And that is your "Spit-Across!"

Why did I take my raincoat? Over the years it has become a habit. What else can we do? It is not in Khabarovsk, but where we are going it is either freezing or a heavy rain. From this alone you can feel the scope of the district.

I, of course, understand your curiosity. In actuality, the word "inspector" has a special affect on some. I recall once I was arriving in a city where the unit was located. I looked out and saw a group of officers standing on the platform. Who, I wondered, were they meeting? It turned out, me.... In the evening they told me that I would be staying not in the garrison hotel but rather in the city hotel, where there was a deluxe room with a television set and radio phonograph. I was led to understand that

I didn't need to be concerned about dinner, everything was ready in the room, and it was waiting in the refrigerator. Of course I had to remind the comrades of certain obvious party truths, give a proper evaluation to both the "collective" meeting and to all these "troubles." But to no good. They were endeavoring, although jokingly, to judge everything in their own way, thinking "You obviously have come for negative material...."

And why do we come? In order to better help in organizing things. I recently met an officer on an official trip. He introduced himself: "Maj Yefimov, Instructor of the Political Department." I felt here was a familiar and unfamiliar man. I was interested whether he was the same Yefimov who was the deputy battalion commander for political affairs in a certain regiment. Yes, he was, he replied. And then I recalled his name: Ivan Ivanovich. Several years previously fate had brought us together. In the battalion things were not going so well, particularly with discipline. I asked him then what he was doing to rectify the situation. He replied: "We are raising questions...we are drawing attention...." That was his style. At that time we worked together for several days, and I endeavored to teach him everything that I knew and could do. Now it is pleasant to think that I helped him in some way, and that he has grown into an intelligent worker.

Position. Once I was asked: How does one become an inspector? Here I felt that the young political worker who was speaking saw only the "prestige" aspect of our work. I began to go through the stages of my service in my mind. And so I said: Before becoming an inspector, I was the commander of a tank platoon, the secretary of a battalion Komsomol organization, assistant chief of a political department for Komsomol affairs, deputy battalion commander for political affairs, secretary of the party committee and deputy regimental commander for political affairs, instructor of the political department.... I described this and watched as the other person was somewhat dubious as to what I was saying. He obviously expected that this path would have been shorter. No, here one must go through a lot....

The train reached its destination. Work was awaiting Col Rodin. Restless, interesting and very important, the ordinary work of an inspector of the political directorate.

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TROOP CONTROL IN COMBAT: IMPORTANCE EMPHASIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Control in Combat"]

[Text] New weapons and equipment have led to profound changes in the nature of combat, and in the methods of conducting it on the land, in the air and at sea. Under the conditions where the opposing sides employ unprecedentedly powerful weapons and with the exceptionally rapid and dynamic nature of combat which develops over an enormous expanse, the importance of firm control of the troops and naval forces has risen sharply. The effectiveness of control has become a most important indicator for the combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship.

The practice of tactical exercises has convinced us that success comes to the commanders who best get their bearings in difficult situations, who rapidly take sound decisions, and impose their will on the "enemy," forcing him to act under unfavorable conditions. Recently in combat training, the motorized rifle troops of the battalion under the command of Maj V. Bicheyev distinguished themselves. The commander and the staff organized effective reconnaissance and they calculated several possible variations of "enemy" actions. They attacked where the "enemy" was not expecting this, they neutralized its antitank weapons with heavy fire, and impeded the committing of the reserve to battle on time. In the depth of the defenses, Maj Bicheyev quickly adjusted the missions for the companies which had been assigned and were supporting the subunits. The high efficiency of the commander and his ability to effectively use equipment were particularly apparent at the moment the battalion crossed an area of minefields and obstacles. The continuous, flexible and concealed control of the subunit provided a high rate of advance and the successful execution of the mission.

Responsibility for directing the combat of the subunit, unit or ship is entrusted to the commander. His plan is the basis for control in combat. The outcome of combat depends largely upon to what degree the plan corresponds to the situation, and upon the ability of the commander to firmly and unswervingly carry it out, and to make the necessary adjustments in his plan. The plans are a concentrated reflection of the professional skill of the officer, his erudition and his moral-political and volitional qualities.

In modern combat only a commander is on top of the situation when he possesses a broad military viewpoint, he flawlessly knows the combat capabilities, the tactics and equipment of his own troops and the enemy's and has mastered the Marxist-Leninist methodology.

Starting with the battalion, command is the purposeful, creative activity of a broad range of persons including the deputy commanders, the staff officers, the chiefs of the branches of forces and services, the flagship specialists and the political workers. The art of a commander, as a solely-responsible commander, consists in the ability to use the knowledge and experience of everyone who is involved in control, to direct their efforts at the precise realization of his plan, and to achieve smooth collective work.

In the system of control, the role of the staffs is particularly great. The range of information needed by a commander for a correct assessment of the situation and for decision taking is continuously increasing, while the time for collecting, transmitting and processing this information is dropping. The staff is the support for the commander also in carrying out complete support for combat, in organizing and maintaining coordination of the subunits of the various branches of troops, and control over the carrying out of the missions given to them. The teamwork of a staff, as a control body, is an essential condition for high efficiency in troop and naval leadership. In tactical headquarters exercises and the staff training sessions, it is essential to constantly improve the style of work of the staffs, and to achieve from each staff officer the expert performance of his functional duties, the readiness to take over for a comrade, and assume command of the subunit.

Modern combat also places high demands upon the chiefs of the branches of troops and services and the flagship specialists. They must have a good knowledge not only of special questions. but also the principles for organizing and conducting combat as a whole, they must be able to control subordinate subunits and take independent decisions within the overall plan.

An important facet of troop command in combat is the ability to anticipate the enemy in opening fire, in executing a maneuver, and to gain time. The best plan loses any sense if it is late in being set or is not promptly given to the executors. In this regard, particular attention should be given to the rational combining of the processes involved in studying the mission, evaluating the decision, taking and drawing up the decision, and assigning missions. There has been a marked rise in the role of the preliminary battle orders which make it possible to conduct preparations for combat in parallel in several levels of control.

The interests of increasing the efficiency of troop leadership necessitate further automation and mechanization of control activities and the broader use of computers. In the primary control elements, support should be given to the use of nomograms, graphs, tables and other auxiliary means which accelerate commander calculations. The giving of orders to executors by delivering tape recordings with the instructions of the commander and the equipping of control points with automatic devices for transmitting important information, signals and commands, as well as technical devices for observing the battlefield are questions which are assuming ever-greater urgency.

Control in combat is carried out using the means of communications, and primarily radio. The reliability of control to a large degree depends upon how well the officers know the capabilities of communications equipment, and are able to use the tables which provide concealed control in calls. The commanders and staffs should be ready to work under the conditions of active radio countermeasures by the enemy, and along with radio be able to use wire, signal and mobile means of communications.

Control is a two-way process. No matter how well it is organized by a commander or staff, success comes only in the instance that the personnel is thoroughly ready for combat. An improvement in control is inseparably linked with a rise in the field, air and sea skills of the personnel, the combat teamwork of the subunit, unit or ship crew.

Purposeful and diverse forms of party political work have an enormous influence on the effectiveness of control. It is essential to constantly teach the military personnel modern methods of control, and indoctrinate them using examples of a truly scientific approach to the problems of control. The commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations must instill in the men courage, initiative and a readiness to steadfastly endure the hardships of a combat situation, and ensure the high moral-political state of each military collective.

The winter combat training is entering its concluding stage. Soon the troops and the fleet will receive the results of the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. To further raise the quality of control and to find ways for accelerating tactical calculations and to find the methods for a scientific basis of the decisions being taken and for carrying them out--all this means to bring about a further rise in the combat readiness of the units and ships.

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COMBINED-ARMS SCHOOL TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Yu. Mikhaylenko, staff officer at the Red Banner Northern Caucasus Military District: "The Level of Readiness"]

[Text] It grows dark quickly in the mountains. With dusk, the lights went on at the firing range of the Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Mar SU A. I. Yeremenko. And soon thereafter machine gun bursts were heard. It was the senior officer candidates who were working on an exercise.

While the first shift was firing, the remainder trained at the rear of the firing range. At this training point the leader of the exercise was platoon commander Sr Lt Ye. Kosarev. Regardless of the drizzling rain, the officer candidates acted confidently and quickly. But, it seemed to me, without any particular enthusiasm. You could feel that the frequent repetition of the long familiar procedures bored them.

"Why are you carrying out the same exercise if it has been well mastered?" I asked the officer.

"It is planned in the schedule drawn up by the senior instructor, Lt Col Samoylenko," he replied.

"And why not appoint one of the officer candidates as the leader of training? He should be gaining procedural skills."

They immediately decided to try it out. The first to act as commander was Sgt A. Khir'yakov. He did not handle the job. In truth, for the sake of justice, it must be pointed out that it was a complete surprise for him to take the role of leader, and he had been given no time to prepare. But a senior officer candidate should be able to correctly define the aim of an exercise, correctly isolate the basic questions, and correctly demonstrate the sequence of executing the procedures for preparing to fire.

This instance was not the only one. Here is what was written by a unit commander about the graduate of the same school, Lt V. Kalyakin: "He has a low level of procedural techniques...." The same shortcoming was noted in the responses about the graduates of the Novocherkassk Higher Military Command Signals School imeni Mar SU V. D. Sokolovskiy such as Lts A. Yurchenko and M. Kirsanov. And this was after 4 years spent in the military school....

Of course, it cannot be excluded that the guilty parties in all of this are the officer candidates themselves who have not given proper attention to mastering educational procedures. But they are not to blame alone. And to show this, let us return to the exercise with which our article started.

Was it an accident that Lt Col V. Samoylenko appointed the platoon commander the leader of the exercise and not a senior officer candidate? Evidently not. Both the instructor and the subunit commander were concerned primarily with checking how ready were the officer candidates to excel at the forthcoming exams for the personal ability to fire at a target accurately. But the question of whether they were capable of teaching this to future subordinates was automatically moved to the background. Certainly other, special exercises exist for acquiring procedural skills and for studying the bases of military pedagogics and psychology.

As strange as it may seem, this viewpoint which in my view is profoundly erroneous is sometimes supported by certain instructors. And this concerns not only the questions related to the mastery of educational procedures. It is no secret that individual graduates from the military schools are not able to fully utilize the capabilities of the military equipment, they experience definite difficulties in organizing its operation, and feel uncertain and uneasy in commanding a platoon in tactical exercises.

There are many reasons for this. But the main one, we feel, is that certain instructors in military schools do not consider it possible to grant the officer candidates fully acceptable and moreover extremely necessary independence. They, to put it figuratively, try to teach a person to swim without letting him get into the water. Practice convincingly shows that this is precisely the case. I will mention an exercise at which I happen to be present.

The officer candidates were working in the field. They were working on an important and interesting subject "The March and Meeting Engagement of a Motorized Rifle Battalion." The trainees in turn playing the role of the commander of the point of vanguard evaluated the situation, took a decision and gave orders to subordinates. And one was struck that some of the future officers, for example, Officer Candidates A. Bezuglyy and T. Dzukayev, did everything very cautiously, glancing at the instructor Maj V. Bykov. It was as if they were waiting constantly for suggestions or advice.

No, precisely at this exercise under discussion there was no excessive interference by Maj Bykov. Noted. But, on the other hand, the habit of "looking for help" obviously did not appear spontaneously. Hence, previously, in previous courses, the trainees were constantly backed up and were not allowed to take a step independently. And if one reflects, is this not because the focus is put on the evaluation as such, and not the actual degree of readiness of the future officers to carry out those complicated duties which will lie on their shoulders after completing the school?

Certainly there will be no hints in combat or even in the daily exercises which the future lieutenants must conduct with the soldiers and sergeants. And success in service will be determined not so much by the grades or evaluations obtained in the graduating exams as by the ability to employ previously acquired knowledge in practice. This must never be forgotten.

It need not be said that the instilling of commander skills and confidence in one's forces and the indoctrination of independence and high responsibility for the punctual and creative fulfillment of service duties are a complicated, painstaking and protracted process. For precisely this reason, the emphasis should not be put solely on tours of duty in the troops or exercises in the last year.

How should this essential work be better organized? The answer to this question can be obtained right in the same Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Mar SU A. I. Yeremenko. The chair headed by Col I. Sokolinskiy has acquired a good deal of experience in this regard.

As an example, let us take the style of work of one of the most experienced pedagogues, Col N. Onopchenko. He has the rule: from the very first year, put the officer candidates in the position of instructors. Initially, he proposes that a certain simple question be explained to comrades. Then, a more complicated one. And, finally, he entrusts them with the conducting of entire firing lessons. And all the persons present at the exercises are involved in assessing and analyzing the actions of the leader.

Or take the officer candidate battalion under the command of Lt Col A. Belozor. Here, each company or platoon commander maintains permanent contacts with the instructors. The development of the future officers has become their common concern. And this gives rise to beneficial initiative and combined search. For example, on the eve of a tour of duty, a competition is held in the subunit for the best educator. And this helps the officer candidates to prepare better for it.

Incidentally, I would like to particularly talk about a tour of duty. It is of primary significance for the development of a future commander. And nevertheless, sufficiently serious preparations are not always made for this. And certain commanders of units in which the officer candidates are to do their tour of duty, judging from everything, have an attitude toward this important and responsible stage of training, which, to put it mildly, is formal.

On what basis is this conclusion drawn? One might take even those grades which are given in the units to the officer candidates on tours of duty. Isn't it strange that in the schools they have become so accustomed to high grades for a tour of duty, that if less than 80-90 percent fail to receive excellent grades this is considered an extraordinary event? It turns out that for no other discipline is a five [the highest grade] given so easily as for a tour of duty, that comprehensive examination of readiness for officer service.

And here the highest exactingness is required. As well as objectivity. A poor service is rendered to the future officers in those units and subunits where they are given an unique "advance."

...The checking of commander maturity in the future officers is occurring even now. It is occurring in the exercises and tactical training. And it is essential to do everything possible so that each of them increases the degree of readiness of the school graduates for pending service in the troops.

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BOOK REVIEW: SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF TROOP UNIT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 80 p 2

[Review by Maj Gen Avn V. Serebryannikov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, of the book "Sotsialisticheskiy Voinskiy Kollektiv. Sotsiologicheskiy Ocherk" (The Socialist Military Collective. A Sociological Essay), by V. Kovalev, Voyenizdat, 1980, 238 pages]

[Text] Under present-day conditions there has been a continuous rise in the importance and role of military collectives in the life and activities of the army and navy. Naturally this subject has attracted close attention by scientists who are studying the psychology of the collective, as well as by commanders, political workers and all our army community. The number of publications devoted to this important problem has been added to with the new book by V. Kovalev entitled "Sotsialisticheskiy Voinskiy Kollektiv." The military collective is viewed by the author as a cell of a socialist society and the Soviet Armed Forces. For this reason, in the given instance it is completely justified to have the broad sociohistorical background against which the appearance of a modern military collective is sketched. Equally important is the analysis contained in the book of those traits which bring together the labor and military collectives, disclosing the roots common to them and the ideological-political, economic and socio-organizational bases of their vital activities. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrinational Work" orients Soviet scientists and practical workers to precisely such an all-inclusive approach to studying the role and functions of the socialist collective in the life of our society.

At the same time, the military collective is a specific social organism, the main function of which is to provide for the successful military training activities of the personnel and a strengthening of the might and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The book thoroughly analyzes the particular features of modern military labor in terms of those specific tasks which one or another subunits must carry out. Scientific and technical progress, having brought about the saturating of the troops with complex military equipment, to a decisive degree has transformed the nature of military labor, the principles of its organization, and the methods of training the personnel. Naturally, all of this poses for the military collective new problems which require profound research. Several of them are sufficiently well taken up in the book. In particular, there is the fruitful attempt by the author to define and analyze the principles of social control of the military collective under the various conditions of its activities.

We all know how profound the changes have been in recent years in the social makeup of the personnel of the Armed Forces, and in raising its ideological-political maturity, its general educational and cultural level. In this regard the book reviews the questions of the improving of political indoctrination in military collectives, and points out the ways for their further spiritual unification and the establishing of a healthy moral-political climate. Particular attention is given to the role of the party and Komsomol aktiv in carrying out these tasks.

An indisputable contribution by the author of the reviewed book is his desire not only to disclose the specific mechanism for the formation, development and functioning of military collectives on the basis of extensive research material, but also to formulate certain very general concepts in the theory of a socialist military collective.

However, probably of greatest interest for the reader is the analysis given in the book of the social relationships and processes in the primary military collectives. This analysis is based on materials from concrete sociological research conducted with the author's participation in the subunits and units. Precisely they add to the theoretical research on the problem those living shadings which make it possible to speak of the social portrait of a modern military collective as an integral organism.

The Soviet Army and Navy are a school of life, a school of maturity, patriotism and comradeship. Using convincing concrete sociological material and instructive examples and facts from the life of the units and subunits, the book poses the problems of indoctrinational work of the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations, and indicates the ways for solving them.

Of course, in making a first attempt to sketch in a general social portrait of a military collective, the author has far from exhausted the entire range of questions. For example, one would like to see in the book a fuller description of the methods of social control of a military collective, and become familiar with the concrete experience of solving this complicated problem under various conditions of troop activities, particularly in a situation of troop exercises and maneuvers. In our view, the role of the military collective in the socialist competition could have been more fully brought out, in particular, in carrying out the tasks of the moral indoctrination of the personnel in the process of military service.

Incidentally, a solution to all of these questions which are timely for the life of our military collectives could scarcely be carried out in one book. And the very posing of these questions and the drawing of the attention of scientists and practical workers to them are an indisputable achievement of the given publication.

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LETTERS HOME: SOLDIERS' ATTITUDES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Filatov: "Letters Home, The Military Publicist's Column"]

[Text] First about letters to the editor: once in a while one of them flashes by airing a complaint, expressing alarm and making a request all at the same time. One such letter came from Voroshilovgrad. A soldier's parents are writing: how many months it's been since they've received any letters from their son; maybe something's happened to him; maybe he's fallen ill; why don't we hear anything from him; help us find out.... Commanders and political personnel also frequently receive letters like this. Then they call the soldier in for a talk, and at that point it usually turns out that he has nothing to say when they ask him why he only infrequently writes his parents.

It has been pointed out that soldiers in their second year of service are most often at fault in this regard. These have all found a secure place within their military collectives; life in the service has become easier for them; they have found good friends and comrades; and there remains no trace of the melancholy prevailing during their first months in the service. All this is understandable, but it can in no way justify neglect of their parents. The soldier is far from home. It is entirely natural that his people at home begin to worry and get upset if they don't have any news from him. But a soldier has at home more than his papa and mama; he also has his other relatives, his friends and his comrades from work and school. So periods that go by without any letters from him frequently become subjects of discussion by everybody, as they say, all together. It's as if a purely personal matter--a soldier's letter home, in this instance--takes, if you will, something of a social aspect.

Commanders and political personnel also focus much concern on the individual soldier: they have to feed him and put clothes on him, toughen his mind and body and teach him his combat skills and know-how. And among these other concerns it is by no means superfluous for them to take an interest in whether or not a soldier is writing letters home. This should be looked upon as one of the forms of training activity. A soldier's letter home is both a letter from the army and a letter about the army.

The military journalist sometimes has occasion to visit families which have sent their sons off to active duty. It never fails that at some point in the course of the conversation there appears on the table a bundle of letters and photographs their son has sent home. They will sort them out and go over them aloud. And then they always have to tell you that they're saving these letters until their son comes home from the army and that they and the photographs are memories, precious memories....

In speaking to a soldier about how many letters he writes home a week or a month, we also ought to speak about what it is he writes home. This is, of course, a delicate, intimate matter; but that doesn't at all mean that we shouldn't deal with it. In the mail I get from different commanders, I have had more than one occasion to read downright panicky letters from parents. As a rule, a mama has enclosed with her letter one she has received from her soldier-son. He has told such "horror stories" in it about his life in the service that his poor mama involuntarily shed a tear. So of course there's panic at home: what is it that's happening to their little boy? But upon investigation it turns out that nothing at all is happening; everything is as it should be. The young man simply wants to look like a real hero in the eyes of his relatives and acquaintances, but he doesn't give any thought to the consequences.

So the parents begin to worry; then they get themselves ready and they go to the unit to visit their son. Or they begin to get packages ready or to send money orders, although all these things prove to be entirely unnecessary.

Commanders and political personnel have skillfully to develop in a soldier a sense of personal responsibility for his every step, his every action and his every word, including those he writes in his letters home. For those to whom he is writing he is the embodiment of our entire army. His letters can instill pride in it, but they can also create a false, erroneous image of military service.

To speak of a soldier's letters home from the army is also to speak of his ability to preserve military secrets. The military weapons and equipment a soldier studies and works at mastering of course strike his imagination; everything here is new to him. He wants to share his impressions with his parents and others close to him. But to "share" in this instance is to violate his military oath. For the fact is that in taking the oath, each man swore to be a vigilant fighting man and strictly to preserve military and state secrets. From the very beginning of his military service his commander and the political personnel who work with him must make clear to a soldier how to write letters home from his military unit, what he can put in them, and what he cannot.

It seems to me that the letters our fathers wrote home from the front will always remain models of what a soldier's letters home should be like. What intelligent caution, in the sense, that is, of maintaining military secrecy, they contained; what delicacy, tact and kindness they showed toward those to whom they were addressed; what good-natured courage and optimism, what modesty, reserve and discretion in reference to those writing them: these letters will always remain noble, exalted documents for us, testimony to the nobility, courage, valor and vigilance of the fighting man.

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BACHELOR OFFICERS' QUARTERS: CONDITIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Bachelor Officers' Quarters"]

[Text] The regular day of intense combat training drew to a close in the Guards Twice Order-Winning Fighter Aviation Regiment. Free from service, the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] head for home. The men need a good rest, to devote time to household matters and to prepare for tomorrow's exercises and flights. For those who still have not established a family, the regimental bachelor officers' quarters have become such a home where the stress of the workday is thrown off and all the necessary domestic conditions have been provided.

Seemingly even the very attractive appearance of the small two-story building under the old pines would have a beneficial influence on the mood of a person. He enters a silent hall decorated with flowers and relief work, and is in a cozy room, where in spite of his fatigue, there is a desire to talk over the events of the day with one's comrades, to devote a little time to music, artistic literature and sports, and then set down to his outline or textbook. It is also good that the classrooms are in the same building, the recreational room inclines one to spirited conversation, and the sports field is nearby.

In order that everything is precisely thus here a great deal had to be done by the regimental commander Guards Col I. Valuyskiy, his deputies, the rear service workers and those who live in the BOQ. The everyday life and leisure of the young officers and warrant officers are constantly in the view of the regimental party and Komsomol organizations. And such constant concern for the men is one of the important conditions in the steady successes of the flyers in combat development and in strengthening discipline and order.

In the army and navy there are many BOQ where, along with a broad range of domestic services, the residents have opportunities for interesting and useful recreation. Among them are the BOQ headed by the employees of the Soviet Army and Navy T. Artemtsev, M. Makarov, L. Sokolov and others. The commanders, political workers, the leaders and specialists of the housing operations bodies and other services are well aware that the ensuring of the high combat readiness of the units and ships and the level of discipline and organization in them are closely related to satisfying the material and domestic needs of the personnel. They see to it that in the BOQ there is room for everyone who needs it, and each BOQ has become a model of high culture and efficient services.

The army-wide conference on improving the domestic conditions of the troops pointed to the need for such work, for paternal attention by officials to the needs of subordinates and to their quartering. Close and constant attention has been given to implementing the recommendations of the conference. But, unfortunately, in a number of garrisons the BOQ still cannot accept all the men needing housing, and in some places the BOQ do not meet the demands made on them, and they lack proper order. The editors have received complaints that the BOQ's lack recreational and domestic self-service rooms, kitchens, showers, and storerooms for the personal effects of the residents, and about interruptions in the supply of heat, water and electric power. "The several days spent in the BOQ of the Kiev Higher Military Engineering Air School left a lamentable impression on me," wrote Sr Lt I. Voronov to the editors. "It was as if nothing had ever been repaired here, as the roof was leaking, the walls were cracked and it was unpleasant to enter the lavatories...."

As checks have shown, a predominant majority of the shortcomings in the operation of the BOQ is related to the inefficiency of officials and an unsatisfactory organization of the question. Certain commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists are infrequent guests in the BOQ's, and do not know of the daily needs and requests of the men. For these reasons, a number of the BOQ's in the Odessa Military District for a long time were not provided with the necessary furniture. Many inconveniences which were encountered by the Transbaykal officers in the BOQ where N. Maydanik was in charge were eliminated only after intervention by the superior political body.

One is struck by the fact that in a number of military districts, clearly insufficient funds are allocated for the construction of new BOQ and for providing amenities in the existing ones, although money does exist for this. The BOQ's are often put up and reconstructed with deviations from the standard plans, and this reduces their possibilities for providing domestic conveniences and services for the residents. In the general housing construction program, these projects at times are not designated specifically, and the need for them is not always determined accurately. The commanders, the staffs, the construction and housing operations bodies must eliminate these shortcomings and carry out the planned work at the designated time and with high quality.

The BOQ is not merely a roof over one's head. Here a definite moral microclimate is formed in which the interests, the needs and habits of the men are shaped. It is important that the situation in the BOQ contribute to the professional and cultural growth of the young officers and warrant officers, and have a positive effect on their moral qualities.

The BOQ councils have an important role to play in creating such a situation. The commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations must direct their work. They should help the young officers and warrant officers improve their own life, organize recreation, and bring up each instance of unworthy conduct by a fellow serviceman for public discussion. The correct way is where the questions of domestic service amenities for the servicemen are regularly reviewed at service conferences and at party and Komsomol meetings, where indoctrination of the men is carried out not only during working hours but also at the place of residence.

The review competitions of the BOQ's conducted in the military districts, troop groups and fleets are an important incentive in mobilizing the men and resources for a further improvement of the BOQ's. The next results of such review competitions will be given by the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. It is important that attention paid to such measures not lessen, that all the BOQ's participate in them, and that the experience of the best becomes available to all who work and live in the BOQ's.

To a good degree the mood, work efficiency, and successes in training and service depend upon how the everyday life of the young officer or warrant officer is set up and how his leisure is organized. The commanders, the political bodies, the rear services and all the Army and Navy community must be constantly concerned with the situation in the BOQ's, and see to it that they meet their purpose.

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POLITICAL TRAINING: PARTY MEETING PROCEDURES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 80 p 2

[Interview with Gen Arm S. P. Vasyagin, chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces: "In a Leninist, Communist Manner"]

[Text] The Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy are preparing to worthily celebrate the important date of the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin. During these times, in the units, ships and military schools, open party meetings are being held with the agenda "To Live, Work and Struggle in the Leninist, Communist Manner."

This major event in the life of the military collectives was described in a talk with our correspondent by the member of the military council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces, Gen Arm S. P. Vasyagin.

[Question] During these days all the workers of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces have been present in the military units at the open party meetings. What, in your view, Comrade General of the Army, are the most characteristic features of these meetings that can be pointed out?

[Answer] First of all I would like to emphasize that the meetings are being held in a situation of a high political upsurge. Particular enthusiasm is inherent to them. The mood of the people, the reports and speeches--everything shows that the communists, the Komsomol members and all the men are endeavoring to properly celebrate the 110th birthday of the founder of our party, V. I. Lenin.

However, and this must be stressed particularly, the solemnity of the meetings is organically combined with their professional nature. The persons giving the reports and the speakers, in talking about the fundamental tasks in the combat training and indoctrination of the men and about the vanguard role of the communists, view the work of their party organization, each member and candidate party member from the position of Leninist principledness and Leninist exactingness. They show an exacting attitude to what has been achieved.

Another circumstance is also important. The communists are carrying out the discussion in the presence of nonparty persons. And how they are settling their questions, how responsibly they view what has been done and clearly see their tasks--the authority of the political vanguard in the military collective also depends on this. To the honor of a predominant majority of the party members and candidate members, they have been up to the Leninist demand of placing the strictest requirements on themselves, regardless of whether it is an issue of the involvement of each in the ideological life of the party organization, the socialist competition or the struggle to master military equipment. This is why the Leninist party meetings are good political and moral schooling not only for the communists. They have become the model of the attitude toward a job, toward one's duties for all the members of the military collectives. Naturally, some party organizations have succeeded more in this and others less.

[Question] Obviously a great deal depends upon the preparations for the meetings.

[Answer] I would say not a great deal but rather virtually everything. Even if you take the most militant party organization in which an atmosphere of mutual exactingness has long been firmly established, this still does not mean that such a meeting will be carried out on a proper level without carefully thought out preparatory work. We have long been convinced that the meetings are conducted in the most organized, meaningful and active manner where the preparatory period has been rationally utilized. A majority of the party bodies act correctly in starting with extensive explanatory work. The party organization secretaries are instructed in detail, the persons giving the reports are given specific aid, and colloquiums are conducted with the communists, for example, on such subjects as "Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," "The Leninist Style of Work," and others. Thus the communists better understand the aim of the meetings, and they see more clearly how Lenin's theoretical ideas and Lenin's requirements are organically linked with those tasks which the military collective is carrying out.

It is important that all the organizational questions are thought through carefully. For example, party veterans have participated in the work of many meetings. This, of course, is important in and of itself. Precisely the speeches by the veterans focus the meeting participants on a serious discussion of the succession of generations of communism, and on preserving and adding to the revolutionary and military traditions. Of course, a respected person could be invited and asked to speak. But it is even better if the veteran in his speech focuses attention on the questions which are particularly urgent for the collective at present, and views them from the heights of his experience, be it political, militrry or frontline.

[Question] Obviously the political bodies and party organizations in preparing for subsequent meetings should utilize already existing experience.

[Answer] Without fail. We have generalized the observations of our workers, as well as the information from the troops. We have considered the recommendations of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The political bodies and party organizations in preparing for the Leninist meetings should focus closer attention on what has been done for carrying out the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination," and whether each party organization is actually the center of ideological and indoctrinational activities. Such a posing of the question presupposes a more specific discussion of the observance of Leninist principles in party leadership and the Leninist standards of party life.

Even now one can say confidently that the Leninist party meetings will go down as a significant event in our life. They will play a great indoctrinational role and help to strengthen the party's influence on solving the problems of military training and the strengthening of military discipline and organization. There is no doubt that the men of the Ground Forces will reach the Lenin jubilee, having successfully completed the winter training period, and thereby make their worthy contribution to the cause of further raising the military readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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COMPANY COMMANDERS: DUTIES, TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "The Company Commander"]

[Text] "Recently I was appointed company commander. From my very first steps I felt how much more complicated and diverse were the duties of a company commander in comparison with a platoon commander, how much more sweeping the tasks confronting him.... Of course, it may be difficult but I am proud of my position. I hope that in it I will gain good schooling and develop as a commander."

These lines from a letter to the editors written by Sr Lt A. Shulyak are very reminiscent of the thoughts and feelings of all officers who now command companies, batteries and other subunits equivalent to them. The importance of service in this position for the development of the solely responsible commander and the enormous role of this level of military personnel for carrying out the tasks of combat readiness are affirmed by all the history of the Soviet Armed Forces and by the experience of the Great Patriotic War. Under today's conditions the role of the company commander has risen to new heights, and this is determined by the increased tasks and military capabilities of the company, as well as by many other factors.

The responsibility of the company commander is great, and the range of his duties is broad. "The company commander (the commander of a ship fourth rank)," state the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, "in peacetime and wartime is responsible for the following: For the combat readiness of the company (ship); for military and political training and indoctrination, military discipline and the political and moral state of the personnel in the company (ship); for maintaining internal order in the company (on the ship); for the condition and safekeeping of weapons, military and other equipment and supplies of the company (ship); for the successful execution of combat missions by the company (ship); for managing company (ship) administration and services."

The basis for the successful activities of a company commander is strong ideological tempering and a broad political viewpoint. The duty of the company commander is to have a profound knowledge of military affairs and the tactics of subunits in various types of combat, and to thoroughly master the art of control in combat. In combat a company commander should constantly know the situation, he should quickly take decisions and issue orders to subordinates, and achieve their unswerving fulfillment and the defeat of the enemy even with smaller forces. Also of primary significance for him is the ability to organize service in accord with the requirements of the regulations, to conduct indoctrination, to organize the competition, and to unite the collective, in relying on the deputy for political affairs, the other officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and sergeants in the company, the communists and the Komsomol organization in carrying out all missions.

For example, Guards Sr Lt S. Kapitonov who has been awarded the medal "For Combat Merit" has great authority in unit X. In commanding the motorized rifle company for 2 years, he has unswervingly achieved high results in military and political training. Under his leadership the subunit has become outstanding. High personal training--political, tactical, technical and firing--is the basis for the service successes of Officer Kapitonov. He perfectly knows all the company's regulation weapons and equipment, he shoots excellently, and can drive a combat vehicle. The main thing in his indoctrinational work is an individual approach, and the ability to rely on the strength of the collective and the army community. Recently Guards Sr Lt Kapitonov was promoted to the position of battalion chief of staff. Such highly regarded officers comprise an absolute majority among the company commanders. Their work is highly praised by the command, and the accomplishments of many of them have been commended by government decorations.

But, unfortunately, there are also examples of another sort. Capt B. Usachev has commanded the company for 3 years. Seemingly this would be long enough to gain experience and to work effectively, in bringing about a continuous rise in the combat skills of the personnel. However, the subunit does not excel in successes, it did not fulfill the socialist pledges last year, and has low indicators in the current training period. Capt Usachev is inclined to explain the shortcomings by various objective factors. But the question rests primarily with the style of his work and weak responsibility. The senior chiefs and the party organization have held him strictly responsible for the failings. It is important that these demands are supplemented by the officer's exactingness for himself, and this is an indispensable condition for his growth.

As in any position, the development of an officer in the position of company commander depends primarily upon himself, upon his service zeal, and responsibility for the assigned job. But, naturally, a great deal is determined by the attention shown to this very important category of military personnel by the senior chiefs, the political bodies and party organizations. A group of company and battery commanders is set up within the system of commander training in a regiment. The exercises here are conducted, as a rule, under the leadership of the regimental commander. The high quality of these exercises is one of the important factors in the professional growth of the company commanders.

Naturally, the battalion commanders have a special role in their development. In following the tested principle that "the superior teaches a subordinate," a battalion commander must constantly and patiently instruct and indoctrinate the company commanders, and direct and supervise their independent studies. In particular, the company tactical exercises are conducted under the leadership of the battalion commanders. It is important that each of them be instructive and serve as a good school of mastery for the company and platoon commanders.

The company is the center of training and political indoctrination. Precisely here is formed the basis for successfully carrying out all the tasks confronting the Armed Forces, including the task of increasing the indoctrinational role of army service as proposed in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." In this area responsible tasks have been posed for the political bodies and party organizations. It is their duty to show constant concern for the development of the company commander as the indoctrinator of the personnel, and teach him the art of party political work. The company commander, as a rule, is the leader of the political exercise group. In this area of activity he should receive constant help from the senior chiefs, the political bodies and party organizations.

Military expertise is forged directly in the platoon and company, and the bases for the combat readiness of the battalions, regiments and divisions are put down here.... At present the company is determining the success of carrying out the tasks of winter training, the socialist obligations in the competition to properly celebrate the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. It is the high calling of each company commander to properly celebrate these noteworthy dates and to constantly improve combat readiness.

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PARATROOPER COMPANY: TRAINING PROBLEMS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Guards Sr Lt S. Mishanin, commander of the paratrooper company in the Red Banner Odessa Military District: "While the Commission Worked...."]

[Text] The personnel of our paratrooper company has accepted high obligations, namely, to win the title of outstanding subunit. Clearly for carrying them out there must be great tautness in training and a precise rhythm to the training process.

The recent inspection exercise in weaponry training could be termed exemplary in this sense. This was pointed out by the inspectors who are staff officers of the airborne troops.

Why was this exercise memorable? There was proper order at each training point, and the range equipment operated flawlessly. The men competed for missions and standards. The experience of the leaders was efficiently generalized. In a word, each minute was used fully.

The "secret" for the instructiveness of the exercise and its effectiveness lies in careful preparations. On the day before, an instruction session for battalion officers was held. In our company, an instructor procedural exercise was held with the crew commanders. The chiefs of the branches of troops and services helped the subunit officers. During those days everything in the regiment was focused on providing a high quality of the training process.

It is a shame to admit it, but this was almost the only exercise held in the winter training season with maximum benefit. One involuntarily asks: Why are we unable to conduct exercises on such a level every day, and what is the source of the flaws which, unfortunately, are numerous?

It is not so easy to answer this question. Just take the following problem. As is known, the training level of the personnel is determined by the skills of the exercise leaders, by their knowledge and experience. The procedural experience is far from uniform among the officers of our company.

Guards Sr Lt V. Yelkin has commanded a platoon for more than a year, but the experience of another platoon commander, Guards Lt O. Tsvetok, numbers only in months. There is a similar picture in the other subunits. Clearly, under these conditions it is particularly important to have a well thought out differentiated approach to commander training and to independent work.

Of course, the exercises in the system of commander training provide us with a great deal. For myself, for example, after them I always drew conclusions about what had been well assimilated and where more attention must be given. However, in and of themselves the commander exercises do not determine the success of the question if they are not combined with thorough independent work by the officer. And precisely here we encounter the greatest difficulties.

For the sake of justice, it must be said that we do have plans for independent work. The day's schedule provides time for this on certain days. But often precisely on these days the officers are given various assignments which are not related to the training process. And they cannot get around to independent preparation.

The various sorts of irregularities lead to a violation of the daily schedule and sometimes to a thwarting of the planned exercises. As an example, recently the driving of combat vehicles had been planned for the company. Unexpectedly on the day before the company officers were assigned to a detail which incidentally was completely unplanned. After the detail in the evening, I assembled them for a brief meeting in the company offices to discuss the questions which will be carried out at the tank driving range, and reminded them of their outline plans and textbooks. Could one expect that this exercise would be held on a high procedural level? Certainly not. And this was actually the case.

I realize that life is life, and as they say, any unannounced changes are possible. However, in a number of instances, the load factor on the officers is due to the fact that the functions of the sergeants are turned over to them.

Once it was necessary to send a group of soldiers for housekeeping work on the double. I assigned a squad and put Guards Sgt V. Skrishevskiy in charge. A few minutes later a call came from the unit duty officer that an officer should be put in charge. I had to summon Guards Lt V. Mitin from the parking area where he was conducting an exercise with a platoon, and put him in charge.

This happens rather often. The officers are appointed the so-called "responsibles," they run through the depots receiving various supplies. And certainly in a majority of instances these tasks could be handled by the sergeants and company sergeant majors. For example take the same guards sergeant Skrishevskiy. For several months he had been performing the duties of platoon commander when Guards Lt Mitin assumed command. Why should he not be in charge of the soldiers cleaning up on the barracks territory?

The quality of the exercises is a common concern. As an example, no matter how hard a company commander may work in preparing for firing exercises, if the equipment does not function properly at the firing range, you cannot expect a good result. Unfortunately, we do not receive constant aid in organizing the training process (as was the case on the eve of the inspection exercises) from the unit staff officers or from the specialists in the various regimental services. They are rarely in the field, at the tank driving range or firing range. And at times the young officers lack their advice.

On this question we would like to say a good word for Guards Lt Col P. Bondar'. The firing range is his basic work area. He patiently teaches us marksmanship and the art of organizing the competition according to the tasks and standards. But now he has gone on leave, and the officers who travel to the training center immediately feel that things have taken a turn for the worse.

Of course, the elimination of certain shortcomings depends primarily upon each of us. I am not denying my own personal responsibility. Without doubt, in the company there are many internal reserves for improving the quality of combat training. And we will endeavor to put them into action. But, unfortunately, here not everything depends on us.

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STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES: TRAINING RESULTS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen A. Melekhin, deputy commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces: "The Search for Better Methods"]

[Text] Whatever the reason that takes us to a unit, always in the course of the work you keep your "sights" on the question: What is instructive and new here in the procedures for conducting the exercises, training sessions and lessons? This interest, of course, is not accidental. Life itself demands our close attention to the problems of training procedures.

As is known, something new is not born in a vacuum. The successful development of training procedures and the seeking out of ways to further intensify the training process are possible only with the skillful use of all that is valuable, progressive and acquired by practice. In our arsenal there are many well-proven, time-tested methods and procedures for training and indoctrinating the personnel. They bring together the experience of the leading commanders, political workers, the scientific studies and recommendations gained on the basis of analyzing the training and indoctrinational process in the troops. The effective study and generalization, and the creative introduction of the acquired experience into practice are the highway for raising the efficiency and quality of the exercises.

The search for the new is not the lot of individual enthusiasts. The best educators and experts are actively involved in this. The most experienced young officers are also involved in preparing procedural aids and studies on various questions. Of course, difficulties often arise for them. But then a collective discussion of the proposals is held at the unit's procedural council. Having heard the opinion of senior comrades and having received the necessary recommendations, a young officer can set to work more confidently. In time he gains the skill of independently analyzing advanced experience and creatively supplementing his own procedural finds.

At a recent special tactical exercise, high combat skills were demonstrated by the subunit under the command of Capt R. Mikhaylov. The young soldiers also showed up well along with experienced specialists. In a difficult, rapidly changing situation they acted confidently and intelligently. At the analysis particular mention was made of the efficient work of specialists from different areas. Many were amazed. How had Capt Mikhaylov succeeded in achieving such high teamwork in a short time?

Success had come primarily because Capt Mikhaylov had made skillful use of the best that had been acquired in the unit. The instruction of new men had been carried out under the principle "from the simple to the complex." The exercises and training sessions were marked by a well thought out approach to working out the combat training tasks and standards using trainer equipment. First the young men mastered the skills of correct operation of the equipment, and only after their actions had become confident did Capt Mikhaylov begin to incorporate assignments for working out individual standards in the program of exercises. Then the young soldiers, along with their senior comrades, began training sessions at which group standards were worked on.

The procedures used by Capt Mikhaylov, generally speaking, are not new. But the search for the new is no end in itself. If practically proven forms and methods of instruction prove effective, and as before are reliable and efficient, one must not abandon them prematurely. Capt Mikhalov showed that the "traditional" approach to developing teamwork among the specialists, with its able and creative application, provides a good gain in time.

But unfortunately, this is not always the case. For example, as soon as a certain procedural study has become known, the commander immediately decides that it is a new thing and must be introduced. And he issues the appropriate order. But soon it is clear that the innovation does not produce the expected effect in practice, and it must be abandoned. Of course, this would not have happened if the unit had made a preliminary study of the heart of the matter and had objectively judged it.

The procedural councils should provide effective help to the commanders in improving training methods. Their membership includes the best trained officers, experienced indoctrinators and high-class specialists. In the course of the assemblies and conferences, and directly at the work areas they arm the young officers with the ability to use in practice all the best that has been acquired in the unit.

The active participation of an officer in the work of the procedural council is also the best schooling for him. Thus, Maj V. Marychev, a member of the unit's procedural council, headed a subunit which, in spite of the overall trend, in the last 2 years has not moved upwards, but has remained steadily in the "middlers." There have been several reasons for such marking time, but the main one has been that the previous subunit commander was not sufficiently enterprising, he worked, as they say, in a limited range, and constantly waited for suggestions from above. In the subunit little attention was given to improving the procedural skills of the exercise leaders, particularly the young officers.

The new commander turned out to be a person with a creative vein. In knowing well the essence of the experience of the best unit educators, he did not merely take this up, but rather endeavored to reason out and supplement it considering the specific features of the missions being carried out by the subunit. Upon the recommendation of Maj Marychev, the exercise leaders began to make better use of the programmed instruction equipment together with the specially worked out training charts. In essence, when necessary, exercises could be held under an individual program with each man.

Immediately the question arises: How in this instance could the exercise leader follow everything to provide an objective evaluation for the actions of the specialists? Hence, he needed an electronic assistant, a control panel.

When the innovators in the subunit began to develop this panel, one of the officers said to Maj Marychev: "You are wasting your time on this, and we are expecting a specific result from you, that is, you should bring the subunit to the level of the leaders." But Maj Marychev, in thinking about the long run, did not abandon his plan.

The development of the panel was in no way easy. Upon the decision of the unit commander, specialists from other areas came to help the innovators in the subunit. The combined creative labor was crowned with success. The control panel was developed and tested. And soon thereafter Maj Marychev was already conducting a demonstration exercise for the officers in the unit using the new procedure.

The enthusiasm and the creative boldness of Maj Marychev and his subordinates, in being supported by the unit commander, the staff and the procedural council, bore fruit. It was possible to substantially raise the quality of the combat skills of the missile troops, and the subunit entered the ranks of the advanced. At present the procedure of holding the exercises using individual training charts and operational control devices is employed in all the subunits of the unit. The innovation is also being taken up in the other units of our troops.

This example convincingly shows how important it is for the commanders and the senior chiefs not only to support the creative aspirations of subordinates, but also help them carry out a commenced job. Unfortunately, such an approach is still not always encountered. The officers of a superior staff, in working in one of the units, decided to ascertain what actual contribution had been made by the innovators to improving the training process. It turned out that few rationalization proposals had been submitted. Virtually each officer and a majority of the warrant officers ["praporshchik"] participated in upgrading the training facilities and in developing simulators, trainers, working models and functional schemes. But some of the devices were not in the classrooms, but rather in warehouses and back rooms. They are basically taken out for demonstration to the inspectors.

Why had such a bad situation developed in the unit in using the technical innovations created by the hands of the rationalizers? In the first place, certain proposals of the innovators could be put in the category of rationalizations only by a stretch of the imagination. Secondly, certain devices could only be used together with units of existing training equipment. Understandably, this should not be a mechanical linking up, but rather an entire series of very precise technical operations. And the innovators lacked the force and time for precisely this. But the unit commander, the staff and the procedural council did not pay attention to these problems.

The socialist competition is a powerful means for increasing the creative activities of the officers, including in the area of improving training procedures and developing the training facilities. In our troops, the unit under the command of Lt Col M. Kolosov is renowned for its successes. The leading collective, having been the initiator of the competition in the Rocket Forces, is setting the example of effectively carrying out the tasks of combat and political training, maintaining exemplary order and strengthening discipline.

There are also high indicators in the neighboring unit. An effective competition has been organized between the collectives. For example, an interesting procedural innovation appeared among the innovators in conducting comprehensive training sessions, and the neighbors also begin to use it. In turn, the neighbors succeeded in finding reserves for rapidly shaping up the young officers, and now even the initiators are sending a delegation to them in order to make a study on the spot and adopt the valuable experience.

Under present-day conditions, the research activities of a commander are assuming ever-greater significance. In our troops all conditions exist for this. During exercises, while standing combat duty, in making repairs and during field launches of the missiles, the officer comes into contact with all that is new and advanced which has been born by military theory and practice and by the repid development of military affairs. The considerate search for the ways to successfully carry out combat training missions and for more fully utilizing the combat capabilities of modern missile weapons and equipment provides the commander with rich factual material. The conclusions and proposals born on the course of his analysis are realized by working out procedures on the most complicated questions and making changes in the courses, programs, the collections of standards and other documents.

The responsibility and independence which are granted to military personnel in carrying out the complex tasks of training and indoctrinating the men presuppose constant work by the officer on his own procedural improvement. And the more tenacity, endeavor and creative search he shows in this, the more often the successes and joys will be on his path as a commander.

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NEW DRAFTEES: QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Under the Glory-Wreathed Colors"]

[Text] An important period has begun in the life of the Army and Navy, the border and internal troops. Today the order of the USSR minister of defense is being published on the discharging of the men who have served the designated time from the Armed Forces and the next induction of citizens for active military service. In this area many important questions confront the commanders, political workers, the military commissariats and the local authorities.

The present call-up has its special features. The work of carrying it out is starting in an important time, when the Soviet people are preparing to properly celebrate the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, with preparations underway for the 26th CPSU Congress. The remembrances of the party and Komsomol veterans, the participants in the revolution, the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, and the heroes of battles and labor and who during these days are speaking to the youth, evoke in the young men going off for military service a feeling of ardent Soviet patriotism and a desire to worthily carry out their military duty.

The men presently standing under the glory-wreathed colors of our valorous Armed Forces know how the soldiers of the older generations under these same colors courageously defended the Soviet nation and the victories of Great October. They are fully determined to worthily carry the heroic baton, and to be ready at any minute to deal a crushing blow to the aggressor.

Today's inductee mirrors the enormous concern which is shown in our nation for the all-round strengthening of its defense capability, for providing security, and for training and indoctrinating worthy replacements for the Soviet Armed Forces. Each family, each school, each labor collective, and all the party and soviet bodies at the center and on the spot are making their contribution to this important state cause.

Among the inductees, around 87 percent are communists and Komsomol members. Some 88 percent of the young men going into the army have a higher and secondary education, and 99 percent have won the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] insignias. One out of every three inductees has received a specialty needed in the Army or Navy. These and other indicators characterizing the current recruits are particularly high among the young men called up for military service from the cities and villages of Moscow, Donetskaya, Dnepropetrovskaya, Minskaya and other oblasts. Here military patriotic indoctrination of the youth is carried out actively, and good training facilities have been set up which provide high-quality training for Armed Forces specialists.

The induction crowns this important work. And it is very important to make every effort so that this is carried out in an organized and precise manner, and in precise accord with the requirements of the Law Governing Universal Military Service and other documents. Here the primary role is played by the military commissarists, and for their workers the peak period has begun. They should set an example of coordinated, close work on all levels, and for the inductees serve as an example of high discipline, smartness, efficiency and sensitivity.

The success in this important work depends largely upon the activities of the induction commissions. An absolute majority of them, as practice shows, is working clearly, smoothly, and with a high feeling of responsibility for the assigned job, and are attentive to each inductee But shortcomings are also encountered. At times there have been violations of the documents which determine who is to be granted a deferment for family and other circumstances. In allocating the inductees, their labor skills and specialties are not always considered.

It is very important to provide good organization in the solemn, cordial send-offs for the young men going into military service. The local party and soviet bodies, the military commissariats, the Komsomol organizations and the collectives of enterprises, construction sites, kolkhozes and sovkhozes should make certain that the day of sending off the inductees to the Armed Forces becomes remembered by each young man all his life. Warm, moving farewells by relatives, close friends, fellow countrymen and honored veterans help the young soldier and sailor by their good mood in starting military service with confidence.

Care must be taken ahead of time so that the railway cars and aircrafts are promptly assigned for the send-off day. Thought must be given on how to better organize political indoctrination along the way, and ensure strict military order during the travel of the inductees to the place of service. These and other questions can be successfully settled if the military trains are escorted by experienced officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik," "michman"], sergeants and petty officers.

The next induction poses responsible tasks for the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations in the Army and Navy. In many units, even now a good deal is being done to receive the new recruits. The living quarters and classrooms for the young soldiers are being equipped. Seminars and exercises are being held with those who are to train and indoctrinate the new men, and care is being taken so that from the very first day in the unit, the young men feel themselves full members of a military family.

In developing the work related to the receiving of the new recruits, attention must not be lessened for those servicemen who are to be discharged into the reserves. Things must be so organized that each of them considers as his primary duty to be an example of discipline, organization and industry for the young soldiers, and endeavors to pass on his knowledge and experience in operating military equipment. The persons being discharged must be helped in selecting their career, and help must be provided to those who have voiced a desire to be admitted to warrant officer schools.

A high political and labor upsurge reigns in the troops and fleets today. Having started up the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 110th birthday of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet military is making every effort to honorably carry out the high obligations in the competition. It is very important to take care that the political upsurge and high enthusiasm have a beneficial effect on the young soldiers, and that they, having taken their place under the glory-wreathed military colors of our valorous Armed Forces, from the very first day of service take an active part in the training, in the socialist competition, and be filled with a feeling of high responsibility for carrying out their military duty.

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OFFICERS' TECHNICAL TRAINING: INDIVIDUAL VIEWS

Emphasis of Human Factor

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen V. Arapov, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Banner Northern Caucasus Military District: "A Subject of Constant Concern for Communists"]

[Text] I have been closely following the discussion of the letter by Maj V. Shipitsin "The Maximum Possible from Equipment." The interest shown by the readers in the discussion started by the newspaper is understandable. At present, when the troops are being equipped with modern technology, a profound study of it and its practical use with the maximum employment of the capabilities residing in it are one of the most essential factors in continuously raising the combat readiness and capability of the units and subunits.

Beyond any doubt, the discussion and the personal experience of its participants will help the immediate organizers of the training process in their daily work, and enrich the methods and procedures of their activities.

At the same time, I would like to say the following. In a majority of instances, the authors of the letters view the problem, so to speak, from the commander's viewpoint. And certainly the party organizations must play and are playing a great role in the effective solution to this problem, as the object of their work is man. No matter how great the capabilities of the equipment are, the realization of them depends upon humans. We feel that in this regard it is very important to analyze the experience of the party collectives, to spot the typical miscalculations, and analyze how effective work is achieved in mobilizing the men to master the equipment perfectly. I would like to take up certain aspects of this question.

In the tank battalion commanded by Maj G. Kozhekhov, there was a meeting underway of the party bureau. It was conducted in the combat vehicle parking area, next to the tanks which had recently returned from the range. The question was being discussed of the responsibility of the communists for maintaining the equipment in constant combat readiness, and a report was heard by the CPSU member Capt V. Koshelev on the fulfillment of party and service duty.

All for the good. Only the activists woke up too late. Such a session should have been held several months earlier. Certainly the secretary Maj B. Panfilov and the other members of the party bureau had long known that in the battalion, and in particular in the company under the command of Capt Koshelev, during exercises malfunctions at times had occurred in the tanks. And they also knew that certain communists had a poor mastery of the equipment, and were indifferent to studying it. But then no measures were taken.

But only when the thunder roared, when the battalion received an unsatisfactory grade for equipment maintenance and the regimental party committee held certain communists responsible did the party bureau finally decide upon a basic discussion of the state of affairs in the subunit.

Although late, it still was of benefit. The criticism, direct and without beating about the bush and addressed against those who had become complacent and stopped in their professional growth helped these comrades to realistically view their labor and their attitude toward the job, and to feel more acutely their personal responsibility for the successes of the subunit. The battalion began to pay more attention to the technical preparation of the personnel and to maintain the equipment better during the vehicle maintenance days and in carrying out repairs.

And it must be emphasized that the party organization began to show greater activity. The communists, and above all the bureau members, realized that they possessed great opportunities for substantially influencing the solution to such a question as the mastery of technical skills and technical know-how.

The instance which I have described is not such a rare one. When we in the political directorate analyze the miscalculations encountered in organizing technical training in certain units and subunits, we are convinced that one of the basic reasons for such shortcomings is to be found in the inability of the party organization to approach this question. Where they clearly see their goal, the forms and methods of work to achieve it, and where they are active and insistent--here all the questions of combat training are successfully solved.

For example, take the anti-aircraft missile battalion where Capt A. Zapol'skiy is the party bureau secretary. The questions of combat readiness and the state of the equipment and weapons are constantly in the field of vision of the bureau. Here they do not wait until the political department gives instructions to investigate one or another problem, but rather they show initiative, they carry out work individually with each communist, and endeavor to prevent shortcomings. And here always in the forefront is a higher feeling of responsibility among the communists for the assigned job.

At the party bureau sessions, communists who are leaders of collectives are regularly heard. Upon its initiative, here they have organized technical evenings and competitions. The members of the party bureau are always up on the daily combat life of the subunits. Any exercise conducted on a poor level or the slightest flaw in the equipment here are a cause for alarm.

At one time it became known that in the crew under the command of Sr Lt V. Kuznetsov, in maintaining the equipment, deviations had been permitted from the requirements of the instructions which regulate the work on it. Upon the assignment of the party bureau, the communist Maj A. Ivanov attended the exercises in the crew and spoke with Kuznetsov. It turned out that he had permitted weaknesses both in organizing equipment maintenance and in observing the requirements of the instructions in operating the instruments and mechanisms. Comrade Kuznetsov was invited to a session of the party bureau. And, of course, not to hand down a reprimand but rather to explain to the comrade his incorrect position. And the senior lieutenant quickly realized that he was wrong when only the strict observance of the instructions prevented the breakdown of one of the units.

It remains to be added that the political department generalized and disseminated the experience of the party bureau, and this helped strengthen the party's influence on the questions of technical training on the unit level. Correspondingly the technical know-how of the personnel was raised, the maintenance and operation of the combat vehicles and units was improved, and as one might expect, combat readiness as well. For 3 years running, this unit has won the rotating Red Banner of the Military Council of the Ground Forces.

We would also like to take up the question of class qualification. If a communist rises by these stages, it means that he correctly understands his military and party duty. At the same time, one could give numerous examples when communist officers for years do not improve the level of their professional training, and rely on their old knowledge. The party bureaus at times tolerate such instances, and pretend that nothing special has happened. We cannot agree with such a position. Class qualification is not only proof of the depth of military knowledge and the technical know-how of the communist officer. This, if you wish, is also his authority in the collective and the degree of his moral influence on people. It is worthy of note that the more competent a communist is on professional questions, the higher his activeness in indoctrinational work with the personnel. I have already mentioned the name of Capt Zapol'skiy. What allows this party bureau secretary to organize the work of the party organization in a purposeful and professional manner? There are many qualities. But among them, as the first I would put his military competence. He is a master of military skills.

The maximum use of the capabilities of military equipment is a most important area of party work. And it is completely essential that each party organization understand this and that it constantly enriches the forms and methods of its work in this area. The more initiative and creativity shown here, the more effectively the party organization can influence the improving of the military expertise of the men and a further rise in the combat readiness of the units and subunits.

Greater Emphasis of Certification

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Engr-Maj A. Pavlovich, senior air staff officer of the Red Banner Siberian Military District: "...And By a Line of Certification"]

[Text] I recall an episode from a special tactical exercise. The subunit commander had been given the unannounced change: "Telegraph channel out of order." The officer quickly assessed the situation and took the correct decision. But his subsequent orders were wrong. He had an excellent command of theory, and this made it possible to avoid mistakes in working out the decision, but he had a hazy notion of how to implement this decision in practical terms.

It turned out that the officer had the skills of a radio communications engineer. But he had studied the wire communications equipment only on a general level. The flaws in the personal preparation of the subunit commander almost became a reason for the nonfulfillment of a training mission.

In this regard we would like to emphasize that from his cadet years a future officer should make it a rule to participate in continuous technical studies and realize that a lessening of efforts in mastering equipment threatens an invariable lag.

In technical training the independent work of an officer is of decisive significance. Certainly in the same unit, one officer quickly becomes an expert, but another for many years is satisfied with third class.

For example, for a long time I have known Engr-Lt Col B. Barakhnin and Maj V. Shevchenko. These are officers who simply cannot allow themselves to know anything superficially, or to tolerate and "blank spots" in their personal preparation. Having felt a gap in their knowledge of one or another question, they immediately turn to the instructions, and if need be, seek help from those who were able to study the new equipment previously. I have become acquainted with Lt V. Shemenev who has less experience as an officer, but the same zeal: on the chest of the young officer is already the emblem of a master of communications.

I share the opinion of those participants in the discussion of the letter "The Maximum Possible from Equipment," who speak of the necessity of raising the authority of an officer's class qualification. Unfortunately, extremes are encountered: in one unit it is amazingly easy to obtain the insignia of a high-class specialist, but in another, much harder. There must be a uniform procedure, a strict and rigid procedure.

One other observation. Far from everyone who should wears the insignias for class qualifications. There are various reasons for this. The insignias are not always presented in a ceremony, in front of the full formation. At times they are in short supply. It is said that at one time the insignias "Outstanding Artilleryman," "Outstanding Signalman," and others were presented in a truly holiday situation, and were viewed as a decoration. Should this useful tradition be forgotten?

In my view, it would be beneficial to have quizzes on technical knowledge held before an officer was promoted to a superior position. In certification one must not overlook the class rating of the officer and the level of his technical preparation. The men must be shaped up and indoctrinated also by the line of certification.

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PERSONNEL: CRITICISM OF COMRADES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 80 p 4

[Article by Sgt V. Sikhodol'skiy of the Alma-Ata Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Mar SU I. S. Konev: "Integrity Strengthens Friendship"]

[Text] Recently we were discussing the unworthy conduct of Officer Candidate Viktor Zelenov. After the meeting, the secretary of the company Komsomol organization, Officer Candidate S. Yeletin said with a feeling of satisfaction:

"In my mind, the meeting went well. Certainly there was no lack of criticism...."

Yes, Jr Sgts A. Lykhopiy and V. Volzhanin, Officer Candidate A. Zabashta and certain other Komsomol members condemned the conduct of their fellow serviceman who had left the subunit without leave. Personally I expressed my attitude toward V. Zelenov's misconduct at a meeting of the Komsomol group. I told him directly and openly that I was indignant over his conduct. Previously he had been in trouble before with a negligent attitude toward his studies and an infraction of discipline. And not more than a month ago the misdeeds of the officer candidate had been examined. And then he vowed to the collective that he would mend his ways, he would behave in an exemplary manner and study well.

For many at that time it seemed that this had been sincere, that our comrade had profoundly felt his errors and would not return to his ways. But Viktor could not hold out for long. The promise which he had given was quickly forgotten. And again he violated the regulations, and again his conduct was being reviewed in the collective. However I did not agree with the secretary as at that time the talk had not been so sharp or principled as one would like. The fate of a person, one might say, was being determined, and some were indifferent to this.

I would particularly blame Officer Candidate A. Bespalov. Even when the conduct of the guilty party was being discussed in the group, Andrey, having said not a word and let others do the talking.

"Why were you silent?" I asked him. "Certainly Zelenov has great respect for you. Your words would have meant a great deal. And all the more so a month ago, and then probably Viktor would not have repeated his old mistakes."

"We are friends," replied Bespalov in embarrassment. "It would have been awkward and I simply lacked courage to speak out against him...."

I was particularly amazed by this "against him." But could it be the contrary, in favor of a comrade? Could principled and friendly just words condemning his actions be of benefit to him?

At that time we had a long talk with Bespalov. And he seemingly understood a great deal. But at the company Komsomol meeting where it was finally decided what punishment Zelenov merited, Andrey did not show up. Later I learned that Bespalov found a pretext not to come in order again to remain on the sidelines. Need it be said that such a position was frankly unprincipled. But now, he might say, I could not be criticized as I did not attend the meeting.

Unfortunately, certain other Komsomol members in our platoon understand comradeship in this manner. Take, for example, Officer Candidates A. Yegorov and Yu. Miroshnichenko. When one or another misdeed by a Komsomol member is brought up for discussion, they prefer to remain silent, stating that "fans of criticism" can be found without them. What is this, sympathy for the guilty or indifference to the interests of the collective? Evidently, a little of both.

But then Officer Candidate I. Kubeyev does not miss an occasion to defend a violator of discipline or a person who is behind in studies, and endeavors to find "objective" reasons to shield such a person. And what is strange, some consider such a virtue of Kubeyev to be almost heroic. Does he not dare to speak out against the general opinion! At the same time Kubeyev is rendering a disservice to his comrades, and at the same time, to the entire collective.

I feel no matter how bitter the criticism may be, it is much more useful than the silent position of some and the lack of principles of others. In a true friendship, directness, a lack of compromise and honesty are very important.

But is everything being done in the Komsomol organization to indoctrinate a true feeling of friendship among the officer candidates? This question cannot be answered affirmatively. For this reason, in my view, the meeting which discussed the conduct of Zelenov did not achieve its aim. And I would like very much to believe that Viktor would draw the correct conclusion from what had happened and learn to distinguish true friendship from faults.

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SIGNAL BATTALION TRAINING: SHORTCOMINGS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Polyakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent from the Red Banner Northern Caucasus Military District: "Specious Well-Being"]

[Text] The warrant officers ["praporshchik"] of the signal battalion commanded by Maj G. Alistratov during the last training year did not fulfill their socialist obligations. Their work skills using the communications equipment were weak, and many had reduced class qualifications.

"Yes, we have overlooked the warrant officers," said the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Maj S. Dovgashov. "But now the situation has fundamentally changed."

The political worker stated that in the battalion at present more than 40 percent of the warrant officers had an increased class rating. We did not understand why such a statement was required, for it was soon learned that in fact here only WO N. Parkhomenko was a specialist first class, and all the remainder were third class.

Was not Maj Dovgashov attempting to smooth over the impression from last year's failure, and embellish the actual situation? Evidently this was the case. Because in a document sent by him to the political department, the designated figure was even higher, some 55 percent.

It turns out that the battalion had not drawn the proper conclusions for itself. Here last year, they endeavored to obscure things. And not only on paper, as at present, but also differently. They resorted to obvious oversimplification in combat training. Before the examinations for class rating, the signal troops were trained in receiving and sending radiograms in the same fixed pairs. They, naturally, were used to one another, and thus achieved a rather high speed of radio traffic. Here the warrant officers kept within the high-class standards, and the picture was created of complete well-being. But in the autumn the members of the qualifying commission disrupted this tradition, and the pairs were made up randomly. And then it turned out that many warrant officers clearly lacked professional skills.

But since now, in the words of Maj Dovgashov, the "situation has fundamentally changed," let us see what specific measures have been undertaken in this area after the failure in the autumn exams.

"In January at the battalion party meeting, we discussed the question of the course of carrying out the socialist obligations," said Capt Savin. "We also raised the issue of the class qualifications of the warrant officers."

They discussed the question.... It is natural to assume that behind this was an analysis of the state of affairs, the disclosure of advanced experience, and at the same time a disclosure of anything that would prevent the achieving of the set goal. As it turned out there was nothing of the sort at the meeting. Mainly there were general appeals "to improve the situation," and "achieve success."

Other very characteristic, if not to say, strange facts show that there could not have been any professional discussion at the meeting. For example, all the warrant officers in the company under the command of Capt M. Vlasov resolved to become first-class specialists during the current training year. At first glance this is all for the good if it were not for one circumstance. The problem is that they simply cannot become this for none of them has the qualifications of a specialist second class. How did such circumstances come to be? It turns out that the warrant officers did not know that after last year's examination they had been reduced in their class rating. And the company commander as well.

It turns out that the fact of the failure at last autumn's examination had been concealed from them. And why did this happen? Because the company officers and the party activists did not sound the alarm, they did not seek out the reasons for the failings, and did not take measures to eliminate the shortcomings and raise the effectiveness of the competition.

Quite understandably, with such a situation one cannot expect an improvement. Just take the results of the recently held contest in work using communications equipment. WOs A. Kucherenko, A. Granitskiy, S. Voronin and certain others showed poorer results than their subordinates, including soldiers in their first year of service.

It can be stated that the commanders, the political workers and the party activists have left the work with the warrant officers fend for itself. And they are doing little to mobilize all the personnel to achieve successes in the socialist competition. The party's influence on the combat training of signal troops in the battalion comes down merely to holding bureau sessions and meetings without being concerned at all for their effectiveness. And for some reason no one is concerned for the fate of the set obligations. This is a dangerous complacency! All the more because very little time remains until the end of the winter combat training period.

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CENTRAL ARCHIVES OF DEFENSE MINISTRY DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 80 p 4

[Article by Ye. Agapova, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Stored in Perpetuity, A Report from the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] The Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense are one of the major archival institutions of the country. Its storage capacity is around 20 million files. More than one-half of them is documents from the Great Patriotic War. This consists in the undying lines of combat reports, operational summaries, documents of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the combat logs, decoration lists and casualty lists. A boundless ocean of facts, millions of human fates and witnesses of the war itself.

...Together with the scientific coworker, Lt Col (Res) Vasiliy Vasil'yevich Tarakanov, we went into one of the repositories. Here, in a maze of shelves stretching for several kilometers, there was unusual quiet. The documents are stored in special boxes. Each one has its own number. We randomly selected one with the inscription: "Perpetual Storage." We read the lines of a report by the chief of the political department of the 331st Rifle Division to the chief of the political department of the 31st Army on the combat of the units on 4 January 1945:

"...The gun crew of the fifth battery, where Jr Sgt Yegor Martynovich Gagarin was the gunner, engaged the enemy tanks in an uneven and fierce battle. Several Panthers were advancing on Gagarin's gun which was firing with direct laying. Behind the tanks were the enemy infantry. Under heavy enemy fire, the courageous crew kept up firing at the advancing tanks.... Gagarin's crew destroyed up to 50 Nazis, and hit a tank and armored personnel carrier. By a direct hit from another enemy tank, Gagarin's weapon was hit, the crew was killed, and the gunner himself severely wounded. Bleeding profusely and losing strength, the courageous communist did not break off combat and activated antitank grenades. The Nazis, seeing that the cannon was out of commission and there was just one wounded artilleryman ahead of them, seized him, poured fuel on him and set him afire....

..."In the battles of 4 January, valor and courage were shown both by individual soldiers, sergeants and officers as well as by entire subunits...."

Who was this intrepid hero, Yegor Martynovich Gagarin? How did the motherland view his feat? These questions were answered by a punch machine: Jr Sgt Yegor Martynovich Gagarin, communist, gunner of the 896th Artillery Regiment of the 331st Rifle Division who performed a feat on Polish territory, was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Everyone who turns to the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense has his own concern and pain. Because it is a question of the life of people, those who defended the liberty and independence of the fatherland. People come here with various requests: to establish the fate of relatives or near ones who were separated by the war, to affirm decorations, wounds, concussions, participation in the army in the field and the place a soldier is buried. The archives are constantly alive with intense activity. And on the day when we visited in Podol'sk, around 2,500 letters and requests were received from the military units and facilities, from the frontline soldiers and their relatives, and Pioneer trackers.

We followed the path of just one of them, a letter from a war invalid K. Vasil'yev which has arrived from Krasnodarskiy Kray. He needed information on his wound. The request was not particularly complicated, and the reply was rapidly drawn up. In working with the documents, the archives coworkers discovered that the veteran had not been presented with his medal "For Valor." Decades later the award reached the soldier.

"Such happy finds are not rare," explained Col Vasiliy Petrovich Nazarov. "The reference service," he continued, "is one of the most important. At times the fate of a person, his mood and well-being depend upon our answer. Over 16 million replies have been sent out to the requests and letters by the coworkers of the archives. In order to answer the mail of just one day such as today, thousands of files are put into motion. They are carefully examined, studied and analyzed. Let me add that at times there are the fates of many people in one letter. As an example, here is a letter which we received recently from Voronezh. The coworkers of the city military commissariat made a request to clarify information on the number of soldiers who died in the battles for Voronezh. In the archives we varified information on over 2,000 fallen soldiers, and located the addresses of their relatives."

In his talk, Vasiliy Petrovich complained that certain authors of letters turn to the archives in bypassing the military commissariats, where much information is to be found on war participants. Unfortunately, this complicates the search and leads to additional correspondence.

And not only do they write to the main depository of documents of the Great Patriotic War. Here in 1964, they opened a reception office. Alas, over the years, details begin to escape from one's memory, and fine points are hidden. And only in a personal conversation with the author of a letter can the forgotten be recovered. More than 130,000 visitors have called at the reception office. Not one of them went away without an answer to the question disturbing them. The visitor comment book is proof of the high sentiments of people who have found out about the last battle of a father, husband or brother, or who received a necessary bit of information. In the letters to the editors, there are often letters of thanks addressed to the chief of the reception office, Col (Ret) Stepan Yevdokimovich Maksayev, and other coworkers of the archives.

Here experienced specialists work effectively, and they have a good knowledge of the history of the war, the structure of the Armed Forces and the contents of the documents. These include: Cols A. Fayzulin and V. Golubev, Lt Col V. Zhuravlev, the scientific coworkers, V. Tarakanov, P. Dobrovol'skiy, S. Abramova, V. Kemenova and others. Many of them went through the severe testing of the war.

Concerning the chief of the archives, Maj Gen N. Lutsev, for example, one of of the political reports from the 33d Rifle Division states: "The men of the First Rifle Battalion fought courageously under the command of Capt N. Lutsev. They destroyed up to 100 enemy soldiers and officers, they captured three tanks, a self-propelled gun, and six motor vehicles." For personal courage and valor shown in that battle, battalion commander Lutsev was awarded the Order of Aleksander Nevskiy, and 28 men of the battalion were presented with decorations.

Immediately after the war, it was necessary to examine and analyze millions of documents, to draw up an inventory of them, to store damaged ones, as well as to create a reserve holding of the most valuable. This took years of stubborn, painstaking labor. More than 60 percent of the files have undergone scientific and technical processing, and 313,000 have been restored and bound by the hands of the coworkers.

We visited the restoration shop. The documents which are worked on here followed the units. Pierced by shrapnel, burned, covered with blood and wet by the rain, today they are fragile and require careful handling. In the hands of the restorer Zoya Nikolayevna Barskova, the documents of the 26th Guards Rifle Division are gaining a new life. This is the very unit which excelled in the battles on the Kursk Salient, and one of the first to enter East Prussia. After restoration and chemical treatment, they will be sent to the laboratory for microfilming. In the archives is also a repository where the negatives of unique documents "live." These priceless pages of history comprise tens of millions of frames of microfilm.

The war document repository which is located in Podol'sk is a large scientific research institution. All significant works on the history of the Great Patriotic War have been written on the basis of archival documents. These include "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945], "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], and "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945].

Here the methods of archival work are elaborated, and these methods are followed by the military archives. For the purposes of providing practical aid to the staffs and to the military schools in studying the history of the war, the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense have prepared 49 collections of military documents and 35 microfilms on the basic operations of the war, and on the combat use of tank and air armies.

Work in the interests of historical science is also carried out in the reading room. Here the experience of the war is studied, maps of engagements are examined, the lines of history are checked out, scientific materials are assembled, and fellow servicemen are sought out. An indisputable document of history can restore all that has been obliterated in the memory of an eyewitness and bring the breath of battles to our contemporary, and reexperience the military past. More than 16,000 researchers who are the chroniclers of the people's feat have already turned to the riches of the archives.

Over the years which have passed since the difficult times of the war, interest has not flagged in the heroes of the battles. On the eve of the 35th anniversary of the victory, we are even more closely looking at the past. And how could it be otherwise? How could one forget the war? Today we can judge how important it was to create the archives of war documents which now are our national wealth.

The decades will pass and new generations with gratitude will read the pages of the giant chronicle of the people's feat which extols the greatness and courage of the Soviet people.

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ACHIEVEMENTS OF UNIDENTIFIED UNITS OUTLINED

Tank-Loading Exercise

Sofia VOENNA TEKHNIKA in Bulgarian No 4, 1980 p 11

[Article by Col Eng E. Pareyuk]

[Text] The mission was complex. After he received it, it seemed to Capt V. Venger that the hands of the clock doubled their pace. The battalion was to carry out a march and after this pass swiftly over mountainous and forested terrain, but no matter what happened, forestall the "enemy" by moving into an advantageous position and preparing to repel significantly superior forces. In other words, it was to succeed in organizing a sure defense. The time for accomplishing the mission was limited. On the outside, the battalion commander was unperturbed, but actually he was excited. He gave orders clearly and confidently. This confidence was imparted to his subordinates as well.

Loading tanks onto railroad cars is a complex matter. In our case it was made more complicated for two reasons. The first was that the loading was being done at night since the combat alert signal had been given late at night. The second was that by decree of the umpire the side loading ramp had been "destroyed" to such an extent that rebuilding it rapidly was not possible. A new one had to be built and side loading carried out. It became clear now that it was no accident that the tankmen had practiced the different loading alternatives many times, had thought out the organization of the job and the technical backup, and had trained crews.

The loading ramp was assembled in literally just minutes from prefabricated elements. Connecting platforms, supporting blocks, wedge chocks and other reinforcing materials were on hand in the necessary quantity. The teams that did the loading worked well. The first tank, driven by driver-mechanic M. Dzyubak, specialist second class and secretary of the company Komsomol organization, confidently went up the loading ramp, carefully advancing its chain links over the platform.

The other vehicles followed, after which the officers once more personally checked that the vehicles were securely fastened and the turrets locked.

When the officer who had been appointed echelon commander reported that the echelon was ready to move, the battalion commander and the locomotive engineer standing beside him simultaneously looked at their watches. The former was satisfied, the latter amazed. . .

The tankmen operated successfully in the following stages of the training, too. Not a single machine fell behind, not a single one was damaged during the very difficult march. The battalion arrived at the specified line earlier than the specified time. When the formations of the "enemy" crossed the plain, the annihilation fire of the tank guns, which they fired point-blank, was a complete surprise for him. The "battle" confirmed once more that today the element of surprise can be a decisive factor in achieving victory. Taking advantage of the "enemy's" confusion, the tankmen swiftly attacked him. The battalion received a rating of excellent from the senior officer. The best companies were those commanded by Senior Lt P. Davidov and V. Vasilev.

The tankmen of the battalion steadfastly fulfilled their promise to greet the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin with an excellent showing in combat and political training.

Exemplary Aviation Specialists

Sofia VOENNA TEKHNIKA in Bulgarian No 4, 1980 pp 11-12

[Article by Col S. Davtyan]

[Text] During the past training year the TBCh [operational and maintenance unit] commanded by Engineer Lt Col G. Karpenko received the award for excellence for the fifth time. This year it joined the competition under the motto, "Let us sacredly fulfill Lenin's precepts, improve combat and political training, increase vigilance, and always be prepared to defend our homeland and the great achievements of socialism." The personnel of the unit have made a promise to retain their excellence award.

In rating the first stage of the competition, regimental headquarters took note that the aviation specialists have fulfilled the promises they made. Periodic servicing of all kinds is performed on time and at a high standard. Aircraft are delivered to the squadron only with good and excellent ratings.

What is the secret of this unit's success?

As the TBCh commander observes, headquarters, the party and the Komsomol organization give constant attention to improving the quality of the work. They do everything so that the labor of the service personnel will be highly efficient. The TBCh gives much attention to the adoption of scientific organization of labor, the proper use of critical-path scheduling, and the even flow of the production process. All groups are required to finish a job on aircraft in uniform time periods.

Rationalizers contribute much to the successful fulfillment of the promises that have been made. The test benches, instruments and devices that they have made help improve the technological process, raise the quality of the work and cut down the time for the performance of periodic servicing.

Among the most active innovators is Specialist First Class, Senior Lieutenant of the Technical Service A. Petukhov. He has developed a technological test bench which makes it possible to raise standards and significantly reduce labor losses in performing periodic servicing of one of the important units. Another innovator is Senior Lieutenant of the Technical Service V. Vendi. He has developed a test bench for checking automatic pilots of various kinds, thus raising the objectivity and hence the accuracy of inspection.

The headquarters and the party and Komsomol organization are continuously increasing their concern over systematically conducting technical training classes at a high level. These are conducted by highly trained officers. Engineer Maj V. Yukhno, Engineer Maj A. Ramazanov and Engineer Capt F. Koslov are rightly considered the best methods specialists in the unit. Aviation specialists improve their skills in technical study groups which are led by Engineer Capt D. Rumantsev and Senior Lieutenant Engineer V. Safonov. There service personnel study design characteristics and peculiarities in the operation of aircraft equipment. In these classes, theoretical questions are tied in with practice. The aviation specialists say many useful things during question-and-answer games and evenings of questions and answers. Thus the servicemen of this unit have raised their qualifications, mastered related specialties etc. Many of them can perform the work of two or three technological flow routes.

The TECh personnel are now working with great enthusiasm. With their crash labor they will worthily greet the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

Submarine Exercise

Sofia VOENNA TEKHNIKA in Bulgarian No 4, 1980 p 12

[Article by Col Eng V. Rebuka]

[Text] The personnel of one of the submarines are giving all their strength and ability to fulfill their socialist promises.

In fulfilling their practice-combat training missions, not only the commander of department-5, but also the other officers pay special attention to the creation of habits of independence in personnel supervisors, squad commanders and seamen. In classes it is constantly pointed out that during a voyage any kind of situation can arise, including one requiring the rapid replacement of particular components and units and the repair of breakdowns and damage.

In his work with personnel the commander of department-5 has the support of his assistants such as Engineer Lt Yu. Imashkin, Warrant Officer V. Chernobilets, Petty Officer First Class V. Ivanov and Petty Officer Second Class N. Demkin.

The enginemen, headed up by personnel supervisor and master of military arts, Warrant Officer V. Chernobilets, show excellent results in all types of training. He has a faultless knowledge of the materiel charged to him and expertly passes on this knowledge to his subordinates.

The commander of the hold mechanics, Petty Officer First Class V. Ivanov, has great success. He is excellently trained and successfully teaches the seamen of his squad who staunchly defend their excellence award. Nor does the electrical officer, Petty Officer Specialist First Class N. Denkin, lag behind his comrade.

In honor of the 35th anniversary the Baltic sailors piously revere the memory of the brave heroes of the Great Patriotic War who fearlessly fought against the Hitlerite fascists. The sailors are well acquainted with the feat of the crew of submarine Shch-303, which was commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union I. Travkin. By her bold attacks and unexpected maneuvers, she created panic fear in the Hitlerites. Every time Travkin went to sea, the enemy's radio, forgetting all about code, hastened to advise in plaintext, "Achtung! Achtung! Step up observation! Travkin is at sea!"

The submariners' feats performed in the past war live in the patriotic deeds of the present generation of seamen.

"Take your stations! Prepare to submerge!" The commander's voice resounded through the compartments of the submarine. After we took on diving ballast, the submarine submerged in order to get under way to fulfill its next combat-training mission. For cruises under conditions approximating combat hone the skills of the seamen who vigilantly stand guard at the maritime boundaries of our fatherland.

Signalmen Compete

Sofia VOENNA TEKHNIKA in Bulgarian No 4, 1980 p 13

[Article by Col Eng L. Migunov]

[Text] Personnel of the signal battalion commanded by Maj A. Shevtsov are fulfilling Lenin's precepts by equaling the initiators of socialist competition in the branches of the service of the USSR. In honor of the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War they have made the promise to uphold their excellence award--to have 11 experts in signal communications, 72 percent specialists first and second class, and a specialty rating for all who are supposed to have it. They continue the glorious combat traditions of older generations and pledge themselves constantly to step up their training under field conditions and their vigilance and readiness under all conditions whatsoever, and at the same time to provide continuous and reliable signal communications and to strengthen their discipline and organization.

Communists and Komsomol members are in the front ranks of the competitors. It is the communist communications experts, Capt V. Selyuminov, Senior Lieutenants A. Parfenov and A. Filatov, and Engisn A. Zabelni, who first in the battalion applied in practice the new procedure of separate instruction, which makes it possible to intensify the training process considerably, to train young servicemen in a short time for successful performance of their functional duties in their work with equipment, and teach them how to operate it properly. The commanders of excellent crews, Komsomol communications experts Ensigns V. Olkhov and A. Asolkin, are good methods specialists. At the initiative of their crew socialist competition has been widely launched among the Komsomol members of the battalion under the slogan, "Excellent results with every training day."

The battalion pays considerable attention to different forms and methods of training servicemen. The meeting of signalmen with delegates to the Third Komsomol Congress and with soldier G. Tolmachov, a participant in the Civil and Great Patriotic War, was exciting. With great attention they listened to his story of the glorious deeds of communists and Komsomol members during the fiery years of the war and in peace time.

The evening celebrations of combat glory, at which those who have distinguished themselves in combat and political training share their experience from their service, have become traditional in the unit. Usually they culminate with competitions to get the title of best specialist in the unit.

The personnel of the battalion have decided to achieve new and still greater attainments in their skills and in combat and political training.

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